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UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

ASKING AFTER LIVED EXPERIENCES OF AND WITH DIFFICULTY IN PHYSICAL ACTIVITY IN THE LIFEWORLDS OF CHILDREN AND YOUNG PEOPLE

BY

MAUREEN CONNOLLY ©

A DOCTORAL DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF SECONDARY EDUCATION

EDMONTON, ALBERTA
FALL, 1990

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled "Asking After Lived Experiences of and with Difficulty in Physical Activity in the Lifeworlds of Children and Young People" submitted by Maureen Connolly in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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In my life, Lord, be glorified, be glorified.
In my work, Lord, be glorified today.

Abstract

Asking after lived experiences of and with difficulty in physical education in the lifeworlds of children and young people is a phenomenological question which authorized and compelled a researcher and 11 co-authors to seek a deeper understanding of the eidos of difficulty. The question was grounded in a concern for the way children, young people, and physical education are treated, lived with, talked about, thought about, and taught, and with the "mythologizing" which surrounds and can obscure the body's deep ontological understanding of Being and of the ways to bring it forth.

The "asking after" involved interviews, conversations, transcribing, ongoing journalling, and living in the question. The transcribed conversations were critically and thoughtfully "thematized," guided by Giorgi's (1985) textual/descriptive analysis and van Manen's (1990) pedagogically informed in-dwelling writing-act poetizing. These two "methods" in combination contributed to a rigorous, sensitive approach which also gave the notion room to speak, move, and have its being. Both the "asking after" and the expressing were informed by a dramatic and dynamic interplay among four "existentials": the authenticity and discernment of the co-authors, Husserl's (1970) notion of eidos/eidetic features, Heidegger's (1962) notions of relatedness-to-Being and open space for disclosure, and Merleau-Ponty's (1962) notion of the body-subject.

The constellation which emerged proposes difficulty as a relationship between a doer and an object/happening which resists and demands, and ultimately as a relationship between a doer and

herself/himself. The "of" and "with" eidetics provide a profile of difficulty which suggests that (a) children and young people experience a felt relation to Being and are serious in their living and expressing of that relation; and (b) difficulty is not an object, definition, or explanation; it is a relationship, hence a wonderfully human way to hear the voice of Being and harmonize with the rhythm of the primordial Dance. It is also a profound praxis.

It would appear that more phenomenologically grounded work needs to be done in physical education, that the "silence of childstory" (Hewes, 1988) needs to be sincerely addressed, and that more serious care and thought need to be given to our bodies in our research and teaching praxis.

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Opening Remarks

This research project is committed to improving the way I stand in the world with and for children. This commitment is informed by a deep pedagogical concern for children: for the way they are treated, talked about, thought about, and, ultimately, taught.

I believe one of the ways I can best serve children is to be more thoughtful in my approach to them and in my talking and writing about them. To this end, then, every effort will be made in this study and in subsequent "reporting" to avoid language which objectifies children and which mechanizes people. If I am to take steps towards relieving the oppression which I believe exists in the lifeworlds of children, then I must take definite action against the reductionist, positivist, "thing-i-fying" language which pervades much of the literature. Root metaphors of caring, appreciation, and respect can begin in a project such as this one. It is my responsibility and privilege to work towards expressing them.

Chapter I of this study will include articulation of the terms of reference--most of which are to be found in the title--which should constitute a statement of purpose. This articulation of terms of reference will include commentary on "asking after," "lived experience," "of and with," "difficulty," "physical activity," "lifeworld," and "children and young people." Chapter II will be devoted to presenting phenomenology as the method, and particularizing and concretizing the phenomenological approach as it informs conduct in both the interpersonal encounters and contexts, and transcript encounters and context.

Chapter III will include biographical sketches of the children and young people and some of my own remarks on research as a shared landscape. Chapter III will also include discussion of the lived experience of dialogue with children and young people in research settings, and will present the themes and features which constitute an eidos of difficulty in physical activity in the lifeworlds of children and young people.

Chapters IV, V, and VI will be presentation and discussion of a "constellation of difficulty" and will include commentary on ineffability and embodiment, the "of" and "with" experiences, and attitude toward and body subject. Chapter VII will be devoted to consolidating the voices of Chapters IV, V, and VI into a saying of a phenomenology of difficulty in physical activity. Chapter VII will also speak to the notion of the dance that is within and beneath all movement and doing.

Chapter VIII will be devoted to discussing the implications of Chapters I-VII for physical education. The concluding "After-Words" section will include my own reflection on the project.

I should mention here that in Chapter III, Method as Lived, I present the proposition that difficulty is a relationship. I do not wish to go into any great deal of detail at this point, but I would like to speak to this proposition for a moment.

Difficulty is a relationship, with all the complexities, features, and dimensions of an interpersonal relationship. The relationship of difficulty presented itself, in good measure, within the relationships between myself and my co-authors. Everything that happened in our relationships contributed to the character of the relationship which is difficulty.

Selecting conversations for Chapters IV, V, and VI meant weighing one message against another, one way of expressing against another, one lived experience against another. It meant decontextualizing "sayings." I found this problematic since I do not feel that it is my place to "select" appropriate experiences or expressions which support my proposition. Rather, I feel that "sayings" have a history and context which are significant, and that lived experiences are "selected" because of their robustness, not their "appropriateness." Once selected, these experiences and expressions then guide the discussion and do not necessarily "support a proposition." This is what I attempted to do in these chapters: remain faithful to the lived experiences, select on the basis of robustness, and allow the discussion and commentary to be guided by the lived experience and co-author's expression.

Selectivity was difficult for me since it meant excluding experiences and expressions, but it was necessary if the work was going to be reasonable in length, yet faithful to the question. The conversations, descriptions, and thematic analyses are available should anyone wish to experience them.

Chapter I

Story of a Study

Chapter I

Story of a Study

Asking After

Ironically, I suppose this "introductory section" poses real difficulty because it asks me to articulate what it is I decided to do as a research project and why I think it is important, not only for me, but also for the profession which has been exacting my commitment for a number of years.

It is difficult to explain these obsessions and passions--I find they lose a lot in my translating from feeling into language: The words never seem to fit together well enough, and I never manage to say what it is I feel in such a way that the feeling is represented with the justice, integrity, and purity it deserves.

But so be it. The effort at articulation possibly compensates for the less-than-sufficient re-presenting of that which compelled the expressing in the first place.

What I wanted to do in this project was to ask after lived experiences of difficulty and with difficulty in physical activity from the lifeworlds of children and young people. The prepositions are significant here--the ambiguity they create is intentional--designed to stimulate more thoughtful, critical involvement.

I am "asking after" in the sense of wondering about this or that, and also in the time-line sense of asking about this or that after it has happened or been done or experienced. I need both these contexts because the temporal aspects of this project are quite complex. On the one hand, the co-authors and I are engaged in a "wondering about" or "asking after" a given experience. The experience has quite probably "happened, as it were, as we are now considering it after it has been experienced. Yet, in a larger context, the given experience might find itself as one experience within a larger sequence, or some of the asking after might take place at or near the actual experience, so even when we "ask after," there is an aspect of "asking during" as well--hence the need for both a "wondering about" sense and a time-line sense of "asking after."

I am asking after children's and young people's experiences. This means that I am trying to gain access to an experience that is not my own, and perhaps one that is not typically "adult," but one which I might find relation with. The interest is with what a child or a young person experiences in a given context--here, the context is physical activity. What is it that happens during physical activity? What does it mean for a child or a young person to be involved in physical activity? Can I, as an adult, and, more especially, as a teacher, improve the way I stand in relationship with children and young people by "seeing" their experience in a clearer, more discerning manner? Can I come to appreciate their experience as being as viable as my own?

At least part of what makes a human science investigation human is that it begins with concrete cases and real, exigent questions in actual lived experience; part of what makes it "scientific" is that it practices a particular form of "seeing." This project hopes to re-present certain lived experiences that children and young people have in the context of physical activity. When I ask after their experiences, I am asking them to help me see their world as they see it and thus enrich my world with their vision.

If I am to concretize the research question, however, I must emphasize or orient to more particular aspects of physical activity. I am therefore asking after children's and young people's experiences of difficulty and with difficulty--"of" being concerned with what difficulty can be for a child or a young person or what makes something difficult, and "with" being concerned with how they feel about it. This kind of questioning invites children and young people to be partners in the research project rather than subjects to be studied as a research project. The co-authors' accounts and anecdotes will help me to build a description of difficulty in physical activity. Often we come at notions like difficulty from an adult orientation: We know what difficulty is for _us_, so therefore a similar, watered-down version of our definition will suffice for a child or a young person. I am not sure that this is giving children's experience or the young person's experience its due--and I am not sure that we can participate in a pedagogical relationship with children and young people if we do not consider their experiences more seriously and critically, instead of fitting them into a pre-packaged developmental framework that has already defined their ontology--and their difficulty--for them. If I can attend to what children and young people reveal about their experience _of_ difficulty, perhaps I will then be better prepared to attend to what presents itself in their experience _with_ difficulty.

Lived Experience

What is lived experience? van Manen (1990) suggests that this is an important question because phenomenological human science begins in lived experience and eventually turns back to it (p. 35). Dilthey (1985) suggests that in its most basic form, lived experience involves our immediate, pre-reflective consciousness of life: a reflexive or self-given awareness which is, as awareness, unaware of itself (van Manen, p. 35).

> A lived experience does not confront me as something perceived or represented; it is not given to me, but the reality of lived experience is there-for-me because I have reflexive awareness of it, because I possess it immediately as belonging to me in some sense. Only in thought does it become objective. (Dilthey, p. 223)

Merleau-Ponty (1968) calls this "immediate awareness" sensibility:

> The sensible is precisely that medium in which there can be being without it having to be posited; the sensible appearance of the sensible, the silent persuasion of the sensible is Being's unique way of manifesting itself without becoming positively, without ceasing to be ambiguous and transcendent. . . . The sensible is that: this possibility to be evident in silence, to be understood implicitly. (p. 214)

Lived experience is not only "where" we encounter and co-construct meaning(s); it is also "how" we encounter and co-construct meaning(s). Lived experience also has a temporal, a "when," quality or structure: It can never be grasped by the consciousness in its immediate manifestation, but only reflectively as past presence. There is always more in an experience than we can access with our consciousness. This is why the notion of lived experience is pivotal in phenomenology. It is our starting point, yet it is also our inexhaustible grounds. It has a particular quality--"structural nexus" (Dilthey, 1985, p. 228)--which compels a doer. In lived experience a doer has a sense of connecting with or accessing something deeper and larger. As Merleau-Ponty suggests, something is evident in silence to be understood implicitly. The doer is then called back or re-called by the voice of Being which she "heard" in a felt, but not explicit, way in the lived experience. Since lived experience implicates the totality of life, we connect, at a primordial level, with transcendent meanings and messages. The particularity of my lived experience reveals to me features of a larger "eidos" and holds open to me the opportunity for personal "enlargement" and empowerment, as well as the opportunity for deep intersubjectivity. "The interpretive examination of lived experience has this methodical feature of relating the particular to the universal, part to whole, episode to totality" (van Manen, 1990, p. 3[illegible]. Lived experience is where, when, and how we encounter Being. Our living of it and our subsequent returns to it are necessary if we are to develop and understand our relationship with Being.

> To truly question something is to interrogate something from the heart of our existence, from the center of our being. Even minor phenomenological research projects require that we not simply raise a question and possibly soon drop it again, but rather that we "live" this question, that we become this question. Is this not the meaning of research: to question something by going back again and again to the things themselves until that which is put to question begins to reveal something of its essential nature? (van Manen, p. 43)

Dilthey (1985) suggests that lived experience is to the soul what breath is to the body: "Just as our body needs to breathe, our soul requires the fulfillment and expansion of its existence in the reverberations of emotional life" (p. 59). Lived experience is the breathing of meaning (van Manen, 1990, p. 36). Phenomenology, then, is a commitment to giving voice:

> The aim of phenomenology is to transform lived experience into a textual expression of its essence--in such a way that the effect of the text is at once a reflexive re-living and a reflective appropriation of something meaningful: a notion by which a reader is powerfully animated in his or her own lived experience. (van Manen, p. 36)

We shall now turn to a consideration of the term "difficulty" and the accompanying terms of "of" and "with." This consideration will present disparate perspectives on difficulty from the literature, but I do not offer these as final or invariant--I offer them only as features which might be compared to, contrasted with, or gathered into our emerging discoveries.

Difficulty

As a beginning point, let us consider the words "difficult" and "difficulty" themselves. They have their etymological roots in the Latin dificile and dificultatas. Dificile comes from difacile, di noting negation, facile meaning easy. Thus difficult means not easy. Dificultatas comes from the Latin dif/dis meaning apart from, and facultas comes from the Latin facultis, meaning aptitude. Thus difficulty is seen as being apart from one's aptitude. Aptitude derives from the Latin aptitudo, fitness. Difficulty means that a doer is out of relationship with her/his "fitness." The doer is not "fit" to partake in that which presents itself. We do not know what it is about the doer or about that which presents itself that placed the relationship in its "apart from" state.

We can see from both these etymological sources that difficulty seems to be a state of "not being in some other state": It is "not easy" or "apart from aptitude." What is it about difficulty that makes it disruptive? Does it claim our attention by reminding us of what we are not, thus nudging us to look at what we are? If it is a disruption, then between what or whom? and what can the disruption, and perhaps re-connection, mean for the doers and doings involved?

Webster's defines difficult as hard to do, make, or carry out; hard to deal with, manage, or overcome; hard to understand. Difficulty is defined as the quality or state of being difficult; great effort or trouble.

> Ease thus appears as a form of freedom from something, namely difficulty, and carries a positive connotation, whereas difficulty appears as a phenomenon which will require a struggle or effort on the part of the experiencing subject. It brings with it a negative connotation. Difficulties are said to be overcome, resolved, or mastered, and yet they are not really things. Difficulty is rather a form of life, a mode of being in the world, one which we all experience. . . . It is interesting to question what a life without difficulty would be like, although difficulty is always found in life. However, if a life without difficulty were possible, we would be condemned to living at the surface; we would never be given the opportunity to penetrate beneath the uppermost layer of our being. The meaning in life would be glossed, for does not difficulty itself give us a sense of what life is? (Oldham, 1981, p. 11)

As has been mentioned, this project addresses the "of" and the "with" of difficulty. The children and young people and I are trying to get a sense of what difficulty is or can be or what makes something difficult; also, we are looking at a "with" aspect: How do they feel about the difficulty? Does it have meaning for them? . . . and other questions pertaining to "with" seem to keep emerging. As I present different perspectives on difficulty, I shall try to differentiate between an "of" and a "with" orientation, although in much of the literature there is an overlap.

"Of."

> All problems present themselves to the mind as threats of failure. For someone striving to win in terms of a successful solution, this threat evokes a mass response in which the most immediate solution is clutched frantically as a balm to anxiety. This is consistent with the natural impulse to master the strange by making it familiar. Yet, if we are to perceive all the implications and possibilities of the new, we must risk at least temporary ambiguity and disorder. . . . A new viewpoint depends on the capacity to risk at least temporary ambiguity and disorder. (Gordon, 1961, p. 36)

What is it about difficulty in physical activity that makes it different from other experiences? Indeed, what makes it a meaningful experience at all?

Van den Berg (1972) suggests that each of us lives in a house that has aspects we have never observed, although stimuli from these aspects no doubt reach our eyes sometimes even thousands of times. Not everything that happens is an experience (p. 84). What, then, is an experience?

> For we have seen that the word "experience" has a condensing, intensifying meaning. . . . What can be called an experience establishes itself in memory. We mean the lasting meaning that an experience has for someone who has had it. . . . What we emphatically call an experience thus means something unforgettable and irreplaceable that is inexhaustible in terms of the understanding and determination of its meaning. (Gadamer, 1975, pp. 60-62)

When does working at something become enjoyable because it is work, not in spite of the fact that it is? "Training" begins to become something else, something more. Things start happening inside the experiences: heightened awareness, patience, calmness, confidence, self-acceptance, self-respect. How does this happen? Or, indeed, does this happen?

Devine (1984) writes:

> The lasting residue of these transcendent physical moments, after the individual returns from the nether world to the realm of everyday matters, is a heightened awareness of the capability of the body--a sense of awe and wonder. Concomitantly with this sense is a renewed faith in oneself apart from the physical milieu. (pp. 176-177)

Simmel (1922; cited in Gadamer, 1975) says that every experience has something about it of adventure. Perhaps this is what contributes to its being an experience. But what is an adventure?

> An adventure is by no means just an episode. Episodes are a succession of details which have no inner coherence and for that very reason have no permanent significance. An adventure, however, interrupts the customary course of events, but is positively and significantly related to the context which it interrupts. Thus, an adventure lets life become felt as a whole, in its breadth and in its strength. Here lies the fascination of an adventure. It removes the conditions and obligations of everyday life. It ventures out into the uncertain.
>
> But at the same time it knows that as an adventure, it has an exceptional character and thus remains related to the return of the everyday into which the adventure cannot be taken. Thus an adventure is "passing through" like a test, from which one emerges enriched and more mature. (pp. 60-62)

There would seem to be an interlacing of experience and adventure--the relationship seems symbiotic. An experience is more than an episode. A physically difficult experience is more than physiology at work--and as magnificent, mysterious, and awe-inspiring as human physiology is, what the physically difficult experience is, is quite possibly more than the sum of the parts.

The affective life begins with consciousness itself. In every concrete existence this "being conscious" is conscious of existing physically, i.e., being limited. The pure phenomenon of existing is the immediate act of experience of its own limit and this experience includes necessarily the experience of a possible transcendence of this limit (Buytendijk, 1950, p. 131).

It is easy to associate difficulty in physical activity with "elite" competent athletic endeavor, and nothing else. This is not the case. A paper by Waller (1986) presents the experiences of non-professional and recreational athletes who have experienced peak performance in sports, performances which could not have been expected from the amount of training involved. These ordinary people, participating in a fairly common pursuit, revealed alterations of consciousness which resemble meditative states.

Human life does not occur in organized, predictable, manageable events; neither does classroom or gymnasium or playing-field life. It is naive, almost, to expect or even hope for such an ordered, steady, balanced existence. Our lifeworld is punctuated with fear, risk, uncertainty, elation, joy, sorrow, growth--and physically difficult experience seems almost to be a microcosm of this larger whole. Perhaps its value lies in its capacity to show us ourselves as we really are. It is real; it demands honesty and what Dawkins (1986) has termed "sincere advocacy." To coin a phrase, life is not a spectator sport.

> So it appears that with all the efforts which gymnasts put into their preparatory work, they are finally faced with commitment. But once the commitment has been made, the opportunity to break the deal with oneself is still an option which the gymnast can freely exercise. The continuous trial, refusal, and negotiation with oneself seems to be a part of the process of gradually approaching the moment when the performer "brushes" the experience.
>
> With each attempt the commitment is made with more specific intentionality, and the option of breaking the "deal" is taken less frequently. Some gymnasts would agree that the first time is the hardest, after which the commitment plays a less significant role, and what takes over is the desire for complete understanding of the movement and with it a fuller and richer experience. (Johns, 1985, p. 28)

The types of difficulties that confront us in our everyday lives vary. Some are superficial, some may be termed "little nuisances," others, trivial. In these forms difficulty does not penetrate, it does not touch us in our depths, nor is it present in our experience in a constant and enduring fashion. Such difficulties appear at a particular moment in time; they require solutions which demand little of us and are quickly forgotten. Yet, even the "trivial" are not realized as such when first encountered. The commitment or investment in the doing is done without any guarantees of end result. Even in the "trivial difficulties"

--physical and otherwise--the initial investment is a response to a summons that makes no promises.

Paul, the apostle to the Gentiles, spoke of the maturity that comes through suffering (Romans 5:1-5). Engaging in that which is difficult is a way of being more intensely involved in one's lived experiences. Difficulty in physical activity can be a way of meeting rather than retreating from one's life and one's self.

"With." Orthodox dogma in physical education, psychology, and sports psychology remains preoccupied with attribution and achievement motivation theories as they relate to success or failure or task difficulty (i.e., perceived outcome). Weiner (1974b) and others (Kukla, 1972; Rosenbaum, 1972) report that causal attributions for success or failure are more often identified as some combination of ability, effort, task difficulty, or luck. Moreover, if we look at the four most common perceived causes (attributions), we can see that they may be classified as being either essentially internally controlled, i.e., effort and ability, or externally controlled, i.e., task difficulty and luck (Rotter, 1966). It is further possible to classify them in terms of how stable, predictable, or constant they are. Ability tends to be fairly stable, as does the difficulty of a given task. In contrast, effort is less predictable and tends to fluctuate with mood and other factors, and luck is characterized by its unpredictability (Smith, 1978).

This view is reinforced by Bigge (1982):

> Since people make situational choices, they can and do experience success and failures. The four principal ascribed causal elements for success or failure are ability, effort, task difficulty and luck. Whereas ability and effort are centered in persons, task difficulty and luck are identified more with environments. Furthermore, whereas ability and task difficulty are relatively stable, effort and luck are quite

> variable. In predicting their future success or failure, individuals assess their levels of ability in relation to the perceived difficulty of the task at hand, and estimate their intended effort and the degree of luck that is involved. (pp. 189-190)

What is intriguing is the way these "variables" can be related, caused, or organized without really coming to an understanding of what each is or can mean as a separate entity. Is "task difficulty" always identified with environments, or do the people involved have some stake in the process? Is task difficulty "relatively stable"? Further, is the experience of difficulty in physical activity a methodical, logical act as presented by Bigge?

How we experience difficulty can be viewed as our participation in the creation of ourselves. Through our encounter with difficulty we can come to a deeper sense of self (Oldham, 1985). Rilke (1975) writes of the jubilation that swells behind everything difficult, the sense of achievement that comes through the knowledge that we have overcome the difficulty.

This discovery that perhaps we cannot overcome the difficulty is, arguably, just as valuable a disclosure. Our culture seems to attach so much shame to failure that little good is thought to be gleaned from experiences that are other than successful. Disclosure is not limited to positive, externally rewarding, immediately jubilant encounters.

"The basic need for feeling competent and self-determining motivates two kinds of behavior: behavior which 'seeks' optimal challenge and behavior which 'conquers' the challenge" (Bigge, 1982, p. 189).

Zuckerman (1983), on the other hand, posits biological bases of sensation seeking, impulsivity, and anxiety; John Dewey (1938) offers yet another perspective: "Every intelligent act involves selection of certain things as means to other things as their consequences" (p. 460), and Weiner (1973) presents the role of effort as a factor in personality development.

Kierkegaard (1975) expresses a similar view, but from a human science perspective:

> For when all combine in every way to make everything easier, there remains only one possible danger, namely, that the ease becomes so great that it becomes altogether too great; then there is only one want left, though it is not a felt want, when people will want difficulty. (p. 86)

"Only one want left, though it is not a felt want"--could this mean that our bodies know better than we do what we need and want? If difficulty is not a "felt want," yet it is an inviting, provocative summons, to what is it calling? Could it be that our bodies respond to this summons, or, indeed, seek it out, before we are aware that we need and want it for ourselves? Could there possibly be something mysteriously primordial about this seeking? Is physical difficulty a fundamental, rather than felt, want and need?

"What is out there?" is part of the summons to do that which presently is not being done. Something out there invites the doer. How the doer responds depends on the ever successive enticements. What is compelling about difficulty in physical experience?

According to Sartre (1948; cited in Sontag, 1967), man experiences pain and pride, tension and lucidity; each one is necessary to fulfill freedom's demand for a push beyond the self. Oldham (1981) suggests that "difficulties, thus, challenge us . . . . Part of me is called by the difficulty. I am challenged to show myself, and through such challenges I am given the opportunity to reach a deepened awareness and knowledge of self" (p. 11).

Dostoevsky (1864; cited in Kaufmann, 1975) writes:

> What is to be done with the millions of facts that bear witness that men, consciously, that is, fully understanding their real interests, have left them in the background and have rushed head long on another path, to meet peril and danger, compelled to this course by nobody and nothing, but as it were, simply disliking the beaten track and have obstinately, wilfully, struck out another difficult, absurd way, seeking it almost in darkness. (p. 67)

There seems to be something provocative about the difficulty in physical activity. When exercise physiologists speak of a "training effect," they mean the increased capacity induced by consistent use, exercise, or stress of parts of the body. Dienstbier (1982; cited in Sachs & Buffone, 1984) states that

> although the limits of adaptability of an organ, organ system, or muscle system may be fixed by heredity and by a combination of previous and present environmental effects, most systems that are taxed in regular running will improve in output capability. To posit that such physiological changes may directly cause changes in trait or temperament is to leap directly into the ancient question of mind and body. (p. 255)

And so, leap we shall.

The developmental advance is in every case accompanied by dangers (Lorenz, 1971). Plato (1953; cited in Stevenson, 1981) spoke of the pain of discovery, as one moves from the familiar to the unfamiliar. He likens discovery to the dazzling brightness of new realities, incomprehensible and threatening on their initial encounter, yet thought of as natural as they become familiar. He refers to an upward, ever improving climb, and how "in the world of knowledge the idea of good appears last of all and is seen only with effort" (p. 46).

Steiner (1978) speaks of decoding in spite of obstacles in On Difficulty and Other Essays. There is a pursuit of something inaccessible. He refers to learning as the "suspension of reflex"

(p. 32). Habitual, familiar, automatic responses must be suspended while we wrestle with the unknown, the ambiguous, the provocative. The things we formerly depended on are not suitable in this unfamiliar realm. New resources are discovered--in self, in others, in action, in thought. The "searching for" needs no end result--it is worthwhile endeavor in itself. Perhaps one of the joys in physically difficult experience is that of the acceptance of doing for the sake of doing, without a preset outcome. Indeed, in the non-predictable experience one can only anticipate surprise, and even when anticipated, a surprise conceals its time and space and remains a surprise.

Much of what is considered physically difficult does require effort, hard work, discomfort. The physical difficulty is also an individual adventure--one on one. Nietzsche (1956; cited in Kaufmann, 1975) expresses his belief in the ability of difficult situations to deepen our sense of being. He states, "For believe me, the secret of greatest fruitfulness and the greatest enjoyment of existence is to live dangerously! Build your cities under Vesuvius! Send your ships into unchartered seas! Live at war with your peers and yourselves" (p. 127).

On a less intense level, Zaichkowsky, Zaichkowsky, and Martinek (1980) speak to positive qualities which can emerge when a person is involved in situations which are initially uncomfortable: "Certainly it is not necessary to eliminate all frustration. In fact, it is important for the youth to experience some degree of frustration in order to establish some level of tolerance" (p. 194).

Is it possible that the elimination of difficulty might promote a superficial existence? Might it not allow us to hurry through life without stopping to reflect on who and where we are, who and where we want to be (Oldham, 1981)?

Frankl (1962), in writing about his experience in a concentration camp in Nazi Germany, describes how sometimes we may have no choice about our difficulties or suffering, but points out how we are free to choose our attitude to them: "What matters above all is the attitude we take toward suffering, the attitude in which we take our suffering upon ourselves" (p. 162).

The deeply felt experience reaches to the core and, as Buytendijk (1961) says, "throws us back on ourselves," demands us to muster up even more strength to survive, to live through it. We need to help each other through it (Kelpin, 1984).

> As we are surrounded by the deep sense of inwardness, we are forced to recognize our independence, our loneliness, our selfhood, to be conscious of our own existence. This actual self-consciousness exposes to us our wholeness, our strengths, and our endurance. (p. 185)

Reich (1970) describes the preoccupation of contemporary individuals with the trappings of experience, who concern themselves with being "knowledgeable" or "competent" at something, but who never allow themselves to learn about the thing from the inside out. The activities they pursue are not integrated into a whole life; they are dichotomized into soulless activities that are not part of that person's life in the sense that they are integral to his holistic well-being.

Lorenz (1987) presents a related concern:

> We civilized humans are becoming continually less capable of supporting pain and sorrow. The extent of our fear of discomfort and the mechanics we set in motion to avoid it border on vice.
>
> The increasing intolerance of the unpleasurable on the part of civilized humans transforms the naturally inevitable highs and lows of our normal lives into an artificially flattened expanse of monotonous gray, without any of the contrasts of lights and shadows. In short, this produces

> boredom and in so doing becomes the cause for so many humans needing to be continually entertained. Passively permitting oneself to be entertained is the exact opposite of creative activity. (pp. 191-192)

Jantsch (1981) has thoughts on this as well:

> A creative human life, too, is not just propelled from one structure to another by outside influences and forces, but reaches out creatively. People leave the security of their jobs and environments without need to do so, and penetrate into the unknown. The most profound challenges in life are set from within, not without. (p. 106)

These reflections are a far cry from the notion of "task" difficulty as a relatively stable concept or factor. Clearly, the literature is disparate and rich; there are areas of relation, and there are areas of tension. We need both for dialogue and dialectic. We do, however, have a context that is eloquent in its omission of children's and young people's commentary on the "task difficulty"--even though they are often subjects (objects?) of study. To be fair, we should say they are consulted, but their place in the research setting can hardly be called authoritative.

I hope this section has served to illustrate the complexity of this notion of difficulty. Hopefully, it has also demonstrated its elusiveness. I believe that discourse on this notion could clarify it a little more; further, I believe that children's and young people's input into the discourse could not only contribute to elucidation and explication, but it could also allow us a greater appreciation of their experiences of and with difficulty, as both pedagogues and fellow humans.

Children, Young People, and Difficulty

There is a vast amount of information in the literature pertaining to children, young people, and difficulty. Much of this research comes from a quantitative and predominantly behaviorist perspective; however, the findings and conclusions do serve to reveal the prevailing thought on how and why children and young people "behave" the way they do in the learning and task difficulty context(s). In this section I shall present research findings and attitudes which represent both the quantitative and the qualitative approaches.

Smith (1978) states that task difficulty is not only subjectively defined by each learner, but it also varied with both social and physical factors. Physical threat is also a determinant of task difficulty. Smith goes on to say that individual assessments of task difficulty are highly idiosyncratic. Learners have their own subjective expectancy of success as one of the two basic components of their motivation toward a given task. The second component is the value the learner places on a successful outcome. Investigations by various attribution and achievement motivation researchers (Trope, 1975; Trope & Breckman, 1975; Weiner, 1974b) have "clearly established" that an intermediate level of subjective expectancy of success produces the most effective motivation. That is, when learners perceive that their chances of success at a task (i.e., subjective probability) are about 50/50 (i.e., intermediate level), motivation is highest to engage in the task. Very hard tasks have a low level of subjective expectancy to success; very easy tasks have a high level. Examination of experimental results indicates that there are two distinct reasons for the effectiveness of intermediate level of subjective expectancy: (1) this level of difficulty arouses the greatest emotional or affective reaction, and (2) such tasks provide maximum information feedback about both present status or capability, and means to improve performance.

Corbin (1986) suggests that achievement motivation is related to the dreams we have. As long as the dream has a chance to come true (in the mind of a child), the interest in activity and physical achievement will remain high.

"Achievement motivation" is the important phrase here: "why do," in other words. Why do children or young people do what they do or try what they try in physical activity settings? The perceived outcome is presented as a major determinant; to this I can only respond, "Fair enough," but what about the what of the activity? What can this experience of difficulty be or mean to children or young people, and can this not play some part in their intending toward it?

A discussion of children, young people, and difficulty seems to also embrace learning theory. "Tasks" are things to be acquired, rather than experiences to be experienced. Children and young people learn tasks, or they learn through tasks; the learning is the object of consideration, and the children and young people and their experiences often seem to be only supporting players. I am including a brief section on "learning," however, because the achievement motivation concept associated with difficulty is fairly well situated in learning theory, and I need to build a ground against which my study can stand and from which, hopefully, new insights can emerge.

Estes (1975) states that "learning always refers to some systematic change in behavior or behavioral disposition that occurs as a consequence of experience in some specified situation" (p. 9). Bigge (1982) suggests that not only have people wanted to learn, but also often their curiosity has impelled them to try to learn how they learn. Since ancient times, at least some members of every civilized society have developed and to some degree tested ideas about the nature of the learning process. Thus, they have developed their respective learning theories.

Twentieth-century systematic learning theories may be classified into two broad families, namely, S-R (stimulus-response) conditioning theories of the behavicristic family and cognitive theories of the Gestalt-field family.

For behaviorists or S-R conditioning theorists, learning is a change in observable behavior which occurs through stimuli and responses becoming related according to mechanistic principles. Thus it involves the formation of relations of some sort between series of stimuli and responses. For Gestalt-field theorists, learning is a process of gaining or changing insights, outlooks, expectations, or thought patterns. In thinking about the learning processes of students, these theorists prefer the terms "person" to "organism," "psychological" environment to "physical" or "biological" environment, and "interaction" to either "action" or "reaction."

To summarize the differences between the two families very briefly, S-R conditioning theorists interpret learning in terms of changes in strength of hypothetical variables called S-R connections, associations, habit strengths, or behavioral tendencies; Gestalt-field theorists define learning in terms of reorganization of perceptual or cognitive fields so as to gain understanding.

"Experience" for Gestalt-field psychologists is defined in terms of persons purposively interacting with their respective psychological environments. When behaviorists do use the term "experience," they interpret it mechanistically--to them, it means the conditioning process by which a human organism either learns new responses or changes old ones as the result of stimuli impinging on its sensory organs.

A behaviorist's theory of motivation has important implications for education. According to this viewpoint, children or young people do not have to "want" to learn history in order to learn it. They only have to be persuaded to study it, to repeat the verbal responses that we associate with a knowledge of history. Anyone can learn anything of which he/she is capable if he/she will allow himself/herself to be put through the pattern of activity necessary for conditioning to take place. Thus behaviorists do not talk much about matters such as "psychological involvement" or "helping students see the point of learning." Instead, they engage students in behavior and assume that behavior with appropriate conditioning automatically produces learning. Teachers carefully plan which learnings (responses) they want students to develop. They then induce these responses and condition them with stimuli.

A Gestalt-field psychologist regards motivation as a product of disequilibrium within a life space. Teachers who accept the Gestalt-field concept of motivation are likely to approach teaching in fundamentally different ways from teachers who operate within a behavioristic framework. Such teachers are deeply concerned with the problem of personal involvement, that is, in helping students see a need to learn. Much of the time the teachers attempt to arrange the teaching-learning situation so that students will adopt goals quite new to them. They are convinced that, unless a child or youth realizes a need to learn something, the child or youth either will not learn it at all, or will learn it only in a transitory and functionally useless way.

Behaviorism is more blatant about it, but it would seem that both these theories are interested in prediction to a large degree and control to a lesser but still present degree. The why of children's and young people's intending is a very dominant feature. While I would agree that studying the "why" is a worthwhile endeavor, our purposes for considering it should be examined, and we should continue to ask, "Where is the child?" and "What is the child's experience?"

Let us now consider children, young people, and difficulty from a human science orientation. Much curriculum literature on difficulty holds an implicit assumption that difficulty is bad and should be eliminated from the lives of students (Oldham, 1981): "The approach which seeks to eliminate difficulty denies that it can be a valuable and meaningful lived experience. . . . it seeks to deny a particular mode of existence" (p. 15).

Oldham (1981) also suggests that difficulty appears in the classroom in a variety of forms, but perhaps one of the most common is the difficulty experienced in trying to understand something. Here, although in a different context from physical activity, we are presented with a potential--what difficulty-can-be: as a being-unable-to-do.

Smith (1984) presents the notion of risk as an area related to the notion of difficulty:

> A pedagogical concern for safety means neither delimiting the boundaries of activity nor prescribing right ways of acting but rather being with the child so that risks are seen where, without our help, danger might lurk. . . .
>
> An overriding concern for the child's safety obscures the landscape in a most profound way. Not only does the world remain hidden but our stake in the world remains concealed. (p. 11)

My intention with this section has been to show that the prevailing attitudes towards difficulty, and children's and young people's experiences of and with it, are not really directed toward children, young people, or difficulty, but more toward how teaching and learning can be improved as a result of understanding "why" children and young people do. Phenomenologically informed research tends to place the child and the young person in a more author~~itati~~ve position, i.e., the child or young person can be the author and communicator of his experience. I suggest that attending to children's and young people's experiences is as significant a purpose as using their experiences to enable better prediction and control.

And now a few words on "context within which." I am asking after lived experiences of difficulty and with difficulty in physical activity. The context within which these experiences occur is the context of physical activity. I shall be talking with children and young people who are involved in different kinds of physical activity--everything from soccer to ballet, gymnastics to skiing, baseball to figure skating, badminton to weight training. While the activities are significant in that each has its own character and unique attractiveness, it is their capacity as an activity in which experiences of and with difficulty can occur that makes them a context, rather than their skill-specific aspects which make them distinct from each other. We shall look at several particulars and see if we can access experience which transcends and relates them.

I should also mention here that the children and young people involved in the project are not elite athletes, but, rather, young people who are involved in a number of physical activities in both competitive and non-competitive, structured and unstructured settings. This is not to say that highly competitive, elite athletes have nothing to say about difficulty in physical activity--they have much to say; but so have others. This project has been more concerned with the everyday participant, engaged in fairly "ordinary" pursuit . . . it is often quite remarkable, though, how instructive the "ordinary" and "everyday" can be; how the everyday, "mundane," taken-for-granted world can contain and reveal experiences which are quite powerful and transforming, in a self-reflective way, for everyone.

Physical Activity

Dilthey (1985; cited in van Manen, 1986) argues that human phenomena differ from natural phenomena in that human phenomena require interpretation and understanding, whereas natural science involves for the most part external observation and explanation. "We explain nature, humans we must understand," says Dilthey. According to Dilthey, we can grasp the fullness of lived experience by reconstructing or reproducing the meanings of life's expressions found in the products of human effort, work, and creativity (p. 2).

I am asking after lived experiences of and with difficulty in physical activity. I have chosen to include a section on "physical activity" because it is the context in which the difficult experience occurs--and also because experiences within a physical activity context or a "bodily mode of being in the world" are becoming the focus of much quantitative and qualitative investigation. The task in "doing" a research project such as this is doing what I have to do in order to do the research. What I feel I have to do is invest time in "building the ground" from which a clearer (eventual) figure can emerge. Building the ground, for me, means developing a context around the language of my title so that each aspect of the project has a "world of meanings" in which and against which it can stand.

This section will include research in the "discovery in physical activity" genre as well as material which considers the significance of bodily modes of experience.

Privette (1981, 1982) reports that the inner process of sports peak performance (exceeding one's preconceived limits) is characterized by a sense of power and joy, a spontaneous click of functional autonomy during which barriers to performance seem to be released and performance becomes almost effortless, a strong sense of self and expression of self, absorption, and loss of time and space. These descriptions are not isolated cases. As well, there is a great deal of anecdotal literature in the field of psychology, sports, and personal growth (Gallway, 1974; Gallway & Kreigel, 1977; Garfield & Bennett, 1984; Jerome, 1982; Leonard, 1974; McCluggage, 1977; Milman, 1979; Murphy & White, 1978; Speno, 1976).

It would seem that some phenomenon is at work here. Coincidence as explanation seems to be one of the trappings of the everyday world. These occurrences which seem common and taken for granted remain taken for granted. I want to find out what is happening, what makes this physical experiencing the special mode of knowing and growing that it seems to be.

There is an adage in coaching which derives from a Chinese proverb: I hear and I forget, I see and I remember, I do and I understand. I do and I understand. I suggest that when we do we understand more than what it is we are doing (the "nature" of "lived experience").

What does it mean to be physically educated? Does it mean that a person is educated, trained, molded, fine-tuned, so that her/his performance is deemed suitable or even excellent against the subscribed criteria demanded by the game, activity, or skill? The whole area of performance is indeed a significant one in physical education; after all, the performance is the appearance, the manifestation, the "end product" of the educating of the body. But perhaps being physically educated is more than educating our bodies, or being educated and knowledgeable about our bodies. Perhaps it is being educated by our bodies. Our bodies live in the real, everyday world. We experience our lifeworld via our bodies. They are the instruments, the mediators; they teach us about moving, sensing, being in the world. Van den Berg (1972) insists that we are our bodies. My response, at present, is that perhaps we become physically educated when, throughout physical and physically difficult experiences, we allow our bodies to teach us more about ourselves.

There are others conducting qualitative research in the "physical experience" area who are producing related, if not similar, themes. Sukey Waller of Saybrook Institute and Nancy Wessinger of Michigan State are both engaged in research concerning the nature of physical activity, games experience, sports performance, and the like. While my "theme-ing" is individual to me and specific to my study, similar themes have emerged from Waller's and Wessinger's and others' investigations and analyses.

In my opinion, this is not coincidence. Rather, it seems to be a form of validity that some find lacking in qualitative methodology. I see us, in our individual pursuits, scratching at a huge surface, finding portals, and enabling disclosure. The emergence of similarities across and in spite of research designs, geographic distance, and individual obsession is not surprising--it is validating.

Several recent texts are related. Levin (1985) presents the "body's recollection of being" as a legitimate means of "sense making," of coming to understand one's self and one's world. Shapiro (1985) in Bodily Reflective Modes and Gendlin (1978) in Focusing discuss the forming of and focusing on meanings and understandings as enabled by physical experiences; Chizentmahalyi (1981) presents the "flow experience" as a disclosing bodily mode, and Wall's (1978) research focuses on the development of cognitive levels through movement. "Laban" and "Feldenkrais" movements are also heavily oriented to the instructive in movement and physical activity.

Van den Berg (1972) suggests that the body does not "belong" to oneself. He asks:

> Is this real? To begin with a crude example: does a person who is known to be suffering from cancer say that the disease is just striking his cover and thus leaves himself unaffected? Does the mother who, in dismay, strokes the arm of her sick child, believe that she is touching a jail which contains her child? Or does her hand touch her child? A person needs only to look at his hand to know that he is there himself, in this hand. Legion are the instances that make it clear that we are our bodies. (pp. 49-50)

Van den Berg goes on to say that one has to reflect upon the body one is for the body one has to come into existence.

Buytendijk and Plessner (1935) compare the relation of body to world to a dialogue. The body forms itself in accordance with the world in which its task lies (Gebsattel, 1932). But one is equally justified in saying that the world is changed by the body moving about in it. Thus, prereflective body and prereflective world are united as in a dialogue. Both should be understood within their context (van den Berg, 1972). Merleau-Ponty (1962) stresses the vitality of human experience and particularly our embodied existence as lived. Merleau-Ponty claims that we are condemned to meaning au sens. In understanding human experience, perception brings together our various senses as the body tends toward expression. Gesture, motility, and spatiality are all aspects of bodily expression; they constitute the phenomenal field in which the meanings of experience appear. This multiplicity of meanings is ambiguously experienced in the ongoing temporal activities of human life (hence the need to return to the "lived experience" again and again).

The experiencer is an intentional participant, drawn to the doing, co-creator of her/his impending transformation. She/he can bring her/his experience to fruition with her/his ongoing decisions and commitments, and along the way there is the constant possibility of serendipity. The difficulty in physical experience that pulls the doer is the instigator of a significant project: The doer becomes the focal point in the ensuing discoveries and disclosures without ever making herself/himself the object of study. The experiencing of the act and all that it holds can unfold naturally as the experience progresses; the experiencing of oneself doing the act and the experiencing of the necessary inward-looking are also emerging "possibles."

Greene (1969) suggests that all knowing is a kind of orientation in which we rely on clues within our bodies to reach beyond ourselves, to attend to what is out there.

Altiere (1981) offers two basic human motives for expressive activity: the desire of persons to create themselves by acting and taking responsibility for their acts, and their desire to understand what actions reveal. In action, one gives public being to one's purposes and qualities, and, in taking responsibility for them, identifies them as self-consciously willed objective signs of one's spiritual being. As well, one desires to take the expressions of others as seriously as possible because in and through them one recognizes others in oneself and oneself in others.

Physical experience may indeed by everyday, common, and taken for granted, but there is nothing casual or ordinary about it. Our bodies have the capacity to teach us more about ourselves if we bend to that which calls us naturally. "The educator," says Spranger (1973), "is born out of self-education" (p. 43). Physical activity seems to be presenting itself as a context which can enable self-education.

My task will be to show that (a) children and young people do indeed have experiences of and with difficulty in physical activity that are viable, and that they can (should) participate in the explication of these experiences; (b) these experiences have distinct characteristics; (c) these experiences are significant from a pedagogical and humane perspective; and (d) these experiences have implications.

As we engage in this dialogue with our bodies, we allow an experience to begin, and we participate in a doing which might be golden in its ability to disclose and immeasurable in its capacity to provoke and evoke reflection. Happily, the process does not have to have a conclusion: "For me the philosophical task is not to close the circle, to centralize or totalize knowledge, but to keep open the irreducible plurality of discourse" (Ricoeur, cited in Kearney, 1984, p. 27).

Lifeworlds

The idea of the lifeworld (Lebenswelt), as the world of lived experience, derives from Husserl's (1970) last and largely posthumously published text The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. He described the lifeworld as the "world of immediate experience," the world as "already there," "pregiven," the world as experienced in the "natural, primordial attitude," that of "original natural life" (pp. 103-186). According to Husserl, each lifeworld shows certain pervading structures or styles which need to be studied. Schutz and Luckmann (1973) elaborated this notion in a sociological direction in their book Structures of the Life-World. Heidegger (1962) gave the idea of lifeworld structures a more existential thrust by speaking of phenomenology as the study of Being, the study of our modes-of-being or ways-of-being-in-the-world (van Manen, 1990, pp. 182-183).

van Manen (1990) suggests that the lifeworld, the world of lived experience, is both the source and object of phenomenological research. To make a study of the lived experience of and with difficulty in physical activity (or any other experience), one needs to orient oneself in a strong way to the question of the meaning of difficulty, and so we need to search everywhere in the lifeworld for lived-experience material that, upon reflective examination, might yield something of difficulty's fundamental nature (p. 53).

> All phenomenological human science research efforts are really explorations into the structure of the human lifeworld, the lived world as experienced in everyday situations and relations. Our lived experiences, and the structures of meanings (themes) in terms of which these lived experiences can be described and interpreted constitute the immense complexity of the lifeworld. (p. 101)

van Manen (1990) identifies four "fundamental existential themes" which probably pervade the lifeworlds of all human beings, regardless of their historical, cultural, or social situatedness. These fundamental themes are not to be confused with more particular themes such as difficulty, teaching, parenting, play; they are, rather, larger, more encompassing existentials forming a "commonality of existence." These "four existentials" suggested by van Manen as guides for reflection in the research process are lived space (spatiality), lived body (corporeality), lived time (temporality), and lived human relation (relationality or communality) (p. 101). These four fundamental existentials belong to the existential ground by way of which all human beings experience the world, although not all in the same modality all at once (p. 102). These four existentials of lived body, lived space, lived time, and lived relation to the other can be differentiated but not separated. They all form an intricate unity which we call the lifeworld--our lived world. But in a research study we can temporarily study the existentials in their differentiated aspects, while realizing that one existential always calls forth the other aspects (p. 105).

Let us consider how this might obtain in the lived experience of and with difficulty in physical activity. In many of their stories of difficulty, the co-authors began from a lived body experience--say, exhaustion. However, the story invariably included the "where" (the lived space) of the doing in which this exhaustion was experienced, as well as a consideration of "how long" (lived time) the doing lasted to enable such an exhausted state. These stories also included a commentary on the teacher who designed the exhaustion-inducing experience, or commentary on others experiencing the same thing, or commentary on how exhaustion enhances or interferes with other doings (lived relation). Significantly, one does not have to ask "special questions" to "get at" these fundamental existential--they are, quite simply, always present or potentially present. Also, significantly, they do not impose an artificial structure or categorization on lived experience. Rather, they are ways of living a lived experience; they guide the reflection process, constantly reminding us of our multidimensionality, constantly grounding our question in its intersubjectivity and particularity. It is these fundamental existentials which make our lived experience robust and which compel a doer and a researcher to return again and again to "see" (feel, hear, understand) more and more.

Children and Young People

Originally (research proposal, May 1988), the research question directed itself to the lifeworlds of children; however, as we can see, the question had to be enlarged to include the lifeworlds of children and young people. This "extending" is an effort to ask the research question more authentically.

"Reflections on Children and Childhood" (Connolly, 1989) addressed the question "What Is Childhood?" This question was raised in the name of clarifying the distinctness of childhood, i.e., when does childhood end and something else begin? This question was/is a cogent one because of the age spread of the co-authors (11-18): Are they still children at age 18? If not,w hen did this 18-year-old's childhood end?

For the most part, it is the body-subject which takes us out of childhood. The body changes as children age, and the emerging secondary sex characteristics change the young person's experience of his/her lifeworld. As the body changes, the body-subject changes (e.g., a 12-year-old female with breasts will experience her world differently from a 12-year-old female who has not yet begun her breast development. The same is true for the onset of menarche). Grounding in the body this way allows us to see that "leaving" childhood is very much individualized since children "develop" at different rates.

We need to speak to qualities or features of childhood which are not physiologically based, however, because a change in body structure or function at age 11 or 12 does not mean that the person is no longer a child or no longer within the boundaries of childhood. The reverse is also true: We do not consider as a child or a member of childhood a person of age 18 who has not experienced a change in body structure or function.

My paper (Connolly, 1989) takes a more in-depth look at these "features" and "boundaries," and I will not elaborate on them at this point other than to mention that play, unmediatedness, relation, and personness seem to be "features" which are indicative of the paradigm or culture of childhood. As the intensity of these features changes in degree or kind, we seem to move farther away from being a member of childhood, although at any age of our lives we have the capacity to re-member our childness.

My reflection on children and childhood (Connolly, 1989) made me realize that some of my co-authors were indeed on the outskirts of the paradigm of childhood, the culture of childhood. Some of my co-authors shift back and forth from one culture to another; some are still very much with the paradigm of childhood. Thanks to this reflection, I was able to form my research question in such a way that wherever the co-authors were, or are, they were represented.

How might physical education research make us more mindful of children and young people? How might it bring a "pedagogical consciousness" (Hildebrandt, 1987) to bear upon our dealings with children and young people in physical activity contexts? How might it enable us to see more clearly where the child is, who and what the child is, what our relation to the child is, and how we might stand with the child in a given yet questionable world of meanings (Smith, 1988)?

> Pedagogy calls the teacher to be an experienced, caring guide who leads children through rich fields of learning experiences. Pedagogically, the child is seen not as something to be filled, but as someone to be travelled with. Teaching-learning occurs for both partners, the guide and the guided, as a unitary experience, and, in fact, often the guide and guided exchange places or explore learning experiences together. The artificial boundaries between teacher and learner become blurred in these moments and we see how inter-related and inter-dependent teacher and learner are. (Mueller, 1985, p. 4)

My work up to this point has been, and is now, informed by a deep pedagogical concern for children and young people. The pedagogical relationship is not, of course, limited to children and adults, or teachers and students. It can exist whenever and wherever growth in a person is enabled or engendered. However, as an educator who is also involved in teacher education, I cannot help but attend to the relationship between the teacher and the student (who is often a child or a young person), and to ways in which this relationship can be improved, enhanced, deepened, and brought to its purest, most caring, most thoughtful, most human level.

This study asked after the lived experiences of and with difficulty in physical activity as spoken to, and of, by children and young people. Their stories, reflections, and experiences will provide not only the seeds, but also the planting ground for those things about physical difficulty that are resistant and concealed at the moment.

It seems appropriate here to consider more carefully how to make the people of my research partners in the dialogue. It seems that an egalitarian, democratic dialogue is not always possible.

> The psychology of children has developed as an enterprise of adults who were interested in studying "how a child becomes an adult" or "how can we effectively, or more efficiently, teach children?" Both interests are sometimes legitimate. But is it

> not more legitimate to discover how children are? They are, among other things, very worthwhile, competent partners in a dialogue. (Beekman, 1983, p. 43)

Consider, also, the words of Smith (1984):

> By his very presence, a child brings us to our senses by asking what we have done in creating him, and what we are going to do now that he is among us. . . . The child comes as a stranger, but a stranger that we, ourselves, have created. What makes a child so strange is that he is so familiar. After all, we made him. He is our flesh and blood. That is why his otherness is so incomprehensible. He takes us by surprise. "Never," says van den Berg, "has the child been more misunderstood than since the advent of child psychology." Because the aim of its effort is to understand him more completely, to contain him, to control him, it misses the point. He is always beyond our understanding because he is beyond us. (p. 292)

Great care must be taken. In the case of children, dialogue means observing and interacting in security, at ease, with patience, and without imposing on them (Beekman, 1983).

Differing research orientations approach children and young people not only with different methods and attitudes, but also with different purposes. The basic thesis of cognitive-field psychology is that people, at their level of development, do the best that they know how for whatever they think they are. In other words, any boy or girl in any situation, at the time that she/he is doing whatever she/he is doing, is doing that because, in keeping with the understandings that she/he holds at that particular time, it is the best way that she/he knows how to take care of herself/himself (Bigge, 1982).

A unique characteristic of human beings is their capacity to pursue long-sighted, as well as short-sighted, self-interests. Cognitive-field psychologists recognize the significance of this fact. When children or young people are behaving purposively, they are pursuing their goals in light of the insights they have available; they are behaving intelligently. Whereas mental disciplinarians generally have held that people are endowed with "free will" and logical empiricistic behaviorists have adhered to determinism, positive-realistic cognitive-field theorists emphasize situational choice--at any juncture of a person's continuous, overlapping life spaces, she/he, to some extent, may choose which way she/he is going to turn next. "Intention is the most critical factor in personal causation" (Deci, 1975, p. 243).

Cognitive-field theory is most sympathetic to the humanness, the wholeness, and the intentionality of children and young people; behaviorism would shape and modify them with appropriate stimuli (reward or punishment); unfortunately, prediction and control remain aspects of both these theories:

> careful study of children and youth (as well as of other animate beings) in life situations indicates that if they are acting at all, they are trying to do something and that it is only through anticipating what they are trying to do that we can predict most accurately what they are going to do. (Bigge, 1982, p. 189)

Let us consider, now, approaches to children and young people that are informed by a phenomenological perspective. No matter how well meaning many of us are as pedagogues, our words and actions may address themselves to a situation of which the child is not part (van Manen, 1986). Thus, as we feel ourselves becoming caught up in our research procedures, strategies, and techniques, we must continue to ask the fundamental question "Where is the child?" And as we ask this question we must keep in mind the questions that arise out of it and give guidance to our particular research endeavors (Smith, 1988).

Van Manen (1986) offers the following:

> Children are not there primarily for us. We are there for them.
>
> . . . Pedagogic thoughtfulness is sustained by a certain kind of seeing, of listening, of responding. Out of this basis of thoughtfulness, tact in our relationship with children may grow. (pp. 12-13)

Langveld (1966) says,

> The theory of education has to undertake a serious analysis and interpretation of--
> 1. what the child is/who the child is
> 2. what the relations to the child are
> 3. what the child's own relation is to himself
> 4. what his world is
> 5. and what the relationship of the child to self-reliance, to responsibility, and adulthood means.
>
> In addition, it has to undertake a serious analysis and interpretation of what the child means to the adult, to the adult as a parent, as an educator, as a person living in a given community, in a given society, in a given world of meanings. (p. 97; slightly altered)

The task for me as a physical education researcher is to call upon my own resources in order to deepen the sense of this pedagogical project. The belief that children, young people, and their experiences are valuable, viable, and redeeming has formed, and informs, my research question and will continue to inform my method and my conduct.

Chapter II

Methodology

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Opening Remarks

Here, I shall present the manner in which I conducted my research, and I shall include some explanation and justification for my choice of research design and methodology.

Morse and Field (1985) have suggested that qualitative methods should be used when there is little known about a domain, when the investigator suspects that the present knowledge or theories may be biased, or when the research question pertains to understanding or describing a particular phenomenon or event about which little is known. Qualitative methods are particularly useful when describing a phenomenon from the emic perspective, that is, the perspective of the problem from the "native's point of view" (Harris, 1968, p. 6).

My proposed study qualifies on three counts. First, while I do not believe that "extreme" bias exists in the profession of physical education, I do think that the structural functionalist/positivist ethic has made performance, success, competence, and achievement the focal points of physical activity. This is commendable and necessary investigation, to be sure, but so, I feel, is a closer look at the nature of the experience so that underlying factors can come to the fore. Glasser (1981), Waller (1986), Privette (1981, 1982), Leonard (1974), and others have pointed to the meditative, emotional aspects of engaging in physical activity. I wish to explore the notion of difficulty in physical activity: What is a difficult physical experience? How is it different from other experiences? How is it pedagogical?

Second, while much is known about "measurable" responses to physical activity and involvement in it, not much is known about the immeasurable, often inexpressible experiences of and with difficulty in physical activity, where everyday participants, and not the elite competitive athlete, are concerned. "Physical education currently is defined as the art and science of voluntary, purposeful human movement. Its central concern is the individual engaging in selected motor performances and the significance of these experiences" (Nixon, 1979, p. ix).

My project hopes to take a closer, more in-depth look at "a particular aspect of motor performance and at its significance for the individual."

Third, the study will be approaching the question from an emic or insider's point of view. Morse and Field (1985) also state that the qualitative approach to understanding, explaining, and developing theory is inductive. This means that hypotheses and theories emerge from the data set while the data collection is in progress and after data analysis has commenced. Thus the research is a process that builds theory over a period of time, step by step.

There are many approaches used in qualitative studies. The commonality across all approaches is that "society" is explored from an emic point of view, trying to understand life from the perspective of the participants in the setting under study. The focus of the study is the everyday lifeworld phenomena of the informants, their satisfactions, disappointments, surprises, and astonishments (van Manen, 1978). Life events are not predictable and controllable and cannot be studied as if these parameters can be applied.

Phenomenology as Method

I have decided to approach this question phenomenologically. Phenomenology can address experiential questions such as "What is difficulty in physical activity like?" or "What is it like to have a physically difficult experience?" Further to this, I have used this approach in previous projects, and I find it to be a stimulating, insight-producing, and rigorous manner of conducting oneself not only in the research setting, but also in the lifeworld itself.

Phenomenology is that kind of thinking which guides one back from theoretical abstraction to the reality of lived experiences. A phenomenologist asks the question "What is it like to have a certain experience?" (van Manen, 1978). Field and Morse (1985) write that the phenomenologist seldom reaches a conclusion. The research should challenge the reader to respond by saying, "Yes, it is like this," or "No, I do not believe it is like that." Phenomenologists use a wide variety of resources in attempting to find some sense of meaning. They may ask informants the question "What is it like for you?" They may obtain data from reading books and poetry on the subject, watching movies, or researching others' research.

A primary requisite of phenomenology is that there are no preconceived notions, expectations, or frameworks present to guide researchers as they direct and begin to analyze the data. Phenomenology also does not presuppose the existence of process, although process may be discovered as the research takes place. The main points to remember are that phenomenology is a descriptive approach to research, that the objective is identification of the essence of behavior, that it is based on meditative thought, and that the purpose is to promote an understanding of human beings wherever they may be found (Omery, 1983).

Van den Berg (1972) states that

> phenomenology is a method; it could be called an attitude. The method is a way of observing, new in science; new, for instance, in psychology, not at all new in general life. On the contrary, the phenomenologist wants to observe in the way one usually observes. He has an unshakable faith in the everyday observation of objects, of the body, of the people around him, and of time, because the answers to stated questions are based on the results of this sort of observation. On the other hand, he distrusts theoretical and objective observation . . . standard opinions, quickly formed opinions. . . . He is convinced that this kind of opinion mystifies reality with an easy, but incorrect, and, as a rule, obscure, theory. He wishes to hold back his opinion (for he, too, has to express one) until later and listen to what the incidents, the phenomena, tell him. His science is called phenomenology. His story tries to be the interpretation of what he observes: hears, sees, smells, and feels. (p. 77)

Van den Berg (1972) also presents other thoughts on phenomenology:

> One of its main characteristics is that it does not offer a fine theory but, rather, gives plausible insight. . . . The investigator adheres to the given facts. This is the basic principle of all phenomenology: the investigator remains true to the facts as they are happening. . . . If he intends to write a discourse on swimming, he will want, first of all, to swim--and repeat his swimming until he knows or can express what swimming is. . . . If the phenomenologist wishes to write about driving a car, he first has to take the wheel and drive. Or he talks with professional drivers sufficiently long and unrestrainedly to know what they do, to know what roads are like, and the weather, to know what slippery roads mean and to know the unwritten rules. (pp. 4, 64, 72, 78)

Van Manen (1984) also presents some thoughts on phenomenology as method:

> The end of phenomenological research is to sponsor a critical educational competence: knowing how to act tactfully in pedagogic situations on the basis of a carefully edified thoughtfulness. Phenomenological research does this by reintegrating part and whole, the contingent and the essential, value and desire. It sponsors a certain attentive awareness to the details and seemingly trivial dimensions of our everyday lives. It makes us thoughtfully aware of the consequential in the inconsequential, the significant in the taken-for-granted. (p. 36)

Phenomenological research is the study of lived experience: It aims to come to a deeper understanding of the nature or meaning of our everyday experiences; it attempts to gain insightful descriptions of the way we experience the world.

Reduced to its elemental methodological structure, hermeneutic phenomenological research may be seen as a dynamic interplay among six research activities:

1. turning to a phenomenon which seriously interests us and commits us to the world;
2. investigating experience as we live it rather than as we conceptualize it;
3. reflecting on the essential themes which characterize the phenomenon;
4. describing the phenomenon through the art of writing and rewriting;
5. maintaining a strong and oriented pedagogical relation to the phenomenon;
6. balancing the research context by considering parts and whole (van Manen, 1990, pp. 30-31).

Every project of phenomenological inquiry is driven by a commitment of turning to an abiding concern. In my case, the abiding concern is the lived experience of and with difficulty in physical activity from the lifeworlds of children and young people. It is, as van Manen (1990) suggests, "a being-given-over to some quest, a true task, a deep questioning of something that restores an original sense of what it means to be a thinker, a researcher, a theorist" (p. 31). It is also "a project of someone: a real person who, in the context of particular individual, social, and historical life circumstances, sets out to make sense of a certain aspect of human existence" (p. 31). Hence, a phenomenological study is that "real person's" interpretation of that which seriously interests her. One aspect of the phenomenological project is presenting that interpretation so that it can be shared, experienced, modified, made more transparent through the commentary, experiences, and insights of others. A phenomenological project never really "finishes"--it calls us.

Investigating experience as we live it aims at establishing a renewed contact with the original experience. This brings us back to our earlier consideration of "lived experience" and "lifeworld." Merleau-Ponty (1962) shows that "turning to the phenomena of lived experience means re-learning to look at the world by re-awakening the basic experience of the world" (p. viii). Husserl (1911/80, p. 116) calls it turning to things themselves.

Reflecting on the essential themes which characterize the phenomenon is a thoughtful, reflective grasping of what it is that renders this or that particular experience its special significance. Phenomenological research attempts to make a distinction between appearance and essence, between the things of our experience and that which grounds the things of our experience (van Manen, 1990, p. 32).

Describing the phenomenon through the art of writing and rewriting brings us back to an earlier suggestion that phenomenology attempts to give voice to being. Most research projects culminate in some sort of writing activity, but giving voice to being is more than reporting one's research findings, and it is not enough to do it at the end of a project as some sort of perfunctory "conclusion." Giving voice to being is a process of ongoing attentiveness. Being is speaking in and through the lived experience, and language is the "ana-logos" (the "parallel telling") of what the body-subject has lived. When I speak I discover what it is I wished to say (Merleau-Ponty, 1973, p. 142). This speaking and discovering also happens in the act of writing and rewriting. Writing and rewriting in an ongoing, in-dwelling fashion is one of the more expressive ways we can be responsible on our relationship with being (dance, music, art, poetry are among the others).

Maintaining a strong and oriented relation means that we are animated by the "object/happening" in a full and human sense, and we will not settle for superficialities and unauthenticity.

> Unless the researcher remains strong in his or her orientation to the fundamental question or notion, there will be many temptations to get sidetracked or to wander aimlessly and indulge in wishy-washy speculations, to settle for preconceived opinions and conceptions, to become enchanted with narcissistic reflections or self-indulgent pre-occupations, or to fall back onto taxonomic concepts or abstracting theories. (van Manen, 1990, p. 33)

This is not to say that other forms or structures of research inquiry are narcissistic, self-indulgent, and so forth. A person committed to phenomenology is not a morally superior being with keener insight than the misguided masses. Rather, she is committed to a particular way of standing in the world, and she has to remain consistent in that stance, hopefully, in all her dealings, but particularly in her research conduct. Maintaining a strong and oriented relation means that the question is in and about me wherever I am in my lifeworld. I cannot escape it or shed it, nor do I wish to. In this way, I am attuned to the voice of being wherever, whenever, however I hear (see or feel) it.

Balancing the research context by considering parts and whole means that one needs to constantly measure the overall design of the study/text against the significance that the parts must play in the total textual structure (van Manen, 1990, p. 33). The researcher has to guard against "not seeing the forest for the trees" or "seeing the lens but not what it reveals." There is usually a "bigness" about phenomenological work: It has layers, themes, sub-themes, stories, descriptions, etymological sources, and so forth. These make the eventual "giving of voice" strong, rich, and deep, but they can also act as distractors or detractors if they become the voice. Also, a researcher can become so preoccupied with the lived experience of the research that the original question loses its primacy, and "method" becomes more important than the voice of the notion which compelled the research in the first place. All these risks and complexities make phenomenological study the delightfully human experience that it is.

Particularities

How does this translate into the practical, particular interacting with children and young people in a research project? Having already turned to a phenomenon which seriously interests me, that of lived experiences of and with difficulty in physical activity, I should then investigate it as I live it, on a monthly, weekly, and daily basis. Because I am asking after children's and young people's experiences, I should follow van den Berg's (1972) suggestions: I should talk with children and young people sufficiently long and unrestrainedly to know what they do, what their experiences are like, what they mean to them, to come to know the "unwritten rules."

First, of course, I have to find some children and young people. How many? What age? Boys or girls or both? I decided to go with boys and girls, not only for reasons of equity, but also to get a sense of the differences and similarities in perspective and experience. I decided to go with junior- and senior-high-school-aged children, partly because of my own career orientation to that age group, but also because I feel the pre-teen and teenage years are quite microcosmic and complex; further, I believe that young people of this age live in a world that is quite unfamiliar to us in many ways. I felt that their commentary would be quite rich and eclectic. As far as number of children and young people to be involved was concerned, I thought I would go out and see how many would be interested in talking with me. I had a target number of 10, which I thought was big enough to cover a variety of activities, ages, and stories as well as fairly equal representation of boys and girls, but still manageable in terms of an interviewing schedule. I thought this group would eventually narrow down to a smaller corps group of five co-researchers as interest in the project developed (or did not) and rapport between us developed (or did not). I anticipated a six-month period of time in which to "conduct interviews," as it were, preceded by a "get-acquainted" month and followed by a two- or three-week de-briefing/separating period.

Also, during the course of the project, I hoped to observe and participate (where possible) with the children as they engaged in their various activities. I intended to remain patient and courteous as far as observing and participating were concerned, ever mindful of them, allowing this aspect of the research to develop as our relationships developed.

I also felt that it was important that I go to them--set up appointments at their convenience and check with them every week, never taking the encounter for granted. Their schedules were just as important as mine.

The project did develop a time frame (eight months from start to finish), had/has serious interest (lived experiences of and with difficulty in physical activity from the lifeworlds of children and young people), "criteria for participants" (junior and senior age, boys and girls, 11 children), and a method (interviews, tape recorded, which were later transcribed and approached with a phenomenological orientation). In effect, the whole project was approached phenomenologically: I turned to a phenomenon which seriously interested me and I investigated it, or, rather, we investigated it, as we lived it.

Now, let us turn to the "we." I "found" 11 children/young people who were willing to talk with me. Two, Tony and Amanda, attended the dance school in my neighborhood; three others, Travis, Danny, and Param, attended the primary-through-junior-high school in the neighborhood where I lived. Four more, Leanne, Andrea, Carm, and Carmelina, were gymnasts who trained at a gymnastics club situated in a high school two to three times a week, and I met them through one of my students, who was their coach. Sylvie I met at the Hansen Training Centre for the Physically Challenged; Leslie was involved in the lead-up project to this one and wanted to stay involved.

Before I met any of these children and young people, I introduced myself to the principal, director, teacher, coach, or instructor involved in the program, explained why I was there, and asked permission to speak to the children and young people and have those interested "come forward," as it were. In some cases, the children and young people were recommended to me, and I met with them, outlined my project, and asked how they felt about participating. What evolved during our time together was neither a consistent group of 11, nor a narrowing corps group. What happened was some children were "regular interview attenders," and some were not. In other words, five of the children always indicated interest in the weekly interview and were there when I arrived; six of the children sometimes indicated that "this week is a bad week" or "I can't make it tomorrow" or whatever. They maintained involvement over the time period, but it was sporadic. So the whole group did keep going, but the regularity of attendance was the factor, rather than a dropping out and narrowing to a corps group. A corps group did indeed emerge, but not in the way that I had anticipated.

What happened was quite phenomenological: We did indeed live in our research and engage in conversation and dialogue about our lived experience. It was an ongoing thing.

As far as "interview structures" go, I was wary of standard interview typologies. I preferred to follow the guidelines suggested by Weber (1986) and Carson (1986), whereby the interview becomes less a clinical, structured aspect of methodology and more an opportunity to advance understanding through conversation and dialogue.

> Through dialogue the interview becomes a joint reflection on a phenomenon, a deepening of experience for both interviewer and participant. It becomes a conversational relation between two people, one in which they come to learn as much about each other as they learn about what is the topic of conversation. Thus, although the honest original invitation "I would like to learn about your experience" in a sense says, "Stranger, I am interested in you-as-you because of what you-as-you reveals about human beings-as-human; it evolves through the power of human encounter to mean, "I would like to know you and I would also like you to know me." (Weber, pp. 65-66)

Thus, the "interview" became part of the reflection on the essential themes which characterize the phenomenon, just as journalling became part of the reflection, and just as transcribing, listening, remembering, and in-dwelling became part of the reflection.

The interview itself was a fluid thing--true, I went in with some things in mind, some questions, intentions, follow-up on previous interactions, perhaps a turn of phrase that I hoped would initiate discussion or start a story or evoke a sense of relation or remembering, but the direction we took was one in which I tried to be a curious, susceptible follower, rather than an insistent, coercive persuader. What is more, the onus was on me to prove myself as trustworthy.

Here, I should like to speak to the methodological flexibility which I feel is necessary in any research involving interpersonal encounters, but especially in the encounter between adult and child. One sometimes wonders if maintaining distance might be the "safer" way to go.

> Maybe it would be better to observe the children from behind a one-way screen, for does my presence not change their behavior? Seeing but not seen, hearing but not heard, that would be "objective"--but would it be real? and would I understand? (Beekman, 1983, pp. 38-39)

Distance might indeed be safer, but if I expected these children to share and reveal, then I had to invest as well. Lippitz (1986) speaks to this:

> The communication precedes the understanding. . . . The researcher expects of the children that they be ready to admit him or her into their world. At the same time, they require that he or she becomes aware of their demands. This mutual obligation to accept one another's strangeness is the necessary, but not sufficient, condition with which communication, and with it, understanding, becomes possible. That this process is set in motion cannot be planned by the researcher in advance. It can take place, so to speak, behind the researcher's back. . . .
>
> It becomes obvious here, as well, that the way to the children before us does not stop in front of them. The researcher's view from a distance is inadequate for us. On the contrary, the closeness of them which they allow us, the participation in their life, makes our understanding possible. (p. 64)

I had to be ever mindful of my ignorance and my status as stranger. It was their place and space into which I cautiously, sincerely, respectfully entered.

> What we plead for is a more careful, "caring" analysis of the diverse possibilities inherent in the dialogue between adults and children. Let me make clear that neither a meritocratic nor a technological approach can fulfill the requirements of a dialogue. Such an approach is imposed from above. Most "forced choice" interviews, for instance, are of this type. In these, we ask what we think is important, what fits into our model or theory. We keep our subjects in the dark about our intuitions, which we call hypotheses. By not disclosing the truth of our intentions for fear of contaminating our data, we display a contempt for the dignity of our subjects. . . . It is too easy to misuse their understanding of events to fit our own beliefs about what is important. . . . I think it is better to start by participating in the daily life and the interests of our informants. This is the place where dialogue can start. And if we are not accepted there, on that common ground, what right do we have to go on? (Beekman, 1983, pp. 37-38)

I consider myself not only fortunate, but privileged: Eleven children agreed to share their experiences with me and allowed me into their lifeworlds, on a weekly basis. I bring many limitations to each interaction: I bring my adult orientation, I bring my research question, I bring my ignorance of their lifeworld, I bring my language; but in spite of these limitations, I do indeed bring myself, my sincere curiosity, my respect for their experience, and my interest in seeing more clearly, unobstructed, as much as possible, by my adult eyes.

Beekman (1983) has more to say on this: "As long as we see the actions of little children through the models of our shared adult conventionality, we are not likely to see the world as children, in their own uniqueness, see it" (p. 40). Working with and through this very real limitation is part of the rigor inherent in the phenomenological approach. It asks me to be constantly thoughtful, to be reflective on a daily basis, indeed, on an interaction basis, to be deeply involved with and oriented to the children, the question, and the ongoing lived experiences.

Heidegger (1968) has some thoughts on this:

> Only when we are really immersed in what is to be thought can we reveal truly the nature of anything no matter how commonplace it may be, and only then can we avoid our habitual ways of grasping it as it is for us. (p. xiv)

If my interviews and text were to be "oriented, strong, rich, and deep" (van Manen, 1986, pp. 90-91), then it remained my responsibility to become so myself--the notion which compels this study demanded and deserved it.

Since the beginning of my "research" year, I kept a journal specifically for the purpose of ongoing commentary and critical reflection on my research project. I wrote every day, but the journalling on the "interview days" was especially important because it allowed me to get my gut responses and immediate impressions down on paper, it helped me concretize what memory sometimes makes fuzzy, and it kept me honest with the children/young people and with myself. I was able to return and gauge my reactions from a different perspective, and this pushed me toward increased clarity and rigor. It also informed the way I conducted myself in the context of the interview. I was able to "be" with the children in a more prepared, receptive manner.

I also kept journalling throughout the transcribing, throughout the analysis of and living with the transcript, throughout the formulation of the lived experience descriptions, throughout the reflection on the themes, throughout the writing and rewriting. I believe my research journal helped me to maintain a strong and oriented relation to the phenomenon, and it also gave me a sense of balance, proportion, and perspective both within my project and on my project.

At this point I would like to give the particulars of the existential investigation, the phenomenological reflection, and the phenomenological writing.

Existential Investigation

When the interviews concluded, I began the lived experience of transcribing. It gave me a chance to relive and return to the conversations. It also reminded me that a "transcript" is not an "object" on which I am working; it is a conversation that my co-authors and I created together. Kvale (1988) encourages researchers to maintain this respect for the groundedness of conversation and not fall into the trap of "thing-i-fying" (p. 97) this interaction into a transcript-object.

When the conversations had been put to paper, I began the process leading to the formulation of the lived-experience descriptions, for which I decided to use a method developed by Giorgi (1985). What this calls for is an "unknowing" entering into a "naive description"--in my case, a transcribed conversation--and a willingness to follow the leads that present themselves. There are guidelines which inform the "entering" and "following":

1. Read the naive description or transcribed conversation to get a sense of the whole.
2. Establish "meaning units," being mindful of the perspective from which I operate (phenomenological) and the notion to which I am oriented (difficulty: of and with). I have to be susceptible to certain aspects of the text: I want to find out about difficulty, so

I have to be sensitive to description or "meaning units" which contain difficulty or speak to difficulty or which might reveal something about difficulty. I might notice the same word or context occurring again and again; I might become aware of commonalities across varying descriptions; and so on. ("Instinctual" messages or "things which leaped out at me" I also made note of in my journal.)

3. Transform these meaning units into expressions which my critical reader can understand or which are in use in my discipline (as long as they do not "objectify"). The given is that the lifeworld is richer than any analysis of it. There is more in transcript than I can ever do justice to, so I come at it with an interest, and I "tease out" the description, all the while informed by my interest, and then try to express it more directly.
4. Synthesize these transformed meaning units. Uplift the language to be faithful to the phenomenon and respectful of the critical reader.

Phenomenology seeks the logos of the phenomenon, that is, that which is experienced precisely as experienced and communicated through description. Phenomenology makes clearer what was already in the pre-reflective experience. The lived-experience descriptions which emerge from this process should have "kernels of truth" in them. They represent what was experienced by the doer in the lived experience of and with difficulty in such a way that the eidetic features of the experience become more visible, intelligible, or understandable (an example of this process is included).

Lived-experience descriptions are "data," or material on which to work. The process of formulating these descriptions also contributes to the phenomenological reflection and phenomenological writing.

> To do a phenomenological study of any topic, therefore, it is not enough simply to recall experiences others or I may have had with respect to a particular phenomenon. Instead I must recall the experience in such a way that the essential aspects, the meaning structure of this experience as lived through, are brought back, as it were, and in such a way that we recognize this description as a possible human experience. (van Manen, 1984, p. 44)

From this lived-experience description I have a "new starting point," so to speak, yet I must remain grounded in the lived experience throughout the reflection/writing process. Giorgi's (1985) method for generating lived-experience descriptions or "protocols" (van Manen, 1990, pp. 64-65) is one which allowed me to account for everything that was said in the conversations. While I have no illusions about the ability of one researcher or one description to deliver the totality of an experience, I am reassured that at least I was able to utilize a process that was thorough, comprehensive, and exhaustive. It also allows me to stay grounded in the experience as I reflect on it and try to give voice to it.

It is to the extent that my experiences could be our experiences that the phenomenologist wants to be reflectively aware of certain experiential meanings.

> Phenomenological themes may be understood as the structures of experience. So when we analyze a phenomenon, we are trying to determine what the themes are, the experiential structures that make up that experience. It would be simplistic, however, to think of themes as conceptual formulations or categorical statements. After all, it is lived experience that we are attempting to describe, and lived experience cannot be captured in conceptual abstractions. (van Manen, 1990, p. 79)

Phenomenological Reflection

"Theme analysis" refers to the process of recovering the theme or themes that are embodied and dramatized in the evolving meanings and stories of the work. There are various approaches to "uncovering" themes. Giorgi's (1985) meaning unit-transformation-synthesis approach, and the holistic or sententious, selective, or highlighting, and detailed or line-by-line approaches described by Tesch (1987) and van Manen (1990) are the approaches which I used. I found them to be complementary approaches which engendered continuous, rigorous questioning of and returning to the lived experience. The most difficult and controversial element of phenomenological human science may be to differentiate between essential themes and themes that are more incidentally related to the phenomenon under study. An example of this from my own study would be the larger theme of resistance and the many ways in which resistance can be experienced, such as waiting, repetition, elusiveness, monotony.

In determining the universal or essential quality of a theme, our concern is to discover aspects or qualities that make a phenomenon what it is and without which the phenomenon could not be what it is (van Manen, 1990, p. 107). On a thematic analysis, we try to identify essential eidetic features--those features which make an experience what it is, those features which give it meaning or make it meaningful--for the experiencer.

> To this end the phenomenologist uses the method of free imaginative variation in order to verify whether a theme belongs to a phenomenon essentially. The process of free imaginative variation can also be used to generate other essential themes.
>
> In the process of apprehending essential themes or essential relationships one asks the question: Is this phenomenon still the same if we imaginatively change or delete this theme from the phenomenon? Does the phenomenon without this theme lose its fundamental meaning? (p. 107)

Phenomenological Writing

On phenomenological human science, writing does not merely enter the research process as a final step or stage; it is ongoing. My own experience has been that of writing every day, even in the very early days of the project (before the interviews), not so much because I had to out of some slavish, martyrlike approach, but because I felt compelled to. I felt the need to begin "giving voice," however tentative and unintelligible it was. I wrote because I could not not write. This writing continued throughout the project. My research journal is open in front of me now . . . just in case.

If the eventual expression is phenomenologically powerful, then it acquires a certain transparency, so to speak; it permits us to "see" the deeper significance, or meaning structures, of the lived experience it describes (van Manen, 1990, p. 122). For the human sciences, and specifically for hermeneutic phenomenological work, writing is closely fused into the research activity and reflection itself. Barthes (1986) suggests that research does not merely involve writing: Research is the work of writing--writing is its very essence (p. 316).

> Writing is a reflexive activity that involves the totality of our physical and mental being. To write means to write myself . . . in a deep collective sense. To write phenomenologically is the untiring effort to author a sensitive grasp of being itself--of that which authors us, of that which makes it possible for us to be and speak . . . in the first place. (van Manen, p. 132)

As well as contributing to the reflective and expressive features of phenomenological work, writing is also a responsible research act. This means that not only does the researcher continue to question the sincerity of her text, but she also has to continually question the sincerity of her convictions and commitment.

Closing Remarks

Finally, some closing remarks on "method," in general. I am excited and challenged by the breadth offered me in phenomenological method: It allows me to draw from my own experience, from shared experience, from accounts of lived experience. There are poetry, literature, etymological study, and other research to be considered as well. I intend to use the full range of options available to me in the phenomenological approach. The "bottom line," however, is that I am engaged in a research project that involves people, specifically children, and these people, these children, are incredibly complex. It is their experience, and the clarifying, expressing, and preserving of the integrity and dignity of that experience, which ultimately direct the manner in which this project will be conducted. Smith (1985) poses the question,

> Can we therefore say that methodologies need to be chosen on the basis of their potential contribution to a deeper understanding of the situation, or do we really mean that our dwelling in the situation is to be deeply understood, and as researchers, the task is to convey the sense of this situation? (p. 222)

I defer to Horkheimer (1972), who says the value of an idea is not in its truth or falseness, but in how far it can take me. I feel this applies well to methodology: Ride the method as far as it can take me, then use it as a catapult, if necessary, to take me where my re-search and especially my co-researchers are pushing and enticing me.

Chapter III

Method as Lived

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Method as Lived

Opening Remarks

This section speaks to the lived experience of "doing" phenomenological research. I will begin by introducing the co-authors of this study. This will be followed by a discussion of the human complexities that are very much a part of interviews, conversations, and dialogues. Following this discussion will be a commentary on research as a shared landscape. I will conclude with an articulation of the "themes" of this study and move towards a "consolidation" of sorts of these themes.

The Children and Young People of This Study

I co-authored this study with 11 co-authors: Amanda, Tony, Leanne, Andrea, Carmelina, Carmen, Travis, Param, Danny, Leslie, and Sylvie. The "co-authoring partnerships" began October 27, 1987, and continued until May 26, 1988. Travis, Param, and Danny began co-authoring on November 16, 1987, and continued until May 5, 1988. We had 13 sessions together. Leanne, Andrea, Carmen, and Carmelina began co-authoring on October 31, 1987, and continued until May 21, 1988. We had 12 sessions together. Leslie began co-authoring on November 3, 1987, and continued until May 11, 1988. We had 17 sessions together. Sylvie began co-authoring on October 27, 1987, and continued until May 26, 1988. We had 14 sessions together. Amanda and Tony began co-authoring on January 26, 1988, and continued until May 16, 1988. We had 5 sessions together.

Throughout this co-authorship period I also had the opportunity to see many of my co-authors "in action" as doers. I was able to see Amanda and Tony dance, see and be with Leanne and Carmelina doing gymnastics, see and be with Leslie doing recovery and training, and see and be with Sylvie doing training and as she made her way in her lifeworld.

I should say that, though the sessions between myself and my co-authors may indeed have had a "concluding date" as far as the actual conversations were concerned, their contribution to and influence on this study go on. The conversations we had together, the transcripts of those conversations, and the relationship I have with our text are experiences that I live every day. I am touched and moved by their presence in my lifeworld. Their co-authorship continues, and I am utterly grateful that it continues.

I approached these "interviews" cautiously and fearfully, yet "stopping" them was one of the hardest things I have ever done. I am happy to say that some of the relationships which began in the co-authorship context have endured and continue to flourish as friendships.

My co-authors and I had many sessions together. Our conversations, transcripts, and lived-experience descriptions are, unfortunately, too "big" to include all of them here (see appendices). I have decided, therefore, to present a biographical sketch of each co-author, and to include her/his commentary on the question and the project in the following "Constellation of Difficulty" section. I shall also include here some remarks on research as a shared landscape.

Now I would like you to meet my co-authors.

Amanda was 12 years old when she participated in this project. She was, and probably still is, a very quiet, slender, soft-spoken girl. Amanda's blond hair was usually pulled tightly back into the dancer's classic ponytail or snood. Amanda has large, forthright eyes in a small, defined, incredibly composed face. She moved, spoke, and conducted herself with consummate grace in all our interactions. Amanda worked hard to express what was close to her heart, but it was clear that she was more comfortable with the silence in which the voice of her dance resides. Amanda is a breathtaking dancer, ageless and transcendent on stage.

Tony was 13 years old when he participated in this project. He was, and probably still is, completely ingenuous and genuinely modest. Tony has the classic dark features of his Italian heritage: dark, thick, curly hair; dark liquid eyes; absolutely open, expressive face. Tony was curious, excitable, funny, and utterly candid. He seemed to enjoy considering and discussing the research question and other questions which arose in our conversations. Tony is an enthusiastic, bouncy, yet thoughtful person, and this shows itself in his dancing.

Both children participate in three different dance forms--ballet, jazz, and character--as part of their overall program. Tony is in Level 4 Checetti in ballet and jazz and concentrates mostly on ethnic and folk dance in his character classes. He is making fine progress for someone who has studied only three years. Amanda is in Elementary level in ballet and jazz and Intermediate level in character. Amanda's character class emphasizes Spanish, Latin, and contemporary dance. She is quite advanced in all three forms for someone so young. Tony and Amanda enjoy all three dance forms equally well and seem to spend time on all three which is in proportion to and commensurate with performance and evaluation expectations.

Travis was 14 years old when he participated in this project. Travis is a sturdily built, utterly pragmatic, totally competent young man. He enjoys having opinions and expressing them. He has clear blue eyes in an open, thoughtful face, under a shock of wiry blond hair. Travis is a dedicated, responsible person who cares deeply about everything he does.

Danny was 13 years old when he participated in this project. Danny is a lean, soft-spoken person with an easy, ready laugh. He has fine fair hair, an almost delicate, freckled complexion, and considered opinions. He is excited and serious about what he does and thoroughly enjoys his doing.

Param was 12 years old when he participated in this study. Param is tall and slender to the point of thinness. He has dark hair and features, huge dark eyes, and an almost graceful air about himself. Param is active, even hyper at times, and he enjoys being active. He seems to thrive on hard work and challenge, but he is fun loving and has a wonderful sense of humor.

Travis is the oldest of three children and has one brother and one sister. All three are presently involved in soccer, Travis's sister being on a hard-luck team and Travis and his brother playing on fairly highly ranked teams. Travis actually began in hockey but, because of problems associated with his family's moving around early on, did not get established in that game. Travis was seven or eight when his family settled fairly permanently in a house near the university, and he became involved with the soccer team operating in that area, since hockey was not available. He found that he enjoyed soccer and followed up his outdoor season with an indoor season. Travis has been playing indoor soccer for about five years and outdoor soccer for about six. He presently plays with a South Edmonton club team in an indoor soccer league, and he appreciates the indoor/outdoor leagues because they permit him to play all year round. Travis is basically an all-around athlete and fairly good at most sports and activities he attempts--he has participated in hockey, some scrap baseball, and many and various sports tournaments. Travis also enjoys and is quite proficient in badminton, but he feels he is really good at soccer, which is his favorite.

Danny remained quiet for most of his first interview but at the end shared, briefly, that his preferred activities are baseball and hockey.

Param is the youngest of four children. He has two older brothers, one of whom plays soccer, and the other is a former competitive weight lifter who is now working on a teaching degree and whose waistline is beginning to betray his present non-active lifestyle. Param's sister is married, and Param is a very proud uncle of a soon-to-be-three-years-old niece.

Param began developing an interest in, and also began playing, football at the comparatively young age of seven and has been playing ever since (he is now 12-13). He began playing with a group of friends at his former school who played a lot of sports, but who were playing football when Param's interest in the game was developing as a result of watching it a lot. Param decided he would like to play and become good at it. He is most comfortable in the receiver position, either as a punt returner or a wide receiver, but he has moderate success throwing the ball in the quarterback position. Param participates in track and field, running short, middle, and long distances. He also plays baseball and basketball but is not really into many winter sports. His dominant interest in football, and he plays almost every day--five times a week for an hour or so a day, and then again on the weekends if the weather is good.

Travis, Danny, and Param are involved in activities at which each one works (and/or which could be considered hard work) and into which each one puts time, i.e., invests in in a number of ways.

Andrea was 14 years old when she participated in the project. Andrea is a very tall, relaxed, rather gangling young person who takes her doing seriously but is very realistic about her limitations and abilities. Andrea has a pleasant, open face, long, blond hair, and interesting facial expressions. She gave ready, candid commentary.

Leanne was 11 years old when she participated in the project. Leanne is small boned, with fine features and a small, excited voice. With wide eyes, quick gestures, and thoughtful pauses, Leanne was a pleasant, enthusiastic partner in conversation. Near the end of the interview process, Leanne seemed to realize that only _she_ could say about _her_ experience, and this seemed to give her a lot of satisfaction. She gave of her experiences generously.

Carmelina was 13 years old when she participated in this project. Carmelina is a tall, long-legged young person with a full head of dark, wild hair and big dark eyes over an easy smile. Carmelina is a soft-spoken, thoughtful girl. She seemed to enjoy talking about her activities and was always forthcoming and candid.

Carmen was 14 years old when she participated in this project. Like Carmelina, Carmen is dark featured and striking looking with a full head of thick, dark hair and large dark eyes. There was a sadness about Carmen at times, a felt frustration with her progress. She was outspoken and passionate. She enjoys being active but does not enjoy stagnating. Halfway through the project she stopped coming to gymnastics, and I did not see her again. It was one of the few real disappointments I experienced in this project.

After some initial reluctance and shyness, the four girls begin to talk and give some history on themselves. Carmelina likes school and most sports, but at the time of the interview is particularly interested in volleyball and gymnastics. Andrea plays just about every sport at school as well as participating in gymnastics. Carmen enjoys all or most sports, but is not into school teams, preferring PE class and recreational settings. She also has a high interest in gymnastics. Leanne is the youngest. She likes skating and track as well as gymnastics.

Leslie was 16 years old when she participated in this project. Leslie is a very pretty girl with long, very well-kept hair, a soft, expressive face, and sparkling, lively eyes. She is very articulate and thoughtful. Leslie and I developed good rapport during the pilot for this project, and there was no transition discomfort at all. We just "picked up where we left off," very comfortably and naturally. Leslie is expressive, emotional, volatile, and outspoken. She is also utterly scrupulous and honest.

Leslie is in grade 12 this year, having passed all her courses from last year. She is taking two courses this first semester, Social Studies and Chemistry, and she also works in the school bookstore, a snack food and school supplies outlet. Leslie has a boyfriend, Alex, a young man who attends the same high school and whom Leslie met this year. Their developing relationship appears to be one which is missing the manipulative, approach-retreat, head game nonsense typical of many teenage relationships in Leslie's lifeworld.

Leslie played baseball this summer, and it was not only one of her really good years in baseball, but it was also fun and a great experience in a number of respects. For one thing, she stayed home while her parents were vacationing, instead of accompanying them as she has in previous years. This enabled her to play baseball all summer, something she has not done before, and hence be involved with different teams and different tournaments and really develop her skills and enlarge her experience. It also gave her the opportunity to depend on herself. As well as discovering these resources in herself, she also managed to become more than proficient in a new outfield position, one she had previously thought was boring and which she was not too good at initially.

Leslie also water skis during the summer and this past summer spent two weeks at the lake with her family. The weather was gorgeous, so they water skied a lot. Leslie did a fair amount of skiing this past summer, but not as much as her brother. Leslie's brother can do all kinds of things he could not do before and is now much better than Leslie, largely due to his ski-school experience. Her brother did really well in his age category at Summer Games, where there were a lot of competitors, but he faces ever-decreasing numbers of competitors as he gets older. Leslie learned a lot from her brother, who taught her everything he was learning at ski school, and Leslie had what she considered to be one of her better years in skiing. Water skiing is harder than it looks, and Leslie intends to participate in this ski school next summer, mainly because her brother learned so much and did so well that she would like to, too, but also because it looked like so much fun. If she goes to ski school next year, Leslie feels that she would do well, although at her age there would not be many people to compete against should she decide to compete. As one gets older in one's sport, one's number of competitors seems to decrease. This is also the case with Leslie's boyfriend, who plays hockey at a very high local level and who, along with his parents, is very dedicated to the sport. He wants to continue in hockey but will have to be selected by a scout for a higher level of play if he wishes to keep improving, a chance he has to take.

Leslie considers coaching ringette to be her big challenge right now. She began the season as a player but volunteered her services as a coach should the need arise. The need did indeed arise, and the league took her up on her coaching offer. Leslie did not want to go back on her word, having already offered her services. When her father insisted that she drop something so that all things would not suffer, she chose to stop playing, since she wanted to maintain her relationship with her boyfriend, was not in a position to leave school, and was aware of the possibility of a new job. Leslie regrets her decision, however, and wishes she had kept playing, although she concedes that the demands on her time would have been excessive. She likes coaching ringette, but she misses playing the game. She enjoys being around the game in any capacity and manages to get a workout herself, participating in her own practices.

It is not yet time for winter skiing, although Leslie wishes it were. She and her school friends are planning a big ski trip for Spring

Break, and Leslie is really looking forward to it, since she anticipates not doing as much skiing as she would like this year due to job and family constraints and considerations.

Sylvie was 18 years old when she began this project and had a birthday during the project. Sylvie is very small, very outspoken, very pretty. It is hard to say what color her hair is--she did so many different things to it--but it was dark with various other colors strewn throughout, and it was always wild. Sylvie has a small, active face, big eyes, bigger smile; she is incredibly mischievous, absolutely forthright.

Sylvie is a recent high school graduate. She graduated in June and is presently taking a year off before she goes on to university. Sylvie plans to go to Europe during this year off and is confident that a trip to Europe will be a great experience. She is taking this European trip with a tour group because she thinks they know better than she does where to go, what to see, and how to get there. She has been to Montreal, Ontario, and Calgary on her own and travels on her own a good deal, so she anticipates no problems with travelling to Europe.

Sylvie is enthusiastic about participating in a project concerned with difficulty in physical activity, and she expresses an interest in the eventual "results." She is also aware and appreciative of the distinctive perspective she can bring to the project. Sylvie's "condition" is cerebral palsy, and she considers "disability" to be an inaccurate term since she has adapted to her condition and does not consider herself any more disadvantaged or pitiful than anyone else. More often than not, she forgets that she is "disabled."

Sylvie has been working out at the Hansen Center, a training facility geared to the needs of people with physical and/or mental "disabilities," for about two years. She heard about the Center from her mother, decided to give it a try, and has been working out there ever since. Sylvie's training pattern for the past two years has been to train two days a week, usually Tuesday and Thursday.

Sylvie has never felt held back from doing things. She has always been in the middle of things and considers herself lucky because she has had--and still has--good friends, good family, enough money, and supportive, positive people around her. Sylvie grew up being treated positively and has remained positive. She maintains that if people think positively, then things will go positively, but she admits that, even though she usually has a positive outlook on life, she does have her non-positive periods and moments.

For the most part Sylvie has had good experiences with other people, and there have been very few nasty episodes. She credits this to the good attitude she portrays and emphasizes that she does not use the guilt of others as a weapon to force them into including her. By not expecting special treatment, Sylvie is usually treated the same as everyone else. This was especially true of her situation in high school, where people would go on about their business, forgetting that sometimes Sylvie did indeed need some extra consideration. She suggests that it is a good thing that her relationships are so natural that people can forget her CP.

Sylvie has a range of everyday things she can and cannot do. Zippers she can do; buttons she can do with a button hook, and if they are big enough, she can undo them as well. Earrings are problematic because Sylvie can take them off, but she cannot put them on. Writing is not a problem, walking is quite manageable, running is almost impossible, and jumping is impossible.

Putting on nylons and slicing are the hardest things that Sylvie has to do on a day-to-day basis. The nylons are hard because when she tries to pull, and the stockings do not move evenly or easily, her long nails put holes in the stockings. Sylvie has no trouble getting into her exercise tights because the material is slippery and moves more easily on her skin. Slippery nylons would be a good idea, and Sylvie suggests that she will have to invent some. Slicing is hard, particularly tomatoes, because she cannot manage the dexterity and co-ordination. Fine muscle and fine motor movement is difficult for her.

Sylvie pokes fun at her driving, but she does indeed drive and does not have any problems with driving. She considers the ability to be relaxed to be an essential for a good driver; she believes she has this ability and considers herself a relaxed person and a competent driver.

Sylvie enjoys going out to clubs, not so much for dancing, which she does not include among her strong points, but more for listening to music, talking, socializing, and generally having a good time with others.

Interviews

Much of the positivist critique of qualitative human science research can be summarized in three concerns: too few "subjects," results due to leading questions, and subjective interpretations. I should like to discuss the second concern, leading questions, in this section, and I shall discuss the other two concerns in the "Themes" section.

When a scientist makes a laboratory or designs a controlled experiment, is she/he not "leading" nature? We could perhaps concede that this is so. We might also concede that sometimes researchers do ask "leading questions"; however, we must ask a question, or many questions, since without any intervention there would be no "data." The potential abuse of a situation is not a proper argument against the use of that situation. I direct my questions to an area of concern which I make explicit, but this does not mean that I lead the doer's answer. We have what Merleau-Ponty refers to as "circumscribed indeterminacy."

Let us unpack this notion of "leading questions" for a moment. Leading questions are those which (1) supply the informant with information which the researcher wants in the answer to the question, (2) are asked or worded in such a way that only one answer is possible, and (3) put words into the informant's mouth. There are probably countless variations on these, but these capture the "typical" patterns. How do we guard against deliberate manipulation of informants? More especially, what happens when the informants are children or young people?

Asking a person a question is an act of trust. It means that I have to trust another person to answer honestly--at least to the extent that the person is aware that what she/he is reporting is accurate or sound. This is true whether we are using questionnaires, multiple choice, Likert scales, true-false items, telephone surveys, or conversations. Unless we want message sending to break down altogether, we have to trust each other.

During the course of the interviews I had to trust the children and young people, and they had to trust me. I had to trust them to be honest, and they had to trust me to be careful and confidential with their sayings and stories. Early on, some of our conversations were awkward and guarded. Some of the children and young people nodded in the affirmative and shook their heads in the negative instead of saying yes or no. Sometimes I had to prompt them. Sometimes I had to supply a word so that they could agree of disagree. Sometimes I had to pick up on facial expression, gesture, body action, and form my question around that so that they could agree or disagree.

It may be true that children or young people have a smaller storehouse of words from which to choose in order to describe their experiences, but the depth and richness of their experiences cannot be denied. My own experience has been to supply the words when the children and young people were at a loss, but to ground the words I supplied in the children's and young people's doings, gestures, and expressions of the moment. There is no way a tape recorder can be sensitive to facial expression, gesture, or body movement, although tone of voice, at least, can be considered, as can silences, pauses, and laughter. Transcript can also obscure the felt, heard, and seen aspects of a conversation. A researcher needs to constantly return to her conversations (tapes) and to journal vigilantly in order to preserve that which the tape misses. I also made a point of frequently repeating and rephrasing questions from conversation to conversation, particularly in those instances where I had originally supplied the words.

It can be argued that children and young people may give answers they feel the adult wants to hear. Spending time, earning trust, and repeating and rephrasing seem to take care of this concern. When I was "off base" I was told so and disagreed with, in no uncertain terms. Also, in sincere phenomenological fashion, I directed my questions to an area of my concern which I made explicit. I did not hide my interest or my research question from my co-authors--they "knew where I was coming from."

Working with children and young people is messy and complicated, and I made mistakes, but we learned together. In spite of my sometimes awkward questioning, the stories of lived experience always let the voice of the experience speak through. Talking about lived experience and talking with children and young people about lived experience are modes of research which are uncircumscribed and unpredictable. They are unfamiliar because we are getting acquainted with a different way of doing research. We are not "good at it," and we may not "get good at it" because conversation and lived experience tend to defy circumscription. This work is messy, but this is not a reason for not doing it. Avoiding it will not make it less messy, and it certainly will not do much to forward dialogue, discovery, and respect between researchers and informants and between adults and children and young people.

I should like to conclude this section with some suggestions from my co-authors regarding researcher conduct:

. Concretize a concept, which seems to allow for more relation and meaningfulness (i.e., give examples).
. Take time to get to know the person; have patience.
. Be there (even when I am not) (i.e., I know you are there).
. Be willing to commit and to do extra.
. Do not "pretend": "Care."
. Show sincere interest--silent but felt.
. Offer security.
. Relax; have a sense of humor.

. Listen; reveal yourself.

. Trust my map; take me seriously.

. Demonstrate rapport with respect; set limits.

. Learn language.

. Know when you are intruding.

Landscapes and Perspectives

To speak forth honestly is to report the world as it is beheld (however precariously) in one's own perspective. Things have contexts, but only a person has perspectives (Wheelwright, 1962, pp. 15-16). I am convinced that children and young people "see" not only from each one's unique, personal perspective, but also from a distinct cultural perspective. The focus in the interviews was on the perspectives and perceptions of children and young people. Hopefully, our accessing of these perspectives and perceptions will (a) give us an increased awareness of what these perspectives and perceptions of and with difficulty in physical activity are, and (b) enable us as teachers to increase our understanding, presumably, of children and young people, their perceptions and perspectives, ourselves, our perceptions and perspectives, and whatever else "understanding" needs to be directed toward.

Perspective, from the Latin perspicere, to inspect, to see through, is defined as "point of view." It is where we stand to see what we see. We inspect what is there for us; we try to "see" it in such a way that it is recognizable, known, or understood. Perspective is not a static term. There is no suggestion that the "point" from which we "view" is always the same (often it is, however). Indeed, in order to recognize, know, or understand something or someone, we may have to walk around it/her/him and look this way and that in order to see what is there for us. Perspective also allows us "to see through." We see "through" our perspective: It acts as a lens, sometimes a sieve; it is that which we see through, that way in which we see. Sometimes, because of the perspective we see through, we do not see what another kind of lens might see. This is why we need many perspectives on lived experience.

Perspective also allows us to see through something. Something becomes visible or transparent to us or for us because of our perspective. This is also why we need the one perspective. Everyone has a particular "seeing through" that is hers/his, and this idiosyncratic seeing is as significant for our understanding.

Perception and understanding are quite related terms. The bridge that seems to link them is insight. Perception (from the Latin perceptus, past participle of percipere, to perceive) is one of those words which has remained intact over the centuries: Perception is about perceiving--the process, act, or result of perceiving; the ability to perceive; insight or understanding. To perceive is to become aware of through the senses, to observe or detect; to achieve understanding of. Understanding is the quality of comprehension and/or discernment; the faculty by which one understands; individual or specified judgment or opinion; interpretation; a reconciliation of differences. To understand is to comprehend the meaning and significance of, to know; to know thoroughly through long acquaintance with; to know and be tolerant or sympathetic toward. Insight is the capacity to discern the true nature of a situation; penetration.

These are not casual words--few pieces of language are when they are reconsidered as embodiments of many messages and hopes. Our focus is on the perspectives and perceptions of the children and young people: what they are aware of through their senses; what they are discerning, detecting, observing; what they are interpreting; what their meanings are and what is meaningful for them; what their opinions, judgments, and insights are. We are challenged to achieve understanding(s) of their achieved understanding(s), and we all seem to understand life situations idiosyncratically; we bring our history with us whenever we set out to perceive and understand. Perhaps this is why one of our definitions speaks to "knowing thoroughly through acquaintance with". Before we focus on the perspectives and perceptions, we need to invest in and attend to the children and young people themselves; we need to "get acquainted" if any kind of "reconciliation" is possible. We need, as van Manen (1986) suggests, to be tactful.

Penetration is an interesting word to use in defining "insight." Discerning or "penetrating" the visible to get to the invisible, or the invisible to get to the visible, is a carnal kind of knowledge. It means that I and the experience have not only collided with each other or impacted upon each other, but, rather, we have been pierced, penetrated; we now "know" in a new or different way, and having known and been known, we now have nuance, subtlety, and susceptibility that we perhaps did not have to the same extent before we happened to each other.

Insight can be thought of as sight inward, coming to know one's self better, or coming to see into a thing or a person, as if for the first time or for refinements on the first time. We can also think of it as referring to something or someone who is "in sight," i.e., can be seen. The subsequent seeing is just as much a matter of degree as of kind.

Perceptions are personal things, yet, for the most part, we do not know we own them. They are like attitudes in a way: In many cases we do not have them; they have us. When one lives with something for a long time, one can begin to take it for granted and its presence does not declare itself until it is challenged, criticized, in conflict, out of control. We can live with perceptions and continue acquiring them without ever "seeing" them, so we almost blindly "know" we "have" them until it comes to our attention that they are being called into question.

This is not really a dilemma. It is the way most of us live in our world(s). The challenge seems to be to talk with each other about it and not talk past each other trying to deny it.

By accessing what may be presently out of our reach, we, as teachers, can enlarge our field of vision and take more into consideration when we do, indeed, consider. Being aware that children's and young people's perspectives and perceptions exist is a first step; accepting them as sometimes different from but probably as viable as our own is another step; taking the children and young people into consideration as active members of a school community and culture is yet another step. We will not "see" everything right away, but we can make progress one step at a time. Go as far as we can see; when we get there, we will be able to see farther.

I believe that human science orientations to research, especially phenomenology, are presupposed by an appreciation of landscape. Here is something I care about that needs to be understood a little better or appreciated and considered in a different way. This is particularly true when I, as a researcher or teacher, enter a "landscape" with *my* map (it is, after all, all I have) and try to make my way. The children and young people have their maps, and they are much more familiar with the territory than I. It seems more sensible to use their maps, at least to the extent that I am able.

One other observation about landscape and territory: Very early in this project I began to realize that not only did I not know the territory, but I also did not know the language, or, rather, I spoke it with an "adult" dialect or accent. I had to learn the language of these children and young people if our conversations were going to be conversations. This does not mean I watered down my "superior adult vocabulary"; it means I had to learn new ways of saying and new ways of understanding what was said. This is a delicate area: I do not want to pretend that I am "cool and hip" or "one of the guys," but neither do I wish to be engaged in parallel discourse. I believe that I achieved a balance, and I learned a great deal in the process.

By realizing that there are many maps, and different maps, of a school territory, we can come to accept that our map is not the only way to orient, locate, or situate ourselves and others traveling with us. Also, we may be able to get a renewed sense of what the territory (or territories) is (are). Whatever the outcome, the acknowledgement and welcoming of someone else's map is already conduct that moves us a few steps away from indoctrination and a few steps toward some kind of pedagogical praxis.

Children and young people are finally being consulted about what is happening for them in physical activity and physical experiences. I hope this trend continues. The challenge for us is to listen.

Themes

In Chapter II, Methodology, I described the process by which I analyzed my transcribed conversations and lived in the question by ongoing journalling and susceptibility. In this section I shall discuss the two remaining concerns voiced earlier (too few subjects, subjective interpretations), and I shall present the themes which emerged from the stories of lived experiences of and with difficulty in physical activity. I am discussing the concerns of too few subjects and subjective interpretations because I feel that these need to be unpacked in order for the notion of "theme" to be appreciated.

Too few subjects: Skinner (1953) himself was the classic defender of the in-depth case study. One would think that the opinion of such an exemplary behaviorist might hold some sway in the positivist camp, but Skinner's belief in the soundness of the case study is conveniently overlooked. In qualitative, human science work, particularly phenomenology, we are more interested in the instances of a phenomenon, not in how many "subjects" have this experience. There can be many doers involved in a phenomenological study, and there can be one doer with multiple instances of the phenomenon. We want variations so that we can get a better grasp on the invariant. In Giorgi's (1988) words, "n+1" can modify a description, but the "+1" can modify it with an "n of one" or an "n of 2000." Besides, dependence or insistence on large numbers of "subjects" presupposes a positivist theory of science as the only theory. Human science and phenomenology within it, have different "rules." Our concern is with meaning (eidos) which depends on empirical and imagined instances. Merleau-Ponty (1962) would say that we are not merely noting the facts, but we are also reflecting on them.

Eleven co-authors may not seem "quantitatively significant," but the depth, richness, and variety of the stories of lived experience allowed descriptions to emerge which were grounded in the lived experience and which were eidetically transparent (i.e., they allowed the eidos of the lived experience some visibility).

Subjective interpretations: This depends on the theory of knowledge that one holds. This "accusation" implies that "the subject" is involved, but "the subject" is always involved. There would be no questions in the world if there were not "subjects" asking questions. Namenwirth (1986) comments, "Scientists firmly believe that as long as they are not conscious of any bias or political agenda, they are neutral and objective, when in fact they are only unconscious" (p. 29). Merleau-Ponty (1962) suggests that meanings are objects of a consciousness; they transcend the acts in which they happen. In phenomenology we attempt to practice a "pure objectivity" (Giorgi, 1988)--let the object be as it presents itself--rather than objectivism, which claims no relation to subjectivity. If because of our particular question or interest we project that as our absolute, then we are saying that a profile of the object (one view of it) becomes the object. When one profile is allowed to stand for the totality, it is indeed "subjective." However, in phenomenology we dwell with the "object" to get many profiles. We do have to be wary of the projective, but all hermeneuticists have this concern.

For example, in this particular study, the co-authors presented many features or profiles of difficulty. "Tiring" and "hard" are among those features which were spoken to, tiring being a "with" experience, and hard being an "of" experience; however, it would do difficulty a grave injustice to say that "hard," one feature of difficulty, should stand for all that difficulty is and means to a doer, or to say that getting tired describes the whole spectrum of with-difficulty experiences. Placing "hardness" in comparison or opposition to difficulty also does not allow the robustness of difficulty to be seen since it asks that a feature, "hardness," be compared to an entirety, of which it is a profile, in order for that entirety to be made distinct from one of its features. This kind of comparison can enable a more thoughtful consideration of hardness as it pertains to difficulty, it allows the feature of hardness as one profile of difficulty to show its prominence as a feature, and it shows difficulty as something that can be other than hardness, but it does not allow us to see or explore the other features or profiles of difficulty.

The lived experience descriptions and the ongoing journalling contributed to the emergence of features and themes which constitute an eidos of difficulty in physical activity in the lifeworlds of children and young people. Difficulty is a notion which cannot be languagized faithfully, so there is a feature of ineffability to be considered. Difficulty is encountered or revealed in a doing, an object/happening, so there is a feature of embodiment to be considered. Further, this object/happening is thematically in-formed; i.e., it also has features. The "of" themes (what difficulty can be) which were recurrent and prominent in the lived-experience descriptions and journalling, and which in-form and co-constitute the object/happening, are resistance, strangeness, control, demand, decision, change, investment, and self-honesty, and these themes need to be considered. Difficulty is encountered in a doing by a doer, so the body-subject and attitude-toward need to be considered. Further, the doer has experiences with difficulty which are subsumed under the necessary tension partners of body-subject and attitude-toward. These "with themes" of attitude experiences (liking and not liking, enjoying and not enjoying, wanting to and not wanting to), physically felt experiences (discomfort, soreness, pain, sweating, injuries, tiredness, unmanageability, detachment, amplification), and feeling and emotion experiences (boredom, tolerance, patience, drudgery, perseverance, sameness, fear, anxiety, uncertainty, confusion, disappointment, annoyance, distress, lostness, immediacy, exhilaration, triumph, understanding) were recurrent and prominent in the lived-experience descriptions and journalling, and also need to be considered. Since it appears that objects/happenings, in spite of the themes which in-form them, are not difficult in and of themselves (they need a doer to bring them into being), and that a doer is not a doer without a doing, it seems reasonable to consider that difficulty might be a term of relation. I shall explore this proposition in the next section.

A Constellation of Difficulty

Difficulty is a relationship between a doer and an object/happening which resists and demands and is ultimately a relationship between a doer and herself/himself.

I shall now examine this proposition in light of the lived-experience descriptions which enabled its disclosure and construction and with as much critical and reflective awareness as I can bring to bear. Such an examination should allow me to come to a deeper, more appreciative, and meaningful understanding of the notion of difficulty in physical activity and will, hopefully, render me susceptible enough to hear its message and responsible enough to yield to its voice. Here I must also refer and defer to Kvale's (1988) artful "unpacking" of a research question. Kvale's critical analysis provides the model by which I can begin the unpacking and analysis of my own proposition.

Difficulty is a relationship between a doer and an object/happening which resists and demands and is ultimately a relationship between a doer and herself/himself. Taken as a whole, the proposition suggests that difficulty is an ineffable experience. It is not so much that its voice cannot be heard--indeed, its voice resides within the object/happening which calls the doer; it is more that its voice cannot be spoken in an unmediated fashion, at least not in language as we know it. Difficulty, then, has an ineffability about it; hence it seems somewhat appropriate and consistent that it is also experienced within or embodied by both an object/happening and the relationship between that object/happening and the doer. It would seem that a critical analysis of this proposition should rightfully include a consideration of ineffability and embodiment.

Difficulty is a relationship between a doer and an object/happening which resists and demands and is ultimately a relationship between a doer and herself/himself. Difficulty is embodied in an object/happening which resists and demands and is also embodied in the relationship which arises between the doer and the object/happening. Resistance and demand reside within the object/happening. They are contradictory, "necessary-tension" partners, and they are complex and robust as experiences because a doer can experience both degrees and kinds of resistance and demand. An object/happening can resist a doer with its elusiveness, its impenetrableness, its monotony, its inaccessibility, its strangeness, its power, and with varying degrees of same. An object/happening can make rigorous demands of a doer in terms of decision making, surrender, change, and investment of time and effort, and can demand kinds and degrees of same. An object/happening, with its degrees and kinds of resistance and demand, places a doer in circumstances where self-honesty is expected and exacted. A critical analysis of this proposition should rightfully include a consideration of degrees and kinds of resistance and demand, and their sub-themes of strangeness, control, decision, change, investment, and self-honesty.

Difficulty is a relationship between a doer and an object/happening which resists and demands and is ultimately a relationship between a doer and herself/himself. Just as the object/happening has residing in it degrees and kinds of resistance and demand, so the doer has residing in her/him the contradictory, "necessary-tension" partners of "body-subject" and "attitude-toward." "Body-subject" and "attitude-toward" not only allow (enable) the doer to experience the object/happening, but they also make possible the relationship which arises between the doer and the object/happening. "Body-subject" and the previously mentioned self-honesty make possible the relationship between the doer and herself/himself. "Attitude-toward" (reconciliation?) refers to the way the doer feels about the object/happening and the doer's experience with difficulty at a conscious level, be it before, during, or after the lived experience. "Body-subject," a term coined by Merleau-Ponty (1964), refers to both the corporeal body and her/his experience of and responses to the lived experience before, during, and after, and to the body as subject to the totality of experience as the experience presents itself. This is to say that the body is a physiological entity which experiences and responds to lived experience in a felt, systemic fashion, and the body is also the body-subject, an entity which has the capacity to access and assimilate the totality of a lived experience and reveal this experience with its layers, complexity, and meaningfulness to the consciousness, to which it is necessarily connected. A critical analysis of this proposition should rightfully include a consideration of "attitude-toward" and its "with difficulty" connotations and implications and of "body-subject" and its physiological and transcendental messages.

The critical, thematically-based, phenomenological analysis which follows will, then, include a consideration of ineffability and embodiment; of degrees and kinds of resistance and demand and their sub-themes of strangeness, control, decision, change, investment, and self-honesty; of "with" themes of attitude experiences, physically felt experiences, and feeling and emotion experiences; and of "attitude-toward" and "body-subject."

Chapter IV

Ineffability and Embodiment

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> If the body had been easier to understand, nobody would have thought that we had a mind. (Rorty, 1979)

The ineffable quality of difficulty is a quality to be considered in itself, but it is also a quality which contributes to the resistant, demanding character of difficulty. According to Dienske (1985), the inexpressible is always with us, not as a part of reality which still has to be explained or put into words, but as the white of an aquarelle, which intensifies the colors (p. 5).

The ineffable is emphatically present when a person wants to convey something and is unable to do so, but most of the time it remains unnoticed on the background. This is the case with much of the taken-for-granted and ordinary experiences which surround us. Everyday life is rich with experiences and revelations; however, we do not often notice its depths or power until we try to own a piece of it. It is at those moments when we wish to preserve something special that we are often forced to acknowledge the secretive and elusive in lived experience. This in itself is a gift which lived experience gives us, because in order to realize that these "secrets" exist, we have to break through the familiarity, the matter of what surrounds us, and this means living in our lifeworlds in a more susceptible and responsible manner.

The unnameable reminds us of a rich, uncontrollable dimension of our existence and of the importance of the nonlinguistic (Dienske, 1985, p. 18). Consider, for a moment, the experience of dance. When doers dance they undergo an internal and external dancing experience. Not everything they go through while dancing can be put into words. Anybody who ever danced can verify this.

Amanda, one of the young women who participated in this research project, has been dancing for eight years, since she was four years old. Throughout the project Amanda was unable to say what she likes about dance or what it means to her. When she talks about dance she explains what she does using mechanical terminology, but with incredible affection and simplicity. Amanda admitted that it was hard to talk about things that she does every day and has been doing for a long time. She cannot remember what made her come into dancing, and she cannot express what it is about dance that remains compelling, other than how she enjoys it and feels good when she does it. It was not until the last interview that Amanda admitted, reluctantly, that being asked to talk about dance constitutes an intrusion of sorts into something private. One of the reasons Amanda found it hard to talk about dance was that it *is* so important to her, and the relationship she has with her body and with the silence and secrets that she accesses when she dances were being compromised. Amanda found it easier to talk as the weeks went by because she discovered that she could talk about things without putting herself or her dancing in jeopardy. Talking about the lived experience of dance remained difficult, however, in part because its familiarity made it even more elusive.

Leslie, another young woman involved in the research project, was more than willing to speak to and about her lived experiences of difficulty in physical activity; however, she, too, experienced a loss of words when trying to express the feel of skiing down a hill, the click or connection when she knows in her body that she has suddenly, magically "gotten" a skill, the signs of tiredness both *in* and *of* an activity. It seems that the unnameable is connected with bodily experiences. In this context it appears as "tacit rich knowledge" (Murray, 1975, p. 78). This kind of knowledge, silently present on the background as long as a doer's attention is not fixed on it, can never be fully made explicit because, at the same time, a doer is submerged in her/his body and cannot dissociate herself/himself from it completely (Dienske, 1985, p. 4). The unnameable connected with bodily experiences is a daily and very general (i.e., intersubjective, though probably uncommunicated) manifestation of the ineffable. It seems ironic that one of the experiences by which humans are so profoundly connected (the ineffability of doing) is that same experience which, if it is to remain itself, must remain unspoken (though perhaps not unshared).

The unnameable can be present in an awkward manner when cultures or means of expression are at odds. It can be assumed, for example, that children lack the insight and word availability to express their experiences. Expressing the hard-to-express does not seem to get any easier as a doer's vocabulary increases. Children may indeed have a smaller storehouse of words from which to build messages; however, if we consider childhood to be a culture in itself, we may be better able to bracket our assumptions about children and perhaps acknowledge that ineffability is a lived experience that we share with them. While doers may not be able to express the ineffability of doing, they can share their stories. This, at least, allows disclosure at some level. Without stories there is no articulation of experiences. Without stories doers cannot understand themselves (or each other) and are trapped in silence (Christ, 1980, p. 1) in a threatening fashion, rather than inhabiting silence in an enriching, empowering fashion.

According to Husserl (1977), it is important that we should break through our "natural attitude" when doing phenomenological research. When focusing our attention on the ineffable, we are able to reawaken the ordinariness of our existence. In this way we give up the routine of our rational attitude and are able to unsettle the familiarity of our world (Dienske, 1985, p. 8). In order to really see the world, we have to detach ourselves from our familiarity with it. Only by virtue of this detachment can we learn the "unmotivated appearance of our world," and this "attentive wonder" also reflects what is meant by phenomenological reduction (Merleau-Ponty, 1962). Dienske claims that

> noticing the ineffable helps us wonder at the world in which we live. . . . Then the awareness re-emerges that our reflective life is situated entirely within the unreflected life, and again we realize that everything verbal has its roots in the non-verbal. (p. 8)

Sylvie cannot tell me what it is like to live with a disability. She can tell me stories about her experiences, she can describe her frustration at her body's intermittent unmanageability, she can explain the way she does things as a result of her differentness, and she can even make me more aware of how complicated my life would be if I had to plan my comings and goings based on stairways, but she cannot tell me her lived experience as she lives it because it is her normal. Sylvie can talk about living with a disability when she places it in a figure-ground relationship or when she sees her life in comparison to someone else's. By speaking to the ineffable in Sylvie's experience, I am able to recognize my own disabilities, and I can compare my life experience to hers, but I cannot feel her normal. My experience with Sylvie is itself ineffable. I cannot express the wellspring of feelings that our relationship has made possible. By noticing the ineffable, we have forced a noticing of what we can express, and by noticing what we can express, we increase our respect for it and our wonder at that which remains in our felt experience, but out of our expressed experience, i.e., the ineffable.

Leanne cannot tell me her lived experience of doing a skating routine. I can supply words like "compressed" and "immediate" for Leanne's description of "sort of dizzy . . . like you're in the air, and all of a sudden you're back on the ground again," but I cannot express, any more than she can, the dizzying disorientation, the compressed complexity, the exhilaration, the anticipation that she feels while she is doing. Doing is a non-language experience that we try to talk about and that we need to talk about; however, with the complexity of what we feel when we do--and, in the case of this research, when we do something difficult--goes the inability to convey it. Ineffability is as much a part of the lived experience of difficulty in physical activity as it is a part of most lived experience. It is difficult to talk about difficulty, yet it is a reminder of our responsibilities as doers. By sharing what we can, we are paying tribute to the expressible and the inexpressible in our lived experience of difficulty. The ineffable part of our experiences is a prerequisite for a rightful understanding of the utterances about our experiences, as well as a proper use of metaphors (Dienske, 1985, p. 4).

If we accept that the lived experience of difficulty in physical activity has an ineffable quality about it, as it seems much of bodily experience does, then our understanding will be approximate at best. Our attempts to understand difficulty in physical activity are not attempts to contain or define it. They are a way of practicing Merleau-Ponty's

(1962) attentive wonder, they are an acknowledgement of the rightful mystery of felt experience, and they are a duty owed to the ineffable in our lived experience. Our attempts at understanding also provide us with an opportunity to practice humility, because at all times in our journey of discovery we need to be diligent about speaking to the notion, of the notion, or with the notion, rather than for the notion.

The lived experience of difficulty in physical activity is ineffable, and yet we need an understanding of it as responsible doers. We encounter this lived experience within relationships between doers and object/happenings and within object/happenings themselves. That difficulty in physical activity is embodied is further testimony to its ineffability. The ineffable cannot be objectified. It cannot be reduced to an image or object. It is not visually present; however, it is also unremovable. We experience it as embodied, already recognizing that a mediation has taken place. As Behnke (1989) points out, the lived body does not exist in a vacuum: we are always somewhere.

Before proceeding with a discussion of embodiment as it pertains to this particular research project, I should like to address its inclusion as "theme." I recall speaking with a professor, for whom I have enormous respect, about this notion of difficulty in physical activity. He told me a story in which he expressed some of his feelings about difficulty. His most enduring memory of difficulty was his experience with the parallel bars in a gymnastics session within a physical education class. At the time of our conversation my professor could not tell me what difficulty was, but whatever it was, it was embodied in those parallel bars--at least for him. I mention this because it illustrates that difficulty is experienced within an object/happening, or within a relationship between a doer and an object/happening, or within a relationship between a doer and herself/himself. Not only is embodiment significant because of the object/happening and/or relationship, but it is also significant because a doer, a lived body, a body-subject is also involved. How difficulty is experienced, i.e., within what and by whom (object/happening, relationship, body-subject), affects or mediates our lived experience of it. This is the problem of embodiment so powerfully spoken to by Zaner (1971).

Embodiment is included because it is where the lived experience happens. Its inclusion also allows us a view of many lifeworlds, each of which offers a multitude of embodiments of difficulty in physical activity. Here I defer to Strasser (1977):

> The features of a phenomenological typology could thus be characterized in the following way:
> 1. The phenomenological typology rests upon the transition from an eidetic awareness of the universal to the typological awareness of expression. This type is thus neither a distillation obtained through combining abstract concepts, nor a concentration of the correlation of features found on the basis of induction. The type is rather a certain revelation of an archetype.
> 2. The transition from Eidos to the Eidos-expressive type is perceivable. But here it is still a matter of an intuitive, not of a purely logical perceivability.
> 3. There is no absolute guarantee that among the innumerable possible modifications of an Eidos all typical forms will be discovered. A phenomenological typology can thus raise no claim to a priori completeness. Such completeness is, to be sure, not its unconditioned goal. The attempt of phenomenologists is simply directed to clarifying an archetype in a sufficient way, through the exhibition of some of its typical expressions. (pp. 323-324)

It is to these "typical expressions" that we now turn our attention: the object/happening, relationships, and doers by way of which difficulty is experienced (or in which difficulty is embodied); the stories of those experiences; and a consideration of the role of analogy and metaphor within the story-telling.

Param and Travis were asked to think of some recent happening that each found difficult. Param described a recent football game in which he tried to tackle and take down a very large, very quick opponent. Param explained that this experience was difficult because he is small and his opponent is large, it took him three or four runs at this fellow to figure out how to take him down, he had an injury factor to take into account, and even when he had his course of action figured out, Param still had to make an inside-the-action decision. Even though Param made what he felt was the best decision, he was still knocked around on his landing. When Param thinks of difficulty, he thinks of tackling because he has trouble with it: He just does not know where to go on the body. He also thinks of cross-country running when he thinks of difficulty because it "burns him out," being such a drastic change from sprinting, something he was used to doing.

Travis described a recent Saturday soccer practice in which his coach had the team running back and forth across the field and running laps around the field. Travis explained that he usually finds this sort of thing hard because it is so tiring, but he has a developing knee condition, which made the running even worse than it usually is (it "kills" him).

Leslie described an experience when skiing--something she usually enjoys and does with ease--was difficult and unenjoyable. Leslie experienced this difficulty when she had been skiing a number of days consecutively, and she was tired. Cold weather also makes things difficult because she is so bundled up and cold that she can barely move. When Leslie is tired or uncomfortable, everything feels different.

When Leanne was asked to think of difficulty, she selected the axle in skating and the forward roll on beam in gymnastics. Leanne hates the roll for a number of reasons: She tends to fall off the beam when she tries to do it, it hurts her back and shoulder-blades whether she lands it successfully or not, and it is not a move that she would willingly choose to practice or include in a routine; it is a required item. The axle in skating is also required. Leanne fell a good deal when she was learning it, and it took a long time and a lot of practice to get the move. As well, the axle is difficult because so much has to happen in a short time, it is done very quickly, and there are many distractions. Leanne did not mind working on her axle, but she is quite annoyed about her forward roll.

In one of our early interviews, Sylvie was asked what was the most difficult thing she had done on that particular day. She responded that she had put on her pantyhose that morning. Other difficult situations for Sylvie included slicing tomatoes, tweezing her eyebrows, and shaving her underarms. These involve intricate movement and control, which Sylvie cannot manage in the conventional way because of her cerebral palsy.

Each of these stories is different. The "reasons why" an object/happening is difficult are different, although there are some commonalities and similarities (there are examples of control, investment, and strangeness). The stories are expressions of individuals' experiences of difficulty in physical activity, and, while each is different from the other, what is common to all is that the individuals involved did not say what difficulty was; instead, they offered an experience in which difficulty was experienced. They offered difficulty as embodied. They would not have had their lived experience of difficulty were it not embodied. Thus, though their experiences were individual to them, they have the possibility of relation because of the unavoidability of embodiment, both in the corporeal and in the object/happening realms.

Wright (1989) suggests that it is embodiment that grounds our ethical relation with others. The way we conduct ourselves with each other grounds itself in embodiment: in our corporeality, in the "within which" where lived experience is experienced. In spite of the differences that begin at our flesh, there is still the commonality of flesh. In spite of the differences which are found among and between object/happenings, there is still the commonality of a notion like difficulty being embodied in an object/happening. Embodiment, both in a corporeal and in an object/happening sense, is a unifying, authenticating, intersubjective, human "problem."

> If the idea or belief "corresponds" with its object, then it is "true" in virtue of this fact. It is the idea or belief that is "true," not the object, but the truth of the belief is grounded in the relation of corresponding with, or being in accord with its object. Despite significant differences between the views of Pierce and James on this topic, they came together in holding an agreement or correspondence theory of truth. . . . If a label is needed, one could not do better than to call their theory of truth a theory of "dynamic correspondence." (Smith, 1978, p. 77)

In general, the dualistic conception of man still prevails in Western theories of epistemology, behavior, education, and, of course, human movement forms such as physical activity, sport, and play. In his Phaedo, Plato (1953) forwards a position that radically separates the body and the soul, as well as denigrates the kinds of information and knowledge available through the senses. It seems that Plato's attitude towards the body is quite negative. This position is derived from his view that struggles with bodily demands and passions are detrimental to the achievement of harmony and moderation, as well as to the attainment of "true" knowledge. Plato's seemingly negative attitudes concerning the body should not be equated or confused with his more positive approach to play and sport (although one wonders what a human was supposed to use in play and sport, if not a body). Be that as it may, Plato's negative perception of corporeality has been both profound and enduringly influential (Morgan, 1988).

Descartes' (1985) Meditations on First Philosophy provides almost a restatement of Plato's dualistic structure in a somewhat different guise; however, Descartes' categorical delineation of the inherent and necessary differences in kind between the physical, extended body and the immaterial, unextended mind is more extreme. Descartes' radical bifurcation of these two entities has provided philosophy and science with a conception of man with which they have struggled for more than three centuries. Cartesian dualism has not only spawned such dependents as those mechanistic, reductionist, physiological disciplines exploring the body-machine and contemporary forms of radical behaviorism, but it has also markedly influenced numerous philosophical and psychological inquiries into physical activity, sport, and play. In addition, a hierarchical position is forwarded in which the superior mind directs, controls, disciplines, and, in effect, conquers the inferior body (I am here reminded of the violence and revulsion I feel every time I hear of someone executing a movement).

Contemporary approaches to the study of embodiment, such as those found within the writings of several modern phenomenologists, offer hopeful alternatives to dualism. These philosophers (Marcel, 1952; Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Sartre, 1956) have broken away completely from the dualistic Cartesian structure to present a substantively different conception of human beings: namely, the view of the human being as an incarnate subject, a unity, not a union, of two discrete components. The body is the primary self, the human being's mode of being in the world; it is not an instrument of the mind or simply a vehicle for directed sensation. The study of the body-subject focuses upon the human being as a necessarily incarnate consciousness concerned with her/his continual unfolding in the world (Morgan, 1988, p. 78).

Morgan (1988) goes on to suggest that those who have been interested in sport, physical education, and physical activity have shown little enthusiasm for acknowledging, much less understanding, the nature of embodiment. Much of positivist research has focused its attention predominantly, if not exclusively, upon the body as object; consequently, there has been a concentration on the treadmill image of physical activity centering on the development and attainment of physical strength, motor skills, and technical efficiency and proficiency, with very little attention given to the lived experience of doing or the meaningfulness of training. In such a mechanistic and often debilitating environment the body is restrained, trimmed, trained, and otherwise dehumanized. More humanly grounded and humanely conducted research, particularly human science, qualitative and phenomenological, offers a different conception that permits a more legitimate and fruitful analysis to occur of the dynamic and expressive components of human doing in physical activity (pp. 78-79).

Merleau-Ponty (1962, 1963, 1969, 1970) dedicated his all-too-brief philosophic career to a considerable extent to resolving the Cartesian problem of how people can experience themselves as incarnate through a rigorous and adroit phenomenological analysis of the person's being-in-the-world and the nature of her/his corporeality. Existential phenomenology in general, and the works of Merleau-Ponty specifically, are based on the tenet that "the most decisive trait of human consciousness, coloring all its manifestations, is that it is an embodied consciousness" (Lawrence & O'Connor, 1967, p. 10). Existence furnishes the point of departure. Human beings' contingencies, their finiteness, and their "being-in-the-world" as subjects are perceived as the starting points.

> I have no means of knowing the human body other than that of living it, which means taking up on my own account the drama which is being played out in it, and losing myself in it. I am my body, at least wholly to the extent that I possess experience, and yet at the same time my body is as it were a "natural" subject, a provisional sketch of my total being. Thus experience of one's own body runs counter to the reflective procedure which detaches subject and object from each other and which gives us only the thought about the body, or the body as an idea, and not the experience of the body or the body in reality. (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, pp. 198-199)

Ambiguity, rather than lucidity, is an integral component of the manifestation and essence of human existence. The numerous, diverse perceptions and meanings of embodiment, the lived experience of "the chiaroscuro of the body" (Kwant, 1963, p. 46), and the open dialogue with the sensible world are precisely the occurrences which must be investigated and not rejected because they violate arbitrary Cartesian doctrines of "clear and distinct" ideas (Meier, 1979).

Through their corporeality, human beings are provided with a foundation in and are open to the world. Meaning arises, is created, and is constituted by the interaction of the body-subject and the world through the body's power of expression.

> If the radical philosophical shift from Cartesian to phenomenological conceptions of the nature of man is acknowledged and accepted, the distinctive potentialities of man's participation in sport may be vigorously and profitably explored. . . .
>
> Through free, creative, and meaning bestowing movement experiences, man becomes cognizant of the limits and potentials of his existence. His actions in sport represent, express, and affirm his capabilities, intentionality and mode of being. In short, sport may be characterized and extolled as the celebration of man as an open and expressive embodied being. (Meier, 1979, p. 198)

Shapiro (1985) suggests that any act reveals, embodies, and describes a relation between things (p. 141). The act might be Sylvie's struggling to pull on her pantyhose without tearing them or tying herself into a knot, it might be Leslie's sweating and freezing at the same time as she tries to negotiate a ski hill with her body imprisoned in too many layers of clothing, it might be Param's flinging himself desperately and wildly at some huge opponent in an effort to stop his progress or bring him down; it might be Travis' courageously working with a searing pain in his knee as he pounds out another lap of the soccer field; it might be Leanne's pushing herself to do a move she hates on the balance beam. Each of these acts or "doings" embodies difficulty in physical activity. Each of these doings reveals and describes a relation between the lived experience and the embodied voice and character of difficulty in physical activity. As well, these doings reveal, describe, and embody a relation between the lived experience and the doer and between the doer and herself/himself. It is within the relation between doer and self that doers encounter their own corporeality and their own embodiment. In Shapiro's words, the "experience becomes that quiet, unnoticed, coconstituting dialectic lived body-lived world. The bodily pole, then, is an embodiment of any and every moment" (p. 51).

As doers participate, they are moved, touched, impressed, affected in a certain way that is now a part of them. The affected body is a way in which doers embody; it is a way experience means to them; thus a particular affected body is an embodiment of a moment as lived (Shapiro, 1985, pp. 46-47). A doing (an act) seeks to know itself in the only way it can, by living in itself and attending from and to it. Doing is a bodily mode of knowing the world which subsequently allows a doer to embody that knowledge.

> Meaning arises through the body as we live it, not that body according to natural science, the physiologist's body, but the lived body. Bodily participation in the world issues in, and is itself an embodiment of that world.
>
> The lived body is the bearer of meaning. (p. 41)

Doer and doing are intertwined. Each participates in the "becoming" of the other. Doer and doing are permitted access, via their shared lived experience, to knowledge--not the knowledge that is preoccupied with acquiring facts, but the knowledge that is susceptible to what any lived experience has to offer. The gifts which lived experience has to offer are, at the same time, particular and transcendent: particular to the doer and the doing and their shared question, yet available to any doer in any doing. Part of becoming reflective doers is acknowledging that there are indeed questions, and there are indeed responses, and acknowledging that doing and being a doer are transcending, unifying experiences.

Shapiro (1985) suggests that if lived experience is embodied consciousness, reflection is built on the bodily and consists in the bodily recovery of that original embodiment (p. 168). What this says to me is that doing is significant in itself, but also for what is revealed and embodied in it; hence, responsible being and responsible research ought to concern themselves with doing, with doers, and with the complexities and disclosures that are made possible by their interacting.

Johnson (1987) claims that "any adequate account of meaning and rationality must give a central place to embodied and imaginative structures of understanding by which we grasp our world" (p. xiii). Johnson believes that traditional accounts of meaning and rationality (objectivists, positivists, behaviorists) focus on a very restricted set of phenomena, ignoring for the most part just those kinds of phenomena mentioned above (embodied and imaginative). In order to comprehend this "new" range of phenomena that are now being recognized as central to human understanding, our colleagues in various positivist orientations are focusing on that which has largely been ignored and undervalued: the human body and especially those structures of imagination and understanding that emerge from our embodied experience. Johnson further states that the body has been ignored because it has been thought to introduce subjective elements alleged to be irrelevant to the objective nature of meaning, because "reason" has been thought to be abstract and transcendent and not tied to any of the bodily aspects of human understanding, and because it seems to have no role in our reasoning about abstract subject matters (p. xiv). As we can see, the dualist, Cartesian influence is alive and well in late-twentieth-century "science." Johnson refutes these dualist claims by insisting that bodily experience is the grounds for our understanding and reasoning (p. xiv).

> We human beings have bodies. We are "*rational* animals," but we are also "rational *animals*," which means that our rationality is embodied. The centrality of human embodiment directly influences what and how things can be meaningful for us, the ways in which these meanings can be developed and articulated,

> the ways we are able to comprehend and reason about our experience, and the actions we take. Our reality is shaped by the patterns of our bodily movement, the contours of our spatial and temporal orientation, and the forms of our interaction with objects. It is never merely a matter of abstract conceptualizations and propositional judgements. (p. xix)

In his exhaustive treatment of the philosophies of Merleau-Ponty (1962), Sartre (1956), and Marcel (1952), Zaner (1971) concludes that the body-proper is the matrix of concrete human existence; it is the "center of action," that which places the doer "at" or "in" the midst of things; it is that "by means of which" there is a "world" at all for a doer; it is that which at once is the doer's presence to the world and the world's presence to the doer.

> Objects in the world, in so far as they are for me only in virtue of my being embodied in the midst of them by my body-proper, are thus disclosed as essentially connected to my possible bodily action on and with them. (Zaner, p. 240)

> The phenomenology of the animate organism is . . . the descriptive-explicative analysis of the continuously on-going automatic embodiment of consciousness by one organism singled out as peculiarly "its" own, and, at higher levels, graspable by me as "my own." (Zaner, p. 261)

It is this descriptive-explicative analysis which has been and remains the heart of this research project. Difficulty in physical activity has been presented as ineffable and embodied; hence we have had the opportunity to reflect on the breadth, depth, and complexities of difficulty, ineffability, and embodiment. Such reflection allows us to respect anew those aspects of our lifeworlds which are so familiar that they are mysterious. It also reminds me of my responsibilities as a researcher and a person.

According to Heidegger (1979), every feeling is an embodiment attuned in this or that way, a mood that embodies in this or that way

(p. 100). Boss (1979), working very closely with Heidegger for many years, has this to say about attunement:

> Every attunement as attunement is a particular mode of the perceptive openness of our existence. The prevailing attunement is at any given time the condition of our openness for perceiving and dealing with what we encounter, the pitch at which our existence, as a set of relationships to objects, ourselves, and other people, is vibrating. What we call moods, feelings, affects, emotions and states are the concrete modes in which the possibilities for being open are fulfilled. They are at the same time the modes in which this perceptive openness can be narrowed, distorted, or closed off. (p. 110)

This "attunement" spoken to by Heidegger (1979) and Boss (1979) is nicely embedded in van Manen's (1984) suggestion that the researcher "be oriented to" the notion that is being considered. Levin (1985) speaks to this as well when he suggests that there is awaiting us, then, if we are prepared to go down into it, a preontological (or proto-ontological) attunement, an "attunement woven into embodiment": an attunement, in fact, to Being as a whole (p. 50). Glasser (1981) describes this "attunement" as a tenth-order perception, when people become aware of their own inner systems and are in a state of appreciativeness for and harmony with them. Giorgi (1985) describes it as "discriminating from within a perspective" (p. 10) while acknowledging and respecting the presence and necessity of the perspective. It is significant that these thinkers, these humans from different cultures, professions, and commitments, have recognized and acknowledge the fundamental character of lived experience and the necessity of developing a relationship with it. This research concerns itself with the lived experience of difficulty in physical activity, and in doing so it bears witness to the richness of lived experience, whatever it may be, and to the doers and their stories and descriptions of the way things are and do. Dewey (1958) declared that there is no limit to the capacity of immediate sensuous experience to absorb into itself meanings and values that in and of themselves would be designated ideal and spiritual (p. 39). I would add to this that there is no limit to the capacity of immediate sensuous experience to reveal meanings and values both about itself and about the doer. If any understanding of difficulty in physical activity is going to be reached, it seems that it will, and indeed ought to be, reached by way of the lived experience of it.

> My faith in the value of direct reference to experience is not at all moved by the old conviction that experience is somehow innocent and pure. Rather, it is moved by the conviction that we break out of metaphysics with greater ease and greater completeness insofar as we can bracket its categories while we get in touch with our existential experience of embodied being and stay close in an open way to its concreteness and specificity. (Levin, p. 43)

While this by no means presumes an end to a discussion and consideration of ineffability and embodiment, it is a point at which a temporary closure can take place while we turn our attention to the stories of the lived experiences of difficulty and the ways in which analogy and metaphor enable description and expression of those experiences.

> A man's reach should exceed his grasp, or what's a meta for? (Brockman, 1977, p. 246)

The co-researchers of this project provided numerous and varied accounts, stories, and descriptions of their lived experience of difficulty and with difficulty in physical activity. They did not say what difficulty was, but they did talk about where they encountered it, what its characteristics were, and how they felt about it. The object/happenings which embodied difficulty became the framework for the stories, and the doers living the experiences became the storytellers. Their stories are individual, and the object/happenings are different from each other, but these experiences were self-selected because they held and conveyed something about difficulty in physical activity. The place of the doer in the story about difficulty is fundamental: Without a particular doer, we could not say that, but of course, this object/happening is "obviously" difficult, because it need not be obvious and/or difficult. Tackling an opponent might not be difficult for Travis, but it is for Param; running laps on a soccer field might not "kill" Param, but it "kills" Travis every time. Leslie might not find putting on pantyhose to be an onerous, strenuous task, but Sylvie ranks it quite highly on her difficulty list. Leanne might welcome the protection of extra clothing on the balance beam and on the ice, but Leslie finds that it makes her movements awkward and uncomfortable. The point is that the doers encounter difficulty in object/happenings which make the lived experience of difficulty noticeable for them. True, several characteristics of difficulty itself do emerge from the stories and descriptions, and these characteristics obtain, singly or in combination, regardless of the doer or the object/happening. However, these characteristics would have remained undisclosed were it not for the particularity of doer and object/happening and for the relationship and meaning-making that ensued.

As a researcher dedicated to phenomenology, I have to attend to lived experience, to "the things themselves" of a research question; therefore I have to attend to those who live the experiences and to the way they expressed what they lived and what they felt. Lawrence (1981), in his translator's introduction to Gadamer's (1984) Reason in the Age of

Science, suggests that the whole enterprise of making sense out of the way people have made sense of their lives has a circular and self-correcting character. Understanding authors, texts, and the realities intended by their words is therefore always a function of self-understanding. Similarly, criticism of authors, texts, and the realities intended by their words is a function of one's capacity to be critical of oneself (pp. xviii-xix). I believe that this effort at understanding extends beyond authors and texts to doers and stories of doing.

When doers tell stories of doing, they are already utilizing analogy and metaphor. They take the lived experience of difficulty and translate it into language that makes the experience both expressible and intelligible. Thus, they have taken something ineffable and made it into what it was not: expressible and intelligible. Such is the power of story--it does not presume to capture or explain; it simply seeks to preserve and convey. Here, too, analogy does not transform or distort; it allows, in Merleau-Ponty's (1968) words, some transparency or visibility. In telling a story about a lived experience of difficulty, a doer is enabling understanding and meaning-making by way of a correspondence in some respects between things otherwise dissimilar. It is the "dynamic correspondence" spoken to earlier wherein the truth of the belief is grounded in the relation of corresponding with or being in accord with its object.

When we speak of analogy we are saying that this object/happening (A) here is expressed by the characteristics of that object/happening (B) there. We do not assign object/happening "A" to the class or category of (all such) object/happening "B"; we simply try to express it (A) from a particularly object/happening (B) which allows disclosure of some characteristics of "A" which are also present in "B." Here again we see the significance of a doer. The doer is the pivot between "A" and "B," and the doer's story of doing is an expressing of attunement. The doer is attuned to both "A" and "B" and therefore makes possible a parallel disposition (ana-logos). For Sylvie, difficulty is putting on pantyhose. That which presents itself as difficulty also presents itself in putting on pantyhose for this particular doer. What is embodied here (difficulty) is embodied there (putting on pantyhose); however, the characteristics we seek become available to us in the story about putting on pantyhose (there) rather than in our selecting characteristics of difficulty (here). For Sylvie there is a truth of correspondence between difficulty and putting on pantyhose. This is not to say that putting on pantyhose is the only situation in which Sylvie will encounter difficulty or that anyone else will encounter difficulty while engaged in the act of putting on pantyhose. Sylvie is living this lived experience of difficulty; hence her place in the experience and her position as storyteller bring this analogy into being. In considering difficulty as a relationship between a doer and an object/happening which resists and demands, and ultimately as being a relationship between a doer and herself/himself, we also consider an ontological question. Difficulty is a relationship. Whatever difficulty is, is brought into being in a relationship between a doer and an object/happening which resists and demands and in the relationship between a doer and herself. Our discussion of analogy has allowed us to see relationship(s), embodiment(s), and the pivot role of the doer. (The relationship between the doer and herself/himself will be spoken to in the section devoted to the body subject.) Let us now direct our attention back to stories of doing and a consideration of metaphor.

> Metaphor requires imagination in both maker and receiver. Saying one thing, and meaning another, thinking of A as B, tracing out the implications, expressing what is difficult to express literally--all of these acts require imagination. Normal science and routine evaluation require us to collect facts, sort information, assemble claims carefully, and express them clearly with little apparent need of imagination. . . .
>
> Useful imagination requires us to set assiduity aside. In a strong metaphor we should find ourselves responding immediately, as we do to a novel event. The metaphor must move us with its sudden salience. It must jiggle our customary patterns of expectation. It should evoke wonder, a glance both introspective and prospective. A reverberating metaphor brings about an altered state of conscious rationality. The metaphor is the hunting horn of inquiry. (Gowin, 1981, p. 197)

For Param, difficulty is (among other object/happenings) cross-country running because, being such a drastic change from sprinting, it "burns him out." For Travis, difficulty is (among other object/happenings) running laps around a soccer field, particularly with a bad knee, because "it kills him" every time. According to Searle (1979), it is often the case that we use metaphor precisely because there is no literal expression that expresses exactly what we mean. Furthermore, in metaphorical utterances we do more than just state that A is X: We state that A is X by way of going through the meaning of A is B. It is in this sense that Searle (1979) feels that

> metaphors somehow are intrinsically not paraphrasable (as per the "substitution theory" of metaphor influenced by Aristotle's thought [Salner, 1988]). They are not paraphrasable, because without using the metaphorical expression, we will not reproduce the semantic content which occurred in the hearer's comprehension of the utterance. (p. 123)

As Wheelwright (1962) declares, words not only are, they also say (p. 50).

Param's and Travis' words "say" a good deal about difficulty, about the object/happening in which each experienced difficulty, and about stories of doing. We shall suspend our consideration of difficulty itself for the section devoted to the characteristics of difficulty; however, we shall consider the language of the stories and how this language allows us access to the lived experience of these two doers.

Param plays football on a regular basis. He runs up and down the field for hours at a time. He is also a member of his school's track and field team. Most of the experiences Param has had with running, at least until recently, have been sprints and short distances. During this past year he began participating in cross-country running, and he finds that he has some aptitude for it. When Param began cross-country running, he found the change to it from sprinting to be quite drastic. Now, even though he has some experience with cross-country running, he still finds the change or transition to it from other activities to be difficult. Cross-country running is different and difficult because it "burns him out" as his other activities do not.

Typical definitions of "burn" include to destroy or be destroyed by fire, to damage or be damaged by fire or heat, to use as a fuel, to impart a sensation of intense heat to, to be consumed with strong emotion. Similarly, "burn out" has several definitions: to stop burning from lack of fuel, to wear out or fail, especially because of heat, to become exhausted from long-term use. Cross-country running is by nature a long-term event: It covers a long distance and takes a long time to complete, so Param quite probably does become "exhausted from long-term use" or "burned out." It seems likely, too, that he "burns out" or "stops burning from lack of fuel" since his energy stores are consumed by the effort invested in his cross-country run. He might also wear out or fail because of how hot or overheated he becomes in the course of a run.

Param is not destroyed or damaged by fire or heat; however, he and his energy stores are used as fuel, he does experience a sensation of intense heat, and he is consumed with strong emotion. Param is passionate about cross-country running, as, indeed, he is about most of the activities in which he participates. It could be said that he is consumed with strong emotion when it comes to running. He gives his time, effort, and energy stores to the doing. He gives himself over to be consumed, and although he becomes exhausted, hot, uncomfortable, and transformed in many ways both within and after the experience, he is not destroyed or damaged by the experience. He is used up, yet he is also built up. Cross-country running is about being consumed and being burned out and thus is a felt experience. Most doers at some time or other are involved in doing that is so intense that they actually feel a burning in their muscles, in their throats and stomachs, behind their eyes. They feel themselves burning. The experience burns them out. This sacrifice, this consumption, this investment, this discomfort are part of what makes cross-country running difficult. There are aspects of cross-country running that are felt and cannot be expressed; there are aspects of cross-country running that are felt and are not difficult; there are aspects of difficulty that are felt that are not a part of the cross-country-running experience; but there are aspects and characteristics of both cross-country running and difficulty that are now pervious because Param's language has allowed access. In cross-country running, Param gives over his body to be burned. Paul (1 Corinthians 13:3) insists that I may give up my body to be burned, but if I have no love, this does me no good. Param,however, not only gives up his body, but he is also consumed by passion for the doing. How else could he withstand and perhaps even welcome the demands and experiences of doing? There is also the notion of purification to consider. Burning is also considered a cleansing act, and there is the accompanying notion of a person being stronger or more worthy after a trial by fire. As we can see from just this brief discussion, Param's expression has provided us with complexities and possibilities. This is the power of metaphor: It takes a word and offers us a world.

Travis has been playing soccer for eight years. He knows the game, loves the game, and loves playing the game, but he does not love running around a field in a soccer practice. When Travis is in the game, running does not bother him. True, his recently developed knee problem has been making itself felt after the games, but generally Travis can run in a game and not hate it. Running laps around a field or running sprints back and forth across a field, however, are difficult at the best of times, but they are even worse now that Travis has this knee condition. Running laps and sprints is difficult because it is so tiring. Running laps or sprints "kills" Travis every time he does them.

Typical definitions of kill include to put to death or slay, to deprive of life, to put an end to, to thwart, to use up, to cause extreme discomfort to, to mark for deletion, to rule out. Travis is not literally put to death or slain when he runs laps, nor is he deprived of life or put an end to; he just feels like he has been put to death, slain, deprived of life, and put an end to, or, put another way, running laps is such a thoroughly uncomfortable, sickening, disgusting experience for Travis that it compares with how being put to death or slain or deprived of life, or being put an end to would feel. Running laps or sprints does, however, cause extreme discomfort to Travis. Travis has openly stated that not only does his body feel uncomfortable when he runs laps, but he also feels physically sick and practically throws up during or after running laps. Moreover, Travis has been playing soccer for many years, so he knows ahead of time how bad he is going to feel during and after his running laps or sprints. In spite of this, Travis willingly stays with soccer and willingly engages in what is required, although he does the laps grudgingly. Travis' developing knee problem only amplifies the experience.

It could also be said that running laps or sprints does "thwart" Travis. Travis is a reasonably good soccer player. He has good skills and good fitness, plays the game well, and enjoys almost everything about soccer. Running laps or sprints prevents or "thwarts" Travis from a complete competence and comfort with soccer. It reminds him that he has to make a decision every time he comes to practice, and when he makes a decision to run the laps or sprints, Travis has to rule out his own comfort and desires. Running laps or sprints rules out Travis' body. Travis' preferences have been ruled out in his decision to stay on the course.

Like Param, Travis is used up by the experience of running laps or sprints. Travis' energy stores, time, and effort are used up by the doing. He gives himself over to something which marks him and his preferences for deletion, and though he is transformed within and because of the doing, he is not destroyed by the doing (although his knee condition puts him at risk of being damaged by it). This investment, this decision to put himself at the mercy of an experience which will make him sick and uncomfortable, this sacrifice of self, is part of what makes running laps and sprints difficult for Travis. Travis' language has allowed us access to a lived experience of (and with) difficulty via his lived experience of running laps and sprints.

When Travis and Param talk about what an experience was like for them, they also necessarily talk about how they feel about it or their attitude toward it or where they stand in relation to it (their position on it or disposition toward it); hence the "of" and "with" considerations. Storytelling or saying about experiences is personal. The storyteller/doer is making an object/happening "mean" something by her/his own meaning-making description of the lived experience.

Travis and Param were not coerced into using metaphorical expressions. They used the language because it was the most appropriate expression of what they experienced. Moreover, I believe that it was a primordial appropriateness in that the metaphors of "burn" and "kill" allow us an understanding of physical effort and discomfort that is rich and deep. The voice of the lived experience demanded an expression that was strong, evocative, and disturbing, and the doers provided language which answered this unspoken, yet felt, request of the body. Metaphor has the ability to tap into our implicit, primordial knowing and allows us, by way of our own meaning-making, to learn and to convey what an experience can say and can mean. The "natural" expressions we use to talk about our lived experience are not only heuristic and strongly rooted in accumulated lived experiences, but they also open up worlds of possibility, meaning, mystery, and understanding.

Shapiro (1985) suggests that the informed (affected) body is a seeker of metaphor. This is surely the case with Travis and Param. They live a doing which seeks a telling; however, even as we turn to language, our faithful guide continues to be the lived body, since our bodily modes are both generative in the creation of metaphor and instrumental in the understanding of a given metaphor (p. 153).

> For its part, the body becomes informed of structures. By the simple expedient of living situations . . . the body gains a sense of their structures. In this way it becomes informed--it has or is a set of possible lived structures. . . . so informed, the body is the ground of metaphor. . . . Through the informed body and the possibility of the virtual enactment of its unfulfilled sense of structures, we can create or discover metaphor. . . .
>
> In that my body can carry the significance of an earlier moment and in that my behavior can find similarities in different objects, through them I can embody, enact, and, in those senses, express metaphors. . . .
>
> . . . sensitivity to bodily modes is conducive to the generation of metaphor. (p. 157)

Beekman (1983) describes how, from a phenomenological perspective, children and young people are active, intentional builders of meaning, are serious partners in dialogue with others, and so participate in creating a social world. Travis and Param's meaning-making is significant in itself, but also because of what it can show us or help us understand about their and our lived experience of (and with) difficulty in physical activity.

Richards (1936) set forth a case for metaphor as a carrier and creator of meaning in its own right. Max Black (1962) suggested that "a memorable metaphor has the power to bring two separate domains into cognitive and emotional relation by using language directly appropriate for the one as a lens for seeing the other" (p. 236). Ricoeur (1976), perhaps more than any other contemporary hermeneutic theorist, has explored the relationship between metaphor and the creation of new meaning:

> Thanks to this detour through the heuristic fiction we perceive new connections among things. The basis of this transfer is the presumed isomorphism between the model and its domain of

> application. It is this isomorphism that legitimates the analogical transfer of a vocabulary and that allows a metaphor to function like a model and reveal new relationships. (p. 67)

Salner (1988) suggests that metaphor reflects a mental grasping of something new by means of something old to create an understanding of what was formerly puzzling or taken for granted. Metaphors help us to orient ourselves in strange and alien circumstances by providing us with a way to explore and express the unfamiliar in terms of the familiar. Understanding results when unrelated frames of reference or experience are made to intersect (p. 7). It may be, as Heidegger (1971/1959) suggests, that we always see the nature of language only to the extent to which language itself has us in view or has appropriated us to itself (p. 134). I would suggest that we see into and say about a doing only to the extent to which doing itself has us in view or has appropriated us to itself. Through my informed body I am a seeker of metaphor, a natural poet-at-large. I speak of my experience to the extent that I let my experience speak to me and listen to what we, together, have to say. There is an agonizing, necessary tension between owning an experience and belonging to it. If I can be joyful, accepting, and reverent about this ambivalence which seems to accompany doing, then I can participate in a relationship with doing as both co-creator and vicar. As a responsible doer I am susceptible to the lived experience which is informing me, and I am open, in a felt, primordial manner, to the language which is strong enough, rich enough, and complex enough to convey the story within the lived experience. As a responsible doer I am also responsible for bringing into being that which needs me as its co-creating partner. Without a doer, there is no doing. Without a doing, there is no doer. If we in the "doing professions" allow the lived experience of (and with) difficulty in physical activity to remain undisclosed because we did not co-operate with giving it voice, then we have joined the conspiracy of silence which has allowed dualism to oppress and suppress the body-subject.

If ontology is the articulation of our understanding of the ontological character of our ownmost being (i.e., our relatedness-to-Being), then the living of ontology--that is to say, the integration of ontology into our daily lives--is the very consummation of our ontological potential, i.e., our potential for a relatedness-to-Being ("what is") as a whole (Levin, 1985). Our "doing," our responsible participation in lived experience, is the consummation of our ontological potential. Here we are talking about carnal knowledge: Doing is no longer separated from self by some dualist fear of the empowerment which accompanies the body-subject's attunement to lived experience. This "fulfillment of our ontological nature, i.e., the fulfillment of our pre-given relatedness to Being and of our capacity for deepening and developing this relatedness" (p. 9) will not be possible unless, as Heidegger (1968) says, the individual human being "of his own accord, and so far as in him lies, begins at last to hold his nature open for once to the essential relation which opens out toward the fullness of Being" (p. 89).

Levin (1985) explains that Being is not a being, but rather the dimensionality within which all beings are to be encountered.

> A deep ontological understanding, then, in which our capacity for realizing this difference is deeply fulfilled, may accordingly be said to consist in a "state" of continual presence, or continual openness: a lively, vigorous attentiveness which serenely rests in, or stays at, the

> primordial ground of awareness, while at the very same time it moves in a shifting succession of focusings from one being to the next. (p. 11)

Levin's (1985) focus is gesture and motility. My focus is difficulty in physical activity. Each has its ground in the body. Levin's study and my own share a commitment to the body's recollection of being. My study, like Levin's, is conceived as a contribution to fundamental ontology. My focus on difficulty in physical activity is "intended to remember its wholeness-of-being, a wholeness which defines it--and which it enjoys--at the level of its normally concealed ontological dimension" (p. 12). A study of the lived experience of and with difficulty in physical activity focuses our attention and reflection on difficulty in physical activity in an attempt to make explicit the *logos* of the *phenomenon*. Doer and doing make themselves and the voice of the experience possible and meaning-full.

Chapter V

"Of"

Chapter V

"Of"

Introduction

This section will be a consideration of degrees and kinds of resistance and demand and their sub-themes of strangeness, control, decision, investment, change, and self-honesty. I propose these as eidetic features "of" difficulty; however, I emphasize that they are proposed as eidetic features, not the eidetic features. I am confident that these features do express something of the "eidos" of difficulty in physical activity, but I am quite convinced that difficulty in physical activity is a notion that is robust, complex, and resistant, and it calls for continued attention and attunement. What I present here are features which are being disclosed at this point in time.

We should speak to the notions of degree and kind for a moment. Most of the lived experiences of difficulty in physical activity speak to not only how difficult an object/happening is, but also to how an object/happening is difficult. For example, I may notice the feature of investment as being how much time and effort I put into something (degree), or it may be that I notice that it is time and effort that I am investing (kind). I may notice that things feel quite different when I wear different kinds of clothing (degree), or I may notice that today I feel lost out here (kind). I may notice that I have to wait for results with a certain kind of training (degree), or I may get results right away but still have to work hard each time (kind). I may be exhausted by the energy demands made on me (degree), or I may be in conflict because the demand is one of change (kind), and so on.

Decision and self-honesty, however, do not lend themselves well to these notions of degree and kind. If I am being halfway honest with myself, I will invariably experience accompanying disquiet either in my consciousness or deeper, in my body-subject. Here, the disquiet (guilt?) is my honesty, not my half-hearted profession of it. It is possible to deceive others, but it is not possible to deceive self; at some level the deception manifests itself. Therefore I would suggest that there are kinds and levels of awareness of self-honesty, but I would not place them in hierarchical arrangements. Decision is a similar consideration. Even when I decide not to do or decide not to decide, I have made a decision. My decision can be impulsive, tortured, reluctant, filled with uncertainty, but it is a decision. There are kinds of decisions, feelings associated with decisions, and decisions made at various levels (e.g., at "gut" level), but again, I am reluctant to place them in a hierarchical arrangement.

The conversations and passages that follow are meant to show how these particular eidetic features are encountered by the doers. Each of the conversations is robust, however, and while one may have been selected to show change or investment, many other features are there as well. It is like asking a person to show only one aspect of herself/himself in an interaction; it cannot be done. We are always balancing parts and whole. Each conversation will be followed by a description/discussion of the conversation and a commentary on the conversation.

These "of themes" will then be considered in a deeper, relational fashion in the attitude-toward, body-subject, and "with themes" sections.

Resistance

"Resistance," from the Latin resistere, to resist: to strive or work against; oppose, to withstand, is defined as the act on the part of persons of resisting, opposing, or withstanding; power or capacity of resisting; opposition of one material thing to another. The related term "Oppose," from the Latin opponere, to set against, is defined as being in contention or conflict with, resisting; to be against; to place in opposition, contrast, or counterbalance. The other related term, "withstand," from the Old English withstandan, is defined as to oppose successfully, resist, or endure. "Endure," from the Latin indurare, to make hard, is defined as to bear up under, to bear with tolerance, to put up with, undergo, to continue to exist, to last.

It would seem that our doers have recognized a feature of difficulty when they say that an object/happening is "hard." When something is hard it bears up under our best efforts to penetrate, modify, shape, or mold it. It continues to exist; it lasts in the face of our efforts. An object/happening that is resistant withstands efforts to capture, contain, control, or understand it. It is elusive, impenetrable. Or it has qualities, such as sameness or strangeness, which test the endurance capacity of the doer who wishes to "get" it or "know" it or "own" it or understand it.

When an object/happening resists a doer, it and the doer are then placed in opposition to each other. The same is true when a doer resists an object/happening. It seems to be a matter of survival, of being. I exist as I am; I resist efforts to claim me. I will oppose that which tries to claim me or a part of me as its own. I will undergo almost anything for my right to exist. So we have the opposition of one thing to another. The doer is in conflict with the object/happening. There is a relationship: the opposition offered by one body to the pressure or movement of another. Resistance is not unmoving; it is dynamic and dialogical.

Strangely enough, though, it is resistance which reminds us that we _do_ exist. I am reminded that I do not wish to be claimed or tamed until something or someone tries to claim or tame me. Without the necessary tension between gravitational pull and antigravity muscles in our bodies, we could not _stand_, much less _with_stand or stand for. We are reminded of our solidness when we encounter something in our paths that we cannot simply step around or avoid. We are reminded of our movement when someone or something moves against us. We are reminded of our direction when our progress is interfered with. Resistances remind us of where we stand and what we stand for. They constitute a _return_, welcomed or unwelcomed, to Being--to that which authorizes us, to that which we bear a responsibility to as a co-creator.

Conflict need not be a "bad" thing. It seldom is "bad" if it is seen as an opportunity to question our _own_ grounds. Often, however, it is used as an opportunity to question the other's grounds and ignore the viability (or lack thereof) of our own. Resistance asks us to question that which is uncompromisable. It asks us how much we are willing to "belong to" in order to "own"; it asks us to examine this relationship between owning and belonging. It asks us to consider what it is in this object/happening that is trying to claim us or get our attention. Something is asking to be noticed and/or heard.

Sylvie

S. Yeah, which was weird. I guess it's because if you promote a good attitude, then they'll have one, too. Like, I don't go around and say, "I'm disabled; don't look at me, okay?" But if you go around act normal . . . normal, cliche . . . but then they treat you fine.
M. So everyone's normal is his own normal.
S. Yeah.
M. One of the other things we talked about was planning. You have to plan more than others because of your CP. What kind of things do you have to plan . . . ?
S. Well, for example, if I have to make a trip downstairs. Going down is worse than going up.
M. Why is that?
S. I have no idea. It's stupid, . . . but I have to go one step at a time down. Anyway, so I think, "What do I have to do down there? What do I have to get? What should I bring down so I don't have to go back again?" I'm always doing that, always . . . plan, plan.
M. I guess when you go out, too.
S. Well . . .
M. Like, do you have to worry about access or anything like that?
S. No, no. I usually find a way in.

M. Those kinds of day-to-day ordinary things. I guess you're just used to them now.
S. Oh, yeah.
M. Do you remember when you were little, learning to do things?
S. No, I don't. It just came. And if I couldn't do it, someone was always there to do it. That's what I mean, I don't really recall.
M. But you don't remember having problems with walking or dressing; you just did it?
S. Yeah. I was very stubborn. Very! I still am.

S. I think the biggest thing with a disability is you got to learn to accept what you can or cannot do. You can't do some stuff, and you can't pretend that that doesn't exist. Otherwise, forget it.
M. People can get bitter and uptight. . . .
S. Oh, they do. It's too bad.S.Last night I went to the museum, and they had a free film on a girl who got molested.
M. Oh, yes, "A Safer Place."
S. Right. It's good. And I thought, sometimes I get down because I wonder, "Why me?" I don't do it as much as I used to. When I was growing up, in my early teens I'd think, "God, why me, why?" I was normal until I was born. My disability is a freak accident. Now, if you try to live with that you think, "It would have been like this; things

would have been different, no doubt." But if you do that, you're going to dig yourself into a hole, and you're going to keep going and going. That film just--things could be worse. I have a good life.

M. Do you ever have negative blocks, like, you have a block against something . . . ?
S. Yeah, sometimes.
M. When do you notice them the most? What kinds of things?
S. When it's something physically challenging, and I know I can't do it. That's when.
M. And what do you do?
S. Get someone to do it. Sometimes when it comes to things I don't think I can do right away, I go, "Oh, no," but I do it anyway.

M. Do you ever have days when you don't feel like working out?
S. Oh, yeah. Sometimes.
M. What makes you not want to?
S. Tired, or it's one of those days, but I do it anyway 'cause I know it'll be harder the next time, and I'll fall behind. That's one thing I really hate, living up to my potential; like, ~~if I~~ fall behind I get really pissed off.

S. Yeah. I'm the hardest person on me.
M. Have you always been like that?
S. Oh, yeah. Always it's stubborn. I'm my own judge. Sometimes it's not good. I'm too hard on myself.
M. Yeah. When you come up against something that's difficult or challenging, does that make you not want to do it, or what?
S. Sometimes it can get really depressing, you know, but not really; like, if you can't do it, you can't. It's something you have to accept.

S. Yeah, well, before I used to live in a world where I never really found out. I never really tried to see anything; I just let everyone do things for me. It was a time when I had a hard time accepting my disability, and I escaped into this little world, surrounded by the TV and myself. And that was a bad time. I never really cared about anything. I never did good in school. Nothing. And then as soon as high school started, I got at it then. I just did what I wanted. Like, before, I would never have wanted to go to Europe or try things out I've always wondered about; no way I would have, never. But now I'm not going to sit back and say, "What if?" No. I'm going for everything I want.
M. And you think your attitude has a lot to do with that?
S. Oh, yeah, my attitude used to be really sucky; it was. I hated who I was. But it just was no good. I was angry all the time, and I didn't have a good disposition. Like, I didn't enjoy my life. Now I do. Of course, I have ups and downs. You got to have some things.

M. So how do you find getting around without your car?
S. I don't! It's weird. It's hard. I don't go anywhere. I just sit at home. So all I do is come here, now. Unless someone has a car and we go out.
M. Do you feel limited?
S. I don't like it.
M. Less freedom?
S. Yeah, it is. Not good. Always having to depend on something or somebody. Not good.
M. Nice to be independent . . . yourself.
S. Yeah. I like going out when _I_ want, but now . . . . oh! Oh, boy!
M. When you first came here and all these machines and activities were new, and you didn't know how to do them or if you could, do you remember how you felt?
S. Well, in the beginning I was really weak, and doing the workout I pushed like that; . . . what a wimp! I was on pulleys. Wimpy, right? I was so embarrassed. So I worked my ass off to get off the pulleys, and I went on to free weights and on to the big machines. That was my goal: to get on them. Machines. How embarrassing. I was really upset then, but I knew that I could do it, so I did.

Description and Discussion

Sylvie. Having CP means that movement takes a considerable investment of time and effort, so looking ahead and considering situations and possible consequences carefully and thoughtfully are part of the lived experience of CP. "Planning" is a significant factor, and "ordinary" activities such as climbing stairs, getting dressed, putting on makeup, and doing one's hair have to be considered carefully in terms of what is involved and what must be invested in each one. Going out can present problems of access for some, but access is improving, even though some people are not aware that CP presents problems in terms of locomotion and access.

A person with CP does not necessarily "learn to make adjustments." Rather, she learns to do _her_ way, the only way she can. If CP is the reality into which she is born, she does not know she is "adjusting"; she is doing.

Everyone needs help, not only the disabled, and a person with a "disability" often feels a sense of duty or responsibility to her life condition to find her best way of doing, rather than making it look more like everyone else's way of doing.

It seems to be important for a person with a disability to learn to accept what she can and cannot do. There will be certain things that she cannot do, and she cannot pretend that this is not so. A person with a disability can become bitter, can engage in self-pity, and can fall into the "what if" trap, but she can also recognize that there are other traumas and conditions as devastating and challenging as a physical disability.

Even when a workout is long and hard, it can still be considered a good, enjoyable workout. It seems that, while it is important for the activities and exercises in the workout to contribute to the development of a given body part in some way, shape, or form, it is just as important for the person to like what she is doing.

When a person first embarks on weight training, everything can seem strange and new, and initially the person can be quite weak, much to her own embarrassment and chagrin; however, a good attitude toward training, a desire to improve, and a commitment to and enjoyment of hard work usually enable a person to become stronger, feel better, and make changes in her body. Aside from the exhilaration associated with the lived experience of training, there is also the satisfaction derived from noticing the increased muscularity of the body.

Of course, there are days when a person does not want to train, but living up to her potential and expectations of herself can be a doubleedged sword, since it means that the person cannot give herself permission to "slack off" (break training) for no good reason. Still, it does not seem so wrong to remain committed when it seems that many people do not seem to be able to push themselves and do not seem to have self-esteem, goals, or a sense of morale within themselves. Fortitude is admirable, but it has consequences. The person is her own harshest critic and judge, which is not always good, especially if a person is too hard on herself. It is nice to get praise form others, but in the final analysis the person has to assess and live with herself; hence, breaking faith, while private, can be personally agonizing, but being merciless with oneself can deprive the self of its authentic worth. As with many human dilemmas, this one has a fine line.

A person with a disability has to develop a sense of acceptance, particularly about those things about herself that she cannot really change. A person can experience dark periods of bitterness, self-pity, hopelessness, apathy. She can "put up with" her body, or she can come to terms with it. Years of lived experience can give a person a sense of what she can and cannot do. Areas of uncertainty means that the person has to try something and discover whether she can do it or not. In those cases where a person cannot do something, she has to ask for help or ask someone else to do it. This is not always a welcome option, but it is a realistic one. When a person comes up against something intricate, demanding, or otherwise difficult, her response is not one of "not wanting to do," but rather is a sadness because she knows that she cannot do. A realistic acceptance of what is possible does not exclude going after what that person wants. A person with a disability is usually limited by attitudes--her own and other people's--but she does not have to deprive herself of what she wants, and she does not have to live with regrets or "what ifs" unless she chooses to do so.

Leslie

L. Yeah. Or you just keep missing the ball . . . another one up, another one gone; . . . this is terrible!
M. How do you feel when that happens?
L. I get really irritated. I just want to say, "Let's quit!" [Laughs.] I do. If I don't get something the first few times, sometimes I get really mad, you know. Keep doing it until you try, I guess.
M. Say you go in and your first three or four minutes are really rough. Do you think that's a good reason to stop?
L. No, you have to keep going. Just because it's a bad day doesn't mean you're not going to get over it; can't quit just because you don't feel like doing it; too bad.
M. Do you think your bad days teach you things?
L. Yeah.
M. Yeah?
L. Maybe . . . yeah. Yeah, sure.

L. If I have a bad game, like, you have to keep going, you have to keep trying, and then I usually try and change my attitude around if I'm having a bad game, like, just remind myself of what I should be doing and get my attitude away [from the negative] because I do have a bad attitude when I don't want to do something. I want to just quit. But you got to keep going and usually after a game, you know, you will do something right if you keep reminding yourself. Oh, well, if you didn't, you just start in the next time.

L. Yeah, I had a hard time. I was in there, yeah, about an hour still, but I couldn't . . . bench pressing was really hard and I couldn't lift my arms with the one sitting, you know . . . that was really hard. God, I thought I would never finish. I'm, like, "Okay, Maureen said if I failed that's good. One more! One more!" and I didn't even make it. I think I finally did three sets of fifteen, which was tough. It was tough.

L. Oh, yeah, because it's not something you'd get tired of and quit. There's always the challenge to it, like you can keep going and going at it and doing it.

L. No, it was just hard. I've done it before, but this was just hard, it really was.

Description and Discussion

Leslie. Different physical activities, whether practices, workouts, or games, can be experienced as "bad" or "rough" or "difficult." Participants can sometimes get a sense early in the activity that it is going to be "a bad one"; however, neither this sense of foreboding nor a difficult first few minutes is considered a legitimate reason for not living through what is in front of you.

Activities can be "resistant," and a person may have to examine her effort and attitude in the fact of such resistance. As well, there are different ways or kinds of working hard. Sometimes a person can push hard and it can be quite unfulfilling; other times it can be so different. This hard work difference is also different from sport to sport and from activity to activity.

Bad days can teach you things, although they may not be apparent during the activity because of frustration and anxiety. The next day, via soreness or insight, people discover that some things were indeed happening with which they simply were not in touch. These insights and discoveries are often attributed to luck when it is often people doing something right in their own lives, not realizing it, and not giving themselves or their experiences their due.

A person usually feels better when she does something for herself, although it may not be recognized as "good" at the time. People may have to force themselves to do things that are "good" for them. It may be easier to get in there and push themselves when it is something that they like or want to do, but if they do not want to do something, yet know they should, then they have to push themselves to do it.

There can be variance in difficulty even when workouts take roughly the same amount of time. Some activities are considered to be more difficult, differences are noticed among and between body parts, a person's strong and weak areas present themselves, and particular activities stand out as being almost impossible to do or finish, thereby establishing themselves as the most difficult.

Weight training has qualities which seem to make it attractive: Even when a person "gets" something, it remains hard work, hence inviting; a person develops an awareness of her various body parts, their differences in strength, and how these differences influence the kind and degree of satisfaction that person feels; the various activities are manageable and reachable, yet strenuous; there is hardly ever a workout when everything is going badly: There is always at least one body part that is doing something well; a person feels so good after a workout that she is enthusiastic about being involved in activity in general; the equipment and machinery offer variety and fun; there is ongoing opportunity for self-discipline; difficulty is inherent: The work can be new and changing but is typically physically strenuous.

Ongoing difficulty is a significant consideration. Feeling that she has not done enough or questioning whether she really accomplished anything is one of the most frustrating, disheartening feelings a person can have after a workout. While comparing her effort in one activity with that in another is not really an indicator of how hard a person may be working, it is hard to avoid, nonetheless. It seems that sweating, soreness, and tiredness must be felt if a person is to have a sense of satisfaction with work done and self invested, so an ongoing presence of difficulty in some degree or kind is considered necessary and is welcomed.

Commentary

Living with a disability is an ongoing kind of resistance in that the person, in this case Sylvie, is living with a condition which resists justification. Cerebral palsy can be explained, but it cannot be justified. Fortunately for Sylvie, she has come to terms with the non-justifiability and is devoting herself to finding meaning in her lived experience, rather than wishing she could live a non-CP lived experience.

With her examples Leslie is able to show us an attractive, compelling, mischievous kind of resistance, as well as an elusive, demanding, incongruous kind of resistance. We see that a doer is drawn or called by both these (and other) kinds of resistance, and that she has to examine her relationships with both these (and other) kinds of resistance if she is to have a meaningful lived experience of and with difficulty. It seems that, in spite of the ambivalence which seems to accompany difficulty in physical activity, Leslie considers it necessary in her lifeworld.

Strangeness

"Strangeness," from the Latin extraneus, without or outside of, is defined as the quality of being strange, foreign, unfamiliar, uncommon, unusual, or extraordinary. "Strange" is defined as not previously known, unfamiliar; different from usual, striking or odd; uncomfortable or peculiar; not of one's own or a particular locality or kind; alien; lacking experience.

When a doer is uncomfortable with an object/happening, she/he experiences discomfort or is uneasy. The object/happening is disquieting. Things are different. What is "my own" is not helping me here, be it my body, my viewpoint, my map of the territory, my "knowledge." I need to get my bearings, to locate myself in relation to something/someone else; I need to use what is familiar to help me make sense of what is unfamiliar.

Sometimes doers are able to do this. Something can be different from something else, but the something can at least stand as a frame of reference for the something else. Other times doers are not able to do this. The something could be new, not just different, and there is no apparent or available something else to act as a frame of reference. In these situations the doer is "lacking in experience." She/he has to build something from nothing; there has to be an unknowing entering. Strangeness asks us to trust--ourselves, our body-subject, our lived experience. Strangeness asks us to acknowledge our lostness, our confusion, our uncertainty, our fear. Moreover, it asks us to live these experiences boldly.

Strangeness is outside of my ordinary. Hence, it makes me notice my ordinary. Strangeness can be within me. If I am injured my ordinary has been disrupted. My everyday moving now has to be different. Strangeness can be cold, heat, noise, silence, too much clothing, too little clothing, noticing too much, not recognizing anything.

Strangeness does not ask me to give up anything. It asks me to take on or enter into something. It asks me to consider my "outside of" position. It asks me to consider experience in a personal rather than "subject-object" fashion. As a stranger I am without that which is strange to me. I can be what I am without that which is strange;

strangeness asks me to be more. It asks me to participate in my becoming.

Travis, Param, Danny

M. Do you think when you get into a game, and then moving into another one, that there's a time when things feel strange? Is there a strangeness getting used to it again?
T. Just the first few times you play. So used to indoor and getting the ball and having six guys on you at once, and now in outdoor practices you get the ball and you actually have time to look around.
M. Is that the biggest difference? The space?
T. Yeah, and can't put it off the boards.

M. Yeah. What do you think, Danny? Was it difficult to get back into your baseball after being off?
D. No, not really. You just catch a little bit, play catch for a while, you get used to it.
M. Do you miss a lot of things, like judgement . . . ?
D. Yeah, on grounders I did, at the beginning. They'd just go by me. . . .
M. You figure "I've got it, I've got it," and there it goes.
D. Yeah.
M. Does that happen in soccer? Do you go to kick it and miss?
T. Not really that. It's more getting it, actually. Just when it comes down you go to stop it, it bounces right over you, and the goalie gets it.
M. Is it usually early in the season those kinds of things happen?
T. Yeah, it's early, and it also depends.

Description and Discussion

Travis, Param, Danny. This time of year (late April) is a time of change for many sporting activities, both within and outside the instructional program of a given school. One kind of activity is finishing, and another kind of activity is starting. There is a strangeness of sorts about moving from one sport to another, but this "transition-time-strangeness" seems to happen during the first few outings of the "new" or "different" activity. Big differences are not noticed going from one activity to another if one has some familiarity or previous experience with the "new" activity. Also, if the skills or movement patterns are similar, the transition is not so severe. After a period of "reacquainting," the physical skills return reasonably quickly. The judgement skills such as determining timing and distance, particularly in receiving rather than sending scenarios, are slower to return.

The demands of a given position or event can involve kinaesthetic awareness, spatial and positional awareness, size, speed, reflexes, reaction time, decision-making ability, manual dexterity, and strength, to name a few.

Leslie

L. Yeah, well, it was just one of the games that I played in. I couldn't figure out what was going on, and I went out to this game, and all of a sudden they started coming out of the air and I'd catch them, one after another. And they're coming in the same place, and I was just amazed.
M. Were they really coming in the same place, or were you just getting to them better?
L. They were in my field, and I figured it out where I should be standing, where exactly would they be coming. [Small laugh.] I don't know.
M. But it was a good feeling.
L. Very good. You love feeling happy about something you've accomplished.
M. Yeah. And you worked at it a lot, eh?
L. Yeah. Yeah, lots. In practices and like that. Lots.
M. That must be a nice feeling, locating yourself.
L. Yeah, it feels good when you've worked at something and finally it comes together, you know, where you know where to stand, or location.

L. Yeah, 'cause I can think of something now, um, I got brand new skis for Christmas and they were, well, I was skiing on little skis last year, one-fifties, and I moved up to one-sixty-fives 'cause I'm so short, but I should be using longer skis. One-sixty-five is kind of a big jump but, um, 'cause my little skis could just go through anything, through moguls especially. I could just go, and I had a hard time . . . when I first got out there, it didn't bother me to ski down the hill, but I used to just find the moguls, and I had to really learn how to ski moguls almost over again because there was, like, longer skis. It's harder to bring them around faster. I had a hard time at first: I'd be going over the mogul, and I'd miss one and have to keep trying, keep pushing.

L. By the end of skiing, the last day, I got the hang of it. But I was getting the hang of it. Actually, it didn't take me that long at all, but at first it was quite different. I noticed that I was going over the top instead of going around (them). You just got to, myself, tell myself that I guess the way to get around it was to push more on my outside leg, which made it tougher but easier to turn; it made me turn quicker.

L. Just kinda comes natural. . . . Well, if it's your first couple of runs or something like that, you're out there, it's just like a new, something new. But each time you do something, you learn something more, and you just pick up on it. Like, about the fifty run I kinda think to myself, "Last time when I did this, this, and that in this position, it worked," so I just keep doing it, or I bend my knees more, take it quicker, or something. I learned that leaning on my outside leg made me turn quicker, where I should be doing it, and I learned that probably from experiences of the hill before.

L. Well, you can, but if you can ski already and you're just taking another step higher to do something else, like, it's not really a big step, like, you're not going on skis for the very first time, heading down the hill. That would be scary, 'cause I can remember the first time I skied, someone put a pair of skis on me, told me I had to do this, this, and that. I got to the top of the hill, and I'm, "You want me to do what?" Really. But if it's just something else, you're just learning something new and you already know how to ski, it's no big deal.
M. You just build on what you already know.
L. Yeah. I guess in any sport that's the way it is, though, like ringette or baseball, water skiing.

L. Yeah, after a while and you can do it, it just, that's, you just adjust it to the way you should be doing it from the way you used to do it. Once you conquer it, it's just like something normal, just like you normally would ski; try not to compare it to the last [former] way you used to do it, because if you did that you're not going to get any better.
M. You're just going to stay . . . .
L. Where you are.

L. Yeah. Or maybe it's just boredom. People get bored of the same sports. I know, I get like that. Like, by the end of the ringette season, I want to do something else, always. When it's baseball season, I want to play ringette; when it's ringette, I want to play baseball.

M. The change.

L. Uh huh.

M. What do you think makes something difficult as opposed to easy, like, this is difficult because . . . .

L. Because it's new. Something new. Something you don't like. If it's difficult you usually don't like it; that's the way I am. Or it's difficult because it's something new to you; you haven't done it before.

L. But when it comes natural and easy to you, it's just no big deal because it's something you maybe pick up on really quick.

M. Do you think you need both?

L. Yeah, oh yeah. You need both. If I can't do anything in a sport, if I'm a total klutz and some things don't come easy to me, I hate when I can't get something. Some sports, like baseball and water ski, I can do it, right? And some things are easy, so I'm interested in it because I can do easy things, but difficult things I work at, and I like to work at them. But I can actually do it. Basketball, I can go out there and not know what I'm doing. Seriously. Even something easy like shooting a basket, I can't do that. I'm not very good at it. I just don't like the sport, and I don't like to work at it because even the things that are easy, I can't do. But you need both, I think, to keep you interested in the sport.

Description and Discussion

Leslie. Examples of "good" experiences within a physical activity context are coming to know one's "location-in-relation-to"; developing one's locating sense; working on something for a long time and finally feeling it come together; having others sense and share one's triumph, accomplishment, and happiness; and feeling something special happening and doing one's best to enhance and preserve it.

Adjusting to new equipment often means relearning skills that a person may already have. New equipment can make familiar movement feel strange, different, and more strenuous. Adjustments have to be made in the areas of timing, strength, decision making, kinaesthetic awareness, and speed. Initially, a lot more effort may be required, but then the person adjusts to the new equipment, and things become familiar again, although they can remain strenuous.

Anticipation is possible in many kinds of physical activities; absolute prediction and control are seldom possible and, indeed, may be quite unrealistic expectations. A person has to be prepared for the experience, yet also has to be open to the experience. Many decisions are made inside an experience, not ahead of it or before it begins. Anticipating and visualizing are different from deciding and doing.

Some activities lend themselves to step-by-step sequencing in learning, some are learned piecemeal, and some are just learned naturally, all at once. Typically, people pick up the activity gradually and gather it into themselves as they learn from mistakes and experiences. Falling is considered a valuable experience, indicative of effort and going beyond one's self, rather than depending on momentum in a non-intentional, "safe" fashion. On first tries or first times, everything is new, but after a while it becomes natural, and with each time something more is learned and/or noticed. A person builds on what is learned or noticed, keeps what works, modifies what does not. Learning about movement, timing, and effort comes from many experiences of the activity, and learning new things within that activity is usually a matter of building on to the fundamentals a person already knows. Learning something else is different from learning something new for the first time.

Once a person "conquers" a challenge and acquires a competency, that skill becomes "normal." This normal becomes the frame of reference rather than previous, less competent performance, since looking back at "bad" performance can give a person permission to be too satisfied with present performance. A person cannot really go back to the way she used to do something once she has learned something more; a change has occurred, and there has been a deepening of appreciation for the activity and her effort and place within it.

A thing is considered difficult when it is new, when it has not been done before, or when it is something the person does not like. It seems that if something is difficult, people do not like it, although its difficulty may not be the only or dominant reason why it is not liked; indeed, not liking something can be a part of what makes it difficult.

The difficulty of a thing need not be what makes it off-putting, but rather the thing itself. Risk can make something difficult, but it depends on what the risk is and what the thing is; also, if it is the first time, anything can be scary, and everything can seem new (unfamiliar) and impossible.

Challenging and different things are considered attractive because they are new experiences, they increase a person's way of doing things, and they require more effort; thus they make a person try harder. However, "liking" and "not liking" are significant in the way a person approaches a difficult thing and/or an activity.

Lack of differentiation between hard and easy--i.e., everything is hard--influences liking and not liking and hence influences a thing's attractiveness for a doer. "Challenge" is not really felt when everything feels the same (i.e., hard); there is no figure-ground relationship, nothing stands out, the landscape is flat.

People are attracted to different kinds of things; certain things hold an attraction for some people but not for others. Feeling no difference between hard and easy may have something to do with how attractive something is. It seems that a doer can tell or sense almost right away whether this differentiation is present or not, and her subsequent liking, enjoying, and doing this activity are influenced by this "felt" insight. Also, if there is no feeling of "fit" between a doer and an activity, the liking, enjoying, and doing are influenced by this. It is absence of differentiation and absence of fit that seem to be significant; indeed, even when a doer tries to change her attitude about an activity and attempts to get a "fit," the connection still remains elusive.

It would seem that both easy and difficulty things are needed in sports or activities (we need to feel the difficulty as it is itself, not as something indistinguishable). The easy things keep a person encouraged; the difficult things keep her challenged and working. When even the "easy" things are un-do-able, "doing" becomes "not doing," and the experience and much of what it holds remain undisclosed, unconnected, undifferentiated, indistinguishable; the doer and the doing cannot penetrate and know each other.

Commentary

It would seem that locating one's self and having a sense of the boundaries of one's territory are significant "strangeness" considerations. Connectedness and "fit" also seem to be significant. Our doers also seem to be committed to finding ways to keep the familiar special rather than invisible.. "Newness" and "differentness" are not difficult unless there is a doer trying to establish a relationship with them or trying to locate herself/himself in relation to them.

Control

From the French contrerolle (now controle), "to take and keepe [sic] a copie [sic] of a roll of accounts, to controll [sic], observe, oversee, spie [sic] faults in," to "countrerolle," was to check or verify and hence to regulate (payments, receipts, or accounts generally), originally with a "counter-roll" or duplicate register. "Control" is defined as exercising restraint or direction upon the free action of; to hold sway over, exercise power or authority over; to dominate, command. If I am in control, I have the function or power of directing and regulating.

"Regulate," from the Latin regularis, according to rule, is defined as controlling or directing according to a rule; to adjust or control so as to remain within certain limits; to adjust for accurate and proper functioning. "Restrain," from the Latin restringere, to bind back, is defined as check or hold back; deprive of freedom; limit or restrict.

Many doers experience difficulty when they encounter objects/happenings in which they feel that they have no control, no agency, no influence on what is happening. In these kinds of situations doers may feel that they have no autonomy: They do not "respond"; instead, they seem powerless to do anything but "react."

Objects/happenings which question or challenge my ability and desire to direct and regulate the action or sequence of events ask me to consider my preparedness, my readiness, my "wants." They ask me, Have I practiced? Have I thought about this? Have I spent time coming to know this? Have I been responsible? They ask me, How important are my wants?

How important is _my_ power? They ask me, Am I trustworthy, and am I able to trust? Am I willing to consider _other_ viewpoints and wants besides my own? Am I willing to risk something in order to learn more? And having considered these questions, having acknowledged myself and others, I then have to ask, How is my discernment? How can I tell whether my wants, my control, are more important or less important than the wants and control within the object/happening? And having considered these questions, having acknowledged my readiness and discernment, I have to ask myself, Am I willing to make mistakes? Am I willing to be accountable? Am I willing to take the consequences of my wants, my control, my willingness? In objects/happenings where control is a feature of difficulty, I am asked to face myself, consider, _do_, and then live with my doing. Living with my doing means that I must begin the sequence again, face myself, and continue this sequence in an ongoing, responsible reflectiveness.

Leslie

M. Like, what kind of things did you feel yourself improving at as a result of your practice?
L. Flies, a lot, 'cause when I went to practice, in a game it was better. You'd know where to stand, where you should be catching the ball.
M. Did it help you with your courage?
L. Well, yeah, a lot. At the start of the year we didn't know how to catch flies. . . . Well, we did, but not as much. "Oh, God, here it comes to _me_!" You're still like that. . . . Here it comes, watching it, oooh, here it comes.
M. What kind of things go through your mind when you're out there?
L. Sometimes you're, like, "Oh, no, please don't hit it out here," you know, or "Oh, it'll come to me right now," and then sometimes you just, "Right on, hit it out here, I'll catch it." Depends what kind of mood you're in, what kind of girl. . . . If I'm really tired and I want out, I go, "Please don't come to me . . . not now, I just don't feel like it."

M. Have you had that happen to you? You misjudge or it does something unexpected, and you have to run and get it?
L. Oh, yeah. Lots of times.
M. How does that feel?
L. I hate that feeling. I hate . . . well, I think I'm just a negative person towards that, but I hate doing something wrong. It bothers me. I'll do it until I get it right; especially with baseball, it's different. It can come to you in a certain way that it's never come to you before, and you can drop it and go, "God! I could've had it! How did I miss it?"
M. Is every ball different?
L. Um.
M. Or are some just so predictable?
L. Yeah, after the--by the end of the year you're like, "It's coming right here, I know it is." You can catch it easy, instead of running up and running back and, oh . . . one game, I'll never forget it, they all went bloop, out to center field, one after another, here comes, same ball in the same place. . . . Depends on what kind of hitters they have.

Description and Discussion

Leslie. Mistakes can and do happen and have to be taken in stride and put into perspective. Players should realize that not everything can be predicted or rehearsed, and the "unpracticed-for" situation is an opportunity for learning rather than merciless self-criticism. Mistakes that occur in situations which seem manageable can be the most frustrating.

Mind and body work as a dialogue, a unity, in learning and doing. Sometimes a person has to think about what she is doing; sometimes she has to let it go and "do" without thinking. Sometimes she has to dwell in it, trusting her practice; her "acquired naturalness"; her awareness of body, position, location, relation; her complicated-ness; her multiple-selves; and her whole self (her body-subject).

Amanda and Tony

M. Do you have some idea going in if you're gong to get it or not, or can anything happen in testing?
A. Anything can happen when you're tested.
M. How about you, Tony, are you sure of your stuff?
T. Sometimes.
M. Sometimes things come up that you aren't expecting.
T. Yeah, sometimes they ask for something different, . . .
M. And you don't do it well?
T. Yeah.

M. What kind of things could come up that you aren't prepared for? Something you haven't learned? Or in a different direction . . . ?
A. Or something you've never heard of.
M. That must be real surprising. Well, I'm sure you guys will do well; you've been working hard for it, eh?
A. Yeah, sort of.

Description and Discussion

Tony and Amanda. Typically in dance schools late March is pre-exam and pre-performance time. Dancers tend to be involved in regular, often intensified, often extra classes and rehearsals. While it is hard work and quite hectic, most dancers get used to it.

Dance exams take place in the spring. An examiner comes in and tests dancers at a given level so that if they do well enough, they can move on to the next level. The exam itself is at the examiner's discretion, and anything can happen. This uncontrollable, unpredictable situation is quite difficult and/or anxiety producing for most dancers, since ability and content knowledge do not always guarantee success. The dance has to deliver under pressure. The two dancers in this interview feel prepared but are realistic.

Sylvie

M. Uh huh. So how's your body feeling?

S. Fine, except for balance and my left foot. It does it all the time. I'm not sure what to do.

M. Has it done this before?

S. Oh, it did it before. I'm used to it. You have to concentrate more, but still, even if you do, the slightest little thing will jerk it. I can't hold it.

M. Yeah. So do you really have to think about it hard and make it move where you want it to go?

S. Yeah, if I don't want to land up on my face.

M. What will it just do what it wants if you don't think about it?

S. Yeah, uh huh. So I try to stretch it this way and put pressure . . . . I don't know why it does that. I can't understand. My other leg doesn't at all. I'm not sure. And it only does it sometimes.

M. When you're tired?

S. I guess . . . I never notice. . . . It's just, I can't stand it because it affects my attitude. . . . I get so caught up in making sure that my leg works that I'm so busy, I'm concentrating so much on making sure it doesn't turn. It just makes me upset; it bothers me.

M. So, like, on days when your balance and your foot are doing well, you can almost forget your CP, and on days when they act up, it reminds you that you really do still have it.

S. Yeah, oh yeah . . . exactly. Or today [sigh], like, I wanted to put this banana comb in my hair, and I can't do it, so I got my sister to do it and it just won't work, and I just got so mad. I went, "Oh, get it out of my hair!"

Description and Discussion

Sylvie. A person with CP or with any disability can have "acting-up" periods when her body or a part of her body seems to have a mind and will of its own and is most unmanageable and unpredictable. In spite of her best efforts and concentration, the slightest thing can cause a spasm or a jerk, and the person cannot hold the offending part in check. During times like these, it takes a tremendous amount of concentration and attending to remain upright.

For a person with a disability, an "acting-up" body part can affect her attitude about other things in her life. It also serves as a reminder that, although her condition may be manageable and may even seem absent at times, it is still a reality which can declare itself quite vehemently and can take control. Feeling hopeless and out of control can carry over onto other things, so a task such as doing one's hair because a frustrating, disappointing trauma, and this frustration then permeates everything. The person gets caught up in making sure her body or her body part works, and she is concentrating so hard on something that should be so easy that she becomes overwhelmed and upset by what she cannot control.

Carmelina

M. Why was it hard for you to do it? Do you know?
C. Well, I was chicken, really, like, I was chicken that I wouldn't get high enough, that I'd land on my head, that I wouldn't rotate, that I'd just stop, that I wouldn't let go of my hands, but one day I had a coach just barely spot me, and I let go, and I tried it. I just went for it once, and I got it, and I wasn't that scared any more.

M. Like, why did they bother you and take so long?
C. Well, on beam, I thought I'd always hit my head, 'cause, like, I couldn't do walkovers 'cause I didn't have a flexible back, so I thought I wouldn't be able to do this, that I'd always be scared, but I guess I just got enough nerve one day, and I just went for it and I got them.

Description and Discussion

Carmelina. Enjoyable and noteworthy in the gymnastics experience have been the competitions, doing moves in which there were elements of grace and control, doing moves in which there were elements of decision making, dealing with fear, and generally feeling a greater autonomy and independence about herself as a gymnast. Much of the difficulty was embodied in those moves which have a backward or "blind" entry. The instances in which the doer made the decision to go for the move in spite of her fear have in common her realization of overcoming her fear of being afraid, i.e., her fear of fear, and her realization of not being supported by her coach, i.e., her felt realization of her own self/body doing the move.

Commentary

It appears that a doer can prepare herself/himself for the doing, but there will always be instances when "anything can happen." These object/happenings are usually outside the doer's influence or control, and she/he has to live this experience as it is happening, trusting in the wisdom and connectedness of the body-subject. It seems that this trusting can be experienced in a felt way, but not necessarily or simultaneously by the consciousness ("I don't know; I just know!").

Demand/Decision

The word "demand," from the French demander, to demand, and the Latin demandare, to give in charge, entrust, commit, request, is defined as an act of demanding or asking by virtue of right or authority; an authoritative or peremptory request or claim; the action of demanding, claiming, peremptory asking; to ask (a person) authoritatively, peremptorily, urgently for (a thing); to require (a person) to do a thing; to ask for (a thing) peremptorily, urgently, or in such a way as to command attention.

Decision, from the Latin decision-em, cutting down, decision, is defined as the action of deciding; settlement, determination; the making up of one's mind on any point or on a course of action, a resolution, determination.

A peremptory request or claim is one which precludes further debate or action and does not admit contradiction or refusal. An object/happening is demanding when it demands or makes demands, when it requires a doer to do something. When something is demanded of me as a doer, it means that I have been entrusted with something, but more than this, it means I must respond. The peremptory nature of the request precludes further debate or action and does not admit refusal; i.e., I must respond. A demand is the action of demanding.

Decision, then, is the acting of deciding. It is the action which follows hard upon the deciding. Decision is already action. I may decide not to take on that which has been entrusted to me; I may decide to take on that which has been entrusted to me. I cannot not decide. Deciding not to decide is still a decision, decision is already action, hence the authoritative nature of demand. No matter what or how I decide, I do decide. The peremptory nature of demand does not admit refusal; I can refuse to do, but I cannot refuse to decide, since in doing so I am already deciding.

What authorizes this demand which places me in the position of decision? I believe it is Being-to-which-all-beings-are-related. It is Being which authorizes the demand, and since all beings co-create with Being, it is "beings" who authorize Being to authorize demand. Demand calls forth decision; decision calls forth our body-subject, our human-ness. When an object/happening commands our attention, it is the voice of Being calling on our body-subject, our human-ness, to participate yet again in a co-creating act: decision.

Carmelina

M. What made you decide not to do it?
C. I was gonna do it, and then all of a sudden I just didn't do it.
M. You just round-offed and stopped.
C. Yeah, 'cause my round off was real high 'cause I was going to do it, and then I stopped.
M. How does that feel?
C. I was frustrated after; I was mad.
M. Were you disappointed?
C. Yeah, 'cause I wanted to do it.

C. Well, I was kind of scared for the first while, 'cause I missed about three weeks of gymnastics, so I was kind of scared when I first came back, so I have to build up my confidence again.

C. Well, I need to take time. Like, if I'm away from it for a long period of time, I'll lose it.
M. Sure, so you just needed to, like, feel comfortable with it. . . .
C. Yeah . . . uh huh . . . Well, I've done it at school, and well, 'cause there's people there to impress . . . my teacher was spotting it, but he said he didn't spot that much.
M. Although people can tell you that, but unless you really feel it yourself, it doesn't really make any difference, does it?
C. No.
M. Have you ever felt yourself do them and you know you did it, you know "that was mine"--have you felt that?
C. Well, once I did, in a fun meet. I did it by myself, and they were pretty good.
M. So you know you can do it.
C. Yeah, but I'm kinda scared.

Description and Discussion

Carmelina. At the meet Carmelina left out her back handspring. Even though she wanted to do it and intended to do it, in the middle of her tumbling approach, at the last second, she stopped and did not do the move. She then had to cover herself by substituting dance. Several days after the meet she still cannot explain why she left it out, since she knows she is capable of the move and has indeed performed it on her own earlier in the year at a fun meet.

Carmelina has been thinking about it, though, and feels that her confidence was down. She had missed approximately three weeks of gymnastics, and she felt scared to try things. During this time she did some show-off stuff at school and some gymnastics work with her physical education teacher, but assurances from these sources did not make her feel confident or competent about a move that she did not feel her self doing, on her own.

A doer can make in-routine decisions based on fear, lack of confidence, confusion, or anxiety, but the decision has implications for her conduct and performance for the remainder of the routine. Deciding to omit a move is a serious decision, usually made because things do not "feel right." Having a move is very much a felt thing, and being told that she has it does not really mean much if the person does not feel it. Following a disappointment at a competition, a doer tends to strengthen her resolve and invests time and effort into rebuilding her competence and confidence. She knows that this is what is required and is willing to do it.

Sylvie

S. Yes! That's what they're afraid of, I think. And anyway, then she started saying, "Well, why don't you go into social work?" I say, "Listen, I know what I want. I don't want to work in welfare. Psychology is the thing. I don't care if it's hard work, I can do it. If I can get the degree, then okay, don't lower me into social work."

M. Lots of people with psychology degrees do go into social work.

S. Oh, I know. But I'm so good at one on one. why deny me that?

M. You have to be tough back, I guess. That's too bad.

S. It really put me down. It really bothered me. But I'm

going to try, at least.
M. Mental toughness.
S. I think that's the hardest part, is being tough up there.
It's hard.
M. Well, you've got to do it all the time.
S. I know.
M. Maybe you don't think about it any more, but you've always
had to do that.
S. Yeah, probably.
M. No matter where you go, there will be new people whose
attitudes you don't know.
S. Yeah, that's right.

Description and Discussion

Sylvie. For a person with CP or any other disability, choosing a career and then having the opportunity to pursue that career are challenges, and one does not necessarily lead to the other. The choice of a career usually involves a person's considering her talents and preferences and balancing them against any physical or other demands that the career might make on the disability. Some careers are more accessible to a person with a physical difference or limitation than others, and people with disabilities generally recognize this. However, differences or disabilities can more often than not be viewed as advantages rather than limitations, although too many people consider the negative scenarios without ever imagining that there might be positive ones.

Having mental toughness is probably the hardest part of CP or most disabilities, and the person has to have it all the time, since the challenges and attitudes do not stop. As a person with a disability gets older, she faces many of the same pigeonhole, stereotyping challenges, except that the form and context may change.

A person with a disability also has to be mentally tough to be able to handle the many kinds of hurts and disappointments she encounters, but she is not invulnerable and some things do get to her, although not as much or as often. A person would not be normal if nothing ever affected her, and pretending that nothing hurts would only make her emotionally sick. This sick, unauthentic approach is no way to live.

Leslie

L. And I'd like to go to maybe another team, maybe Beverly, with a lot of girls I kind of hang around with. Like, I have my separate . . . my ball team that I used to play with, like, I get along with them really well, good friends and everything, but I have my separate friends that I'd like to be with; it should be good, too. And I played for Beverly, and they have pretty good coaches, so . . . The only thing with community league baseball is you have a lot of friends, especially when you get to be my age, because everybody works, and a lot of girls could really care less if they're on a team or not. They're just there because some days they want to play ball and then, you know.
M. The commitment's not the same.
L. No, no, not at all.
M. And when you're older no one makes you go. Like, you go because you feel some kind of responsibility or connection.
L. That's right.
M. And if you don't feel that, then, um . . .
L. Yeah, that's right. That's the only thing about it that's bad. The only thing I think I'll have a problem with is if I do go over [to Beverly], and a lot of my friends have really bad attitudes. And once I get there I might get into their attitudes. If I played here, it might be different. I don't know.

L. Like, they went out and partied the night before, and our team was younger, and we have more discipline; we couldn't do things like that. So I even noticed it last year, 'cause that's why I know when I move up this year, I go to that team, I have to watch it. I don't know.

L. I think with my commitment to work and everything, I think I'd just rather play community league, because I don't have the time or commitment to make it with a team like that [The Babes]. I wish I did, but I can't. But some things, when you get older, you have to think about.
M. Yeah, you do. Well, you have to make decisions.
L. Oh, yeah. Uh huh.

L. It's not like, oh, you've practiced, and you've got this right down pat, and you know when you go into a game, like, you don't think things, but you know that . . . like, you don't "know," but it does help you, practicing.
M. So it's not useless.
L. No, no.
M. You think you need it?
L. Oh, yeah.
M. Even when you're playing a fair bit.
L. That's like ringette; ringette's like that, too. If you practice and practice and work on plays, they don't really help, like, you don't think [in a game], "Oh, right now I can use this play, right here." It just automatically comes to you. That's like baseball.
M. You develop a mentality, a mind set.
L. That's right.
M. Yeah, I guess the more familiar you get with the way you're meant to behave on the field, the less you have to think about; it's just a familiar thing.
L. That's right, yeah.

L. You *have* to, that's part of it. It's like work. A lot of times I don't feel like going, but I have to go; that's my duty.
M. Part of being more mature?
L. Well, if you join something, you should finish it out, that's the way I look at it. That's the way my dad is: You start something, you don't quit two weeks down the road. . . .
M. Or if you don't feel like it?
L. No, there's got to be a good reason behind it. I think that appointments or anything, if you *say* or start something, you always do what you say you're going to do, because that means you're a reliable person, and you know, you don't do that, 'cause if everyone in the world did that, could you imagine how unorganized this world would be?

Description and Discussion

Leslie. As players move up in organized team leagues, things change. In community leagues the players are older, and the self-discipline and commitment are no longer "givens." When a player gets older no one "makes" her go. Instead, she goes because she feels some kind of responsibility or connection to the game, and if she does not feel that, then she tends to miss more games and practices than she attends. Many older players do indeed connect their on-field conduct with their off-field conduct, but if one or both are influenced by negative attitudes, work and commitment tend to be casualties. In community leagues the notion of team does not always transcend personal differences, as it often does in junior leagues. Community league coaches cannot enforce a "team ethic" and cannot make players get along if the players do not want to get along.

As players move up they are faced with decisions about where to play and with whom. They have to decide about time commitments, priorities, what is manageable. They have to decide if they are strong enough to play with yet resist lazy, negative attitudes. They come to a decision about whether the physically active things they do will contribute to rather than detract from their lives. They come to realize that there are many decisions to be made, and many kinds of decisions to be made, and some things really have to be thought about and considered carefully and thoughtfully.

Most activities and sports are complicated and multi-dimensional in their own way but often appear deceptively easy; therefore practicing and practices are important and are never useless, even when players are playing on a regular basis. Games help players with developing skills and making decisions, but they do not replace practices. Practices are different in degree and kind. A player does not improve by doing alone; she also needs to learn about what she is doing. She needs to learn new things, she needs to develop a familiarity with basics, and she needs to realize that she knows and what she knows. A player develops a mind set when she practices, and the familiarity with skills, movements, and decisions carries over into the game situation. A practice does not allow a player to "know" what to do with certainty in every situation in the game, but it does enable her to play better. Practicing does not give a person perfection or predictability, but it does give some measure of control, and it helps a person develop a kind and degree of knowing.

Going to practice, especially when a person does not feel like it, is part of what being active is all about. There is a commitment involved and hence a duty of sorts to be fulfilled in the name of that commitment. A person's word (i.e., commitment) should stand for and translate into her conduct. Maturity may have something to do with how and to what degree commitment informs conduct. However, it seems to be important for a doer to be aware of why and for whom (self or others) she is doing; in effect, what and/or who authorizes the doing? A doer has to keep regaining the doing and regaining a sense of self within the doing. She has to own it yet belong to it in a special way. There has to be a necessary tension between "owning" and "belonging to," and if one dominates the other, then both the doer and the doing run the risk of becoming something they are not and standing for something in which they do not believe.

Commitment and investment are related. A person commits to a doing and then follows through on that commitment with investment of self, time, and effort. If people did not follow through on their verbal commitments, there would be very little basis for trust or dependability. Following through usually entails investment of some kind or another.

Travis

M. If you were going to teach someone one thing about your sport that you thought was the most important thing, what would it be?

T. Play with guys your own skill level. [Laughs]
M. Really?
T. Like, don't go around and play with guys who are twice as good as you are, 'cause it's no fun.
M. No fun, eh?
T. Yeah . . . Play the game for fun, basically; play on a good team that wins. [Laughs]
M. Say, if you could pick out a skill that was important?
T. Basically, once you get the ball, to know what to do with it, like know where everybody is, and to be quick with it and just, like, have it, move around somebody, and pass it straight away.
M. Awareness?
T. Yeah.

Description and Discussion

Travis. Important things about soccer are developing good individual skills, recognizing the importance of one's own individual effort, having fun or playing the game for fun, and developing field awareness and decision making. Moving is also important; standing still during a soccer game does not seem to be highly valued and is usually greeted with loud and pointed criticism.

A player cannot control what the whole team does, but he/she can decide and control what he/she does. While it is accepted that people do not make mistakes on purpose, one must also realize that decisions are not just arbitrary choices between or among options where one option can be as good as another. What a person does counts, and a person has to make the "right" decision and do what is best or called for in the situation he/she encounters.

Commentary

There are different kinds of decisions and different levels of self at which decisions are made. Carmelina's was a lived, unexplainable decision; Travis advocates making a decision, deciding where one stands, then doing; Sylvie's lifeworld is a demanding one filled with opposition and assumptions, and the decision to be mentally tough is ongoing; Leslie realizes, as do all our doers, that decisions have consequences. A doer lives her/his decision and then lives with it, the ongoing demand being to walk one's talk.

Investment

Investment, from the Latin investire, to invest: "an enstalment, enrobing, endowrie, imploiment, investing," is defined as the act of putting on clothes or vestments; the action of investing or fact of being invested with an office, right, or attribute; the investing of money or capital; the amount of money or capital invested in some species of property.

When a doer decides to do, she/he then, as the Apostle Paul advises, "puts on the whole armor of God," as it were. She/he enrobes herself/himself with the character of doing. The doer is now investing "capital" (time, energy, effort, body, attitude) into some species of property (the doing or object/happening). In doing so, the doer is then invested with office, rights, or attributes. The kind of investment (energy, effort, time, and so forth) is as significant as the degree of investment (how much effort, time, and so forth). Many doers are aware of their investment during their doing: sweating, distress, awareness of time, exhaustion; many doers are aware of the investment after the doing: soreness, tiredness, exhilaration, disappointment, triumph. Many experience both kinds of awareness. Many have a sense of degree and kind of investment before the doing starts.

All doers are invested by virtue of their doing. They are invested with pride, humility, confidence, "knowing," connectedness. When doers do, they are installed into the doing. They clothe themselves in the doing, and they outfit themselves for the doing. They invest and are invested.

Amanda and Tony

M. Would you like to start, Amanda? How old are you?
A. Twelve.
M. How long have you been dancing?
A. Ummm . . .
M. Long time?
A. For eight years.
M. Really. So you were really young when you started, . . . just a little thing, five or six.
A. Yes.
M. Does it seem like you've been dancing that long?
A. No.

M. How about you, Tony? How long have you been dancing?
T. Three years.
M. And how old are you?
T. Thirteen.

M. So, what kind of stuff do you do, Amanda? What's your typical week like--your typical dancing week, say, this time of year?
A. I'm getting ready for a show; testing, festival piece.
M. So what kind of work goes into that? Do you have rehearsals, or do you have to learn routines?
A. Lots. Everyday. Every class there's so much time spent on each thing.

Description and Discussion

Amanda and Tony. There would seem to be a definite investment of time and self involved in dance. These two dancers expressed the somewhat typical pattern in dance training and study of working on and working at elements over a period of time until these are to a point where the dancer can then move on to more demanding elements, and so on.

Commitment and discipline seem to be necessary. The pattern seems to be work on an element, master it, move on.

There is an acceptance of hard work, putting in time, practicing, the level of the elements--"difficulty" as necessary. Both children expressed liking and enjoying dance, but neither could express how he/she felt about dance or why he/she liked it. There seems to be an ineffable quality that cannot be adequately expressed.

Leslie

M. Do you miss it?
L. Yeah, and even though I want to do it, I know I want to do it, and I have to do it, you know, because you don't feel good, but it's hard to get back into the routine; it is very hard, yeah.
M. Is it a whole-effort thing? Like, are you worried about re-injuring it, like, if you put too much into it, you'll hurt it again?
L. That mostly, but it's just laziness, I guess. A lot of people get lazy; you know, once you're off of something for a long time, you do get lazy. It's hard to get back into it.
M. Discipline.
L. Yeah.
M. What does discipline mean to you? Do you think it's necessary?
L. Yeah, I think, a lot of sports, if you want to stay with it you have to be active, and, like, if you get lazy, you could go on [like that] forever, and you never get back into it, so you really have to discipline yourself with any kind of sport; it's like that.
M. Do you think you change when you're not doing things, like, your personality, your attitude?
L. Yeah, uh huh, 'cause I know when I do a lot of exercise and eat right, I feel better.

L. That's right. If I want to do something, I'll do it on my own and make myself feel better for myself. But I don't do it for someone else.

L. . . . Sometimes when I do muscle-toning things like running or lifting weights, you'll notice this about me, I don't get results right away, and sometimes that'll make me so mad that I'll do it too much because I'm not used to it, and I still . . . but I noticed that I was mad, nothing worked, so I ended up quitting because I was really mad, and I never noticed what it did for my body until I quit, and then a month later I looked in a mirror, and I'm, "What am I doing? Why did I quit?" But I don't notice results on myself. A lot of other people do. . . . My mom does, my friends do.

L. If I don't see results right away, I get totally just turned right off. . . . Yeah, because that's like in ringette or any sport, if you, ah, do something like that and you have to wait for it, like, ringette, you're learning something and waiting and waiting, and you never get it, but after a while it kinda comes on you, 'cause it feels better when it comes. But you just have to wait. . . . It pays off, it does in the end. It's just, when you're doing something, it's really . . . you know, if you don't get something right away, you know.

M. Sometimes I think, too, that when I spend time on something I should feel like I'm working hard, sweating or sore or something, like I'm proving to myself how hard I'm working, so the effort is worth it, worth the time. . . .

L. Yeah, I agree with you, oh yeah. If I don't sweat when I'm doing something, that really bothers me, but sometimes when I don't sweat and I . . . there are some days when I guess you can sweat, and there are other days when you don't at all.

M. I guess the next day you feel it.

L. Yeah! And the day after that.

Description and Discussion

Leslie. Well-intentioned, concerned "advice" from others can often be met with resentment and defiance, since the person getting back into a personal wellness commitment needs to do it for herself, not in response to an external, manipulated stimulus. Defiance and discipline seem to be linked in that a person can be so obsessed with avoiding external manipulation that her subsequent defiance can be self-destructive; yet it is this same doggedness and tenacity that enable her to be committed and self-disciplined. Intensity is desirable, but a doer has to be aware of when what she is doing is damaging rather than building. Intentionality is a, if not the, significant consideration in a person's commitment to personal well-being, and the "will-to-do" must come from within. Self-determination is preferred over manipulation.

Self-image can be inaccurate, and an unrealistic or disparaging view of improvements or change in size or appearance can lead to disappointment and frustration. Coming to see and know one's self in a new way often involves waiting, having patience, and persevering. As well as being difficult in themselves, they are also a part of what makes change so difficult. Waiting and working are often aspects of earning an experience, and doers sometimes need to be reminded that not getting results right away is part of acquiring skills and getting better. Waiting is part of the process of "getting" something, but when one is in the actual doing, waiting and knowing that one has to wait can be difficult.

Feeling how hard one is working is "evidence" of sorts of how much effort is being put into the work; however, this "feel" can be deceptive. A person can work hard and not "feel" anything until the next day, when soreness sets in, and this soreness can continue on into an additional day. Not avoiding soreness is as significant as feeling the effort during the actual doing.

Effort may not be immediately apparent, and this applies to almost any activity. Waiting for results and having patience are part of a commitment to perseverance, and perseverance is commitment to a larger investment. Investment may not be immediately apparent to a doer; the doer has to have faith.

Travis, Param, Danny

M. I was wondering how you feel about hard work and working at things.
T. There's different kinds of hard work: Hard work where

you're doing it and not even thinking about what you're doing; and hard work where you're thinking about what you're doing--then it's hard. Like, you're not really thinking about what you're doing; you're just kinda . . . you're working, but your mind's somewhere else. But, like, if you think about what you're doing, then it comes harder, and you feel it more.

M. What do you think, Param? What makes you go when you don't want to be there?
P. Well, um, willpower, basically, 'cause I want to play the game.
M. How about you, Danny?
D. I don't know. I always like going.
M. You do, eh?
D. Yeah, 'cause it's better than just, well, even if I have something else to do, that's about the, well, I'm not saying I do it. It's better than just sitting around doing nothing. And I like to go, to play and stuff.
M. Do you think the things you do, like baseball, take a lot of your time and energy?
D. Takes a lot of my time; not too much of my energy, though.
M. Is that 'cause it's enjoyable?
D. Yeah.
M. And you don't mind that time investment; it's worth it?
D. Yeah.
M. How about you, Param? Your stuff takes a lot of your time?
P. Yes, and it takes a lot of energy except when you're running around, then it takes a lot of nervous energy.
M. Yeah, and Travis, your stuff takes a fair bit of time.
T. Yeah, and energy.

Description and Discussion

Travis, Param, Danny. There are thought to be different kinds of hard work. There is one kind where the person is doing it but is not really thinking about it or not really connected with or to it, and whose mind is elsewhere; there is another kind where the person is thinking about or is connected with or to, or is dwelling with or in what is being done; then it (the doing) is hard. If a person connects with or thinks about what he/she is doing, then it becomes or is harder, and he/she feels it more.

There are times when people do not feel like going to their activities, even activities that they like. This can be cause of overscheduling, tiredness, and other commitments, among other reasons. People tend to go to things when they do not want to because they know that it is fun and they usually do enjoy it, they have made a monetary investment, or they are expected to be there and they do not want to disappoint. There also seem to be deeper "reasons," however: a sense of commitment to oneself and to the activity, and a feeling of perseverance in the face of changing conditions.

Having something to shoot for at the end of an event is important for some people's involvement and enjoyment, and willpower and a desire to play are also important. Others find that they always "want to" and derive satisfaction from working on something that they really want and realizing at the outcome that they worked for it or earned it. Too, "doing nothing" is not a preferred activity, and "doing" or "playing" and all that goes with them are usually liked and enjoyed.

Activities require, perhaps exact, time and energy investment. Sometimes one is emphasized more than the other, sometimes one is noticed more than the other, and sometimes differentiations are made between (or among) kinds of time and energy. Generally, what is being done is considered worth the investment(s).

This project was one of many kinds of investment, all of them appreciated.

Commentary

Investment is one way that a doer can earn the "ownership" rights in the owning: belonging-to relation. Investment is also a responsibility that a doer bears for the doing. Energy, effort, and time are offered as particular kinds of investment, and the *time* investment is noticed more in these particular lived experiences by these particular doers.

Change

Change derives from the Latin *cambi-um*, exchange, from Latin *cambire*, to barter, exchange; likely cognate with the Greek *ka*__, to bend, turn, turn back. Change is defined as the act or fact of changing, the substitution of one thing for another, succession of one thing in place of another; the act of changing; alteration in the state or quality of anything; the fact of becoming other than it was; variation, mutation (change of heart: conversion to a different frame of mind); to put or take another (or others) instead of; to substitute another (or others) for, replace by another (or others); to give up in exchange for something else; to give and receive reciprocally, exchange, interchange; to make (a thing) other than it was; to render different, alter, modify, transmute.

When an object/happening asks me to change, it turns me back on myself. It asks me to consider other perspectives, other methods, compare them with my own, and make a decision. To do this I must then notice my own perspective and method, and this can be more complicated than it seems. I have been seeing through this lens for so long that I may not realize it is there, much less consider its viability in relation to other lenses.

Changing can mean substituting one thing for another, altering the state or quality of the thing, giving and receiving reciprocally, and, ultimately, becoming other than what was. Change asks me to become "the other"--to turn back on myself, to stand and see me as "the other" would see me, to stand in the place of "the other" (instead of my own place) and "see" from that viewpoint. Change asks me to become, at least momentarily, other than myself and, having done this, to decide what my course of action will be.

Substituting one thing for another or altering a state or quality does not mean that I negate me or what I stand for. It means that I give to and receive from Being reciprocally. It means that I enter into a different degree and kind of relationship with Being, for in even considering the change I am already other than what I was. I am considering possibles instead of certainties, and if I decide, for now, not to change, I have a renewed sense of respect for what I stand for. My conviction now means more than it did before; my connection (relatedness) to Being seems to be more attuned. I have more confidence in my grounds not because they are my grounds, but because, having stood as "other," I decide that they are, for the moment, the more informed grounds.

Sylvie

M. A couple of things you said last week that I really liked. You said you liked doing different things, not the same thing, time after time.
S. Uh huh.
M. Have you always been like that? Like, you don't like monotony?
S. No, I don't like the same old stuff.
M. How about your workout?
S. Yeah, I get bored at that.
M. Then what do you do?
S. I was doing pulleys and I wanted to do something else, so I built up. . . . That's the only way I could change, right? . . . And the same with school . . . .
M. And, like, Europe will really change your television viewing habit.
S. Because those kind of changes I always do--drastic stuff-- and my parents and family are just, "Oh, my God, stop her!" And they're just in a panic, but they can't do anything.
M. Is it the whole idea of doing something new and different?

S. Well, yeah, and I'm tired of the same old people. Like, I love you guys and all that, but there's a time in your life when you want to meet new people and have new ideas, new conversations. . . . Like, I can't really express it. . . .
M. Yeah.
S. Like, I met you only a while ago, and that's great, because I needed to make new friends. I still want my old friends, but I want new friends, new people; it brings change.
M. Yeah, it does.
S. And difference.
M. And then you've got to adjust.
S. Yeah!
M. You learn more.
S. Yeah, you grow too. New discoveries; I'll learn things. That's interesting.

S. In a way, yeah. I wanted a break from school. I've lived with it for twelve years, and I want to get away from it. People said, "You're going to get bored," and they were right. You do. Nothing to do. I mean, going out is boring if it's all you do. That's all I was doing.

Description and Discussion

Sylvie. Monotony or sameness can make a person unappreciative, bored, complacent, unmoving. Change in the form of challenge, differentness, or newness is often sought by a person who finds herself growing sluggish in a situation which is always the same. Such change seems to work best when it is self-initiated, even when the consequences may be unpredictable or difficult. Such change can be met with resistance, caution, and suspicion, but it can make the person more appreciative and can allow her to learn and grow.

It seems that a person has to be involved in something worthwhile as an intentional, autonomous, authentic human being and that something ought to push her to be reflective, self-honest, and responsible.

It seems that a person can grow tired of taking a break and doing nothing. A year of partying and free time may seem attractive initially, but the sameness of it diminishes its appeal after a while.

Leslie

L. I guess if someone never pushed you, like me, I'm kind of a lazy person, and if I get used to doing something, I hate to change things. That's just my worst thing.
M. Changing?
L. I hate changing anything, like, I, if it's good the way it is, why change it? And I hate things, like, usually I have a time schedule of everything, and it usually happens around the same time every day, and if something changes, that just bothers me; it does. So if somebody never pushed me to do something, then I may never get it done, and I may never improve in anything. So if someone pushed you to do it, you'll improve.
M. You think that's what you want anyway, is to improve?
L. Yeah, sure.
M. You don't get into something just to stay the same and never improve, right?
L. No, because that's boring! Like, not challenging any more. If you can't move on and learn new things . . . . There's always something you can learn and practice; in every game, every practice, you can. Yeah, I think that's right, and I never thought of it that way: If someone never pushed me to do nothing, I would probably stay the same. . . .
M. You think so? You wouldn't do it yourself?
L. Some things, sometimes. You push yourself, too.

Description and Discussion

Leslie. Once a person embarks on a training program, changes of any kind, such as additional exercises, a new or different training area, costs associated with training, and schedule adjustments, can be frustrating and bothersome, particularly when they are sudden and therefore unprepared for. How a person takes these changes and the decisions she makes seem to depend on how important it is to her to keep training.

Some people are lazy about changing things, particularly if they see no good reason for change, if they value regularity and predictability in their schedules and daily lives, if they get used to doing things in a particular way, and if they are left completely unencouraged. Change is resisted when it threatens familiarity, security, predictability, responsibility, and/or control. An extreme resistance to change can be considered as a "character defect" that needs work.

People are able to push themselves to change and to work harder, but coaches, teachers, and other significant others are thought to be extremely influential, in an empowering way, if they are not overbearing. There is a difference between pushing someone to do something and forcing someone to do something. Forcing a person by way of fear or shame can trigger resentment, increase resistance, and turn the person off the activity for good. Children, and learners in general, need to be involved in deciding what is done to them and for them if the "pushing" and subsequent "improving" are to be meaningful.

A person usually gets into an activity because she wants to improve. She does not want to stay the same, since this makes the activity boring and unchallenging. Boredom and frustration set in when a person cannot move on and learn new things, and sometimes a push from outside herself is what a person needs. Since there is always something to be learned and/or practiced in every practice and every game, boredom, frustration, and anguish need not happen at all if learner and teacher are oriented to the activity, open to suggestions and options, and practicing mutual respect and commitment.

Commentary

Absence of change or sameness can offer a security blanket of regularity that can be misleading and deadening. Doers may become comfortable with sameness, but then there seems to be a primordial call for movement.

Self-Honesty

Honesty, from the Latin honest-are, to honor, dignify, adorn, embellish, to confer honor upon, to honor, honor, is defined as the quality of being honest; uprightness of disposition and conduct; integrity, truthfulness, straightforwardness; the quality opposed to lying, cheating, or stealing.

Integrity, from the Latin integere, soundness, is defined as strict personal honesty and independence, completeness, unity, soundness. Upright is defined as in a vertical position, direction, or stance. moral, honorable. Truthful is defined as consistently telling the truth. honest. Moral is defined as of or concerned with the discernment or instruction of what is good and evil; arising from conscience, being or acting in accordance with established standards of good behavior.

When I am honest with someone or about something, I do her/him it honor. Being honest means that I do honor to that which makes the thing (or the person) what it (he/she) is. It is not evaluative. It is giving honor to or dignifying what is.

In De Partibus Animalium, Aristotle (1958) notes that "man alone of all animals stands erect." As a human, a body-subject, I have the privilege of standing in the world; hence I bear the responsibility for being upright, for standing for discernment of what is good and evil, not in the "judgemental-condemning" sense, but in the "recognition-decision" sense. Standing in the world means that I also must accept my corresponding vulnerability, the "ontological limitation by which our noble stature is ultimately measured" (Levin, 1985, p. 349).

"But to man it is no easy task to remain for any length of time on his feet, his body demanding rest in a sitting position" (Aristotle, 1958, p. 689 b 19 21). If I am to remain upright, if I am to continue to stand for something, then I must nourish my standing both physically (resting) and reflectively.

Amanda and Tony

M. Aside from things you learn about yourself, what kind of things do you think dancing trains you for as an athlete--does it?
T. Yeah.
M. Like, what does it train?
T. Well, it trains you, ah, discipline . . . . Like, you have to work and work hard.
M. Uh huh.
T. That's it.
M. Does it make you stronger?
T. Yeah . . . and confidence.
M. Yeah. Does it make your muscles stronger?
T. Yeah.
M. How about speed or endurance.
T. Probably.
M. And flexibility, for sure.
T. Yeah.

M. What kinds of things has it trained in you, Amanda? [Pause] Has it made you stronger? More confident?
A. Yeah.

Description and Discussion

Amanda and Tony. Dance offers much to dancers: the opportunity to get to know themselves and to develop discipline, confidence, and athletic ability. Dancers learn to work hard and to persevere, but they learn when to surrender to a move and when to keep at it. These children know when it is time to move on; perhaps what was there to be learned was not necessarily a physical skill.

There is the opportunity to think about and reflect upon what they are doing. These children are thoughtful, even though they cannot or do not always talk about what they do and what they think.

While the interview process was enjoyable, after initial discomfort, intrusion into privacy was a factor. Dance is close the heart, and talking about it is sometimes difficult, sometimes an interference between a dancer and his or her craft.

Carmelina

M. Do you enjoy all these kind of sports things?
C. Yeah, I love sports.
M. You try out for them all, don't you?
C. Yeah, except basketball, 'cause my marks went low . . . but next year.
M. So, in order for you to do the kind of athletics you want to do, you have to be good at other things, too, eh?
C. Yeah.
M. A lot of people think that people who do sports are just dumb.
C. A lot of people are, though.
M. Some of them are?
C. Yeah. 'Cause if you do one sport after another, they don't have enough time.
M. It takes a lot of time, doesn't it?
C. Yeah. Unless you have to give up something.
M. Yeah, but you've got . . . practices and games; that's a fair bit of time.
C. Uh huh.
M. Then you got to do homework . . . and live, I mean, have a social life, you hope.
C. I know . . . yeah.

Description and Discussion

Carmelina. Self-honesty and decision continue to play a part in a doer's relationship with a given activity. Self-honesty is invoked when a doer has to come to terms with how she has done this season and how she chooses to finish it. She can decide to participate in the remaining one or two events, or she can decide to forego them. She can also justify either decision, but only she knows the reasons behind whatever decision she makes, and she will be the one who lives with the consequences of it, be they self-satisfaction, guilt, wistfulness, disappointment, or whatever.

Sylvie

M. At one point last week you mentioned how when you were younger you used to say, "Why me?"
S. Right . . . .
M. And you don't seem to do that that much any more, is that so?
S. No, no I don't. I just figure it's done. Nothing I can do about . . . what happened was, it was an accident. I wasn't supposed to be like this. And, you know, as you grow up you kind of live with that. You try and say, "What would have been or could have been," like, and then, just, there's nothing you can do, and if you harp on it, you're going to be miserable.
M. Yeah.
S. But just in the past few years I've been really accepting it and stuff. It doesn't bother me.
M. Did you struggle with it before the past few years?
S. Oh, yeah. Oh, I did, because I was at that age . . . around thirteen or fourteen you become aware of, that you are different physically and that other people notice, and they stare. I had to adapt to that, too, and realize that I can't do everything. It's mostly accepting. But now it doesn't bother me.

M. You don't think you need to be felt sorry for?
S. Why?
M. How would you rather be treated? . . . Like, can you tell when someone's feeling sorry for you?
S. Yeah. You can tell. And you can tell if someone is uncomfortable with you. You grow to know, inside. And you try and . . . make them at ease. With me, it works. They forget so easy.
M. What about staring, looks? You can see it all over their faces. . . .
S. Sure you can. You know what I do? I look at them right in the eye. I look at them. And then they don't know what to do. And then I smile. And then they relax and they smile back. See, you've got to get them if they stare. But staring is different from looking. I stare, too. It's a human thing. Anything, you now, that's different, you can't help it.
M. I guess we have to learn more about being with others--honestly.

M. I was going to ask you, do you think about your body much?
S. No. It, sometimes when my balance is a bit shaky I have to

concentrate a bit more, but, no.
M. You don't think about yourself negatively?
S. Sometimes, when I have bad days. Not about my physical. I think, "Oh, I'm a dog" or something, but that's when I want a guy and no one's there, but then I find another one, and everything's okay.
M. It is, eh?
S. Yeah. [Laughs] I like who I am. I do. But, you know, everyone has her bad days; you can expect them.
M. But you don't have negative feelings about your body?
S. No, no. I have a good body. I think I'm attractive, in that aspect. It's nice to be skinny.
M. You like being little, eh?
S. Yeah, I do.

S. I think I appreciate more things than other people. Like putting on a watch. You guys think, "No big deal," but to me it is. . . . And, um, earrings . . . . you know, you guys don't pay attention to that, but I do.
M. Do you notice more or think about things more?
S. Think about how to get it done. I don't go, like, "How am I going to do this or do that?" It's just natural. You grow to do that.

M. Can something still be difficult or challenging once you know how to do it?
S. Even if you have the know, just do do it, it kills. But it's good. I like it.
M. Yeah, it's a good feeling. I like it, too.
S. I'm not addicted, though, like a fanatic. I just do it. . . . I don't know why, I just do. I like coming here, 'cause I like the people.

S. I never think about it. Sometimes when I meet new people I ask my friends if the other person knows about me, . . . and my friends say, "Know what?" and I say, "That I'm disabled," and they don't even notice or bother. So I'm going to try to stop that, too. I shouldn't do that, but because of past experience . . . I try to explain. But no more. Nah. You either accept me for me or buzz off.
M. Do you think you'd be different without CP?
S. I think I would. I know that during school I would have had more males chasing me. And I would have been a bad kid, I think.
M. You think so?
S. Oh, yeah. I really think this tames me down. It does. I'm serious. I really think it's a blessing sometimes. Now I'm so wild with it, imagine me without it. I can't even imagine. I wouldn't have been so caring. It's kind of, I'm glad it happened sometimes 'cause I know what would have happened.
M. You didn't get into any sports in high school?
S. No, never was interested.

M. No?

S. Which is good, 'cause I can't do them anyway. I've never been interested, and people say, "Because of your disability?" and I say, "No, I'm not a sports person." Like, here, they wanted me to go into some athlete thing, and I said, "Forget it." It's just not me. I'm just hanging out, and that's it.

M. But you like the training?

S. Yeah. I just do it 'cause I like it. It's not 'cause I'm on a goal; I have no goal. It's not 'cause I want to compete or anything. It's to do it.

M. For your own good?

S. Yeah. For me.

S. To a point. After a while you know it's 'cause you're disabled, and they're, like, "Wow!" People go nuts. Like, "What are you wowing about? Calm down."When I tell them I drive, they freak right out; when I say I'm going to Europe, same thing. Why is it a big deal? I'm not sure. Maybe it's 'cause nothing fizzes on me any more.

M. Maybe others have expectations of you, and when you exceed their expectations, they're surprised.

S. Blown away. My whole school would say, "You're incredible!"

M. You are a good girl, Syl.

S. Maybe it's 'cause I do it but I don't know it. Like, it's not something I plan or really think about. I just do it. But they see it as something amazing. Sometimes it's encouraging, but sometimes it makes me feel bad; 'cause, like, she can do it, why can't I? Which is why I think my best degree would be in psychology. I've been through it. That's an edge I've got: . . . I've been there. Life is hard on everyone. Everyone has tough times.

M. Do you think you learn from those kind of times?

S. Oh, yeah.

M. What kind of things do you learn?

S. That you can survive no matter what. I'm kinda religious.

S. Well, no, I didn't have to wait. See, I'm such a conniver because I went to Glenrose and thought, "Forget this noise!" I went to A.M.A. lessons and got it quicker. Like, I'm not into waiting around for something special to do it for me. Forget it. Like, if I have trouble doing something, I call for help, like, "Please help," and if they don't come, like, within ten minutes, well, forget it; I do it myself, and I don't care how I do it, I get it done.

Description and Discussion

Sylvie. It seems that a person has to struggle with CP, acknowledging the "injustice" of the birth-process accident and coming to terms with the daily lived experience of CP before coming to accept it in a meaningful rather than a defeatist way. The person has to learn to live with the "what is," realizing that if she dwells on the "what if," she will only be miserable. The lived experience of CP provides many opportunities for recollection and reflection. A person with CP probably appreciates the intricacies and complexities of ordinary things such as putting on a watch more than most people. She pays attention to how to get something done without consciously analyzing it, and thinking about "how to do" becomes a "natural attitude" that she grows into rather than something that she learns in a formalized, structured fashion.

A person with a disability can influence the attitudes and actions of others by her own attitudes and actions. Suggested are developing perspectives on and responses to typical human responses to differentness such as staring and discomfort, not exaggerating that which makes her different or projecting her different-ness as the only important or representative aspect of her whole self, and not "acting disabled." "Acting disabled" means moping, expecting to be pitied, and "harping" on the disability. Harping on the disability makes everyone else aware of it and guilty about it and makes the disabled person a miserable victim.

It seems that people need to learn more about how to be with each other honestly. Honest responses are preferred to contrived or "appropriate" ones. What is needed is more sensitivity on everyone's part and some effort on the part of the non-disabled in the direction of asking questions of the disabled about their condition, capability, and preferences instead of making assumptions. Some people do worry about how they come across as being helpful or insulting. There is a fine line separating the two, but, generally, one person offers help to another who appears to need help, whether she is in a wheelchair or has a disability or not.

Age 13 or 14 is a particularly vulnerable time to be "identified as different" both by self and by peers. There are unwritten "norms" for success in school, and many implicit social, athletic, and appearance-related "standards" for acceptance among peers. A person with a special condition has to adapt to being different and to others' responses to that difference. She has to realize that she cannot do everything and begin accepting herself. When she is accepting and comfortable with herself, it translates to others, and if the others remain problematic, then that is their problem.

CP means that a person has to pay attention to certain things. Balance is an important consideration. Some days a person can be more off balance than others, whether from inner ear disfunction or body position. Other days balance may be no problem, although walking usually involves being careful and methodical, in the best circumstances.

Body image is also a significant consideration. Any person can have an "ugly" day, a day when she feels unattractive, and a person with CP is no exception. What is significant is what she attributes her ugliness to: her condition or how she happens to be feeling that day. This is under the person's control and can have a great effect on how she feels about herself as a person.

"Adjusting" to her body depends on how awkward a person feels, what kind of "adjustments" she has to make, and how she does the "adjusting."

For example, falling may not be recognized as "falling" if it happens all the time, and "adjusting" might not be thought of as "adjusting" when it happens all the time. When a person with CP does something differently, it does not feel different or like an adjustment to her; it is simply the way she does things; i.e., it is her "normal."

Improvement in training is noticed when a person can do her regular workout, but with more repetitions and heavier weight. Improvements can also be noticed in the changing proportions and shape of muscles, in balance, posture, strength, dexterity, and general well-being. Weight training can be a challenging, engaging activity without becoming competitive. The person can be committed to it and excited about it without becoming obsessive or fanatic. Vocal encouragement from well-wishers or training partners is a matter of personal preference. Some people feel really encouraged by others yelling and pushing them; others are bothered by it and would rather push themselves.

A person need not have a specific "training objective" in mind; indeed, the best training is often done for the person's own good and for the sheer joy of doing. Even when a person has the know-how, doing the thing can still be difficult; however, doing something difficult, something which requires effort, is a good feeling and an enjoyable doing. People who train tend to like what is happening to their bodies, they like how they feel when they train, they like moving weight and feeling strong, and they enjoy the totality of experiences offered and disclosed to them by weight training.

CP as a condition has many challenges and negatives about it, but it can also have some benefits. A person with CP who tends to be wild and impulsive would probably be even more so without it, so in this case it could have a calming, self-controlling, self-reflecting effect. Quite possibly, CP also contributes to a more empathetic, compassionate attitude towards others.

While some people might argue that a person who is a new acquaintance should be "prepared" for a person with CP or any other condition, it is also true that people need to be accepted as they are, whether a new acquaintance has been "prepared" or not. People who hold preconceived, usually underestimated, expectations of the "disabled" are often quite amazed by what so-called disabled people _can_ do. This incredulity is fine up to a point, but it can become offensive and artificial, particularly if the "praise" is being given simply because the person is "disabled."

"Having it tough" does give a person an edge, however, in establishing relation with others because people can tell when a person has "been there," and this is often a common ground from which to start. People can learn from tough times. They can learn what kind of survivors they are, in whom and in what they believe, and from where they draw their strength and resources. They can also find out things about themselves, their fears, and their feelings.

There is a difference between waiting _for_ things and spending time on things. Waiting for things she has to work on is not as bad because a person has some autonomy or agency in these situations. When things are unnecessarily lengthy or if assistance and answers are slow, reluctantly given, or have conditions attached to them, then waiting can be a victimizing situation which makes the person waiting dependent rather than autonomous. With waiting, a person and that person's agency may be limited; with working _on_ things, there are limitations, but there are also things which are under the person's control. Working on things means that a person can change or modify the limitations or the thing itself; waiting for things means a person can only change her "attitude toward." (More agency means a difference in degree and kind of difficulty than less agency, which has a degree and kind of difficulty of its own.)

Commentary

Each of these doers does honor to "what is" in herself/himself and her/his lifeworld. We are able to see that children and young people do indeed consider where they stand, what they stand for, and whether or not what they stand for informs and is informed by their conduct (praxis).

Chapter VI

Body-Subject, Attitude-Toward, and "With" Themes

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Body-Subject and Attitude-Toward

> Only human beings have come to a point where they no longer know why they exist. They . . . have forgotten the secret knowledge of their bodies, their senses, their dreams. (Lame Deer, Sioux Medicine Man, 1972)

In this section we shall consider the "necessary tension" partners of "body-subject" and "attitude-toward" which reside in and, indeed, are a doer. The necessary tension spoken to here refers to the potential for non-connection between the doer and the doing because of the "attitude-toward" the doing, and to the reflective awareness called into being by this potential. A denial of "attitude-toward" might compromise the complexity and robustness of the lived experience; however, a preoccupation with "attitude-toward" might obscure a potential transparency. Both "attitude-toward" and "body-subject" are acknowledged, since a denial of either would be an opportunity for Cartesian dualism to offer a convenient resolution to a tension which appears problematic but which is actually dialogical and symbiotic.

We shall begin with a discussion of the body-subject and move onto a discussion of "attitude-toward" via the consideration of "with" (difficulty) themes. Throughout will be discussion of the relationships among the body-subject, the "with difficulty" experience, and the doer.

Merleau-Ponty (1962) posits the human being as a "body-subject" or incarnate consciousness--a being in the world concerned with her/his unfolding in the world. The existence of a disembodied, separate, or distinct mind is emphatically denied, and "body and mind" are simply limiting notions of the body-subject which is a single entity or reality neither "simply mental" nor "merely corporeal," but both simultaneously.

The human's "being-in-the-world" is a given viewpoint only through her/his body. The body is "the seat or rather the very actuality of the phenomenon of expression" (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 235); it is the locus of a dialectical and dialogical relationship with the world; it is the center of openness, intentionality, and meaning-producing acts.

> The body is our general medium for having a world. Sometimes it is restricted to the actions necessary for the conservation of life, and accordingly it posits around us a biological world; at other times, elaborating upon these primary actions and moving from their literal to a figurative meaning, it manifests through them a core of new significance: this is true of motor habits such as dancing and sport. Sometimes, finally, the meaning aimed at cannot be achieved by the body's natural means; it must then build itself an instrument and it projects thereby around itself a cultural world. (p. 146)

Through their corporeality, humans are provided with a foundation in and are open to the world. Meaning arises, is created, and is constituted by the interaction of the body-subject and the world through the body's power of expression.

> Man, dwelling in a world of fluctuating perspectives, possesses the possibility of unfolding diverse projects of personal import--in the laugh of a child, a gesture of a hand, the work of an artist, or the movement of an athlete, meaning is manifested. (Meier, 1979, p. 196)

Humans are anchored and centered in the world through their bodies, which provide them with an orientation for action and projection. "Nothing is more expressive than the human body, our hands and fingers, our dancing feet, our eyes, our voice in joy and sorrow" (O'Neill, 1974, p. 114). It is through the power and gestures of the "lived body," fully and openly engaged in dialogue with the world, that a doer disclosed, establishes, and broadens the personal meanings of her/his existence. Moments of "intense realness" available in doing (particularly difficult doing) provide opportunities for the unfolding of new insights and the restructuring of previous perceptions. "During instances of total immersion and dynamic individuation man unfolds his powers, becomes aware of his capabilities and his limitations, develops forms of self-expression, and affirms himself" (Meier, 1979, p. 198).

According to Giorgi (1985), there is always too much happening in a lived experience. This coincides with van Manen's (1984) suggestion that "we know too much" (p. 46). This "too much" is problematic for our consciousness, which is able to receive reality or experience in profiles (Giorgi, 1988). This is not to say that our consciousness is separated from our knowing body, but rather that each one's capacities for knowing, while unified, are different in kind. The body-subject, being part of Being, is therefore receptive, attuned, open, susceptible to the totality of "the thing (experience) itself as it reveals itself." There is a carnal, penetrated "knowing." The body-subject is a body subject to experience--a creator and conduit. If I may use a particular metaphor for a moment, the voice of the experience is understood by the body-subject in a felt way and is then made intelligible or understandable or meaningful to the consciousness by the body-subject. The meaning of the experience is shared with or revealed to the consciousness via the necessary, primordial connection between the consciousness and the body-subject.

At the heart of the matter, at the center of action, is the body-subject. The body-subject is susceptible to all that it experiences, and it then bears the meaning and message of the experience while it seeks ways of delivering, disclosing, and knowing the eidos it has encountered and co-created. Here, Shapiro (1985) denies that eidos emerges only insofar as the "I" is radically "letting be what is" and is somehow forgetting the history and the person that the "I" brings to the experience, but rather that the "I" stays with the experience in as immersed and attuned a manner as possible, both prereflectively and reflectively. In Merleau-Ponty's (1962) words, there is a "loosening of the intentional threads" to the phenomenon. A doer, however, does not seek to stay somehow outside the phenomenon. The lived experience and the return to the things themselves are still operative, and the doer seeks to stay with them, but without becoming absorbed in them uncritically. The body-subject is an amazing, overwhelming concept in many ways. As doers we have access to the totality of experience and, in particular, to the eidetic features of a phenomenon because we are a body-subject. Our responsibility is to attend to our unity and connection as a body-subject, to develop an "I-thou" (Buber, 1958) relationship with the doing and within the doing, with ourselves and within ourselves. Our "body-subject-ness" gives us the freedom to be the doer and to step back and see the doer, to be the co-creator of doing and to step back and see the doing. This stepping back allows us to be even closer and more open to the experience and to ourselves.

This kind of phenomenologically based approach to doers and doing depicts both in a radically different manner than the inadequate and deceptive Cartesian dualistic structure which "portrays man as ontologically schizophrenic" (Dillon, 1974).

> Rather than stripping him of his existential character and delineating him as composed of two diverse and discrete substances, man is characterized as embodied consciousness--the distinction between the subject and objective poles is blurred in the experience of the lived, meaning-bestowed body. Man is

> acknowledged as an open and engaged being, dwelling in the world, capable of developing personal meaning in the process of actively manifesting himself. (Meier, 1979, p. 196)

The body-subject supplies us with a "method" for feeling, seeing, knowing, and understanding our lived experiences and the eidos or eidetic features of those experiences. We have available to us a means for meaning-making, a means for deep intersubjectivity, a means for responsible and reflective personhood, all grounded in that which is basic and common to everyone: our bodies.

It would appear to be logical to assume that, of the several realms of human enterprise, the particular areas of the philosophy of sport and theories of physical education would be the most enlightened in regard to the nature of the human being's corporeality and, therefore, predisposed to advocate an image of the person concurrent with the phenomenological analysis of the "lived-body." However, such an assumption would be both imprudent and inaccurate. The philosophy of sport is replete with implicit and explicit restatements and affirmations of Cartesian dualism, despite occasional assertions to the contrary. The flight to the respectability and acceptability of the natural sciences framework and the appropriation of stimulus-response and behavioristic schema are still much in evidence, with the consequence that the human's incarnate being is more often objectified and reduced than expressed or celebrated. In accord with such an orientation, the anatomical kinesiological, biomechanical, and physiological sciences are intensely and tenaciously pursued and granted almost exclusive sanction to scrutinize, analyze, and manipulate the human's corporeal nature and her/his participation in sport and physical activity. As a result, a doer is often regarded as capable of being completely understood by means of stimulus-response conditioning, laws of learning, transfer of training, and neurological brian wave analysis (Kleinman, 1972; cited in Gerber, 1972).

Weiss (1969), in one of the first two philosophical treatises to investigate sport in considerable detail, suggested that the fundamental task facing the athlete (the doer) is that of eliminating the dissonance and disequilibrium between mind and body by struggling toward unification and harmony. The doer "starts with a separated mind and body" (p. 221), "becomes one with his body through practice" (p. 218), and "comes to accept the body as himself" (p. 41). Weiss seems to support the notion that the emotions and the body should be under the power of the mind, thereby implying that the way in which a doer "becomes one" is one in which the body adjusts until it proceeds in accord with the mind's (rightful) expectations (p. 46). This kind of language depicts the body as an object and the doer as "possessing" a body rather than fully "being" a body.

Leonard (1974), Weiner (1985), and others also advocate the movement of a separated (mind and body) person toward a unified, vibrant self. It appears that practitioners and researchers value the notion of a unified self, since the message of much of the research is that of striving for oneness. Implicit in these messages, however, is the direction in which the body moves: upward. In other words, the intellect is in a superior position to the body, and whatever unification occurs does so because the body has learned its "proper" place and function. Doing is considered valuable insofar as it can provide ancillary data to "real" (cognitive) data or insofar as it can provide a means by which "real" (cognitive) knowing can be augmented or refreshed. (This kind of reasoning is evident in practitioners who believe that physical education is valuable because it gives children a "break" from academic work and helps them to learn the "real work" better.)

The tragic irony of this kind of thinking about doing is not that it is so far off the mark, but rather that it is so close to the mark. It is ironic in the sense that many of these practitioners and researchers are fiercely committed to physical education, to achieving mind-body oneness, to expounding the value of physical activity, yet, because of their assumptions, they reinforce the premise that people are naturally disconnected from themselves and can achieve re-connection only by bringing their bodies to their minds. Thus, though oneness seems to be the intention, it is a compromised, unauthentic oneness because it does not realize that a unity already exists and that this body-subject is already attuned to lived experience. If the body is viewed as an object to be controlled, then what is there visible in and for the body-subject remains invisible or opaque in and for the consciousness. If we strive to unite in a forced or artificial way that which is already a unity, we work at capturing, rather than liberating, the eidos, the meaning, of lived experience.

This kind of thinking about the body is tragic in the sense that it objectifies and demeans the very entity it seeks to serve. It also gives legitimacy to research and conduct which perpetuates the very dualism it purports to resolve. The body perceived totally as an object is drained of its humanity; it is a dead body devoid of its vivifying, expressive, and intentional abilities and qualities. It is not my intention to suggest that all physiologically or mechanically based investigation be abandoned. I do suggest, though , that these approaches give us only a partial view of the lived-body and no view at all of the body-subject.

If we are to stand for anything in physical education, surely we must stand for the primacy of the body-subject as a sense-making, meaning-making entity fundamental to our human-ness and personhood.

In addition, it should be noted that "the body is the vehicle of an indefinite number of symbolic systems" (Merleau-Ponty, 1970, p. 9). Consequently, physical activity, as a vibrant form of human endeavor capable of manifesting and transmitting affective states and meanings, may be viewed both as a symbolic medium and as a potentially artistic enterprise capable of releasing and celebrating the creative subjectivity of the participant (Meier, 1979).

> Thus it may be seen that the open and aware athlete apprehends and experiences his body neither solely as an object or an instrument to be manipulated nor externally as others view him, but rather as a multi-faceted being totally, uniquely and indelibly an embodied consciousness. The comportment of the body is the manner in which man exists for himself, and sport permits him to attain acute insight into the depth and mettle of his existence. (p. 198)

I ally myself with Levin (1985) in thinking that this research project on difficulty in physical activity, a work devoted to the human body, is contributing to a collective task: the humanization of our sensibility and the culture of our capacities for perception. Thus, physical education not only has responsibilities to and ramifications for individuals, but it also has responsibilities to and ramifications for societies. It is no longer possible to avoid the central, primordial position the body-subject has as reconciler, meaning-maker, "logos." Responding to the voice of this logos is the challenge for physical education. Acknowledging the body-subject and allowing this conviction to inform our conduct require courage, faith, and commitment: courage because normal science (Kuhn, 1972) gatekeeps against non-traditional, non-positivist theories or propositions, and the criticism brought to bear on the perpetrators is often intense and personal; faith because the practitioner who stands for the body-subject does so from a rootedness that is deeply felt or "known," but which is not seen; commitment because standing for and speaking of the body-subject is an endeavor which will require investment of time, effort, and energy. This is not to say that the body-subject is an unnatural notion; rather, it is so natural and so empowering that many people will respond in the manner pervasive within the positivist paradigm: Mistrust and devalue anything which is personally or humanly empowering.

Levin (1985) suggests that there is a deepening crisis in our Western tradition. On the one hand, it seems clear that we must break free of a dominant tradition which is taking us ever closer to the time of our annihilation through nihilism. On the other hand, it also seems clear that we cannot hope to escape the danger of nihilism without drawing strength from resources of spiritual wisdom which also belong to our tradition, but which the prevailing "world picture" continues to suppress and exclude (p. 3). A tradition can certainly be oppressive; it can stand in the way of growth, of life. But a retrieval of the origins of that tradition (Nietzsche's [1968] "genealogy of morals," for example) can be emancipatory, a source of strength.

> In this regard, I would like to observe that the objective of this study is to retrieve for future history a body of understanding which our dominant tradition has kept in concealment. The retrieval is two-fold, since, first of all, this tradition has vigorously fought to suppress the life and truth of the body, and secondly, the mainstream of our tradition has steadfastly excluded ancient spiritual teachings--traditions of ancient universal wisdom--which speak in archetypal and mythopoetic language of the body's deep ontological understanding of Being and of the ways to bring it forth. (p. 4)

This, then, is also the intention of my own study: to retrieve a body of understanding which our dominant tradition has kept in concealment. I, too, am committed to the life and truth of the body and to the body's deep, ontological understanding of Being and of the ways to bring it forth. I suggest that the lived experience of and with difficulty in physical activity is one of the more profound ways in which an open space for disclosure can be created and experienced. Our dominant tradition in physical education has various doctrines on difficulty which have succeeded in keeping this open space unacknowledged, closed, inaccessible, and/or suspicious. We have at one end of the continuum the notion that the body must be beaten into submission, brought under control, trained for efficiency, and at the other end of the continuum the notion that difficulty must be mediated or eliminated at all costs. We have biomechanical analysis of efficient force production; we have physiological analysis of maximum muscle exertion; we have psychological profiles on the doer's anxiety levels, arousal levels, motivation levels, and attitudes; we have anatomical information on the structural stress and strain which the body sustains; but we have very little information on how meaningful all this is for a doer, on how a doer "knows" with her/his body, or on how it can be that that object/happening which is difficult is sought out or at least is not avoided, even though the doer "suffers." We have very little information on the relationship between the doer and the body-subject. I concur with Levin (1985) that our physical education tradition has steadfastly excluded traditions of ancient universal wisdom, traditions which speak, in archetypical and mythopoetic language, of, to, and through the body-subject. I would like to think that this exclusion is the unfortunate by-product of pure, well-intentioned, humanizing research and investigation, but I am aware that education is not disconnected from politics and, in some quarters, empowerment of people, and these experiences which lend themselves to such empowerment are considered dangerous. If our tradition continues to present and investigate difficulty as an exercise in discomfort and powerlessness, then its empowering, meaning-making potential can remain untapped.

> For the body has served from time immemorial, as the carrier, the place-holder, and the metaphor of our tradition, passing on its culture, its history, its life. And yet, this same tradition has systematically distorted, suppressed, and concealed the body's essential being. The human body, as a body of deep ontological understanding, has suffered centuries of systematic misrepresentation. . . . The body's suffering . . . is a worthy focus for our attempt . . . to articulate a critique of nihilism. . . . For the human body plays a decisive role, not only in Nietzsche's critique of metaphysics, but also in his diagnosis of the life-denying character of nihilism. The body is not only a metaphor for the crisis in tradition; it is also a metaphor for an historical moment in which the suffering of the crisis could at long last be significantly overcome. (p. 5)

The suffering of the crisis in our tradition, i.e., the negation of humanity, may be at a point where it is being addressed as a crisis, and it would seem that the acknowledgement of and inquiry into this crisis is a step in the direction of overcoming it. I do not believe this casts the notion of suffering in a necessarily negative light, but rather, it asks us to be more attentive, critical, and responsible in our relationships with crisis, with tradition, and with suffering. I believe that we also need to ask what we mean when we say that we are suffering of, from, or in a crisis (or any other object/happening, for that matter). As Levin (1985) suggests, neither beast nor angel need confront the physical nature of its being. The nature of our corporeality is an existential question for us, and for us alone (p. 46).

Nietzsche (1968) is quite possibly the first philosopher since the beginning of the Judaeo-Christian influence to espouse the human body in its truth, its beauty, and its goodness. Nietzsche comes within a breath of recognizing something like a corporeal intentionality, i.e., a "functioning intentionality" of the body which is anterior to acts of "judgement" which makes them possible: "Before judgement occurs," he writes, "there is a cognitive activity that does not enter consciousness," but which operates through the living body (p. 289). According to Nietzsche, "All virtues are physiological conditions" (p. 148), and even "our most sacred convictions are the judgements of our muscles" (p. 173). Nietzsche's resurrection of the body is a project of great scope. For Nietzsche, as for the early Marx, "a genuine and actual process" in the direction of our "humanization" essentially requires a "spiritualizing of the senses" (p. 70). "The phenomenon of the body is the richer, clearer, more tangible phenomenon: to be discussed first, methodologically, without coming to any decision about its ultimate significance" (p. 270).

Levin (1985) argues that, on their face, these formulations may sound like physicalist reductions, but he suggests that they should be heard, rather, as attempts to salvage the experienced body, the body as lived, for a new morality and to overcome the Judaeo-Christian hierarchy of values which requires an extreme polarization of body and spirit (p. 34). The struggle to overcome the polarization, the objectification, the negating of the human and spiritual in our tradition, is by no means over.

> We, the new, the nameless, the hard-to-understand, we firstlings of a yet untried future--we require for a new goal also a new means, namely, a new healthiness, stronger, sharper,

> tougher, bolder, and merrier than any healthiness hitherto . . . such healthiness as one not only possesses, but also constantly acquires and must continue to acquire, because one continually sacrifices it again. (Nietzsche, 1960, p. 351)

Levin concurs, stating that sacrifices of the body, our countless crucifixions and mortifications of the sensuous flesh, will continue to test and try our developing consciousness (p. 36).

Heidegger (1962) suggests that the human's "bodily nature hides a whole problematic of its own" (p. 143). Whenever Heidegger formulates the problematic as a question of thinking on the eventual nature of the human body or the bodily nature of the essentially human way-of-being, he is compelled to repeat the difficulty and repeat the deferment ("though we shall not treat it here"). When he goes directly into the hermeneutical phenomenology of our perceptive and gestural being-in-the-world, then he has much to say about our hearing, our vision, our breathing, our gestures, our postures and bearing, our mooded ways of dwelling on and experiencing the earth (Levin, 1985, p. 41).

Levin (1985) believes that there is great intuitive wisdom in Heidegger's (1962) repeated postponement of his "first method or strategy." Levin also suggests that Heidegger, being so immersed in his traditional mode of metaphysical thinking, was not able to see his own fruitful contributions to a phenomenology of body by his instinctive turning to his "second method" (his analyses of perceptual and gestural capacities).

In the dialogue which takes place between Fink and Heidegger (1966-67) in their joint seminar on Herakleitos, Fink comments that

> he [man] has the double character: on the one hand, he is the one who places himself in the clearing, and on the other, he is the one who is tied to the underground of all clearing. . . .
>
> Through the body and the senses, a human is nigh to the earth. (p. 145)

This provokes from Heidegger (1962) a major question: Can one isolate the dark understanding which the bodily belonging to the earth determines, from being placed in the clearing? (p. 145). Later in the session, Heidegger reiterates that the body phenomenon is the most difficult problem (p. 146), and he gives a final remark on the subject: The bodily in the human is not something animalistic. The manner of understanding that accompanies it is something that metaphysics up till now has not touched on (p. 146).

Levin (1985) suggests that perhaps it may be that in going beyond metaphysics, our new and more radical thinking must "pass through" the trial posed by the human body, since we clearly need to retrieve a new and more radical experience of Being as that which is our ground (p. 47). Levin also asks whether it could be that our patriarchal metaphysics has not yet been able to touch upon the manner of understanding which accompanies our corporeal being because it has not allowed itself to be touched by the truth of the body, and because the only way it knows of getting in touch with the body's true nature is a way that does it an unforgivable violence (p. 48).

I would concur with Levin's (1985) suggestion that positivist tradition and Judaeo-Christian tradition have not really allowed themselves to be touched, and I agree that much of their methodology does indeed violate or do violence to that in which they claim a genuine interest. I am not convinced that they realize the extent to which they deprive others of "bodily-access" or the extent to which they, themselves, are deprived.

> Ultimately we dare not split up the matter in such a way, as though there were a bodily state housed in the basement with feelings dwelling upstairs. Feeling, as feeling oneself to be, is precisely the way we are bodily. Bodily being does not mean that the soul is burdened by a hulk we call the body. . . . We do not "have" a body; rather, we "are" bodily. (Heidegger, 1979, p. 112)

The body we are considering is the body of Merleau-Ponty's (1969) depth phenomenology (the body-subject): "neither the ontical body of common sense nor the ontical body of science, but rather the body of deepening experience always already inherent in Being as a whole. Merleau-Ponty also wrestled with the subject-object relationship of classical metaphysics. The relationship, he says, is a "doubling, a mirroring; subject and object belong together like two sides of a leaf" (pp. 139, 146). He also speaks, in that same text, of hinge and pivot, trying in many different ways to undo the metaphysical knot. But the deconstruction of this rigid subject-object polarity takes place in the context of a radicalized phenomenology of embodiment. The crucial notion in Merleau-Ponty's deconstruction is the notion of flesh (Levin, 1985, p. 65).

> The flesh of the world or my own is . . . a texture that returns to itself and conforms to itself . . . the formative medium of the object and subject . . . a sort of dehiscence opens my body in two and the human body remains incomplete, gaping open. (Merleau-Ponty, p. 146)

According to Levin (1985), the notion of flesh makes possible a radically deeper understanding of the human body as a phenomenon of a field of Being: an opening and a clearing (p. 65).

> Merleau-Ponty's notion articulates a corporeal schema which roots the human body as a local opening and clearing in the multi-dimensional field of Being; and it accomplishes this in a way that discloses a new historical project for the ontological truth of our incarnation as human beings. (p. 67)

A doer involved in a lived experience of and with difficulty in physical activity is a body-subject which is both meaning-maker and meaning-deliverer. A doer is able to access, via the particularity of the lived experience of and with difficulty, disclosures about self, experience, others, body, Being. The body-subject is method, reconciler, pedagogue--simultaneously. It is the openness to Being; it is the clearing space of Being; it is the felt, the perceived, in lived experience; it is our most primordial sense-of-being-in-the-world.

> The anamnesis by which we go down into the pre-ontological (or proto-ontological) body of felt sense, deepening our contact with its panoramic attunement and holistic awareness, lifts up this dark pre-understanding into the clearer light of thought. . . . By virtue of this corporeal anamnesis, our visionary being may progressively realize what it has been given to understand all along. Boding forth this gift of understanding kept within the body (making it manifest, explicit, and articulate), we are opening into the clearing field of Being. (Levin, 1985, p. 55)

"With" Themes

Let us now consider some of the bodily experiences of the doers involved in this research project. These body experiences include physically felt experiences of discomfort, soreness, pain, sweating, injuries, tiredness, unmanageability, detachment, and amplification, to name a few; feeling and emotion experiences of boredom, tolerance, patience, drudgery, perseverance, sameness, fear, anxiety, uncertainty, confusion, disappointment, annoyance, distress, lostness, immediacy, exhilaration, triumph, understanding, to name a few; and attitude experiences, such as wanting to and not wanting to, liking and not liking enjoying and not enjoying.

These experiences I am calling the "with" component of the lived experience of and with difficulty (the "of" component has also been considered a little earlier in this study). Both "of" and "with" have a dynamic character, so these "with difficulty" experiences will be considered and discussed in the before, during, and after physical activity time contexts.

I should say that the "categorizing" of these experiences has been done in the name of understanding. It does not suggest that the body-subject is a fragmented entity; rather, it should demonstrate how incredibly complex the body-subject is. I have to impose an "order" on the lived experience so that I can notice and attend to as many features as possible. The body-subject drinks in the totality of lived experience without the artificial distinctions of category and order.

Attitude Experiences

Attitude, from the Latin aptitude, meaning fitness, is defined as a position of the body or manner of carrying oneself indicative of mood or condition, a state of mind or feeling with regard to a person or thing. Disposition, a related term, is defined as temperament, tendency, or inclination. Mood is defined as a state of mind or feeling, an inclination or disposition. Condition is defined as the particular state of being of a person or thing.

In dance an attitude is a body position, a posture. Attitudes can vary in terms of arm, leg, head, and body positions and relationships, but the attitude posture is a recognizable, distinct posture in dance.

It embodies possibility, mood, relationship. It is possible to look at "an attitude" and realize that this posture is carrying, bearing, anticipating, or projecting something. We can tell by looking at a dancer that what she/he is doing or assuming is an attitude posture because of the way the body is inclined. We have a sense of inclination, of propensity (propensity, from the Latin propendire, to be inclined).

Clearly, there is relation among these "attitude" terms. Posture, inclination, mood, condition, propensity, tendency, disposition all speak to a way of being in the world, a way of standing in the world. Standing in the world in a given way means standing for something. When we stand for something, we are disposed or inclined in a certain way. When we stand for something, it informs our conduct, our thought, our praxis. We carry what we stand for with us. What we carry with us is going to affect how we stand in relation to other people, objects, and happenings in our lifeworld.

Let us see where and how some of our doers stand in their relationships with difficult doing.

Danny

M. How do you feel when a team is beating you that badly?
D. Depressed.
M. Hard to go back out for the next inning?
D. Yeah, especially when the rest of the team doesn't want to either. . . . There are some guys that want to; everybody else kind of feels like, maybe we can do better than this; but if nobody wants to play, it's not very good.

M. Is it harder to go out and do your best when you're really getting slaughtered? . . . Is it hard to do your best when you're feeling down?
D. Yeah. Even if it's close, you don't feel too bad; you feel good, you can catch up; but when they're far away, you don't feel good; you can't play as well.

M. Yeah. What's going on in your mind really affects the way you play.
D. Yeah.

Description and Discussion

Danny. Being beaten, outclassed, and/or humiliated by another team, be it overwhelmingly superior or not, is a depressing, frustrating experience that many players would rather not have, which leaves a lingering "awful feeling" and which is seen as having very little edifying potential. If there is a chance of catching up, there is the possibility of maintaining a positive attitude and a level of personal effort. If there is no chance of catching up, the focus shifts to how much time is left and how bad the players feel. It is hard to maintain a good attitude, to play well, and to do your best when you are far behind and feeling down. Your head and your heart do affect your play.

Leanne

M. Is it a move you would do if you had your choice? . . .
L. No.
M. Like, would you love to have a forward roll in your beam routine?
L. No.
M. But you need it for the test, eh?
L. Yeah [sigh]. I wish we didn't.
M. Mmm.
L. This bunch of things we have to do that don't even matter--like, some things we're doing [in the test], I haven't seen or done in my entire life.

Description and Discussion

Leanne. Test items are usually those moves which involve attention to detail, precision, and control. They can be particularly annoying and difficult because they are not the kind of moves a doer typically enjoys or voluntarily chooses to practice; they tend to be moves with a greater-than-average chance of failure and/or physical discomfort or injury. It is hard to put effort into moves that have no meaning or purpose other than being test items. Perhaps if a doer saw a connection between attending to detail, precision, and control (i.e., if these were presented in a meaningful manner) and improving as a doer, she might appreciate them more, but if meaningfulness is missing, the best that she can hope to bring to bear on test items is stubbornness and determination for that period of time that is required by the test (no long-term appreciation or apprehension).

Leslie

L. Give it, give their best. That's like my ringette team, my little girls. Like, oh, wow! I get so frustrated with them. I always tell them my theory is, the more you try, the better you'll get, and the more ice time you'll get, because if you aren't going to try, and you don't even want to be there . . . I can't stand that. Like, I hate . . . There's one girl on the little girls' team, she could care less if she was out there. It's her mom that wants her out there, and I think that's so stupid, like, she doesn't want to do it, so why make her do it? Why don't they find something that she enjoys doing? Maybe it might even be school activities or some kind of sport, she just, she . . . and it really bothers me, and I get really frustrated with her, 'cause she's really . . . she doesn't care. She's just skating out there for the fun of it, you know.

M. You think it makes a difference if they like it or if they don't?

L. Yeah. Even with me, if I don't like something, I might as well not be out there.

L. Yeah, anything. School. If I get frustrated with something and I don't like it, turned off, like, take it away, I don't want to do it. But when I like and enjoy something, like school, chemistry or something, then I enjoy working at it. Sometimes I'll sit there for hours, and I'll do it. Any sport, if I like it, I'll do it, and I'll stick with it, but if I don't like it . . . . My dad always told me, I've always been taught that if I start something, I always have to finish it. You never leave something. . . . Like, if I don't like something, sometimes I have to do it, just to finish it off.

L. Getting tired, you know, like, you know it's time to get off. Sometimes that really bothers me. You get tired . . . or you get bored with the same sport over and over again; if you're playing too much of it, you obviously get bored with it. Sometimes in ringette when I'm used to playing games Monday and Wednesday and a practice Thursday and a game Saturday, like, to me that's too much for the enjoyment. Sometimes I'd just skip practice. . . . Thursday outside in the cold just didn't turn my crank.
M. But it's not so much the work; it's something else?
L. Yeah.
M. 'Cause some days you can work when you're tired.
L. Yes! And some days you just can't. Laziness. You know, like, you're tired. Some days you just don't feel like going out there in the cold, but other days you might enjoy to go out there and work really hard and come off and feel like you've done something. If you're not enjoying it . . . .
M. How hard are you working?
L. Yeah . . . and what's the use of going out there? That's my theory. But there's some things you have to do that you don't like.

L. Ah, yeah, because usually with things you don't like, you have a hard time doing. If you, because, I don't know . . . People's minds work like that. Things you hate doing, you obviously don't want to do it, so you have to work harder at it to do it. School, you know.
M. Are school things hard in the same way as, say, grounders are hard?
L. In the same way. It's likes and dislikes. What you like, you like to do and do a lot. If you don't like it, you don't want to do it.
L. Sometimes does your body have to work hard at things you do like to do?
L. Yeah, 'cause it works both ways, you know.
M. You don't mind it then?
L. No. If you like something, then you, like, . . . well, it may be hard work, but you like to do it.

Description and Discussion

Leslie. As well as being linked to space, time, and learning considerations, difficulty is also seen in situations involving decision, responsibility, control, tiredness, disliking the activity, and hard work.

Most activities involve judgement calls and decisions made on a moment's notice. When the responsibility and consequences are for the self, the difficulty is of a different kind than when the responsibilities are for and to others who may be involved and the consequences have to be shared by a whole group.

In some activities there is a time/space constraint added to the decision in that a player has to be in a certain place at a certain time to do a certain thing. This expectation can make an activity challenging, but the feeling of obligation can also detract from the richness and/or the enjoyment of the experience. "Having to" is an ambivalent consideration, with some feeling that "having to" is important for self-discipline, and others feeling that "having to" detracts too much from the activity. It would seem, though, that it is often necessary to do things one does not like because one has to, and this is not necessarily a demeaning thing.

The freedom to be and do in one's space at one's own time is considered a plus in terms of liking and enjoyment, and it is possible to work hard at things that one likes and enjoys, as it is to work hard at things one neither likes nor enjoys. The notion of unpredictability or not being in or able to control can also contribute to something being difficult and not liked.

Hard work is seen in situations involving effort, dislikes, likes, change, and tiredness. It seems that it is harder to work at things one does not like; however, anticipation of some sort of self-fulfillment often makes the process less onerous.

Sylvie

M. Same all the time?
S. Well . . . I guess I do, 'cause some days I'm just, "Oh, let's just get it over with," but then other days, but then other days I like it.
M. What's it like working on the days when you just want to get it over with?
S. Um, I don't know. I don't do as many reps, and I just don't push as much.
M. Why do you come at all?
S. Well, it's for the physical challenge. It's fun. I like being in shape. I feel good. I take real pride in appearance. Me. Myself. Not in others, but just me. I've always been like that since I was a kid. I always had to look my best.

M. So when does something challenging become negative? What happens to turn something challenging into something negative, or when does it stop being challenging and start being negative?
S. When you just know you can't do it and you just . . . ooohhh! When you can't, no matter how hard you try, but . . . it's not a negative thing until you adopt a negative attitude; then it becomes a pain in the ass. But if you adopt a positive attitude, then you're successful even when you can't do it. If you can't do it, you can decide your attitude about it. I never was positive before, but I am now.
M. You don't avoid things that are challenging?
S. Oh, no. No. Then why live? If it's got to be done and you can't do it, and you can get someone to help, why not? But you're not defeated or anything; you're just realistic.

Description and Discussion

Sylvie. Even people who want to train and who usually look forward to workouts find their training affected by their attitudes of the moment. Some days training is utterly enjoyable; other days they just want to get it over with, and the work intensity definitely suffers on those "get it over with" days. On a "get it over with" day, a person comes for the physical challenge but also because in her heart she knows that she likes being in shape and likes how it feels to be in shape. Pride in her appearance also plays a part in getting her there on days when she wants to get it over with.

For a person with a disability, challenges can be everywhere. Going up and down stairs or even walking or moving with control can be difficult or can require more concentration and effort than an "able-bodied" person might imagine. Life would be rather dull with no challenges or difficulties, and while a difficulty is not considered a reason to avoid doing something, a person has to be realistic about her limitations. Concentrating on taken-for-granted things and acknowledging limitations can be frustrating, and it is natural to be frustrated in those circumstances; however, not being able to do something only becomes negative, a defeat, or a failure when the person adopts a negative attitude. Even when a person cannot do something, she can still decide her attitude about it.

Developing an attitude about embarrassment is also a part of the lived experience of being disabled. Fear of embarrassment and the capacity to be easily embarrassed seem to be addressed more with a disability than without, since the person with a disability is often in the position of having to let things happen and then adjust to them.

Falling, needing help, or withstanding curious or judgemental looks can be embarrassing but can be handled with humor or realistic acceptance. Falling or losing control because it is an "off-balance" day can be more frustrating because the body is no longer under the will, and the attitude is the only thing left to make decisions about.

Amanda and Tony

M. What else makes something boring? Is it the teacher?
T. Especially when they're in a bad mood.
M. Do you find that, too?

A. Yeah.

M. Does it make a difference when the teacher is pleasant?
A/T. Yeah.
M. Is it easier to work with someone who's more pleasant?
A/T. Yeah.
M. Even when the work is hard?
A/T. Yeah.

M. What made you feel like you didn't want to do it or you couldn't do it?
A. Too fast and too much to think about. I just have to be really quick.

M. Do you have to practice things that are difficult on purpose in ballet?
A. Yeah.
M. Why do you think you have to do that? Does it do anything for you?
A. You learn; you get better.

M. Do you mind working at it, Tony? Are there some things you don't enjoy but you work at anyway?
T. Some things take time.
M. But you do it because it's part of the whole thing.
T. Yeah.

M. Well, since you had that hard class today, Amanda, how do you feel about working at something? Does it bother you to work at something?
A. No.
M. Does it help if you like it?
A. Uh huh.
M. Can you like it and still have to work at it?
A. Uh huh.

M. How do you feel about that, Tony?
T. Depends on what I'm doing.
M. Some things are more enjoyable, and some things are a pain, regardless.
T. Yeah.

M. Do you think that because something is challenging, it's negative?
A. No.
M. Does it get negative after a point?
A. No.

M. Do you think challenging is negative?
T. No.
M. Does it turn you off at all?
T. No.

M. What kinds of things turn you off?
T. Like when some stuff . . . You look like girl's stuff, and
I have to do it.
M. Yeah? That's a turnoff.
T. Yeah! And I have to do it.
M. Why are you supposed to do it? Is it a part of it or
. . . ?
T. Yeah . . . I guess . . . I don't know.
M. But you don't like it; you don't feel comfortable.
T. No.

Description and Discussion

Amanda and Tony. Much about dance is difficult, some of it deliberately so, and dancers have to develop good discipline to work and apply themselves whether they like the particular skill or not. Discipline is part of dance and is accepted and enjoyed, rather than endured.

Stereotypes linger--boys are thought to be sissies, and girls are thought to be prima donnas--and are usually inaccurate.

Challenge tends to be experienced in new, different, or other imposed situations. Challenge is not thought to be negative but, rather, enjoyable; it produces good feelings.

Turnoffs or negatives seem to be associated with being uncomfortable or embarrassed and with injuries. Soreness is not pleasant but is part of going beyond one's present limits.

Attitude is important--toward work, self, others, and teachers. Comparing one's self to others is done to a certain degree, but not to the point where it interferes with the dancer's relationship to the work. Realistic self-assessment (usually tending towards modesty), concentrating on one's own work, and keeping frustration low are significant. Obedience is accepted up to a point as part of the discipline. Learning from instructors and obeying them are not usually problems as long as there is trust and respect between students and teachers, and as long as the instructor is sincere (knows his/her stuff).

In sport psychology the key word as far as "doing" something is concerned is "motivation." A model which has been widely applied on a theoretical basis is Weiner's (1980, 1984, 1985) attributional theory of achievement motivation and emotion. Weiner's (1985) approach to motivation emphasizes the importance of causal attributions in explaining the consequences of perceived success and failure outcomes. According to this theory, affective reactions are determined in part by an individual's attributional conclusions concerning his or her success/failure experiences. Affective reactions are assumed to subsequently influence both expectancy of failure outcomes and levels of persistence.

Robinson and Howe (1990) call for more study of the nature and extent of the attribution/affect relationships that exist among young people. They claim that this need would be most usefully fulfilled by the study of early adolescence, since this appears to be a crucial period when many young people withdraw from organized sport (Roberts, 1984). I applaud the concern these researchers have for the perceived decline in youth participation and interest in sports. I find problematic the cause-effect mentality which dominates the theoretical framework and which is implicit in the expressed concern over lack of participation. (If we find out what is turning them off, we can modify/manipulate it so that we can then turn them on.) This assumption acknowledges "attitude," yet at the same time does violence to it as an intentional posture. It is an example of the increasing dominance of the "cognitive paradigm" in sport psychology.

To a "cognitive theorist," though governs action (dualistic). The essential task is to study the way in which knowledge is acquired, represented, and used by humans. The emphasis is on the creation of models of knowledge to understand how cognitions or thoughts govern behavior. Thus, cognitive theorists in sport psychology would eschew paradigms that are strictly behavioral, such as those by Rushall (1979, 1982) or Seidentop (1976), or are trait or drive based, such as those by Morgan (1980) or Straub (1978). Cognitive theorists believe that behavioral variance in sport and exercise is better captured by models that incorporate the cognitions and beliefs of individuals.

Roberts (1989) suggests that

> sport psychology is going through a period of deep soul searching in terms of developing a conceptual paradigm to drive our research and practice, in terms of the measurement technology to use, and in terms of the appropriate model to use in our delivery of psychological services. (p. 81)

I find encouraging Roberts' willingness to examine accepted structures and concepts. I find discouraging the use of the words "a" (as in a conceptual framework) and "measurement" (as in measurement technology). Implicit in these words is a way of seeing, one, I might add, which appears to ignore the body-subject and the notion of "position."

Buytendijk (1950), however, speaking from a phenomenologically informed perspective, does address the notion of position. "Every feeling is a feeling of something, and the human attitude in which a feeling is experience in a positional, not reflective, consciousness results in fuller understanding" (p. 128). Where we stand makes a difference in what we "see," both literally and figuratively. This may seem like an "obvious" statement, but most of us have encountered others who believe that where they are standing is the only place to stand; hence they can see only what can be seen from where they stand. Perhaps we engage in this kind of "fixed-space" seeing ourselves. When an object/happening is seen from many positions, our understanding of it is fuller.

Aoki (1978), Freire (1968), Glasser (1981), Habermas (1971), and many others within the critical theory orientation have pointed out to us that many, if not most, people do not even realize that they do indeed carry the way they stand in the world with them. Some of what they carry is empowering, humanizing, "oekuminal" (Garfinkle, 1988); some of what they carry is degrading, dehumanizing, and enslaving. Regardless, all of what they carry calls for critical examination.

Our body-subject gives us the advantage and privilege of being positional seers. We are able to gain access to the fullness of lived experience and to the meanings and understandings it has to offer us because we are a body-subject. As responsible doers, we need to acknowledge our body-subject, and we need to examine and re-examine our posture. Our body-subject is our intentional corporeality, and we connect with it and learn from it often at a level and in a manner that is not fully revealed to consciousness. Experience is received by the body-subject in an attuned, unmediated purity. However, when we fail to acknowledge, examine, question, and critically reflect upon the history and culture we carry with us, we are practicing what I call "lazy personhood": We are giving up our position, and we lose our opportunity to "see," to meaning-make, to understand.

Polanyi (1964) and Shapiro (1985) both proclaim that "at any moment

I know more than I could tell" (Shapiro, p. 40), mainly because the "bodily pole . . . is an embodiment of any and every moment" (p. 51). "Any act reveals, embodies, and describes a relation between things" (p. 141); therefore, our doing, our body-subject, and our posture "carry" more than our consciousness "knows" at any given moment. We need to attend to our doing, our body-subject, and our "posture."

Shapiro (1985) states that "a posture is a peculiar relation of a person to the objects of his experience" (p. 24). He sees the term posture referring to the "way I hold myself, the way I am being at any such intended object" (p. 25). Shapiro "joins" posture and body-subject with his statement, "No posture is knowable except 'in action,' as already engaged with the object it would take or is taking" (p. 25). He suggests that, "since a posture is present also as possible relation to an object, it is a way I am more or less free to assume at any moment" (p. 25). Shapiro reasons, "That it is a possible way of being at or approaching things suggests that any given posture can be appraised critically as a return" (p. 25). Shapiro's question "Does a particular possible posture provide us with the return to things as lived that is requisite to a phenomenological method?" forms the basis for his phenomenological method for psychology in which he advocates and practices a return to "the things themselves" by way of connecting with the "knowing" of the posture/body-subject "partnership." Shapiro is not the only theorizer who proposes such a relationship; we see many expression of such "returns" in the writings of Gendlin (1978), Heidegger (1977), Johnson (1987), Levin (1985), Merleau-Ponty (1962), Nietzsche (1954), Polanyi (1964), van den Berg (1973) (among others), and Strasser (1977), to whom we now turn our attention.

Strasser (1977) suggests that "intentionality is not the primordial phenomenological characteristic of self-experiencing life (of consciousness). Still more primordial than being directed to the mundane pole is disposition . . . and that being-receptive for . . . which follows from it" (p. 121). Before the body-subject can "intend," it must be "in position." Strasser goes on to articulate a more fundamental sort of dispositional directedness: basic comportment. "By basic comportment we understand a structure of attitudes, convictions, and modes of comportment which is expressed in a relatively constant readiness for determinate modes of behavior" (p. 279).

Strasser's (1977) notion of "basic comportment" is a gathering term for our many ways of saying about attitude: disposition, inclination, mood, and so forth. This makes it nicely consistent with its Latin root comportare, to bring together. Comportment is our bearing, the way we carry our "selves": our body-subject, our history, our culture, our convictions, our postures. Strasser insists that "a basic comportment is no 'trait' imposed from without, but rests upon an active self-porting of man. . . . What is here understood 'from within' is the decision of a man with respect to the way in which he proposes to deal with life" (p. 280). Strasser's statement leads me to believe that comportment and body-subject are dramatically and dynamically intertwined (as was indicated in the introduction: "the necessary tension partners of body-subject and attitude-toward"). Their "positions" in relation to each other are not "fixed"; hence the range and depth of seeing and understanding are incalculable; such dimensions cannot be accounted for by "measurement," in any case! Moreover, their positions in relation to each other are also simultaneous in terms of "owning" and "belonging to." The body-subject neither "owns" (contains) nor "belongs to" (is contained in) basic comportment, just as basic comportment neither "owns" (contains) nor "belongs to" (is contained in) the body-subject. Each one "owns" and "belongs to" the other--simultaneously. (This is nicely consistent with one of the definitions offered for comport: harmonize.)

I should now like to return to our original definition and discuss the connectedness of our consideration of "attitude" to its Latin root aptitudo, fitness. "Fitness" is defined as being suited or acceptable for a given circumstance or purpose; appropriate, proper. Similarly, "appropriate" is given as suitable, proper, fitting; to set apart for a specific use; and "proper" as suitable, appropriate; characteristically belonging to a person or thing. "Appropriate" has its roots in the Latin appropriare, to make one's own. "Proper" has its roots in the Latin proprius, one's own.

If I am "fit" for something, then the way that I carry myself--my comportment--makes me acceptable for a given circumstance or purpose, or, as we have been saying, where and how I stand makes a difference. Where and how I stand makes me appropriate--set apart for a specific use--and I am set apart, I am me, because of what is proper to me (where I stand; how I stand), what is characteristically belonging to me.

"Character" derives from the Greek "χαράσσω," which suggests the idea of an object on which something is inscribed or stamped in a certain way. Sport psychology and other behavioral, positivistic orientations would try to convince us that how we are "stamped" is decisive. We can do nothing but react as we have been programmed. Body-subject and comportment, on the other hand, speak the primordial message of our intentionality. As Frankl (1962) and our own doer, Sylvie, would insist, we are not always free to choose our circumstances, but we are always free to choose our attitudes.

My choice of how I am to be bears witness to the complexity and simplicity of our harmony of body-subject and comportment. I am informed, yet I also inform. My voice is part of the harmony.

> As far as bodily space is concerned, it is clear that there is a [prepersonal, bodily carried] knowledge of place which is reducible to a sort of co-existence [i.e., attunement] with that place, and which is not simply nothing, even though it cannot be conveyed in the form of a description or even pointed out without a word being spoken. (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 101)

> The body's gesture toward the world introduces it into an order of relations of which pure physiology and biology do not have the slightest idea. Despite the diversity of its parts, which makes it fragile and vulnerable, the body is capable of gathering itself into a gesture which for a time dominates their dispersion. (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 68)

> Rapture is feeling, an embodying attunement, an embodied being that is contained in attunement, attunement woven into embodiment. But attunement lays Dasien open as an enhancing, and conducts it into the plenitude of its capacities, which mutually arouse one another and foster enhancement. (Heidegger, 1979, p. 105)

Body-subject, comportment, and I stand for something. We stand in the world in a certain way--a way that makes me me. I encounter difficulty in an object/happening, and because of how I (we) stand, a particular relationship unfolds. It is my stand, my intentional choice, hence my fragility, vulnerability, susceptibility, and power, which co-create the relationship in which I participate in the continuing co-creation of my self, and from which my harmonizing with others begins.

Physically Felt Experiences

This section of my study (and the following two sections) is directed toward the expression of impression. There are several particularities to be considered at this juncture: soreness, pain, injuries, and distress (discomfort, tiredness). In effect, I am asking after an "after-effect": usually soreness, pain, injury, or distress is the result of previous work, so if one is sore or in pain, something (some object/happening) has already been experienced, as well as the something (soreness, pain, distress) that is being experienced.

I confess to a deep personal interest in this area, both as an athlete and as a teacher in relationship with children, other athletes, and physical educators. What I want to do is "ask after" experiences of soreness/pain/distress and with soreness/pain/distress in physical activity. I am therefore asking after experiences of and with--"of" being concerned with what soreness or pain or distress can be, and "with" being considered with feelings about it or what it can mean.

If I can attend to what is revealed about the experience "of" soreness, pain, or distress, perhaps I will then be better prepared to attend to what presents itself in the experience "with" soreness, pain, and distress. The bottom line, though, is a clearer description of the pre-reflective experience of soreness, pain, and distress in physical activity.

Sylvie and Soreness

S. Oh, yeah! I had a good workout last Thursday. I rode the bike with the new bike thing with increasing tension, and, oh, the legs hurt after. I like it.
M. Really?
S. I like it because I can *feel* it. Then I know something's going on. Before, when I rode the bike, you know, it felt good, but I didn't feel it, really.
M. Was it anything like your injury?
S. It's different. You can tell the difference between a hurt from a workout and a hurt from an injury.
It's good after the bike; you know you pushed

yourself, you did something. I love it. You're just sweating. It's great. I like the work. I like pushing; you're so hot, and then you're so aware of what's going on, and your body is saying, "Okay!"

Amanda and Tony on Soreness and Injuries

M. Have either of you ever been afraid? Like afraid of hurting yourself or . . . ? What kinds of things are there to be afraid of in ballet? Are there things?
A. Hurting yourself while you're doing something.
M. Like what?
A. Like stretching the wrong way.

M. Have you had an injury?
A. Yeah. I fell on my tailbone during dancing.
M. That sort of holds you back for awhile.
A. Yeah.
M. You haven't broken bones or pulled anything?
A. I've had strained/pulled muscles. It was really sore.
M. Will you be sore tomorrow after this class?
A. I don't think so.

M. How about you, Tony? Have you ever had an injury?
T. Yeah.
M. What happened?
T. I sprained my ankle.
M. Was it dancing when you sprained it?
T. Yeah.
M. What were you doing?
T. I was doing a turn, and I fell out and turned it on the landing. It really hurt.
M. Did it stop you from dancing for awhile?
T. Yeah.

M. Do you still get sore, Amanda?
A. Yeah.
M. Can you tell when you're doing it that you're going to be sore tomorrow?
A. Yes.
M. What kinds of things?
A. Classes where you work really hard and where there's lots of stretching. Then I knew I'd be sore 'cause I wasn't used to it.
M. So, any time you . . . but you're probably quite flexible already, so there are days when you work even harder, beyond the flexibility that you have.
A. Yeah, that's when you get really sore.
M. Is that important: to go beyond what you've got now?
A. Yeah.

Leanne and Andrea on Soreness, Tiredness, Pain, Injuries

L. She makes you work hard.
M. Yeah. Well, why don't you tell me about your practice today? You guys are tired today.
A/L. Yeah.
M. How come you're so tired?
A. Too much conditioning.
M. How much is too much?
A. So [until] you start to hurt.
L. Not hurt! Get pooped out.

A. Well, near the end it does. . . . Sometimes you need a rest; you get tired, and your arms get weak.
M. Things don't work as well when you get tired and weak, eh?
A. Yeah, right.

A. Well, you like it, so . . . I don't get sick of it 'cause I like it.
M. How about you, Leanne?
L. No, I like it. I want to learn how to do it.
M. So you don't mind putting in the time.
L. No.
M. And you don't mind being sore like you are today.
L. I just like to go home and relax after, but I don't mind being sore. Like, even if I am sore, I'll watch TV, . . . I'll still do it.
M. Is that part of learning new things? Being sore?
A. Yes.

M. What about falls? How do you feel about falling?
A. Hurts. Depends on what you do and how much. Like, you fall and get up and fall and get up again, like that.
M. Does it depend on how bad you want the trick?
A. Yeah. Depends on how bad you want it.
M. And I guess it depends on what kind of a fall, right?
A. Yeah.
M. . . . If you split the team when you fall, that's a worse kind of fall than landing on your butt on a crash mat.
L. Well, I landed like that on the beam. I was doing a cat leap, and, yes, it hurt!
M. Those are horrible falls, aren't they?
A. You never forget them.
L. Now, I'm scared to do them. I hate them. I hate beam, now.
M. Since you had that fall?
L. Yeah.

Travis and Param on Soreness, Pain, Distress

M. How do you feel about working when you're sore? Do you get sore a lot?
P. I do if I haven't run in a long time or something; then I get sore. . . . or if I run a lot. And, well, um, if I'm sore I just go there and run and try to forget about my soreness. That's happened to me.
M. You have to run through it, kind of.
P. Yeah.

M. What kind of things do you think about when you're running and you're tired and you're going, "God, I'm hating this"? . . . Are you thinking that?
T. Usually I'm thinking, "How much longer is this going to go on? . . . Five more minutes, four minutes and fifty, four minutes and forty," just counting down the time.
M. Uh huh.
T. Just, keep up to the guy in front of me, and I don't have to excel at this, I just have to do what the guy in front of me is doing, so I keep up to him till it's over. It's over. I think about that.

M. Do you work as well when you're tired?
T. No.
M. Are you as . . . effective?
T. No, no.
M. You make mistakes?
T. Yeah.
M. But it's okay to train when you're tired?
T. Yeah.
M. Interesting, eh? Why do you think you're expected to train when you're tired?
T. So you don't get tired as easily when you are.

M. How do you guys feel about soreness? Do you get sore?
P. Well, yeah. When I'm running cross country, like, right here in my shoulder.
M. Your shoulder?
P. Yeah.
M. Not your legs?
P. No. Except sometimes when I get cramps and stuff in my legs.
M. Do you get sore a lot?
P. Well, no, not unless I run a lot, like, uphill a lot, that's when I really get sore.
M. What do you think makes you sore?
P. I think it's basically, my heart is pumping too fast.
M. What about you, Travis? Do you get sore . . . anymore?
T. Well, probably more like getting cramps late in the game. Two minutes to go, I always get a cramp.
M. Where do you get--in your lower leg?
T. Right in my stomach. Then I usually have to stop and bend

over and hope the ball doesn't go by me. Um, other things, like people stepping on your foot with cleats. Also, soccer can get a little vicious, too, like players behind will give you elbows, or when the ref's not looking they'll push you, or most obvious one is being beaned in the face by the ball. That happens quite a lot. It hurts, but you just got to tough through it.

M. Yeah. Why do you think you get sore? Working too hard or just working, or is soreness something that happens?

T. Something that happens, especially when someone steps on my foot.

P. Yeah, it just happens when you work.

Leslie on Soreness, Pain, and Injuries

M. What exactly did you hurt when you had the accident?

L. Um, bruised really bad my ankle and wrenched my knee.

M. Just on the one leg?

L. Yeah, and it was funny, like, on Friday, I didn't even run. I was at the basketball game at school, and I ran across the court, and I got this feeling in the side of my knee just below, and I hate that. I thought, "My God, if I can't run *that* far," I don't know. Maybe I twisted it bad or something. . . .

L. I don't know what I'm going to do for running, 'cause with the knee and ankle acting up . . . . I guess I'll make it . . . . maybe just walk; that would be the best thing.

M. Or run when you can, walk when you can't run, or a jog-run, and tell your coach about it.

L. Yeah, uh huh.

M. So how was swimming last week.

L. Ah, good.

M. Yeah.

L. I only went once, though, and I was pretty sore the next day.

M. You were, eh?

L. Yeah, 'cause I worked kinda harder than I should have.

M. How did your legs feel?

L. Good. My knee's still really sore; I have to go slow.

L. Uh huh, uh huh. Sometimes when I do muscle-toning things like running or lifting weights, you'll notice this about me, I don't get results right away, and sometimes that'll make me so mad that I'll do it too much. . . .

L. Yeah, I agree with you, oh, yeah. If I don't sweat when I'm doing something, that really bothers me, but sometimes when I don't sweat and I . . . . There are some days when I guess you can sweat, and there are other days when you don't at all.

M. I guess the next day you feel it.

L. Yeah! And the day after that.
M. Try not to get too hung up on "the feel" right at the moment, but sometimes you can't help it.
L. Yeah, I think that's true. I guess I'll just have to remember that sometimes, too, in anything.

L. I guess I'm scared, but I don't realize it.
M. Are you afraid it will hurt?
L. I don't think it would hurt; it's just in your mind, you know?
M. Yeah, "after-an-injury" thinking. After my knee surgery I was afraid that if I bent it the whole thing was just going to fall apart.
L. Yeah!
M. You get this picture, and it's totally illogical, but it sure stops you from doing stuff.
L. You bet. Yeah. I was just so mad.

M. Have you been sore in the past, or are you active enough that it's not too bad?
L. I'm not now, but I have been before.
M. What makes you sore, even though you're active?
L. Probably just going from one thing to another, there are differences; you use different body parts different ways.
M. Yeah. And I guess this year your injury is a factor, coming back.

L. How can people tell you, though, that there's nothing wrong with you when it hurts? Pain is not normal.

L. Yeah, my muscle here is really sore. It's kinda sticking out, and I played baseball, and my legs are *sore*! They're not today; they were yesterday, *really* stiff, kinda, little bit, but yesterday I could barely bend over. [Laughs] It wasn't as bad as I thought it would be. I thought I wouldn't be able to get out of bed.
M. What made you that sore: a whole game, a big practice, or what?
L. Yeah, we ran and we ran and we ran. Yeah, we ran the *whole* practice; that's all we did, we had a "sweat practice." That's what it's called.
M. Just conditioning.
L. Yep. Uh huh. It was brutal.
M. How did you feel while you were doing it?
L. Pretty run down, tired, dead. And I got this cold, and it just won't go away. It's starting to now, but that really drags me down, right, 'cause my chest gets so sore.
M. Hard to breathe.
L. Yeah, but actually, I'm doing better than I thought I would, considering.

M. Is it still difficult if you know how bad it's going to be, or if it's not *as* bad as you thought?

L. Depends. You have to have an open mind, I guess.
M. A lot of it depends on how you feel after?
L. Uh huh, if you're tired or if you feel good after you did it.
M. But the training is part if it, eh? You wouldn't stop playing 'cause the training is unpleasant.
L. No, no.
M. Did you think you'd be as sore as you are?
L. I thought I'd be worse.
M. Really.
L. Oh, yeah. I thought I wouldn't be able to move . . . but, good. It wasn't too bad. . . .

M. Can you feel yourself getting tired, or all of a sudden you're there?
L. No, I can feel myself starting to get more and more tired.
M. You know when you start that you're going to be that tired at the end?
L. Ah, sometimes . . .
M. Or do you just not think about it?
L. I don't really think about it. I usually try not to, but that day I felt like I had no energy. I just sat down on the hill, kind of, and I realized I'd better just go in and sit down.

Let us begin our reflection on soreness, pain, and distress with a physiological perspective on pain or soreness in the context of physical activity.

Although certain kinds of strenuous efforts are associated with pain during the exercise period, soreness often develops some hours or even days after exertion. The soreness that begins as fatigue approaches during heavy contractions, especially those that have a large static component, is thought to be caused by an inadequate blood flow to the working muscles. This deprives the muscles of oxygen and fails to wash "pain substances" out of the muscles. There are several products of contraction that could build up in the muscles or tissue fluid surrounding the muscles and cause pain by stimulating nerve endings in the muscle or connective tissue within the muscle. Lactic acid and potassium, for example, can cause local pain when they are injected into a muscle. A lack of oxygen by itself does not cause muscular pain, but hypoxia does have an indirect effect by increasing the diffusion of substances out of capillaries into tissue fluid. This fluid accumulates in the tissue spaces, leading to swelling and consequent stimulation of pain nerve endings in the area of the swelling.

It is curious that the greatest delayed soreness in muscles occurs in response to eccentric (lengthening) contractions which are less difficult to perform with the same load than concentric contractions. In a bench press, for example, soreness is much more likely to occur in a person who repeats only the lowering (eccentric) phase of the movement than in one who only raises the load, even though it is much more difficult to raise than to lower a given load. Because there is less electromyographic activity and less oxygen uptake with eccentric exercise (Bigland-Ritchie & Woods, 1976), it appears that fewer (or different) motor units are activated or there is a lower frequency of motor unit recruitment during eccentric contractions than during concentric contractions. Therefore, each individual muscle fiber may produce greater force while lengthening than while shortening. If this is so, it seems probable that the individual fibers and their connective tissue attachments are under greater stress during the eccentric exercise and are thus more subject to disruption (Asmussen, 1956).

There are three common hypothetical explanations of the soreness that occurs usually a day or two after strenuous exercise: the lactic acid accumulation hypothesis, the muscle spasm hypothesis, and the tissue damage hypothesis.

The Lactic Acid Accumulation Hypothesis

It is well established that lactic acid accumulates to a greater extent in more intensive types of exercise and that more intensive exercise generally causes the greatest delayed muscle soreness. However, there are several lines of evidence which suggest that lactic acid has little to do with delayed soreness. First, lactic acid does not remain elevated above resting values more than 15 to 30 minutes after exercise (Karlsson, 1971), yet soreness typically is delayed until 24 to 48 hours following exercise. The onset of soreness is so far removed from the period of elevated lactic acid that it is difficult to believe that lactic acid could cause the soreness. Second, the greatest soreness accompanies eccentric contractions, which are associated with relatively slight lactic acid accumulation. Third, there are some activities which produce much soreness but essentially no lactic acid. As an example, consider an overweight, basically unfit person who begins a training program with a few vigorous straight-legged toe-touching exercises. Within a day after the stretching, which causes little or no lactic acid production, the backs of the trainee's legs would be very sore. Finally, patients who have a hereditary absence of phosphorylase, an enzyme required for breaking down glycogen to lactic acid, still experience great muscle pain after strenuous contractions, in spite of a lack of lactic acid accumulation. Accordingly, it seems extremely unlikely that lactic acid accumulation can explain delayed muscular soreness after exercise.

The Muscle Spasm Hypothesis

Those who believe in the muscle spasm hypothesis say (a) that strenuous contractions cause a reduction in blood flow (ischemia) to the working muscles; (b) that this ischemia in turn triggers the release of pain substances out of the muscle fibers into the tissue fluid, where the pain substances stimulate nerve endings; and (c) that the pain receptors cause reflex spastic contractions of the painful muscle fibers to produce further ischemia and continued release of pain substances to renew the pain cycle (de Vries, 1980). This hypothesis is sometimes but not always supported by electromyographic evidence that under some circumstances fatigued muscles may indeed continue to contract after exercise. Also, stretching of the muscles may reduce the contractile activity and the associated pain. However, it seems unlikely that ischemia and post-exercise spasms occur after all types of exercise that can result in pain. For example, in untrained persons the mere act of stretching in limbering-up exercises surely does not cause ischemia but can result in pain the next day. Therefore, the spasm-pain substance hypothesis is not a completely satisfactory explanation of all muscle pain caused by exercise.

The Tissue Damage Hypothesis

A more persuasive hypothesis is that free nerve endings are stimulated by swelling (edema) of muscle tissue after microscopic damage to a relatively few muscle fibers or their surrounding connective tissue. There are several reasons for believing that strenuous, unaccustomed exercise may cause some minor damage to muscle tissue. First, microscopic disruptions of myofibrils, especially of the Z-lines, have been observed in biopsy specimens from the calf muscles of men who ran down 10 flights of stairs 10 times (Friden, Sjostrom, & Ekblom, 1981). All the people in this experiment suffered intense muscle discomfort, especially two or three days following the exercise.

Second, myoglobin appears in the blood (Ritter, Stone, & Willerson, 1979) and urine (Abraham, 1977) of people who participate in strenuous activity. Since myoglobin is a large protein found only in muscle, its appearance in blood and urine suggests muscle damage. After training, there is less exercise-induced soreness; there is also less myoglobin released into the blood.

Third, large enzyme molecules such as lactic acid dehydrogenase and creatine phospho kinase leak out of the muscles into the blood to a much greater extent after eccentric exercise than after concentric exercise at the same absolute load. The appearance of these enzymes in the blood is widely viewed as an index of muscle fiber damage. Since delayed soreness is also much greater after the eccentric exercise, it therefore seems likely that tissue damage is a precursor to delayed soreness after exercise.

Fourth, there is substantial evidence that muscle protein degradation is accelerated for at least six hours after treadmill running or weight lifting (Dohm, Williams, Kasparek, & van Rij, 1982). This increased degradation of muscle protein may be a reflection of increased activity of lysozymes, enzymes which become especially active in response to cellular damage (Vihko, Salminen, & Rantamaki, 1979).

Finally, it has been reported that connective tissue in skeletal muscle may be degraded by exercise that produces soreness (Abraham, 1977). This may be especially important in view of the suggestion that eccentric exercise (which causes the greatest soreness) places more stress on connective tissue than does concentric exercise (Asmussen, 1956).

To summarize, there is little evidence to support the view that lactic acid accumulation is causally related to delayed muscle soreness. Muscle spasms may accompany soreness after certain types of exercise, but it is unlikely that ischemia and spasms occur in mild eccentric exercise which produces soreness. Such spasms may be a result of tissue damage and not the direct cause of soreness. Most of the evidence suggests that minor damage to muscle and/or connective tissue causes a gradual increase (over 12 to 48 hours) in the leakage of chemicals into the extra-cellular spaces of the muscle. These chemicals may directly stimulate free nerve endings in the tissues or cause a progressive swelling of the tissues that places pressure on the nerve endings and causes the discomfort reported as "stiffness," "soreness," or "pain."

Physiologists, it seems, remain committed to and curious about cause and effect. Pain and soreness are approached from the "what causes them" perspective, yet a description of a lived experience of soreness, of what it _is_ and what it can mean, is not really advanced by an explanation at the muscle fiber level. "What happens" at the muscle level and "what happens" at the lived level are two very different questions.

Mainstream and sport psychology have attempted to articulate pain threshold "iron-man" theories whereby certain personality types are more likely to push through pain barriers than others or are able to work with pain due to one or another coping mechanism (Bass & Finn, 1987). Focus on the "pleasure versus pain" motivation is also prevalent (Bigge, 1982).

As with physiology, though, the implicit emphasis is on the "why" and perhaps the "how," rather than on the "what." If, however, positivist science does indeed succeed in identifying the "what" of soreness--and I am quite convinced at this juncture that what soreness can be or can mean is not a burning question for physiology or sport psychology--then what? Is it discovered in order to be eliminated or understood?

Lorenz (1987) voices a similar observation:

> We civilized humans are becoming continually less capable of supporting pain and sorrow. The extent of our fear of discomfort and the mechanics we set in motion to avoid it border on vice.
>
> The increasing intolerance of the unpleasurable on the part of civilized humans transforms the naturally inevitable highs and lows of our normal lives into an artificially flattened expanse of monotonous grey, without any of the contrasts of lights and shadows. In short, this produces boredom and in so doing becomes the cause for so many humans needing to be continually entertained. (pp. 191-192)

Though the focus of this section is soreness/pain/distress (etc.), it is its context, physical activity, which actually compels me the most. I believe that physical activity can be an open space for disclosure; therein, our bodies and eventually our consciousness can access, can collect the logos, the eidos, which presents itself. Soreness is one of the more profound experiences because it is "felt" in such a dramatic way, but it is but one of the lived meanings of the inexhaustible referent, which is physical activity. In like fashion, aspects of soreness or pain will emerge as lived meanings which do not exhaust soreness as a referent.

Shapiro (1985) suggests that any moment can affect us. It can lay hold of us, touch us, flow into us; we are, then, touched, moved, influenced. Having been "affected," what we feel is affect, feeling, disposition. This is akin to Scheler's (1970; cited in Shapiro) notion, "vital feeling." In vital feeling there is "unified consciousness of the body" rather than the localizable awareness of a separable part, as in a sensory feeling: "In vital feeling, the value of phenomena is given to us before the phenomena themselves. . . . we are a radical opening onto the world; we are threaded to it" (p. 44).

Shapiro (1985) presents Scheler's notions in support of his own present exposition: the affected body, but also to illustrate how both "affected body" and "vital feeling" illustrate the way in which we are always receiving through these feelings the "register of the world's impress without yet positing it as such" (p. 44).

> We must let go, finally, of our metaphysical conception of thinking. We must simply give our thought to the body. We must take our thinking down into the body. We must learn to think through the body. We must learn to think with the body. Thinking is not a question of bracketing the body, but a question of integrating awareness, living well-focused in the body. For once, we should listen in silence to our bodily felt experience. Thinking needs to learn by feeling, by just being with our bodily being. Are we ready to let this body of experience tell us how to think its essence? Are we, as thinkers, ready to quiet the conceptualizing mind in order to listen to the body's own speech, its own logos? To be sure, our "thinking" will sound, and be, radically different. That, however, is precisely my point. I can see no other way for thinking to break out of the history of Western metaphysics. (Levin, 1985, p. 61)

Sensationalism, according to Levin (1985), is an "epoche" (reduction) symptomatic of our technological epoch: a way of avoiding the true depth of our body of felt experience. Sensationalism turns us away from the disclosive presence of the pain, and therefore from its primordial truth. What it offers is a mere "re-presentation" of pain, and its image of the fragmented body is determined by the classical paradigm of Newtonian physics. "For me, therefore, the paradigm shift is one of a shift from 're-presenting' the pain to 'being with it' in the wholeness of an experience that lets it simply be present" (p. 88).

In order to let the meaning of soreness or pain show itself as it presents itself in lived experience, we might consider letting go, for the moment at least, of some of our assumptions.

Neumann (1970) suggests that pain and discomfort are among the earliest factors that build consciousness. For pain or soreness to show itself as it presents itself directly and primordially, certain held notions about it should be "bracketed" in order to attune ourselves to hear what the experience itself tells us.

Kelpin (1984) offers the following as typical held assumptions:

> 1. The idea that pain should be denied.
> 2. The idea that pain must be relieved (although we agree that human suffering must be reduced, let us stand back from our expectation that avoidance of pain is a primary and valuable goal). Rich (1976) suggests that this notion "is a dangerous mechanism, which can cause us to lose touch not just with our painful sensations but with ourselves" (p. 152).
> 3. The assumption that pain is only negative. Can pain be shown to be a positive experience?
> 4. The assumption that pain can be explained. There are theories that explain pain physically, psychologically, sociologically, and culturally. These theories and explanations contribute to our understanding of pain, but they also fragment our sense of wholeness of the pain experience. (p. 179)

According to Sartre (1948; cited in Sontag, 1967), man experiences pain and pride, tension and lucidity; each one is necessary to fulfill freedom's demand for a push beyond self. The deeply felt experience reaches to the core and, as Buytendijk (1961) says, "throws us back on ourselves," demands us to muster up even more strength to survive, to live through it.

In moments of pain or soreness the athlete asks herself, How can I go on? Where is the edge? Will I go over? Can I go on after having been--here? (Devine, 1984).

> To play like this with pain that is unbearable yet is being borne, to summon up the presence of death itself, is to become a high wire artist at some lofty place in human existence, one who balances precariously and triumphantly at the edge of unknown possibilities. A day without such interplay is incomplete. (Leonard, 1974, p. 176)

According to Devine (1984), the lasting residue of these transcendent training moments is a heightened awareness of the capability of the body--a sense of awe and wonder. Concomitant with this sense is a renewed faith in oneself apart from the training milieu.

Reich (1970) describes the preoccupation of contemporary individuals with the "trappings" of experience who concern themselves with being "knowledgeable" or "competent" at something, but who never allow themselves to learn about the thing from the inside out. The activities they pursue are not integrated into a whole life; they are dichotomized into soulless activities that are not part of that person's life in the sense that they are integral to his holistic well-being. Jantsch (1981) states a similar perspective: "The most profound challenges in life are set from within, not without" (p. 106).

To bear, to carry on, to endure the soreness or pain is part of the experience. Bearing pertains broadly to the capacity to carry oneself in a specific way; endurance specifies a continuing capacity to face the pain; misery suggests resignation.

The way we bear the soreness or pain (to carry or ride above; to endure; to suffer) depends on our relationship to the experience of soreness/pain itself and to the reason for it. Our relationship to the soreness or pain is intentional; that is, our pain is experienced by our stance in the world; perhaps our pain-as-experienced is empowered by our way of standing in relationship to it, our riding with it, our enduring it, or our being overwhelmed by it.

> Our "training search" is a quest for a new being in the world, a new sense of self. Through training we have the opportunity to mold--to re-create--ourselves. . . . The training quest is a difficult one. Early (and later!) training experiences are characterized by impatience, frustration, pain, and a sense of despair--one needs hope to initiate training; but to carry through the training process, one needs faith as well. Faith--fidere--means to trust, believe, to confide. One must believe in oneself. Training also requires fidelity, which in Latin derives from fidei, referring not only to faith in oneself but to a belief in "credibility, actuality, fulfillment." When the person commits herself to "work out" she is keeping faith in the sense that she has made a promise or given her word of honor. (Devine, 1984, p. 170)

Soreness and pain are aspects of the bearing, carrying-through process; also, it seems, they embody more than a set of responses at the Z-line and intracellular levels. We live in and with our bodies and their experiences and their wisdom daily, but we do not always listen or attend to what our bodily modes can tell us about ourselves and our lifeworld. Soreness and pain are particulars of the physical activity context which I believe can contain and reveal meaning.

Van den Berg (1972) suggests that each of us lives in a house that has aspects we have never observed, although stimuli from these aspects no doubt reach our eyes sometimes even thousands of times. Not everything that "happens" is an "experience."

I feel this to be quite analogous to our bodies and our bodily modes: We live in a body with aspects we have never "observed." Even though they are there for us, we are not always there with or for them. Perhaps what makes them more "present" are these "experiences" such as soreness and pain.

Clearly, the literature is disparate and rich; there are areas of relation, and there are areas of tension. We need both for dialogue and dialectic. We do, however, have a history that is eloquent in its omission of what soreness or pain or distress can be and can mean, both in the context of physical activity and in the larger context of the lifeworld.

Soreness can be experienced after an activity and can be acutely felt in specific body parts. The soreness is evidence of and a result of one's investment and effort. It reminds the experiencer of the significance of what was done; it makes the experiencer more aware of her body.

We shall now consider other particularities of physically felt experience which the doers in this study experienced: sweating, sensitivity, detachment, amplification, unmanageability, and heightened awareness. We shall first consider sweating and sensitivity to the surround and then move on to a consideration of unmanageability, detachment, amplification, and heightened awareness. I should mention that although I have separated these experiences for purposes of discussion, they do not often happen in isolation from each other, and the discussion will no doubt confirm their interrelatedness and overlap.

Leslie:

> If I don't sweat when I'm doing something, that really bothers me, but sometimes when I don't sweat and I . . . There are days when I guess you can sweat, and there are other days when you don't at all.

Sylvie:

> It's good after the bike, you know you pushed yourself, you did something. I love it. You're just sweating. It's great. I like the work. I like pushing: You're so hot, and then you're so aware of what's going on and your body is saying, "Okay!"

Param:

> I just basically played football. It's hard running on ice. . . . You really have to enjoy it to play when it's icy.

slippery, cold, and mucky.

Param:

> There is a tingling in my face after I finish a run, and how hot or cold or tired you are; you really notice it. . . .

Leanne and Maureen:

> M. You don't mind all that kind of work?
> L. No, as long as I learn how to do it.
> M. 'Cause that was a lot of work . . . and you're all sweating and tired now. You don't mind that?
> L. No. . . . It was neat.
> M. You don't mind sweating. . . . Do you mind when you get hot and sweaty . . . ?
> L. No, I'm used to it.
> M. Yeah. Is it a good feeling? . . . Do you like it?
> L. Yeah, 'cause then you go outside, and the breeze comes and feels nice and cold 'cause your face is hot.
> M. That's nice.

Travis:

> Basically you've got to always be on the lookout for where everybody is, and you got to anticipate where everything's going to happen . . . and you put yourself in position, and when you get the ball, you got to know where everybody is. . . . You should have all your thinking done before you get the ball. . . . It has to be just natural reaction.

I would also like to include what I consider to be an extremely robust lived-experience description. This description is more anecdote than interview, but I believe it contributes to our understanding of sweating, effort, and the like. This anecdote is from Carl, a former classmate, a fellow Newfoundlander, a kindred spirit. I actually came to know Carl, the person, in the weight room before I discovered that we were in the same faculty, department, and degree program. As I come to know him better, my first, general impression, which was of a warm, articulate, gentle man, has only been confirmed again and again.

Carl:

> I enjoy weight lifting. Twice a week I spend an hour or two in the University of Alberta weight room. I don't follow a strict pattern. I don't know the science of weight lifting--the terminology, the procedures for optimum results, the proper diet. I don't do arms one day, legs another, back another. I just lift weights for an hour or so. Mostly I get hot, tired,

and sweaty. And I enjoy the whole experience immensely.

Because I spend most of my time with words, my hours in the weight room are opportunities to be part of a physical world, a world devoted to aching, straining, grimacing, huffing and puffing, sweating, stinging, groaning, and stretching, a world full of metal and iron and machinery.

I love the feeling of pushing my body to the edge of its strength and endurance. I love the feeling of participating in a communal experience with other weight lifters. I love the feeling of gradually growing stronger. I love the feeling of being too tired and too busy to go to the weight room and going anyway and having a satisfying workout.

But the best feeling is probably the feeling of using my hands. I often think I should buy gloves. My hands sweat a lot. Sometimes my grip on the bar slips. Perhaps gloves would help me lift more weight. But what I'd miss if I wore gloves is the feeling of being joined to the weights--the sense of the weights as an extension of my hands, my body. I'd miss the direct contact with steel and iron. And I'd miss the callouses that build up where the fingers join the palms. And I'd miss the pleasure that comes from feeling (even if only briefly) tough and in control

For the same kind of reasons I don't carry a towel into the weight room. Lots of people use a towel to wipe away the sweat. But I like the sweat trickling down my face, into my eyes, down my back, down my legs. I'm not a masochist, but I feel a sense of fulfillment or completion when there is a strenuous physical component in my life. I have the privilege of a sedentary, comfortable, secure life, and I wouldn't want to surrender that life, but I also need to be physically active and close to the physical world. Weight lifting provides that kind of experience.

The temperature-regulating mechanism of the body consists of three parts:

1. a regulating center located in the hypothalamus that acts as a thermostat to maintain body temperature at or near 37 degrees C. (98.6 degrees F.);
2. regulators such as muscles that increase body heat by shivering, or vasomotor controls that constrict or dilate arterioles to conserve or lose body heat; and
3. heat and cold receptors located in the skin to sense changes in environmental temperature conditions.

I would suggest that the children and young people who co-authored this study might not be able to describe their temperature-regulating system, might not be able to distinguish between heat exhaustion and heat stroke, might not be able to tell me that salt loss tends to cause heat cramps, or might not realize that their hands and feet are cold because of vasoconstriction, but they can talk about how it feels to run on a muddy field on a cold, windy November afternoon; or what it is like to feel oneself getting hotter and hotter and then break into an affirming, liberating sweat; or how it feels to locate oneself in the middle of action and feel the "right thing to do."

When Param talks about the tingling sensation in his face and how noticeable heat, cold, and tiredness are, he has indeed put his finger on a pulse. He is living, with his metaphor-seeking body-subject, what his physiological systems are responding to. When Leslie talks about wanting to sweat, yet acknowledges that some days she just cannot seem to get one going, she is attuned to the resistance of her body and to the "properness" of sweating: Sweating is what her body should do when she exercises. Leanne speaks to the situatedness of a cool breeze on her hot face, a lived experience not really expressed by the term "evaporation." Sylvie acknowledges the heightened awareness of self, of skin, of work that accompanies breaking into a sweat, a lived experience not really expressed by "reaching the elevated set point." Travis describes his lived experience of being on the field, in the action, sensitive to the surround, anticipating movement and nuance; his lived experience cannot be expressed by the terms "acclimatization" or "kinaesthetic awareness." The language of physiology and biomechanics is illuminating in that it can explain what is happening at a certain place, during a certain time or set of circumstances. It is obfuscating to the extent that it claims that this is the only thing that is happening at this place, during this time or these circumstances. I do not believe that "trusting the judgements of our muscles" (Nietzsche, 1968, p. 173) means explaining the processes which occur at sub-cutaneous levels. I believe that it means letting the body-subject have its voice and taking that voice seriously.

Let us return for a moment to the lived experiences of sweating, hot and cold sensations, and sensitivity to the surround offered by Leslie, Sylvie, Param, Leanne, Travis, and Carl. During a workout Leslie likes to feel her work. Feeling the work is evidence to herself of how much effort she is putting into it. Leslie likes to sweat, and if she does not feel tired or sore or does not sweat, she wonders if she is working hard enough. Sylvie likes how much she sweats during and after exercise. She likes sweating because it means that she has been working hard and pushing herself, and it feels as though she has broken through some kind of barrier. As well, she experiences a heightened awareness of her body, of how hot she is, and of all of her body senses and sensations. Sylvie can almost hear her body's approval of her effort and her sweating, and it is a great feeling.

In spite of the cold and the miserable field conditions, Param continues to play football. He and a group of friends meet, organize themselves, and play in the cold, the wind, and the ice. Field and weather conditions make a big difference in the way a game is played. A snowy, icy, or otherwise slippery field surface makes running and other kinds of footwork complicated, more difficult, and, at times, ridiculous. Falls and impacts are also more painful on a hard rather than on a grassy surface. As well, the cold makes it hard to control and handle the ball.

Muddy or mucky conditions are not considered as bad as cold and ice, and the largest worry in messy conditions, at least in Param's opinion, is keeping the dirty clothes out of Mother's sight. A player really has to enjoy the game to keep playing when the weather and field conditions are miserable. Param describes the pleasant tingling sensations he experiences when he finishes a run, and he also mentions the definitely felt, very real and noticeable bodily sensations he experiences during running, particularly during periods or moments of exhaustion and effort.

In spite of the hard work she has put in, Leanne feels energetic rather than tired or sore. She does not mind getting hot and sweaty; she is used to it and finds it to be a good feeling. She especially likes feeling a cool breeze on her hot face--an interesting opposition which contributes to heightened bodily and sensual awareness.

Travis thinks about what is going on when he is playing. He feels that a soccer player has to be aware of where everybody is, be able to anticipate plays, go through the possible moves available to an opponent and to himself, and adjust his position and actions accordingly; all his thinking should be done before he gets the ball. While all this thinking is going on, Travis depends on his body to do the right thing without having to think about it--a "natural" reaction.

Carl, whose professional and family life tend more towards literary and sedentary pursuits, presents the weight room as a place where he can connect with and enjoy the physical world. He presents the free apparatus, machinery, the sounds, feelings, sights, smells, and shared effort as prominent and significant aspects of the weight room world. He says that, while he is no expert, he does make a point of getting to the weight room for an hour or so twice a week. He says that, though he has considered options, he has deliberately chosen not to wear gloves or use a towel, even though his "performance" might be enhanced by them. Rather, he prefers to feel the equipment, to get (earn?) his callouses, to sweat, to push himself to his limit. His direct contact allows him to feel more connected and in control.

While he appreciates his "other" life, he says that he needs his physical component for a sense of wholeness and fulfillment. The weight training experience leaves it effects on the body, but also allows the person who is training to gain a heightened tactile, bodily, and kinaesthetic awareness, as well as a feeling of strength and well-being.

The sweating, sensitivity, soreness, pain, and other distress which these doers experience tell them that I lived that experience, or I am living this experience. It reminds them of their presence to the lifeworld as a body-subject. It speaks to them of all this is, seen and unseen. It stirs, in their depths, a recollection of the primordial wisdom which informs "natural reaction." It speaks to them of the properness of work and sacrifice in the service of Being, in the responsibility to human-ness. The push beyond the self spoken to by Devine (1984) is perhaps not so much a negation of self as a push beyond the self's predisposed expectations to the body-subject's larger, deeper "knowing."

Travis' example of his sensitivity to the surround and trust in his body wisdom is also a doorway into our "physically felt experiences" of detachment, unmanageability, heightened awareness, and amplification. Travis is deeply embedded in the soccer-playing experience, yet he is strangely disconnected from "making his body do things." Leslie talks about how she knows that she is tired when her body cannot do basic, easy, taken-for-granted moves, no matter how she tries. The unmanageability makes her bend to her body's request for recovery, but the request is not in agreement with what she thought she wanted to do.

There are other examples of unmanageability and detachment:

Sylvie:

> It's the same with me before I used to accept myself the way I was. My right arm used to twitch, right, bad . . . right up. At night time I just used to be so angry, I hate it. I'd scratch it. I hated it. Like, it was like it wasn't my body, you know? You just have to deal with it. The more you fight it, the more it'll fight back.
>
> . . . Except when I have bad balance and my left foot sometimes won't turn out, like it just hangs. . . .
>
> . . . Sometimes if I'm terribly tired, exhausted, then my body sometimes acts up.

Travis:

> Just keep up to the guy in front of me; I don't have to excel at this. . . . Do what the guy in front of me is doing, keep up to him till it's over. It's over. I think about that.

Param:

> Like, when I began running, like, I didn't look behind me or anything, I just sprinted as fast as I could around the track, and I just really didn't think anything. I just got all caught up in the action. . . .
>
> . . . Except for my legs, like, they just keep going, I can't stop them. . . . I can keep going when I'm tired. . . . In a cross-country run, gets kinda boring, so I kinda sing to myself or something to keep it lively. . . . Don't really pay much attention to it [the race], just let the thing to go. . . .
>
> . . . Lots of times when I'm doing cross-country running it feels gross. I put it in the back of my mind and think about other things, . . . stuff like football or some movies that I've seen, and I talk to myself. . . . No [I'm not with my body]; we're two different people, kind of.

Sylvie used to have a severe twitch in her arm and was not only angry about it, but she also hated her arm and attacked it as if it were not a part of her body. Sylvie had to deal with her arm, however, because the more she fought it, the more it fought back. As a person with a disability, Sylvie is harder on herself when her body "messes up" than a non-disabled person would be, because the non-disabled person more or less knows that the "messing up" probably means nothing or is temporary. Sylvie has no such comfort or assurance, and her messing up might well be ongoing. Fortunately, Sylvie's messing-up experiences are infrequent and usually occur when she has bad balance; then her left foot just hangs there and does not turn out. Sylvie tries not to think too much about her foot at those times, finding that her left foot does not seem to be as bad when she is not preoccupied with it. Sylvie feels that a lot of body management and mismanagement is in a person's head, so, along with not being preoccupied, relaxing about the problem also helps. As well, when Sylvie is tired her body "acts up," although it seems that most people's bodies "act up" or act differently when they are tired.

Travis focuses on how much time is left and on someone else's doing to "get through" his running (conditioning). He takes the focus off himself so that he can "do" without interference. He knows that he can and ought to do, so, rather than participate in getting his own way, he follows another person.

Param sees nothing and thinks nothing on the short-distance runs and gets all caught up in the action. In long-distance events there is not much to do except run; this gets kind of boring, so he sings something upbeat to himself to keep it lively. Param does not think about how awful or tired he feels, but rather, he attends ot the race and lets the experience happen; he goes with it. Cross-country running is difficult for Param. It "burns him out" and is hard on his body. His legs seem to be the exception, because they keep going and keep him going. Param says that he cannot seem to stop his legs, even when he is tired. He does have times when he is running when he "feels gross," but he gets past it by "putting it in the back of his mind," by not dwelling on how bad it feels even though there is a lot of time available for thinking, by thinking about other things besides the task at hand, and by talking to himself. When Param does feel distress, he has a sense of being disconnected from his distressing body as if he were two different people.

Unmanageability and detachment are related. When a doer cannot manage her movement, she does not feel connected to it; her body is interfering with her moving. When a doer cannot manage her distress, she would rather not be connected to it, since it interferes with her doing. On its face, this disconnectedness or subject-object relationship with the body seems grounded in dualism, yet I would suggest that detaching or disconnecting (slackening the strings) is actually one way in which the body-subject acts in the service of unity.

Let us examine the familiar phrases "It's all in your head" and "Put it in the back of your mind." These are often used to explain or relieve distress. Sylvie and Param used them in trying to describe their lived experience. We can negate or dismiss a message from our body-subject by using the mind as a "container" or "location" for that which is mysterious and unexplainable. Yet Sylvie, Travis, and Param insist the they do not get preoccupied with thinking about the distress. They do not dwell on it; rather, they allow it dwell in them, in the way that it can show itself to the body-subject. Detaching allows for embeddedness, allows the things themselves to present themselves. When we step back we often can get a closer look.

Here, too, we need to reconsider the necessary tension partners of owning and belonging. Doers can "own" a doing to the extent that they are willing to belong to it. Owning a doing invokes a subject-object polarity; belonging to it invokes a self-negating process. Neither is unifying; neither acknowledges the body-subject. Doers give themselves over to the doing as a responsible act of a co-creatorship, not as a nihilistic act of emptying: Emptying oneself and opening oneself are not the same.

Let us now consider some examples of amplification and heightened awareness. Param has spoken to his tingling sensations, his "noticing" of his sensations. Sylvie has spoken to her heightened awareness of her body and her effort when she is sweating. Leslie commented on how important the "feel" of the exercise was to her, how she did not enjoy waiting to feel her work. Leanne described how the cool breeze on her hot face was a pleasant yet "noticed" experience. Carl spoke of the feeling of sweat trickling, of iron in his hands, of communal experience. There are other examples:

Param:

> Well, um, yeah. It's like, where do you put football? You can do anything you want: You can kick, throw catch. . . . And I also like track and field a lot because you can run, and there's nothing to stop you, right. You can just keep going.

Leanne:

> M. You didn't think you did well?
> L. No! I forgot everything.
> M. How did that happen?
> L. I don't know, I just, I don't know. I just had a body suit on, I just felt weird, forgot everything. . . . I want to do well, sometimes. I don't know, I just forget everything 'cause, like, I know the judges are watching, and I just get nervous.

Param likes football and track for their potential for limitlessness. Track offers a feeling of unboundedness: He can run, and there is nothing to stop him, but Param likes football more than other activities because, along with the limitlessness potential, the hugeness of experience that it offers, it also has incredible diversity and a large range of skills built into the game.

Leanne admits to some nervousness about people and judges watching. She does not usually miss moves that she knows due to nervousness, yet at this meet she forgot everything. The factor which seems to make the most difference was that she wore a body suit. Leanne does not practice in a body suit, and it felt weird, she says. She was more exposed and more aware of being exposed, and this seemed to make the judges' scrutiny even more intense. Leanne's self-consciousness was a distraction, and she was attending to and present for other things rather than the task at hand. Her nakedness amplified things which would normally not have affected her so adversely or deeply. Her own exposure made her more susceptible to others' exposure and made her feel more vulnerable.

As we can see, amplification and heightened awareness can also be doubled-edged swords. Both are forms of simultaneous disconnection and immersion. Both can fall prey to subject-object polarity and to self-negation (i.e., the experience is more profound than the lived experience). Both allow the body-subject to act responsibly.

Devine (1984), Leonard (1974), and Waller (1987), among others, refer to being on the edge of an experience, to being intensely attuned to an activity, to being in some "nether-region" or "altered state." Markott, Ryan, and Young (1982) and Sharkey (1984) offer commentary on the "runner's high," the "endorphin effect," the "somatopsychic effect." Glasser (1976) praises "positive addiction"; Morgan (1970) expresses concern over chronic "negative-addiction" activity. These writers are speaking to the intensity of a lived experience and the consequences for the doer in her/his lifeworld. They do not make mention in their work of the body-subject; hence its role as reconciler, unifier, and revealer is not explicitly acknowledged. Body-subject does not give us freedom from distress, from amplification, from the risk of self-objectification. It does give us an opportunity at meaning-making and reflection, at "seeing" or "feeling" the eidos, the meaningfulness of lived experience, and this continues to liberate us from the objectivist, positivist "thinking" that could keep us unempowered.

These physically felt experiences of soreness, pain, distress, sweating, amplification, and detachment remind us of our human-ness, our "limits." They also remind us of our potential for limitless access via the profound embeddedness and connectedness of our flesh in and to the lifeworld, and the attunement and relationship of our body-subject to Being.

Sore, from the Latin saevus, meaning fierce, is presented by Webster as causing pain or distress, painfully sensitive, tender; also, attended by difficulties, hardship, or exertion.

Pain, from the Greek poine meaning payment or penalty, is also akin to the Greek tinesthai, to punish. Webster offers bodily sensation characterized by physical discomfort and typically leading to evasive action; trouble or care taken for the accomplishment of something.

The related words are quite fascinating in terms of the pathways and connections they suggest: tender, meaning sensitive to touch, injury, or insult, highly susceptible; susceptible, meaning open, subject to some stimulus influence or agency, impressionable; and impression, meaning an especially marked influence or effect on feeling, sense, or mind.

To me, there seems to be a carnality about soreness, distress, sweating, and their related terms which suggests "knowing" in its Biblical sense. The body is known by the experience, the experience is known by the body: the irrevocable bonding of an intimate encounter. More than "impact" has happened, although there has indeed been the forceful contact, the force of impression of one thing on another, but there has been more. There is also susceptibility, willingness to be taken, to be impressed upon, to be penetrated, pierced. The experiencer is nourished by the diffusion into and through his or her body, the senses and feelings have been deeply, profoundly affected. Penetration also carries the sense of the discovery of the inner contents or meaning of . . . something? Ourselves, our pain, our experience?

The descriptions have revealed soreness, distress, sweating, detachment, and amplification as the evidence and result of investment and effort. There is heightened awareness of and connection with the body as doer and the body as wisdom. There would seem to be a sense of Gadamer's (1975) experience and Simmel's (1922) adventure. Soreness also seems to be one of the "non-gray" (Lorenz, 1987) aspects of our lived experience. We also find relation with Shapiro's (1985) notion of the affected body and Levin's (1985) suggestion that we learn to listen in silence to our bodily thought. We have not exactly turned away from physiology, either. Investigations at muscle level and deeper can and do reveal what is physiologically happening; lived experience descriptions allow for a "translation," as it were, into a felt and meaningful encounter. We can also appreciate the need to bracket negative assumptions about pain and soreness, as Kelpin (1984) has suggested, in order to see it in a new light.

Devine's (1984) notion of keeping faith is also evident here; we see the affirmation of effort in the soreness.

Interestingly enough, there does not seem to be a move toward evasive action. Soreness, distress, and other physically felt experiences seem to be a welcomed acknowledgement; we have been penetrated by our experience, yet we too have penetrated with our investment and effort mutuality; communion of sorts. We are not seeking to damage, but to nourish. The discomfort or disconnection is not avoided; and although it may not be directly sought, there is an intentionality to the investment which produces it.

Are physically felt experiences our only way of knowing the depth of our devotion? Probably not, but it is a profound way of knowing: We are touched and moved in every cell and fiber (physiology assures us); we being to feel in a bodily way the meaning of devotion, the value of service.

The descriptions, anecdotes, and conversations have revealed some commonalities about physically felt experiences: They are evidence of and the result of effort and investment, and they enable a heightened awareness of and connection with one's bodily modes of being in the world. There has been some commentary on what these experiences feel like (burning, aching, sickening, strange, exhausting), but more commentary directed to how present it is, to how we notice "it" because we are so aware of our limbs, our muscles, our "affected bodies" now that they have the quality of soreness (or sweating or amplification or detachment) about them and in them.

According to exercise physiology, the qualities of soreness and other physically felt experiences could be the result of lactate build-up, muscle spasm, micro-trauma, temperature-regulation systems, and so forth. According to sport psychology, these qualities of physically felt experience are forms of determining this or that behavior or the motivation for it.

For a phenomenologically informed pedagogical perspective, the qualities of physically felt experience are a way of being more present with our bodies, to our bodies, and for our bodies, and this being present enables us to discover meaning in our doing behavior that is there for consciousness. Our eventual conduct, then, is informed by this meaning. It allows us to stand in relationship with physically felt experience in a more discerning way.

I would suggest that more attention be paid to bodily modes of physically felt experience in the context of the workout and in the context of injury so that the experiences which have the potential to unfold are ones which build rather than damage.

In conclusion, I would like to add that I believe that we are indeed "fearfully and wonderfully made" (Psalm 193:14) and that there is something greater and finer than ourselves that can inform our consciousness and conduct. We have to learn to listen.

Feeling and Emotion Experiences

> It is our passions, and our passions alone, that provide our life with meaning. (Solomon, 1976)

> An emotion is a transformation of the world. (Sartre, 1948)

Our passions are not the animal intrusions and physiologically based disruptions that they have always been thought to be. Neither are they sporadic and "irrational" intrusions into otherwise meaningful and quite "rational" lives. The passions are not threatening or overwhelming "forces" that push us in this way or that, hopefully to be controlled by "the sweet light of reason." It is not as if the passions themselves (and thus our lives) were dirty little secrets that would best be left in the darkness, untold. This approach to the passions, which Solomon (1976) calls "the Myth of the Passions," is itself part and parcel of that system of denial and neglect that leads so directly and inexorably to the conclusion that "life is absurd."

The Myth of the Passions is the myth of passivity--the self-serving half truth that we often suffer from our passions, submit ourselves to them, find ourselves carried away and foolishly behaving because of them. The purpose of this myth seems evident: to cast us in the role of unempowered, helpless victim.

> So long as the "passions" render us "passive," the most important and vital attitudes and actions of our lives fall beyond the scope of our doing and our responsibility, and so we find ourselves with an elaborate and convenient system of excuses for our feelings, for our behavior, for our Selves. "I couldn't help it; I was angry"; "She's not responsible, she's in love"; "Don't blame him, he was embarrassed": These are symptoms of a malady that cuts far deeper than a merely faulty theory of human nature. These are products of irresponsible self-deception, attempts to place blame and responsibility beyond ourselves for what, I shall argue, is in fact the most our own. Our passions--our emotions, moods, and desires--define us, our selves, and the world we live in. (Solomon, 1976, p. xvii)

Our language and our thinking about the passions are riddled with this myth of passivity: We "fall" in love, much as one might fall into a tiger trap or a swamp; we are "paralyzed" with (or by) fear, "driven" by anger, "crushed," "smitten," "carried away," "undone," and so forth. The passions are our inheritance from a more primitive and animal part of the soul, originating in the body, unlike thought and reason, which are of "Divine" origin, "man's gift from the gods." The passions have been generally agreed to be primitive and "natural," disruptive and irrational, lacking in judgement and purpose or reason, without scruples, and sometimes shockingly short of taste (Solomon, 1976). Passions are wild beasts which "mature" humans are supposed to control. Solomon argues that there has been no suggestion that we might also be responsible for the passions themselves, which might need no "control" at all if we were to realize only that they of are our own making in the first place (p. xviii).

Buytendijk (1950) states that every feeling is a feeling of something, and the human attitude in which a feeling is experienced in a positional, not reflective, consciousness results in fuller understanding (p. 128). These statements are supportive of this study's stand on the body-subject as being grounded in the world and open to the world, yet also as a being who experiences and is susceptible to what is offered in lived experiences. In other words, the body-subject comes to an experience already bearing feelings, but it is also in a position to be open to feelings.

> Our feelings are no senseless states of consciousness or psychic facts, but modes to detect the signification of situations, to know what is savory, disgusting, alarming, distressing, lovely, etc. . . . Feeling and emotion are the affirmations of our attitudes toward situations, and the pure phenomenon of feeling reveals the human being as always projecting it, and always projecting the world. . . . Feeling is a mode of replying to a situation and transforming it as a projected new world, in which unknown qualities are categorically experienced. (pp. 128-130)

According to Heidegger (1979), feeling is that basic mode of Dasein by force of which and in accordance with which we are always already lifted beyond ourselves into being as a whole (p. 99). There is, then, a pre-understanding of our relationship with Being, an attunement preserved in the primordial body of feeling which initially bears the destiny of our visionary (seeing) skill (Levin, 1985). We must learn to think and see through the body. We must learn to think and see with the body. This "thinking and seeing" is not a question of "bracketing" the body (Husserl's [1970] epoche), but a question of integrating awareness, living well focused "in the body." We are called to listen in silence to our bodily felt experience. Thinking and seeing need to learn by feeling (and by feeling feelings), by just being with our bodily being (Levin, 1985, p. 61).

There are, of course, many theorizers who profess an interest in and an abiding commitment to the whole area of feelings and emotions. These theorizers are to be found in many professions and disciplines: psychology, philosophy, phenomenology, psychiatry, psychotherapy, education, and so forth. Scheler (1970) has explored the relation between feeling and value and has developed a theory of the stratification of feeling into pre-intentional, intentional, and meta-intentional levels. Sartre's (1948) treatment of emotion lays great emphasis upon the intentional, world-revealing character of emotions. Sartre chooses not to address the "pre-intentional" level of feeling, and he does not distinguish "normal" and pathological emotions as does the work of phenomenological psychologists Shapiro (1985) and van den Berg (1972). The psychiatrist/reality therapist Glasser (1981) addresses both "normal" and pathological feelings and emotions, and we have already been exposed to the thought of Buytendijk (1950), Levin (1985), and Solomon (1976).

Berlin Gestaltists such as Kohler (1977) and Wertheimer (1977) focus upon the configurated character of objectifying acts of perception. Leipzig Gestaltists such as Krueger (1928), Lersch (1952), and Stern (1950) are more concerned with the location of the objectifying acts within the broader world horizon revealed by feeling. For Krueger, feeling is the matrix of all modes of experience, though he emphasizes the effect of feeling upon the other modes and tends towards an emotionalist position. Stern points to the reciprocity between the withdrawal of objectifying acts from the felt matrix and their re-embedding within that matrix. Lersch further articulates the theory through a strata-doctrine consisting of "life-ground, "endothymic" ground, and person super-structure. At the intermediary level of the endothymic ground, he develops a distinction between the stable dispositions that guide the configuration of experience and the reciprocity between feelings of drive directed to the world and feelings of attraction coming from the world.

Strasser's (1977) *Phenomenology of Feeling* is a work on the phenomena of "the heart": dispositions, intentional feelings, emotions, and passions. The "heart" of Strasser's work is a schematic overview of the stratification of human feeling. Strasser explores the relation between feeling and reason, as well as the phenomena of disposition, emotion, and passion. Kierkegaard's (1946) works on despair, Sickness unto Death, Fear and Trembling allow us to see and feel these experiences with an intensity that is silencing; Nietzsche (1954) denies the "irrationality" of feeling and asks us not to dismiss our feelings so easily "as if every passion did not have its quantum of reason." Heidegger (1970) reminds us that our feelings move us beyond ourselves to ourselves; Merleau-Ponty (1962) allows us to authorize our feelings with his commitment to the flesh and the body-subject.

Clearly, this is a complex, robust landscape, not without conflicts and conundrums. Some theorizers are more oriented to structure and relationships, to stratifications, to distinctions; others orient themselves to grounding, to transforming, to meaning-making. Some may debate the passivity implicit in some of our "feeling language," and I believe that this is an important avenue of investigation, not only for its critical, perhaps radical, looking-at-ourselves, but also for its support of the notion of an empowered and empowering body-subject. I am encouraged by the passion evident in work on feelings. In spite of the individual differences among theorizers, the common theme is one of intentionality, surely a hopeful message for those of us who believe in the primacy of the body-subject.

Following hard upon this discussion of theorizers and their relationships with feelings and emotions, we move now into the feeling and emotion experiences of the children and young people in this project in their experience with difficulty in physical activity. As was noted in the previous section on physically felt experience, feelings and emotions do not and need not occur in isolation from each other. There is considerable overlap and interconnectedness. I present them separately only so that we can "see" each one a little more carefully.

Boredom, Sameness, Monotony, Drudgery, Tolerance

Param:

M. Do you think it would be any fun if you never got better, if you always just stayed the same?

P. Well, no, I don't think so, 'cause, like, every player gets more improved as they play, and if I stayed the same, I'd get thrown out or something. . . . So I want to improve.

M. What makes you want to improve?

P. Well, ah, love for the sport, 'cause if I really like the sport and I want to become better, then I just have to . . . it's not a decision or anything for me; it's just something I have to do.

Leslie:

M. Does working at it, um, . . . ?

L. It makes it interesting, I guess. If you automatically pick up on something, a sport, you might get bored with it pretty quick or pretty soon, because it's so easy, right? If there's an interesting thing and you have to work at it, you have to spend time at it, it'll last for a long time 'cause you *will* be interested in it for a long time because you may not ever master that game, there's always something it to learn, you know.

M. Yeah. Like tennis: If all you did was stand in the middle of the court and return the same kind of shot . . . .

L. It would be boring! There's nothing to work at.

Sylvie:

M. A couple of things you said last week that I really liked. You said you liked doing different things, not the same thing time after time.

S. Uh huh.

M. Have you always been like that? Like, you don't like monotony?

S. No, I don't like the same old stuff.

M. How about your workout?

S. Yeah, I get bored at that.

M. Then what do you do?

S. I was doing pulleys, and I wanted to do something else, so I built up. . . . That's the only way I could change, right? . . . And the same with school. . . .

M. Yeah. If all you're doing is the same thing, and you don't appreciate it any more, like you say, it's good to try . . . to change.

S. Agreed.

Amanda and Tony:

M. What have you been doing? In your classes here? Any decent stuff or what?

T. What we've been doing in all our other classes.

M. Do you get bored?

T. Sometimes.

M. Do you get bored, Amanda?

A. Yeah.

M. Is there stuff you do that isn't boring?

A. Yes.

M. Like what?

A. Exercises with hard things in them.

M. Do you do stuff that isn't boring, Tony?

A. Jumps.

M. They're not boring? . . . How come?

T. Well . . .

M. Do you think stuff is boring when you can just do it and you don't have to think about it?

T. Yeah.

M. Does that make something boring?
T. Yeah.

M. What else makes something boring? Is it the teacher sometimes?
T. Especially when they're in a bad mood.
M. Do you find that, too?
A. Yeah.

Carmen and Andrea:
M. Do you think you'd learn more if it was a bit harder?
A. Yeah.
C. I think it should be harder, 'cause I already did all this stuff for four years.
M. You're tired of it?
C. Well, yeah.
M. Time to learn new things.
C. Yeah.
M. Do you think that's what makes some people quit: same old stuff over and over and no new stuff?
C. Yeah.
M. Boring, 'eh, doing stuff you know how to do.
C. Yeah.
M. Anyway, it's interesting that you guys would like it harder. I've often thought that when it's too easy, it's not as enjoyable.
C. It's not.
M. When you first get it, it's okay, I suppose.
C. Yeah.

Leslie:
M. So what kind of things detract from enjoyment?
L. Um . . .
M. Like, make it unenjoyable.
L. Getting tired, you know, like, you know it's time to get off. Sometimes that really bothers me. You get tired. . . . or you get bored with the same sport over and over again; if you're playing too much of it, you obviously get bored with it. Sometimes in ringette when I'm used to playing games Monday and Wednesday and a practice Thursday and a game Saturday, like, to me, that's too much for the enjoyment. Sometimes I'd just skip practice. . . . Thursday outside in the cold just didn't turn my crank.
M. But it's not so much the work; it's something else?
L. Yeah.

A sport or activity would not be as much fun for Param if he just stayed the same. Most players improve in the playing itself the longer they play. If Param simply stayed the same, he might get bored and lazy and find that the sport has no place for him, or he would have no place for sport. Param wants to improve and keep improving.

There are various factors which can make an activity unenjoyable or detract from its enjoyment. Getting tired in the activity, where a person works at something for a long time, or working hard to the point where the body is weakened and getting tired of the activity, where a person gets bored from doing the same thing over and over or fed up with an unchanging pattern, are both factors which detract from enjoyment.

Leslie found the game and practice schedule in ringette too much for her when she was playing, so she would miss a practice--at times, because she did not want to be out in the cold, but usually because she was tired of ringette. It is not always or even usually the work involved that can make something tiring. How strenuous a thing is does not bother Leslie; indeed, sometimes she likes feeling tired, and some days she can and does work when she is tired. Some days, however, she just cannot work because she is physically tired and tired of it. At these times, feeling tired makes her grouchy and fed up, and she needs to break from what she is doing-if she wishes to keep her interest in it.

Leslie also offers ease of learning something as a potential problem in terms of staying interested. She claims that an interesting thing remains interesting because she has to work on it, not because she gets it right away. Leslie believes that this aspect of an activity keeps it fresh and new because there is always something to learn.

Sylvie likes doing different things rather than the same thing time after time, and she has always been that way. Sylvie is not fond of monotony and does not like seeing or doing the same old things. If Sylvie continues to do the same thing, she does not appreciate it as much, or at all, so it is good and even necessary to try changes. Sylvie can become bored with a workout that never changes. She was doing pulleys for what she considered to be long enough, and she wanted to move on to something else, so she made herself stronger because it was the only way she could change her workout circumstances. Sylvie feels the same boredom when there is a sameness about school. In this "sameness" type of situation, Sylvie needs a challenge for a change.

This has been the year in which Sylvie took her "break from school" before going to college or university, a year that she had anticipated but of which she has now grown weary. Everyone around her is busy, and Sylvie is tired of not doing anything. It does seem strange to be tired of taking a break or tired of doing nothing, but Sylvie has taken her break and now she wants to get the break over with. She thought she would have a wild and wonderful year, but she has discovered that going out, partying, and meeting men can get boring if that is all she is doing.

There seems to be a day-to-day "sameness" about dance, and both Tony and Amanda admit to being bored sometimes. Doing easy things and things which require no thought, over and over, contribute to boredom, as does the temperament of the instructor. Amanda feels that exercises which are hard are not boring, and Tony says that jumps are not boring, although he cannot really say why.

Both Andrea and Carmen would prefer it if their practices were harder. They feel that in this way (harder) they could learn more about what they are doing as well as learn new moves. They seem to agree with Leslie's earlier statement about moves that are too easy. Carmen is tired of the same moves and wants to learn new ones. When a doer first gets a move, it is fun to do it over and over, but after awhile it gets too easy and is not as enjoyable; it is boring doing only what one knows.

To be bored is to tire with repetition or tediousness. "Bore" is also related to "bear": to carry, support, to carry on one's person, to endure, to proceed, to be patient or tolerant with. These doers confess to being bored--bored with repetition, bored with sameness, bored with easiness. When doing becomes boring or when a doer becomes bored with a doing, the experience is one that is endured: Its character, its features, its eidos have changed, and it is no longer the experience that it was at first encounter. Enduring an experience, proceeding grudgingly, is experience of a different kind from being excited in an experience or being interested in an experience or being empowered in an experience.

Kierkegaard (1946) claims that boredom is the root of all evil. The influence it exerts is altogether magical, except that it is not the influence of attraction but of repulsion (p. 22).

> What can be more natural than the effort to overcome it? Here, as everywhere, it is necessary to give the problem calm consideration; otherwise one may find oneself driven by the demoniac spirit of boredom deeper and deeper into the mire, in the very effort to escape. Everyone who feels bored cries out for change. With this demand, I am in complete sympathy, but it is necessary to act in accordance with some settled principle. (p. 25)

Change for the sake of relieving boredom or experiencing differentness does not necessarily "relieve" the boredom. This method defeats itself; it is plain endlessness. Kierkegaard (1946) advocates a "method" which he calls "rotation." His method does not consist in a change of field, but resembles the true rotation method in changing the crop and the mode of cultivation. Here we have at once the principle of limitation, the only saving principle in the world. The more you limit yourself, the more fertile you become in invention (p. 25).

How can we find relation between Kierkegaard's (1946) theorizing and our doers' experiences? Our doers seem to experience boredom when things are the same day to day, when things are always easy, when no effort or investment on their part is required, when doers are doing only what they know, when there is a lack of improvement and an absence of challenge or change. Monotony in and, hence, frustration with the doing can make a doer unappreciative, complacent, indifferent, unmoving: bored. Sometimes this is relieved by taking a break from the doing. Change in the form of challenge, differentness, or newness is often sought by a doer who finds herself/himself growing sluggish in a situation which is always the same. Such change seems to work best when it is self-initiated, even when the consequences may be unpredictable or difficult. Such change can be met with resistance, caution, or suspicion, but can make the doer more appreciative and can allow her/him to learn and grow.

How do these prescriptions offered by our doers relate to Kierkegaard's (1946) notion of "rotation?" Kierkegaard is suggesting changing the crop and the mode of cultivation, not changing the field. Our doers have more or less accepted that, within their doing experiences, there will be sameness, repetition, seeming non-investment, seeming non-improvement. These features change the experience and change the doer. Boredom is change; Kierkegaard's method allows us to change Boredom, not the original experience. Kierkegaard advocates living in the experience in a different way. So do our doers: "taking a break" or modifying an approach or practicing self-examination. Limiting oneself does not mean not exploring possibilities; rather, it means opening oneself to all that is, that has gone unnoticed because of our boredom.

In this way we can go down into our experiences and continue to regain that which is new and wonderful in ourselves and in our doing. In the words of Antonine, it is in your power to review your life, to look at things you saw before, but from another point of view.

Boredom need not be the death knell of a doing, a doer, or the relationship between them. It is an opportunity to act pedagogically to find meaning in this new "bored" experience so that our original turning to the world remains open. Playing, participating in, "doing" any activity involve coming to know the activity itself and coming to know one's competencies in, attitudes toward, and feelings about the activity and all that it entails.

Patience, Perseverance

Leslie:

M. Would you rather work for it?

L. Yeah, 'cause that's such a good feeling; when you work for something so hard, finally you know you've mastered it, that makes you feel really good. In anything, if you're working on it for a long time, and you finally get it, you just feel ten times better. You just feel like screaming, "Right on! I did it!"

M. I'm sure there's stuff you get in baseball just like that.

L. Just like that, yeah. I was talking with my friend Lisa. We were playing baseball, and I'm not very, oh, I mean, tennis, and I'm not very good at tennis because I've never played it before. And I'm the type of person, I said to Lisa, "I hate games," 'cause I just get totally mad at myself when I don't pick up on it right away. 'Cause I'm the type of person, like, with ringette and baseball, I just picked up on it right away, right. And I'm playing tennis, and I'm getting mad because, stupid ball! And I'm just getting back, . . . and Lisa laughed at me because she said, "I feel the same way." She's like me, really sportsminded, and she said that she just hated games that she couldn't get. So in tennis, like, I have to work on that, hard, and I guess it was finally coming to me, and it did feel better; I felt good about it. But, oh, just, that's the worst . . . .

Sylvie:

M. Have you had experiences where you have been frustrated, but you stay at it until you do it?

S. Oh, yeah.

M. Like, the day you do it, something happens. . . . .

S. It's great. Yeah.

M. Have you had experiences like that?

S. Oh, all my life, I guess.

M. I bet, eh?

S. Oh, yeah. Like, the latest development is plucking my eyebrows. Yeah, because that takes a steady hand, and I *can* to it.

M. When did you discover you could do it?

S. I didn't think I could, right, so I never bothered to try. I thought, "I'll hurt myself, for one thing." [Laughs] Take out my eye. Anyway, I tried it last Friday, and I could do it. I'm just, "Wow, this is incredible!" 'cause my mom would do it, and it would hurt like hell, right. . . . but if you do it yourself, it doesn't hurt. I was so shocked. I'm going, "Oh, YAY!" I was so happy. And my underarms. I couldn't shave them. And I couldn't do it with an electric razor, so I thought, "I'm going to try it with a blade," like, a regular blade.

M. Geez, that takes a lot of nerve, Syl. You weren't worried about cutting yourself?

S. Oh, I did, but it's not major.

M. You're not going to bleed to death, eh?

S. No, no; I'm really careful.

M. That's great.

S. Yeah. I can do everything, now.

M. Those are breakthroughs.

S. Oh, hell, yeah.

M. How did you feel when you did it?

S. Good, because I hated not being able to do things myself. I really do. And, oh, *and* . . . . I can slice oranges now. So, figured that out. My next thing is my curling iron.

M. How about incidents like that in the weight room?

S. The bike, lately.

M. And you feel yourself pushing?

S. Yeah. Um . . . when I first came here I was on the pulleys, I hated it. I saw everyone else doing "real" weights, so I worked my way up to real weights. It's like a mentality thing. Mental. It is. I'd have to be as good as everyone else.

There are skills in baseball that Leslie gets with very little investment of time or effort, but there are other things in baseball and in other activities which are more resistant and take longer to get (if, indeed, they are ever acquired). Leslie usually gets frustrated when she does not catch onto something right away, because she feels awkward and uncoordinated, as though her body is a stranger and she should not even be out there trying this. Leslie recently ventured into tennis, a game she had never played before and at which she was not very good. Even though Leslie had to work hard at tennis, there was a good feeling about it, and she felt it coming to her and felt better about playing it. She is learning tennis from a friend, who also hates not catching on right away, so there is a built-in relation even though the doing is difficult. Leslie will keep working at something until she gets it. She jokes about buying a tonic that would give her the skills without the work, but she insists that the skills would not feel the same or mean the same if they were acquired in such an underhanded fashion. Leslie would rather work hard for something, because when she works on something for a long time and she finally "gets" it, she feels really good and proud that she did it.

When Sylvie has been working at something, trying to do it, there comes a time when something clicks and she just does it. Sylvie feels good when she gets something on which she has been working. She experiences a sense of confirmation that she would, could, and did get it, that she was getting stronger, and that these "anticipations" have been realized. Sylvie has had experiences where she has been frustrated by something but has stayed with it until she did it. After working at something for a time, one day something happens; Sylvie gets it, and it is great. Thanks to her CP, Sylvie has had many experiences like this throughout her life.

Sylvie's latest "long-time-coming" accomplishment is plucking her eyebrows, and it is an accomplishment in which she takes some pride because, even though it takes a steady hand, she can still do it. Sylvie never bothered trying to pluck her own eyebrows before because she thought she would hurt herself or take out an eye, so her mother has always done it for her, and it has been a painful process. Last Friday she tried it and discovered that she could do it. Sylvie was shocked, but pleased, especially since she has discovered that when she plucks her eyebrows herself, it does not hurt.

Sylvie's other recent accomplishment has been shaving her underarms. She was not able to use an electric razor, so she thought she would try shaving with a regular blade razor. She was worried about cutting herself, but she was very careful, and though she did suffer a cut, it was a small cut which did not bleed very much. Sylvie also figured out how to slice oranges, so she can do that now as well. She is pleased with all these "breakthroughs," for such they are. Sylvie felt good doing these things and felt even better when she realized that she could actually do them because she hated not being able to do these things--or anything, for that matter--herself. Sylvie has decided that her next breakthrough will be using her curling iron.

Sylvie has had similar breakthroughs in the weight room. When she first came to the Center, she had to work on pulleys and hated it because she saw everyone else doing "real weights." Sylvie has to be as good as everyone else, so she worked her way up to real weights, although she freely admits that her desire to use real weights was a mental as much as a physical thing. Sylvie can feel herself pushing herself on the stationary bike and has had breakthrough experiences there as well.

It is interesting to notice the "necessary tension" and the almost contradictory polarity between boredom and patience/perseverance. On the one hand, we have the assurance that when something is or becomes "too easy" or monotonous, it becomes boring (i.e., it is no longer what it was). On the other hand, we have the expression of exasperation when something does not bend easily when it requires perseverance, when it asks us to have patience. The preceding section on boredom suggests that not only do we have to persevere and have patience with that which is resistant (elusive), but we also have to persevere and have patience with our boredom.

What does it mean to have patience or to be patient? Webster offers tolerant, understanding, persevering, steadfast; the capacity to put up with pain, troubles, difficulty, hardship without complaint or ill temper; the ability to wait or persevere without losing heart or becoming bored. Likewise, persevere: to abide by strictly, continue steadfastly, persist; to continue steadfastly in a course of action, especially in the face of difficulty or obstacles to continue staunch and constant.

It would seem that the two terms are related. Let us examine for a moment the notion of "persevering without losing heart." At a so-called literal level, "Heart" means that organic blood pump which stands at the center of the vital blood system. This literal level has a metaphorical extension in expressions such as "She put her heart into the endeavor," implying that a given person performs a given task with full commitment; the vital center of her personal life is fully, enthusiastically engaged. Consider "losing heart" or "not having one's heart in it." In this case, one's performance is likely to be "half-hearted," routine, lifeless, mechanical (as one is tempted to be when one is bored)--approaching the operation of the pump as a mechanism. Heart here seems to be a matter of will, an act of choice. "Not having one's heart in it" implies reluctance; "losing heart" implies weakening resolve or conviction.

Physiological relatedness appears likewise in the case of courage (or constancy), the term for which exhibits its etymological derivation from coeur, the French word for heart. One "encourages" those who are "losing heart" to "take heart." Indeed, the path to one's basic commitment is a matter of "taking it to heart," of giving deliberate consideration to the basic seriousness, the centrality of what is involved.

Heart is intimately connected with love. Having patience or persevering is a labor of love, a language of the heart. It is one of the ways that doers can "bear" and bring forth, meaningfulness. To bear, to carry on, to endure is part of the "bringing forth" experience. Bearing pertains broadly to the capacity to carry oneself in a specific way. The way we bear or have patience or persevere depends on our relationship to the experience and to the reason for our persevering: the bringing forth of our labor of love, the "earning" and co-authoring of this experience, this meaning, this doing. Our relationship is intentional: Our patience and perseverance are experienced because of where we stand in relationship to them, and it makes a difference where we stand.

> Responsibility is the state of having accepted a commitment, and autonomy means the right to choose our commitments and the ability to live by them and accept the constraints which they always impose. So responsibility and autonomy are not antithesis; they are complementary. And yet each qualifies the other. (Vickers, 1980, p. 6)

When doers enter into a relationship with a doing, they take the matter to heart; they make a commitment, an intentional, autonomous commitment, and then they bear the responsibility of having accepted that commitment.

A person who trains can get upset and discouraged if she does not reach her limit or remain true to her responsibility. A person with a disability--Sylvie--can be even harder on herself in this regard. People may not realize just how much Sylvie hates not only not being able to come up to her own standards, but also not being able to do things on her own. Perseverance seems to be the response (the "responsible" thing to do), both in training and in daily experiences that prove to be problematic for whatever reasons. Taken-for-granted tasks such as tweezing eyebrows, shaving underarms, or slicing oranges are tasks on which a person with cerebral palsy has to work for a long time before she accomplishes them. These breakthroughs are all the more special because of the independence attached to them. A person can have similar breakthroughs in the training situation, such as moving from an assisted to a more difficult exercise or pushing herself beyond or through a "barrier." This desire, this commitment to breakthrough, is a unifying kind of experience which can also be purifying, confirming, and instructive. Persons with disabilities have many such experiences: They are frustrated by something, but they persevere until they do it or reach some resolution about it, and when this happens, it is a good feeling.

"Getting" a skill or a move or a competency means bringing it forth after bearing it. Again we see the relationship between "owning" and "belonging to." Waiting for results (the "training effect") and having patience are part of a commitment to perseverance, and perseverance is a commitment to a larger investment. Investment may not be immediately apparent to a doer (the body-subject receives everything from experience; consciousness receives experience in profiles); the doer has to have faith, has to trust.

Coming to see and know one's self in a new way often involves waiting, having patience, persevering. Waiting and working are often aspects of earning an experience, and doers sometimes need to be reminded that not getting results right away is part of acquiring skills and getting better. Waiting is part of the process of "getting" something, but when a doer is in the actual doing, waiting and knowing that one has to wait can be difficult. The thing's elusiveness is already frustrating, and the realization of "having to wait" can add to the frustration. However, these also contribute to the "earning and doing" being a labor of love. In Goethe's words, we are shaped and fashioned by that which we love.

Annoyance, Frustration, Disappointment

Carmelina:
M. You seem a little disgusted. Are you?
C. Not really. I should be happy 'cause in soccer we're undefeated.
M. Oh, super! How's the soccer? Going well, eh?
C. Yeah. You get hurt a lot.
M. Don't you!
C. Yeah!
M. It's a rough game.
C. Uh huh.

Leslie:
M. Have you ever had anything like that happen in baseball?
L. Oh, yeah, last game, it was awful. . . . I just had a shitty game. I did, I . . . This ball came right out to me, and I was like total klutz-o here, and I went down to get it and felt like saying, "Pull me right now," 'cause, like, I knew it was gonna be one of those days, and then I caught the next one, but it wasn't that good, like, I could have done better, oh, I was just, I hate that! Oh, I was so mad at myself 'cause I know that, just, oh, that just makes me so mad. . . . I got up and then he pulled me the next inning after that, and I was kinda happy that he did because I just, I didn't even feel like being out there, I was so ticked off with myself. Oh, yeah, I get really mad with myself.

Danny:

M. This is baseball?

D. Yeah. We couldn't do anything, but they were, I don't know, too good. We were bad!

M. You managed to survive the game, eh?

D. But then after you've lost, it's awful.

M. How do you feel when a team is beating you that badly?

D. Depressed.

M. Hard to go back out for the next inning?

D. Yeah.

Travis:

T. Well, I couldn't really play his position 'cause I'd get out of mine, so I felt kind of hopeless 'cause I couldn't do anything.

M. Well, there's nothing you could do: They're going to go where he is.

T. Yeah.

M. And you can't do anything about it. That must have been frustrating.

T. Yeah, it was. We both got bawled out by the coach; but everybody bawled out him.

M. It must have been a frustrating experience.

T. It was.

M. How do you feel when you get that many goals scored against you?

T. Feel like, I'd like to play on one of these Italian teams.

M. Yeah.

T. Just, you get all frustrated.

M. Sure, yeah. Okay. How do you feel about success or achievement? . . . Do you think it's always good?

T. It's usually good. I've been kinda frustrated. I was on an outdoor team a couple of years ago, and we came second in city's; this other team, Killkenny, which I played for in the indoor season, I got to play on that team, we came second again; and we came second in the outdoor again, and in the previous year in the indoor we came second. . . . So I've got all these silver medals hanging all around. It gets kinda frustrating.

M. You'd like to get the . . . .

T. Yeah, I'd just like to get the gold for once, but it's usually fairly good.

M. Does it mean a lot to win or to be . . . ?

T. Yeah, . . . usually. . . . Every game we play in soccer right now is fairly close. Like, we've only won by one or two goals, and even if it's the worst team or a really close team, we only beat them by that much.

M. Do you think it's not as much fun when you're totally outclassed, and people are running all over you, and you feel terrible?

T. Yeah, it's not nearly as fun, but it's twice as much fun to be on the other side. [Laughter]

M. Yeah.
T. That's the most exciting . . . the most exciting game you can be in, for me, is when you whip the other team twelve-nothing, and everybody else goes, "Oh, ho hum, they didn't play very well." Nobody says they liked it that much, but it's the most fun I've ever had is beating a team really bad. The least fun I've had is being beaten real bad!
M. Do you think failure is always bad?
T. No. You learn a lot from it.
M. Yeah?
T. 'Cause if you start winning too often, it gets to your head, and if you're always just losing by this much and you figure out things, you do better, and you usually use it for improvement.
M. Uh huh.

Carmelina says that she really should be feeling good about how well her soccer team is doing, but she remains disconcerted and disappointed about how rough the game is and how often players in general and she in particular are hurt due to falls, being tripped, or being stepped on or kicked with hazardous footwear (soccer cleats).

Leslie has had days in baseball when she could not do anything wrong. She has also had experiences of "do-nothing-right" days in baseball. Sometimes when Leslie makes mistakes out in the field, she feels that she must look like an idiot. Leslie has had days when she asked herself what she was doing out there and wondered if she should be there at all. One such experience was a game in which, at the very beginning, Leslie knew that things just did not feel right. This premonition possibly began with the absence of a warm-up and progressed from there, with Leslie dreading the thought of a ball coming to her, a rather ominous harbinger even before the game started. Leslie began the game by going for the ball, missing it, and having it go through her legs. She felt like leaving the game right then because she knew it was going to be "one of those days." Even when she caught the next ball, Leslie still felt shaky and not quite right and was glad when her coach pulled her. She was so angry with herself that she doubts that she would have been effective even if she had managed to feel that she belonged out there.

Danny describes a "bad" game where he and his team were badly beaten. No one wants to be there during a bad beating, and players feel bad about it long after they have survived the ordeal. Danny would rather not have those kinds of experiences and feels depressed by them, no matter how potentially edifying they may be. Danny says that it is hard to keep a good attitude going inning after inning when one is being outclassed. If there is a hope of catching up, it is not so bad, but when the other team has an enormous lead and keeps building on it, the focus shifts from trying to catch up to counting down how many innings remain until it is over. When a doer is far behind and feeling down, it is harder to play well and to do one's best.

It is not only poor defensive play that needs to be considered when a lot of goals go in, but also the offensive forwards who do not come back to cover the play as they should. Travis admits that he did not have his best day as far as free kicks and penalty shots were concerned, but he feels that the crux of the matter was that the other defender was not playing up to par. Travis was not in a position to affect what was going on on the other side of the field, so the whole defense looked bad, even though Travis was pulling his own weight and trying to do as much as he could to help his teammate. Travis felt that he was carrying the responsibility for both defense positions, but at the same time felt and was powerless to control the play on the other side of the field (where the weaker defender was really being taken advantage of) without getting out of position himself. The coach yelled at both Travis and the other defender, but the team as a whole was harder on the other defender. Travis felt hopeless in the game and frustrated by the whole experience.

Travis admits that failure is not always bad. He believes a person can learn a lot from disappointments. He points to the complacency that can often accompany winning too much and suggests that missing by just a little often offers more incentive to improve and dig in than winning all the time.

Anger and its variations (rage, outrage, irritation, annoyance, being peeved, pissed, piqued, and incensed) always provide at least one entry in every list of emotions, no matter how abbreviated (for example, in every major dictionary, in Watson's short list of three, in most of Freud's formulations). In the current vogue for "self-expression," it is virtually always anger which receives central, if not exclusive, attention. (Pent-up anger is said to poison the personality, and thus should be "let out.") Anger is an ideal example of the emotional constitution of our world, of the judgemental character of the emotions with their ideological commitments (Solomon, 1976, p. 284). We freely and often judge the "rationality of anger" (its reasonability and warrant, its pettiness, or its moral self-righteousness), and it is clear that anger is neither a "good" nor a "bad" emotion, neither "positive" nor "negative," but it depends in any particular case upon the circumstances and the individual, the nature of the "offense" and its background. (It is, however, listed as one of the "seven deadly sins" in Christian mythology.)

> The key to anger is its judgement of indictment and accusation. Anger is a judgement of personal offense. It often has a moral edge, but need not; it is usually outer-directed but may on

> occasion be turned inward toward one's Self. It is worth stressing the fact that anger is a great equalizer, judging one's antagonist to be equal. To become angry with a child (as opposed to merely irritated) is to treat him (perhaps unfairly) as an adult. To be angry with a superior is to raise yourself to his level ("insubordination" is an apt turn; "uppity" also). . . . Anger is usually direct and explicit in its projection of our personal values and expectations on the world. Anger, whether expressed or not, is our insistence upon our own ideals, even when that insistence is based far more on self-assertiveness or obstinacy than on any commitment to the ideals as such. . . . Anger registers our displeasure that the world does not obey our expectations, and displays our desire to punish those who would not obey our demands, no matter how trivial and meaningless, or how indubitably moral and eloquently humane. (pp. 284-285)

Shame, like anger, is one of those emotions which is responsible for as well as responsive to the structures of moral responsibility that we impose upon our world. Unlike anger, shame is self-accusation and an unfavorable judgement of one's accomplishments (Leslie and Travis). In small doses shame is a prod to self-improvement. Despite one's actions, shame is not an over-all self-condemnation. Quite to the contrary, it is an affirmation of one's autonomy and responsibility, a confirmation that a doer will live by her/his standards and accept responsibility. Shame is conducive to self-esteem but requires considerable strength to maintain such limited self-accusation and can give way to guilt. Shame in larger doses can become a self-demeaning emotion, extremely defensive and impotent, without the ideology of atonement and expiation that makes it such an important emotion for self-realization (Solomon, 1976, p. 365).

Danny says that he feels depressed after or during a bad loss. We hear similar expressions from the other doers (being down, feeling hopeless). Glasser (1981) claims that "depressing" is the feeling part of the conduct a person may choose when that person attempts to reduce an "error" in her/his lifeworld. "Depression" is a term that now encompasses everything from "having a down day" or "feeling blue" to a debilitating and destructive physical malaise. Solomon (1976) suggests that depression is itself our means of coping. Like Glasser, he claims that it may not be a matter of "getting over it," but a matter of accepting it and using it as our own.

These two theorizers propose depression as not always a medical "problem" but, rather, a window to the soul, a mood that is our most sophisticated and most radical means to shuffling the structures of our lives when they have become intolerable and unlivable. Neither theorizer denies that depression can be "pathological"; they posit that anger, jealousy, grief, love, and even contentment can be "pathological." They wish to argue that depression is in itself not pathological, but even essential to normal life and "self-overcoming."

> Our depression is our way of wrenching ourselves from the established values of our world, the tasks in which we have been unquestioningly immersed, the opinions we have uncritically nursed, the relationships we have accepted without challenge and often without meaning. A depression is a self-imposed purge. It is the beginning of self-realization unless it is simply ignored, or drugged away, or allows itself to give in to the demands for its own avoidance-the most extreme of which is suicide. (Solomon, p. 295)

Depression would seem to be a courageous attempt to open ourselves up to the most gnawing doubts about ourselves and our lives, that kind of openness that precedes the most clear-headed commitments and the least qualified acceptances of ourselves and our lives. To treat depression as a transient illness or dismiss it as a fleeting, "weak" mood is to deny its primordial call. Through this kind of denial, we are able to keep ourselves closed and are able to avoid "seeing," in Don Juan's peculiar sense, through the values and structures which we have uncritically accepted or imposed upon ourselves which we now find tedious, unlivable, and self-degrading. To reject depression is to affirm, by default, those same values and structures (Solomon, 1976, p. 295). To reject the depression is to deny visibility to that which asks to be seen.

Frustration could be argued not to be an emotion or a passion as such but, rather, the result of the lack of satisfaction of emotions and other passions (primarily desires or "wants"). But the judgement that one is not satisfied is as much a judgement as the judgement that one ought to be. Frustration as an emotion is a rejection of a state of affairs as personally unacceptable, with a tinge of hopelessness (Travis), but with dogged, sometimes bullish, determination. In expressing frustration, we can destroy what we desire, wrecking an object we sought to possess, or interfering with a goal we wanted to achieve.

> Whether we ought to call such behavior "self-defeating," however, depends upon our estimate of the likelihood of success. And it is the very nature of frustration, like so many other vengeful passions, that it would rather destroy what it cannot possess than to simply give it up in despair. But frustration has the power to destroy. (Solomon, 1976, p. 315)

Some pages back, when we were considering metaphor in the telling of experiences, we remarked on the power of words to open up worlds of meaning. The "feeling words" of anger, shame, depression, and frustration are just such words. When our doers use these words to tell their lived experiences, they are expressing the primordial connection of the body-subject to Being and the voice(s) of Being. They are expressed so that they can call us to be more mindful of the experience that sought and compelled these words. They also ask us to be more critical of our predispositions. Anger and frustration are assumed to be somewhat "wholesome" and justified, yet we have become aware of the dark, dehumanizing potential that they have. When we make the effort to look at the back of something (as Husserl [1970] would suggest), we see that there is more there than meets the eye. A reconsideration of anger and frustration asks us to consider again the tension between "owning" and "belonging to." Likewise, shame and depression are assumed to be weakening and "unwholesome," yet in "looking at the back" of these, we see that they are a means of gaining access to, creating visibility, and engendering understanding of aspects of ourselves, our lifeworlds, and our lived experiences that have the potential to remain hidden or invisible. There seems to be some credence to Solomon's (1976) notion that the perpetuation of myths about this or that emotion does indeed contribute to unempowered humans. A critical analysis of depression and shame show them to be emotions with profound possibilities, yet the dominant tradition would insist on using them as subduers or oppressors. When experiences with difficulty in physical activity give us these kinds of messages, it behooves us to listen and act.

An activity can be enjoyable in spite of things about it which are personally distressing to a doer. Things which can make an activity personally distressing are parental pressure or parental interference, no matter how blatant or subtle, an uncertain relationship with the coach/teacher, coaching/teaching philosophy, violence and aggression within the activity, making mistakes, or being outclassed and humiliated. A doer may eventually have to come to terms with one or all of these if she/he wishes to stay with the activity in good conscience and in the right relationship with the body-subject.

Mistakes can be silly, embarrassing, or downright degrading. They can make a person laugh, work harder, or wonder if she/he should be there at all. Things can be learned from failure and disappointment: The self-examination that follows a loss can often lead to improvement. In any activity, however, there are always things to learn and things to work on, and having others as well as oneself as critical doers contributes to everyone's ongoing learning and betterment in the activity. Going back to do an activity again is an acknowledgement and perhaps an acceptance of the necessity of the "good" things and the "bad" things about it.

Doers experience good and bad days with workouts and with activities. The good or "peak" experiences are those where a doer is doing well or exceeding expectations and is aware of it, where she cannot do anything wrong. These experiences are usually exhilarating and fulfilling and leave a doer feeling good about the activity and about herself. The "bad" days are those when a doer cannot do anything right no matter how hard she tries. These are days when there is no owning or belonging to, and they are usually accompanied by ominous premonitions, sudden realizations that it is "one of those days," and feelings of shakiness, frustration, and absence of connection or fit. These are peak experiences of a different kind. These test the doer, cause her/him to look inward, give exhilaration, fulfillment, and understanding of a different kind.

Uncertainty, Confusion, Lostness (Anxiety, Fear)

Leslie:

M. You think you get a sense of where you "should be" the longer you play.
L. Oh, yeah.
M. Like, where the limits to your area end and someone else's responsibilities begin.
L. For sure, yeah, exactly, 'cause in baseball when we started

at the starting of the year, we were lost, like, there was center field, then left and right. There were so many times at the starting of the year, even till maybe the end in the playoffs, we were, "Oh, well, that should have been your ball!" "No, it wasn't; it was yours!" and we'd go, "Gord, who should have had that one?"

M. Yeah.

Travis:

M. How's it feel on defense when a lot of goals go in? You know, in a close game it's not so bad, but when you're slaughtered it's like it's all the defense's fault.

T. Oh, it was kind of the forwards weren't coming back, but I was stuck on a line with this one guy who is becoming really unpopular with the team. And most of the goals were scored by guys getting around him, and I just couldn't get back in time 'cause I was on the other side of the field. Guys were just going right by him. And I wasn't having a great time with my free kicks or my penalty kicks, but most of the goals that came by, one went right off his rear end, deflected it in.

M. So that, did you feel like you were playing two positions almost?

T. Yeah.

M. Yours and his.

T. Well, I couldn't really play his position, 'cause I'd get out of mine, so I felt kind of hopeless, 'cause I couldn't do anything.

Carmen:

M. So what would you like to be doing, say on bars? If you could make up your bar routine, what would you like to be doing?

C. I don't know. I don't know anything else.

M. What do you think you would have to do to get the moves you want, Carm? What's the next move you'd like to get on bars besides kip?

C. I don't know, really [don't know what's next].

M. You're not really sure about what you want?

C. Yeah.

During the baseball pre-season Leslie and either the right or the left fielder would often be confused about who should have gone for the ball, and they would often consult their coach about whose ball it actually was, i.e., in whose territory it was. Center field is a tough position. Playing it well involves knowing where the ball is going to come or go and where one should be in relation to that ball, every second. It also involves becoming aware of the space for which one is responsible and developing a sense of where one "should be," of where the limits of one's own area of responsibility end and where someone else's begin. This spatial awareness also includes time factors of judgement of speed, distance, and duration. All of these skills are difficult, but they can become practiced and acquired competencies (at least temporarily; each season it seems that they need to be re-acquired). Leslie got her sense of the limits or boundaries of center field from her coach and from being in the field and coming to know her area, her "space."

Travis describes the indecision, hopelessness, and helplessness that he felt when he was in a position where he could not exert any influence, even though he was putting in his best effort. He was torn between the responsibility for his own position, his rightful responsibility, and the sense of duty to help a teammate in obvious difficulty. Unfortunately, there was no "right" decision, or at least no decision that felt right.

Carmen knows that she needs a consistent kip (a fundamental connecting move) on uneven bars; but beyond this she cannot really say what she would like to do next, even though she dreams about new moves and pictures herself doing them. There are moves that she has seen in the Code (a pictorial list/description of gymnastics elements) and that she has seen others doing, but she knows only what she has. She does not have a sense of direction or sequence as to what comes next because she does not know what is next (or her relationship to it or influence on it).

"Confuse" comes from the Latin confundere, to mix together. If I wish to confuse someone, I mislead or "mix up" that person, I make things unclear, blurred, non-transparent. A person who is confused is unable to distinguish between one thing and another. There is uncertainty: not having sure knowledge; being doubtful, questionable, vague, or undecided. A person might also feel lost or at a loss: perplexed, puzzled, uncertain, bewildered, absorbed, gone, or passed away.

Carmen is not only without knowledge of what is "next," but she is also somewhat bewildered by her "position" or, rather, her non-position. She has no locatedness toward which she can move and no way of locating her present position (I only know what I know) in relation to other positions. She knows that there is something toward which she wishes to move, but she does not know where or how. Without a locatedness, she has "passed away" as far as where she wishes to be headed is concerned. She cannot participate in making her way through a territory, since she knows neither where the territory is (if there is one), nor where she is on it. She is not only without a map, but she is also without a figure/ground.

Travis decided to stay in his own position, but only after experiencing considerable anguish. Even then he has doubts and guilt about his decision. Leslie is lost in her territory, but she develops a sense of locatedness and decision. When a doer is not in a position to be able to distinguish one thing from another or when even making such distinctions feels almost futile, the doer is then lost. The personness has been absorbed; the doubt remains real. Drews (1976) claims that we are never more human than at the moment of decision. Perhaps the converse is also telling: Our humanness is never more precarious than at moments of doubt or at moments when decisions seem impossible or meaningless. Perhaps this is why we feel so uncomfortable, so uneasy, when we feel doubt, when we feel lost: Our humanness is showing itself.

Travis feels "bad" because he made a decision, and he is not sure if it was the right one. Leslie feels uncertain about responsibility, about making a mistake. Carmen does not know where she stands. These doers are in positions of intense humanness. It would seem to be a difficult place to be, yet also an almost necessary place to be. It is another clearing for meaning which doing offers us.

Kierkegaard (1946) captures the frenzy inside a moment of decision: My doubt is terrible; nothing can withstand it; it is a cursed hunger, and I can swallow up every argument, every consolation and sedative; I rush at 10,000 miles a second through every obstacle (p. 14). Yet when I emerge from my moment of decision I am still me, more or less, and I have to come to terms with where I stood and where I stand. Uncertainty, confusion, and lostness are experiences with difficulty in physical activity which require us to acknowledge our humanness. They give us opportunities to reflect, celebrate, wonder, and go on.

Trying too hard and feeling ineffectual are frustrating. Doing one's best and still feeling powerless and not in control are frustrating as well. The feeling of being unable to assume responsibility even when one is willing contributes to the hopeless atmosphere that seems to pervade a "losing streak" or a less-than-spectacular end-of-season finale.

Most activities involve judgement calls and decisions made on a moment's notice. When the responsibility and consequences are for the self, the difficulty is of a different kind than when the responsibilities are for and to others who may be involved and the consequences have to be shared by a whole group.

Let us now turn to the related feelings of anxiety and fear.

Anxiety, Fear (Uncertainty, Confusion, Lostness)

Leslie:

M. How did you feel coming back from that horrible injury?
L. I was really scared. That was a while. I guess I just got used to it. . . .
M. Did you play the rest of the season?
L. Uh huh.
M. As catcher?
L. No! I've never been behind there since, not even once, for anything, even easy warm-ups. No one even asks me. I wish I could play there sometimes, but I just can't.

Param:

M. That's really good. Have you ever had any experience with anxiety? Like, things that make you uptight, tense, nervous . . .
P. Well, every time before a kickoff I really get nervous because this could be coming to me, and I don't want to get tackled or anything; and, um, if I get a really bad return, like, the ball bounces or something, I'm not gonna feel too good about that.
M. Does it affect the way you play? Does it make it worse or better or what?
P. Well, I think it kinda makes it better, 'cause you're thinking you don't want something to happen, so you don't make it happen.
M. You're more ready?
P. Yeah.
M. What kind of things go through your mind just before the kickoff?
P. Well, it depends on their front line. If it's, like, a really tough line, then I'm thinking, "I hope it doesn't come to me; let it go anywhere else." If it's not, then I say, "Let it come to me. . . . I'm just gonna burn right through 'em." Last game they had a really, really tough lineup, and it came to me, and, um, I still ran, but I just kinda deked through them instead, and I got a touchdown that cost me. [Shows me his scratches.]
M. Oh, yeah! You've got scrapes there!
P. Yeah.

Carmelina:

M. Isn't that something? How did it feel?
C. Good! I'm scared to do everything, but I wasn't scared to do this [back somersault dismount off balance beam].
M. No? What made you decide you wanted to do it all of a sudden, or . . . ?
C. Well, like, she said we could try something, and she said she'd spot if we want, and she spot me for one, and she said, "You can do those by yourself," and I'm there, "No way!" So then, you know Monica?
M. Yeah.

C. Well, she just held her hand there, and I knew she didn't spot that much, so I tried it by myself.
M. Wow!

M. What's it like, going for something that you're afraid of? Like, what is it that makes you afraid--injury?
C. Yeah, I'm afraid I'll just stop in the middle and land on my neck or something.
M. Or smack into the beam?
C. Well, I'm not really scared of smacking into the beam; I never think of that, but I think . . . .
M. You think of the rotation stopping.
C. Yeah! And I thought, "Oooh."
M. That's a horrifying thought, isn't it? I guess that's why the beginning of the move is so important--to do everything just right.
C. Yes.
M. Anything else you thought about just before you did it? Did you think of all the things that could happen?
C. Not really. I'm going, "I'm going to fall, I know it," but then I just went for it. Like, it wasn't the greatest, but as long as I got my confidence, that I went over.
M. Yeah.
C. Then I worked on beam since then. I like beam.

Being made to do something a person does not like or is afraid of may make her feel that the person behind the "making her do it" either hates her or is hurting her, and neither may be the case. A person making someone do something typically thinks that the would-be doer is ready, whereas the prospective doer may not be ready or may not feel ready.

Sometimes, however, people do things out of fear: If a person is afraid of someone or something or something's consequences, then she will do things she might not do in the absence of this fear. Coaches seem to use this fear sometimes to good purpose, but when it is used to excess, then it is no good (and probably ineffective) as far as Leslie is concerned, because the players become overanxious, end up hating the activity, and have to be forced to go.

Living with uncertainty and fear seems to be part of the toll that injuries take on their victims. Leslie was really afraid for a long time after her baseball injury, so she had to get used to playing while feeling afraid. She finished the season after her injury, but not as catcher, and she has not played or practiced in that position since. Although Leslie sometimes wishes that she could play catcher again, she simply cannot; her injury has made it impossible.

Param feels nervous before every kickoff, largely due to anticipation of the ball coming to him and what will happen as he makes his way up the field, particularly body-contact possibilities. He does not feel good about those returns when the ball bounces before he can get to it, but, generally, being nervous helps Param to play better. He feels that his nervousness makes him more ready or better prepared for whatever happens. When he anticipates problematic scenarios, he then can work to prevent them from happening.

The thoughts that go through Param's mind prior to kickoff tend to depend on the front line that is opposing him. A rough and tough front line tends to evoke thoughts of avoidance and self-preservation, while a less-than-awesome front line tends to promote more aggression and confidence. In his most recent game, however, Param ran back a kick for a touchdown with all due finesse and confidence, getting past opponents and breaking tackles, even though the front line was tough. He did not escape unscathed and has scrapes and scratches to show for his labors.

Carmelina's gymnastics is going well, and she reports on a recent personal accomplishment, that of doing a back somersault dismount from the beam on her own. This accomplishment is of particular significance for Carmelina because she overcame her fear, made a decision and did the move, realistically assessed her performance, and still remained proud and regained some badly needed confidence.

Carmelina's fear of this move stems from the very real potential for injury that is inherent in the move. She felt that she might fall out of the air and land on her head. The blind aspect of the move was not as significant a fear factor as was losing control of and orientation to the trick in the middle of it.

Her decision to do the trick came about through a combination of factors. She had wanted to do it for a long time, had practiced it with a spot, and had received encouragement and assurances form her teammates and coaches. This all helped, of course, but it was Carmelina's *felt* realization of an absence of support that ultimately led to going for the move by herself. Feeling independent and autonomous seems important to her, and she emphasizes how good it is *not* to get a spot. She will accept a spot now when she feels the need to correct her body position, but this does not detract from her competence because she knows that she does not *need* it.

Her kinaesthetic and technique awareness are improving, and these play a significant role in her getting and keeping the move. She can assess her take-off and body position by the distance she lands from the beam, and she maintains her autonomy by concentrating on the take-off, body position, and actions. This also contributes to a reduction in fear.

In sport psychology two major theories underlie the sport psychologist's understanding of the relationship between "arousal" and athletic performance: the drive theory hypothesis and the inverted-U curve hypothesis. The drive theory hypothesis (which comes out of the drive theory literature, particularly that of Spence and Spence [1966]) suggests that there is a simple, linear relationship between drive (arousal) and performance: The higher the drive, the higher the performance. The inverted-U curve hypothesis suggests that as arousal increases from a very low level of drowsiness to a moderate level, performance improves as well. But once arousal increases past that point to extreme or uncontrolled excitement, there is a decrease in performance. This suggests that there is an "optimal level of arousal" for top performance in any task and for any individual. Below this point or beyond it, performance is less (Alderman, 1988).

According to the original Yerkes and Dodson (1908) study, the major task characteristic probably most connected to the influence of arousal is the complexity of the task involved. Conveniently enough, three major dimensions of task complexity have been identified by Billing (1980): decisional characteristics (number of decisions, number of alternatives, speed of decision making, order in which decisions are made), perceptual characteristics (number of stimuli needed and present, duration of these stimuli, their intensity, internal conflict), and motor act or motor response (number of muscles involved, precision and steadiness, amount of speed and power).

The bulk of sport psychology research on anxiety in athletes has focused on their "state-anxiety levels." State anxiety is defined as a transitory emotional state that varies in intensity and fluctuates over time from situation to situation. It is the anxiety that is generated by the situation itself (Alderman, 1988, p. 84).

The emphasis in sport psychology as we move into the 1990s continues in this quantitative orientation. Caruso, Gill, Dzewaltkowski, and

McElroy (1990) express concern over the numerous questions which remain regarding the dynamics of competitive anxiety and its relationship to performance. They postulate that this lack of understanding may be due in part to the failure to employ multidimensional and sport-specific measures of anxiety.

Apparently, all we have to do to understand anxiety is to find an appropriate instrument that can measure it. This, I believe, is the violence which Levin (1985) speaks to when he comments on the "how" of the dominant research tradition. Aside from the patriarchal overtones in this kind of research language (arousal, drive, performance), there is the underlying assumption that doers are stimulus-react creatures; that they are the slaves of an experience rather than partners with it; that they can, will, indeed should, find out about their "personal level of trait anxiety" and use this in the prediction and control of effective decisional, perceptual, and motor task performance.

This type of research orientation--sadly, the dominant one in physical education and sport--does not express an interest in what the lived experience means to the doer, in what anxiety or fear say to the body-subject, in why these ways of saying were sought by the body-subject in communion with Being in the lived experience. It is to these concerns that we now turn our attention.

The concept of "angst"--anxiety, anguish--is best known for its role in the contemporary philosophy of existentialism, but it has never been far from the core of the Christian spirit. Solomon (1976) suggests that the mythology that accompanies anxiety and anguish makes every companion a torturer, every space a prison, every move a risk. It presents a picture of the self as dangerous and possibly out of control, capable of the most dastardly deeds imaginable (pp. 288, 290). This mythology encourages a person to hide, disappear, make oneself secure, protect oneself (and the world) from oneself (pp. 288, 290). It is a pattern similar to that of uncertainty, confusion, and lostness--assumed to be a "negative" experience. (It has been suggested that angst has been used [abused] by various religious sects to keep "the faithful" oppressed and unempowered.)

Anxiety and anguish are sometimes used to refer to excruciating distress or suffering, sometimes to extreme fear, sometimes to a special kind of fear--a fear of the unknown, an all-embracing fear of everything--or a fear of oneself, one's own desires, emotions, or identity. (As with most cliches, the one on fear has a "truth" in it: We have nothing to fear but fear itself.) In existentialism, particularly in Kierkegaard (1946), Heidegger (1962), and Sartre (1956), the object of this special fear is "nothingness," lack of meaning or justification.

"Dread" is also a favorite translation for angst. Solomon (1976) suggests that dread is an intense fear of the unknown. He suspects it to be anguish (fear of oneself) turned outward, but he supposes it might also be anxiety (fear of everything) hiding under the guise of a single fear of the unknown. Solomon goes on to suggest that dread is often an emotion of intrinsic self-deception, a refusal to recognize anguish and lack of resolution in oneself by projecting it outward into some void in the world (p. 300).

"Fear" seems to be at the heart of anxiety and anguish. It is defined as a feeling of alarm or disquiet caused by awareness or expectation of danger. In Lorback's (1981) study, scared swimmers explain what being afraid entails:

> With few exceptions these people describe feelings of "tenseness" (both physical and psychological) as well as feelings of a lack of control of their bodies in the water, to the point that they cannot be sure that they would not take a breath while their face is still in the water. Drowning is a very real, distinctly possible occurrence. . . . They do not like the water. . . . [They] resist entrusting themselves to the water; they try to maintain their hold on their regular environment . . . and they sink deeper into this strange and feared environment. . . . the water environment requires constant work. . . . we can never unwarily relax in the full sense of the word, as we can on land. (p. 31)

Solomon (1976) suggests that fear is one of the least complicated emotions. It is clean, pure, intense. Fear can take any object or form: other persons, the dark, the water, falling, pain, going bald, and so on. Fear is a family term covering all shades of that sense of impending danger and comparative helplessness: fright, horror, terror, and panic; apprehension, concern, misgivings, nervousness, distrust, and awe. Fear is a unifying emotion: Men, women, children, young people, babies, animals, even certain species of plants feel fear. It is an equalizer, a purifier, an amplifier, a lens.

Let us return to our doers' experiences for a moment.

Injury can take its toll on its victims in almost every aspect of their lives. Everyday activities such as walking down stairs can be unsafe and painful. Small pains and twinges become ominous and foreboding. Physical competence, self-sufficiency, and spontaneity become question marks. Uncertainty and fear can be ongoing. The body can feel like a stranger, easy things are strenuous, former activities become impossible due to physical or emotional trauma, and a general apprehensiveness pervades the early stages of a sports season or activity resumption. The recovered or recovering person can feel fragile, susceptible, weak, unprepared, underconfident, and scared. There are no "formula" solutions. Time, patience, perseverance, and progressive loading are significant considerations, but sometimes a person has to bite the bullet and do, even when she feels scared and underconfident. Encouragement and patience from others are also significant.

Anticipation and nervousness are seen as contributing to preparedness. Being in an activity involves both concentrating and attending, i.e., being attentive to the surrounding and the potential of one's actions, while concentrating with varying degrees of intensity on the task at hand.

Personal triumphs tend to occur when a doer does something that had previously been unreachable or undo-able for reasons of fear of injury, embarrassment, or failure, or for various kinaesthetic or concentration considerations. A doer can be afraid of a move because there is the possibility of her losing control or orientation during the execution of the move and, hence, incurring a serious injury. Overcoming this fear, deciding to do the move, then doing it by controlling what she can, plus realizing that there is an absence of active assistance, combine to convince a doer that she can, indeed, do the move on her own. Independence and autonomy are important.

When a person does not follow through on a decision or commitment, she not only lets others down, but she also lets herself down. She is diminished by her absence. Starting something means being there until it finishes. Making commitments entails making decisions and following through; "deciding to do" has consequences, actions have consequences, and non-actions or withholding actions also have consequences.

What is at stake in many of these fear experiences is a loss of autonomy, agency, or authorship. A doer is giving herself/himself over to air, water, others, to something other than self. Someone or something else is now responsible for me, must now take care of me--at least momentarily. What is also present is the knowledge that I initiate the giving over of myself. I first must trust myself, and then I must trust something other than myself, my co-author in the experience. This is not some blind submission to fate--what will be will be--rather, it is an intentional act.

Johns (1981), in his study on gymnastic movement, states:

> With all the efforts which gymnasts put into their preparatory work, they are finally faced with commitment. . . . But once the commitment has been made, the opportunity to break the deal with oneself is still an option which the gymnast can freely exercise. The continuous trial, refusal, and negotiation with oneself seems to be part of the process of gradually approaching the moment when the performer "brushes" the experience. . . . Some gymnasts agree that the first time is the hardest, after which commitment plays a less significant role, and what takes over is the desire for complete understanding of the movement and with it a fuller and richer experience. (p. 28)

Solomon (1976) presents dread as a "copout"--a means of not facing oneself and one's fears of oneself (anguish). He also cautions us to guard against anxiety (fear of everything) disguised as dread. Either way, facing oneself and one's fears of oneself seems to be the hinge which can move the lived experience toward an opening or a closing. Fear allows us to see ourselves as we are; it is also that kind of intense experience that allows us to "brush," contact, "see" more clearly the lived experience which offers itself to our co-authorship.

Through Holderin's poem, Heidegger (1977) points to a relationship between "danger" and "saving power": But where danger is, grows the saving power also (p. 311). Heidegger asks us in what respect the saving power does most profoundly take root and thence thrive even where the extreme danger lies. I submit that "danger" is not the same as fear, and "saving power" is not the surrender to a supreme deliverer. Fear is the awareness of danger, and "saving power," which I believe arises from this fear, is our decision to see ourselves and our experience as clearly as possible; it is our belief in our body-subject's connections and relationship with Being; it is our affirmation of our image and likeness to that which informs us and co-creates with us.

Finally, a few thoughts on fear, doubt, and other "negative" experiences and emotions. I believe that we must be vigilant in the examination of assumptions about doubt, fear, indecision, and the like. The polarity that is sometimes presented (doubt-decisiveness, fear-courage) seems to me artificial and needless. These experiences are complementary--amplifiers of each other, flip sides of the same coin. It is in these so-called negative experiences where we experience ourselves in our splendid tentativeness. We are filled with wondering: I wonder what's next? I wonder what's right? I wonder what I should do? I wonder if I did the right thing? We are "wonder-full": human. Extremely alive. These are the experiences which give us the opportunity to question and re-establish our grounds.

> The closer we come to the danger . . . the more questioning we become. For questioning is the piety of thought. (Heidegger, 1977, p. 35)

Immediacy

Leanne:

> L. Well, you can't think about that you're getting scared, and you can't think about that people are watching you, and if anybody, like, makes some kind of noise, like, they start yelling or something like that, then it sort of sets you

right off, but then after . . . usually, well, like it was for me, you start it and land it, and really, it's not even very much.
M. What's the hardest part in it, getting into it, landing it, what? Is it all sort of . . . ?
L. Well, it's sort of dizzy, because after you come out, like, just when you land right back again . . . so, like, 'cause, really, like, you're in the air, and all of a sudden you're back on the ground again.
M. Yeah, and then you got to go on into the next thing and get back into it right away.
L. Yeah.

Param:
M. But are you thinking, like, "Now I have to do this, now I have to do that, I should go right, I should go left . . . ?
P. Sometimes I have to make really sharp turns, and so I'm kind of thinking, "If I do this, I'll slip," and stuff like that, and so it's always decisions.
M. Do you notice a lot when this is going on? Like, do you notice people around you or noise, or are you into what you're doing?
P. Actually, I don't really notice the noise, 'cause I'm doing all the talking myself: "Get this guy out of my way," and stuff.
M. Uh huh.
P. So I don't really pay attention to anyone else.
M. You're into your own thing.
P. Yeah . . . I'm saying to my blockers, "Come this way," "Go that way," or "Block off that guy."
M. Yeah . . . Your reflexes got to be pretty quick.
P. Sometimes.
M. 'Cause you don't have loads of time.
P. Yeah.
M. There's not a whole lot of time to make plans as these mean people come toward you, right?
P. Yeah.

Param describes the "fullness" of a moment. In a moment on the field he can decide, talk, run, go through possibilities, adjust: Time is elastic, yet everything is happening very quickly. Param lives in the moment; he is into his own thing, open to the fullness which this moment and the next and the next have to offer.

The axle is hard because so much has to happen in such a short time, and, indeed, when it is done and landed it seems as if nothing has happened at all. Not only is the time it takes a factor in its difficulty, but also the speed at which it is done--a dizzying disorientation, and then feeling a finish before you have assimilated a start. Complexity is compressed into an instant and then placed in a context that is actually a sequence of complexities, each one already anticipated almost at the same time as the previous one was completed.

To add to this complexity, there are potential distractions which skaters should avoid, such as not thinking about being scared or being watched, because they can interfere with the flow and rhythm of a routine and/or a move.

Leanne says that doing an axle in a routine seems to be easier than doing it over and over in a practice session. She does not have to worry about getting into it, because she is already so oriented and so caught up in the rhythm and sequence of the routine. Also, she has to do it only once.

When doers are "caught up in a doing," they have entered into a relationship with doing--one of trusting forgetfulness. The doers forget themselves in those suspended moments, so they can be co-authors, partners. The "body" may be, in Sartre's (1956) words, "passed over in silence" (p. 398): handed over, by the doer (passed over), in silence. No words are necessary between body-subject and Being. During those moments of intense embeddedness, when seconds and silence are suspended and amplified, doers say "yes" to "belonging to" and are left with the reality of their body-subject and its, and their own, vulnerability and susceptibility.

> Be--and at the same time know the condition of not-being, the infinite ground of your deep vibrations,
> that you may fully fulfill it this single time. (Rilke, 1962, p. 95)

> Releasement toward things and openness to the mystery belong together. They grant us the possibility of dwelling in the world in a totally new way. They promise us a new ground and a foundation upon which we can stand and endure in the world of technology without being imperiled by it. (Heidegger, 1966, p. 53)

> To be sensitive to any single moment during this short period of effort by the performer is to capture the intensity of effort and the total absorption of the individual as he attempts to perform the movement. (Johns, 1981, p. 25)

When we focus on our experiencing of movement we find or realize that "each instant of the movement embraces its whole span" (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 94). Instead of "a collection of movements strung laboriously together," the motility character of human beings will have a certain "melodic character" (p. 105). The more focused we are, i.e., the more self-aware we are in regard to our bodily felt sense of the movement or gesture, the more we will experience this "erotic" embrace, this good-feeling, melodic character (Levin, 1985, p. 298). Levin goes on to suggest that, because of this "melody" embracing our movement, there is a very real sense in which it is true that every movement is "magically already at its completion" from the very instant it begins (p. 298). One way of describing this is to speak of a kind of corporeal "projection":

> The normal function which makes abstract movement possible is one of "projection," whereby the subject of movement keeps in front of him an area of free space in which what does not naturally exist may take on a semblance of existence. (Merleau-Ponty, p. 111)

The melodic embrace, which is our felt sense of the movement as a whole, forms a sort of "intentional arc," and, according to Merleau-Ponty (1962), it is this intentional arc which brings about the unity of the senses, of intelligence, of sensibility, and of motility (p. 136). As it begins to become clear, however, that motility is a "basic intentionality" (p. 137), the melody or dance of the intentional arc begins to disclose itself as arising from an absolutely primordial dimension of our bodily being in the world: as, in fact, the _arche tes kineseos_ (the origin or principle of movement) of the body of ontological understanding (Levin, 1985, p. 299).

Levin (1985) has more to say on this:

> What I would like to suggest, then, is that this embracing melodic arc of motility reaches down into the primordial origin (arche) of movement, and that, when our movement is filled with the gift of thought it can have the felt quality of a poetizing dance: a dance, I mean, in the sense of a primordial, ontological attunement, a deep chthonic intentionality--the very energy of Being (Physis) giving rise to various ontic motions, rhythms such as our walking. . . . Understood in relationship to the earth, its grounds of support, "dance" is the joyful feeling of an ontological movement, a movement which, by virtue of its guardian awareness, attunes us to the primordial Being of the ground and gathers us into the embracing arc (arche) of its ecstatic energy. As such, dance is indeed the poetizing which makes all our movements possible. (p. 299)

Perhaps we should consider the discovery of an anthropologist, Reichel-Dolmatoff (1977), who lived with the Kogi Indians of Columbia: The child first learns to dance and only later learns to walk. Obviously, since the poetizing dance informs all movement, _dancing_ should properly _necessarily_ precede walking. Children and young people seem to be closer to "dancing"; they have not yet achieved the "distance" of an adult, yet to the extent that adults, as doers, can "belong to" a lived experience, they too can regain their poetizing origins.

However, as van Manen (1990) suggests, poetizing is not "merely" a type of poetry, a making of verses. Poetizing is thinking on original experience and is thus speaking in a more primal sense. Language that authentically speaks the world, rather than abstractly speaking of it, is a language that reverberates the world, as Merleau-Ponty says, a language that sings the world (p. 13). Such is the language of living in a doing, of "belonging to." It harkens us back to the silence from which words--and dancing--emanate.

Talking about an activity allows a doer to relive it in a way that is different from the actual doing, especially in terms of her sensitivity to particular aspects of the doing (ongoing disclosure to the consciousness). It also allows a listener to situate herself in the lived experience.

Performing a move that had been elusive or resistant can be the high point of a doer's performance. Doing the move in a routine may be easy compared to learning it, and, indeed, there is so much complexity compressed into an instant that a whole move may be over before a doer has had a chance to feel it happen. There is a need, then, to relive the experience in a reflective way so that the many profiles of the experience taken in by the body-subject can be revealed to the consciousness.

> A good athlete can enter a state of body awareness in which the right stroke or the right movement happens by itself, effortlessly, without any interference of the conscious will. This is a paradigm for non-action: the purest and more effective form of action. The game plays the game, the poem writes the poem; we can't tell the dancer from the dance.
>
> Less and less do you need to force things,
> until finally you arrive at non-action.
> When nothing is done,
> nothing is left undone.
>
> Nothing is done because the doer has wholeheartedly vanished into the deed; the fuel has been completely transformed into flame. This "nothing" is, in fact, everything. It happens when we trust the intelligence of the universe in the same way that an athlete or a dancer trusts the superior intelligence of the body. (Mitchell, 1988, pp. vii-viii)

Joy, Triumph, Exhilaration (Learning, Understanding)

Danny:

M. How about you, Danny? You got a story?

D. Yeah, I guess so. Last year when we were playing baseball, um, I was shortstop. This guy, he hit it, and he was kinda turned, so I didn't think it would come anywhere near me, and he hit it, and it bounced, like, around, and I just dove for it, and it went right into my glove. That was really good; we got him out, and we won the game. Hah! And yeah, we went to Dairy Queen.

M. The rewards, eh? How'd you feel?

D. It was great. I didn't think I'd get it, but it was just kinda jumping and landed in my glove.

M. Did you feel like good instincts or good reflexes, or were you just kind of lucky?

D. Well, it was, I don't know, I don't even remember why I jumped, I just dove for it 'cause it was really far away, but it went right in. And, ah, we won.

M. And you think that sort of helped the team, helped whole . . .

D. Yeah.

M. Do you think moments like that in a game sometimes change the game, or little things that are surprises? It's an up, you know, like, it can turn things around.

D. Yeah. It picked our team up, 'cause we were losing by, like, I don't know what we were losing by, but we cut it out. Before, like, everybody was kind of depressed about it, about the game, not really trying too hard, then it just changed around, and we won.

Travis:

T. In our practice I scored the only goal.

M. Oh . . .

T. We weren't using real nets; we were just trying to put the balls . . . like, instead of nets we had these two soccer balls at the other end and no goalies. And I got a good pass, and I went around a guy, and I put it off the ball.

M. That's good . . . good feeling?

T. Yeah.

M. How do you feel at those times . . . like everything's connecting?

T. Sort of, yeah, you can just see it coming, just, I could tell about five seconds, like, two passes before I scored that I was about to.

M. That's neat, eh?

T. Uh huh.

Sylvie:

M. So, here we go. So, what was it you wanted to tell me?

S. You know on TV, they have the exercise machine, the cross-country ski thing?

M. Yeah.

S. Well, my mom bought it, and I thought maybe I wouldn't be able to do it because of the balance, right? But I tried it, and I can do it.
M. Wow!
S. Yeah. I like it.
M. Is it a good workout?
S. It's fun. Well, I only did it five minutes, but I liked it, so I'm going to start working out at home, too, all the time, every day.

M. So have you had any triumphs this week, any new things?
S. New things . . .
M. Like, lately it's been the tomato and shaving and the curling iron.
S. Oh, yeah. Well, I tried the curling iron with the rod, and I can do that. I thought, no way, I'm going to burn myself, but I didn't.
M. So do you have to do it any different from what I would do?
S. Not really. I can't grab the handle; I have to grab with this hand and put it in my right hand and then curl. But I usually have a perm, so I don't bother. But I had to try that. But the biggest conquest would be plucking my eyebrows. You have no idea how important that is to me. I'm very conscious about how I look. I take pride in appearance, and I hate looking like a slob.

S. You know when you have a wallet, and it has those clasps. . . . I have a manicure set, and I always break a nail trying to open it. . . . It's hard to do, and that pisses me off. And I use a key usually to open it. I should have been an inventor.
M. Yes! You're very ingenious.

Danny's special moment involved an "impossible catch." His catch happened while he was playing shortstop in a baseball game last year. Though not expecting the ball to come to him, he reacted to an unexpected bounce and dove for the ball, which seemed well out of his reach. Danny is not sure what part was played by instinct, reflexes, or luck, or why he even went for the ball, because it was so far away, but he did, and he made the catch. The hitter was, consequently, tagged out. Plays like this can really turn a game around. Before Danny's catch, his team had been losing and were a little listless and half-hearted, but this play picked them up, things just changed around, and they went on to win and to a victory celebration at Dairy Queen after the game. Danny felt great about the catch and the whole experience.

Danny's hit in the previous evening's practice was something he considered challenging and effort producing because he hit the ball further than he had ever hit it before. Not only was there challenge and effort, but it also made him happy. In his recent soccer practice Travis scored the only goal--a triumph of sorts--into make-shift goal posts after a good personal effort of receiving a pass and getting around an opponent.

At these "good-feeling" times there is a sense of anticipation, of everything connecting. Travis says that he could tell before it happened that he was going to score. He "felt it coming," and he considers this a "neat experience."

Sylvie's mother has purchased a cross-country ski machine, and although Sylvie thought that she would not be able to use it because of her balance problems, she tried it and discovered that she can indeed do it, and she likes it. Sylvie tried this cross-country ski machine for only five minutes, so she cannot really comment on what kind of workout it is, although she realizes that it will work for arms and legs, it will be good for her cardiovascular system, and it is fun.

Sylvie enjoyed the feeling of being on the cross-country ski machine. She recognizes its benefits for body shaping and cardiovascular fitness. She plans to start working out at home using this machine.

Sylvie has triumphed over the curling iron. She thought that she might burn herself using the rod instead of the brush, but she figured out a way to grab the curling iron in one hand and place it in her other hand so that she can turn it with control and curl her hair. She usually has a perm, so she does not bother with a curling iron, but she had to try it just to prove that she could do it.

Sylvie has had another recent accomplishment: She has discovered a way to open her manicure set without breaking a nail. She usually has a hard time opening clasps with her fingers, so she now uses a key to open the manicure set. She admits that she should have been an inventor.

While the curling iron and the manicure set are breakthroughs, and while Sylvie has had other such, her most significant conquest has been plucking her eyebrows because her appearance and her responsibility for it are so important to her.

Solomon (1976) suggests that the "up-down" metaphors that permeate discussions of the passions are nowhere more appropriate than in the contrast between joy and depression (where "up" and "down" in the contemporary idiom are personal adjectives which are virtually synonymous with these two moods) (p. 335). If depression places our world in brackets of doubtfulness, joy enclosed it with silvery meanings. These need have no dependence upon particulars, and joy, like depression, may well be oblivious to details. Joy is that happy passion that renders our world not only satisfactory, but also "wonderful"--where we "wonder at" rather than "wonder about" (as with fear, doubt, uncertainty).

Solomon (1976) further suggests that it is easy to feel good about oneself when one has no values or refuses to accept responsibility for one's actions or when everything is going well. However, self-esteem and personal dignity cannot depend on the happy contingencies of a life without errors or on the self-deceptive conveniences of amorality and irresponsibility. "The ability to admit and atone for our mistakes is as

2

essential to wisdom and personal dignity as the ability to love other people and share our world with them "(p. 365).

It has been said that happiness is a by-product. We are not told what it is a by-product of, simply that it is a by-product of some other process. This "process" can be any lived experience where we accept the privilege and responsibility of co-authorship, where we acknowledge our place, our essentialness, in the scheme of things. Happiness is not a given, but something that must be attained or "earned." Strasser (1977) suggests that happiness involves a certain feeling of result, but also something deeper, more lasting. We have discovered not only happiness, but also something more: We have come to realize things about self, experience, body-subject, Being. Like enjoyment, happiness implies the intimate possession of a concrete good, but it likewise opens out to a certain infinity (owning/belonging to). Happiness is not a "reward" for effort; it is a state of relationship, a state of Being that we can share. All that is required is our participation.

Travis and Danny spoke of special moments in their respective activities. Each special moment had a sense of the impossible about it; i.e., there was no way that it really should have happened, but the person involved took a chance and "went for it," as it were, and the completely unexpected happened: He did it! While instinct, reflexes, fluke, or luck may have played a part, what is definite is that if the boy in each case had not tried to do something that he thought was beyond him, it would not have happened. These "impossible" catches and goals usually (often) have a pivotal, transforming effect on the game as a whole and on the other people involved in it. These moments tend to leave a sense of accomplishment and pride and a feeling of contributing to, a being a part of, something larger than one's self, but which needs that one self that is intentionally deciding and acting.

Both boys describe incidents which were challenging and/or effort producing, but which left a "good feeling." These challenging or difficult situations may involve training when one is not feeling well, when one triumphs over obstacles, when one expends energy and invests effort. Sometimes in the midst of an activity the participant can feel extreme discomfort; he usually gets through it by not dwelling on the unpleasantness but, rather, on other things. Talking to oneself is not uncommon, and feeling "disconnected" from one's body or one's pain is another fairly common experience (see pain/distress section).

At these "good-feeling" or "happy" times, there is a sense of anticipation, of everything connecting, of "I felt it coming." There was also some discussion about exceeding one's expectations of one's self and how this feels. This exceeding expectation usually happens when one performs or plays well when one did not expect to; however, perceptions of a "good" game or a "good" performance vary considerably from person to person. The way that you yourself feel is not always the way that others see you. People notice different things, and different things are important for different people.

A person with a disability may assume that certain devices or machines will not be appropriate or possible for her because of her balance or other problems associated with her disability; however, it is good to make an attempt at something which seems improbable, because she may be pleasantly surprised. Many of these "at-home" training systems do have body-shaping and cardiovascular benefits, allow the person to train at home, and can be quite enjoyable.

A person with a disability often has to find fairly ingenious ways to manage personal grooming, since using curling irons, manicure sets, tweezers, pantyhose, hairspray, and so on usually involves manipulative dexterity. These individualized ways of dong things are often quite significant for the doer, whose appearance and her responsibility for it are important to her.

A person with a disability can develop a good attitude and learn to make her way both because of and in spite of her disability. However, even with a good attitude and a degree of success, this person lives with a disability that is not going to go away. She lives with her disability every day, and if she has achieved a certain level of success, she earned it, and so can anyone else.

> What is the greatest experience you can have? It is your hour of the great contempt. The hour in which your happiness, too, arouses your disgust, and even your reason and virtue.
>
> What is great in man is that he is a bridge and not an end; what can be loved in man is that he is an overture and a going under. (Nietzsche, 1960; cited in Solomon, 1976, p. 427)

Understanding, Learning (Joy, Triumph, Exhilaration)

Travis:

M. Do you compare with others? Is that good to do?

T. Aahhh, sometimes it is, sometimes it isn't; depends how critical you get. Like, if you say there's always somebody better than me, well, of course there always is, and, like, everybody's gonna do something better than you, but if you say everybody does everything better than you, then, you know . . . .

M. That's not a very good attitude.

T. Yeah. If you keep on striving, saying, "He does the best; I'm gonna do it better," it'll never work because that's what *he* does best.

M. And you have things that you do best.

T. Yeah.

Carmelina:

C. Well, like, for awhile I wasn't aggressive. . . . Like, in the beginning I was, but in the middle I wasn't that

aggressive, but the last game we had I was pretty aggressive.
M. How do you know? What happened?
C. Well, this girl, the ball was coming right in between, and I just went right in front of her, and she fell; this other time I kicked the ball, and they said I kicked this girl's face, but I don't think I did.
M. No . . .
C. But I haven't gotten a yellow card yet, and if, my coach, she doesn't care if I do. Like, she goes, "Are you scared of getting a yellow card?" and I go, "Well, I don't want one," but . . . I don't want to hurt anyone either.
M. Yeah. So you're digging in more, eh?
C. Yeah.

Carmelina:
C. Yeah.
M. You've enjoyed that?
C. Yeah.
M. Did you think you'd enjoy it as much as you do?
C. Um, actually, I thought I wouldn't like it that much, 'cause I never really did it before. Well, I did when I was younger, but I quit, and then I started again in school, and I was cut last year, and I thought I'd be cut this year, but I wasn't, and I found it pretty fun. It's harder than any other sport, 'cause you can't use your hands or anything, just your feet. . . . Like, in volleyball you can use your hands, in gymnastics you can use your hands, in basketball . . . .
M. But this is all feet.
C. And chest! That hurts!
M. Yeah, and your head.
C. Yeah, uh huh.
M. That's different, eh, leaving out the things you use most of all.
C. Yeah.

Leslie:
M. Some people have a harder time "saying" about what they're doing. Maybe they don't have any practice with saying.
L. Yeah, or they don't really think about it, though, you know, if you don't realize what you're actually doing, like, dancers put in a lot of work, probably more than I do in baseball or any recreational sport, maybe that makes me thinking because I have more time to think about things, maybe they spend a lot of time doing this and no time thinking about it. They don't really have time to sit down and think, "Today I loved what I just did," they really don't; it's just that it's there, they're doing it, and they don't think about it, you know.
M. Yeah, 'cause concentrating on it while you're doing it is different from thinking about it after you're finished it.
L. That's right, exactly.

M. A different kind of thinking.
L. Uh huh.

Sylvie:

S. Really! I'm good at perception. I know. It's the eyes. They tell so much.
M. And you have good sensitivity.
S. Yeah, but I know what it's like. I know the struggle, the pain, the wanting to give up and die--I know that. I knew it, anyway.
M. And you sort of worked through it.
S. Yeah, and I know how society can put such a negative label on you, and I know what it is to fight, you know, how normal people on this side, different people on this side, don't cross over. But I'm crossing right over.
M. Yeah.
S. I've always crossed over the line, even when I was small; even then I knew, as a little kid, these adults who supposedly are so wise, they were trying to have me put away in a little place where "You can't be with other children." In school, when I first started, the principal wouldn't let me participate in school. She put me in the corner or on the stairs and said, "Well, you can't do that." I said, "Yes, I can."

Learning new skills and working on learned skills are considered important aspects of participating in an activity. Getting the basic idea of a skill does not take a long time, but getting it good enough for the game situation does. There is the early effort at trying something new and the happy, surprising discovery that it works. Players do build on things that work: They experiment, drop what does not work, keep what does, and practice it till they get the hang of it. Some skills take longer than others, some players learn more quickly, some players have more ability in specific areas. Mental blocks do happen and are just as related to attitude as they are to ability. Trial and error and persistence are part of getting the feel of something and developing consistency in it. Comparisons with others are helpful when they enable improvement or provide "motivation," but they are destructive when they are unrealistic. It is good to be realistic about what one does well in comparison to what others do well, but thinking that one does nothing well sets up a negative attitude. It is similarly frustrating to strive for unrealistic goals based on inaccurate assumptions about one's self.

Soccer has been a pleasant surprise for Carmelina this year, since her previous soccer experience had not been enjoyable and usually culminated in her quitting or being cut from the team. Making the school team was an unexpected, continuing pleasure, but her development as a player has had its share of problems and conflicts. She began the year confidently but then began hanging back, waiting for her opponents to make the first move on the ball instead of going for it as she knew that she should. As the season draws to a close, Carmelina feels her aggression returning in that she is digging in more and going for the ball whether other players are around or not. She follows her first instincts and does what she has "known" for most of the season but only recently realized or believed in a felt, meaningful way in the game situation. Her aggression is not without misgivings, however, since she does not want a yellow card for excessive roughness, even though her coach has no problems with this, and she certainly does not want to hurt anyone.

Soccer is a hard game which makes use of body parts not usually used in team sports and activities. The hands are not dominant; the feet are. Also, learning to use the feet and other "unused" parts such as the head and chest in different and novel ways contributes to the difficulty and is harder than not using the hands. There are daily practices. There is the development of ball control, strategy, aggression, and stamina. All of these make the game difficult. But in spite or because of the hard work, the investment, the discipline, Carmelina likes the game, enjoys herself, and would like to keep playing.

Talking about what one is doing is important, but a person should not be forced to talk, or it should not be imposed upon her. When people talk about what they are doing, the doing seems to become more meaningful for them. Talking about what she is doing gets Leanne into the background and history of the activity, and this makes her more interested in it and more familiar with it, so it tends to mean more to her.

Some people have a harder time "saying" about their doing than others. This could be because they do not have any practice with saying, they do not think about what they are doing, or they spend all or much of their time on doing and not a proportionate amount on reflective awareness. Perhaps people who work at their activity all the time, who are constantly doing, have no time to reflect on what they are doing or on how they feel about it. They have no opportunity to tap into their body wisdom and experience, and their doing becomes an object separate from them. "Concentrating on something while doing it is different from reflecting on it when the doing is finished; these are two different kinds of "thinking about."

Sylvie is well aware that she is a "natural" for psychology because she feels that she has good perceptive instincts. She can sense things about a person simply by looking into that person's eyes. Sylvie believes that a person's eyes reveal a lot, and she has always been good at perception and discernment when it comes to the eyes. This is one reason why she thinks that she would be a good psychologist. She believes that she has this sensitivity because she knows what it is like to struggle, to have pain, to want to give up and die, but then to work through all this and learn from it.

Sylvie also knows how it feels to be labelled by society and to fight against this negativism and stereotyping. She stands against the notion that normal people belong on one side, and different people belong on the other side, and neither side should ever cross over onto the other. Sylvie is crossing over these artificial barriers and is not going to be held back.

> Every movement of infinity comes about by passion, and no reflection can bring a movement about. (Kierkegaard, 1954, p. 53)
>
> We are attempting to learn thinking. The way is long. We dare take only a few steps. If all goes well, they will take us to the foothills of thought. But they will take us to places which we must explore to reach the point where only the leap will help further. (Heidegger, 1968, p. 12)
>
> Now I am light, now I fly, now I see myself beneath myself, now a god dances through me. (Nietzsche, 1956, p. 41)

Self-overcoming is "taking hold" of ourselves and becoming more than we are, using our reason not merely to understand, but also to change ourselves (Solomon, 1976, p. 413). The doers in this project had a "with difficulty" experience of understanding. They were involved in meaning-making activity. They came to realizations on "where they stand" and "how they stand." Self-overcoming is not the imposition of ideals "from the outside": "You ought to be or do such and such." It is the recognition of the discard within our strategies (stand) for living in our lifeworld. It is recognizing and rejecting self-deception. Solomon advocates honest reflection, however painful it might be, as our only guarantee that we are not undermining our own self-esteem and "accepting" a Self which is in disharmony with body-subject and Being.

> To the extent that I can elaborate and extend my corporeal scheme, to the extent that I acquire a better organized experience of my own body, to that very extent will my consciousness of my own body cease being a chaos in which I am submerged and lend itself to a transfer to others. (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 118)

A person's body, or, as we have come to realize, body-subject, is that person's grounding in the world. What happens when we "do" counts. My doing allows me to "see" and "hear" that which had been invisible and silent, yet it also opens up an even greater field of invisibility and silence into which I now must venture. To the extent that my lived experience of and with a "doing" (difficulty) can also be yours, we are joined in a poetizing dance.

> At last the horizon seems open once more, granting even that it is not bright; our ships can at last put out to sea in face of every danger; every hazard is again permitted to the discerner; the sea, our sea, lies open before us; perhaps never before did such an open sea exist. (Nietzsche, 1968, p. 330)

When a person embarks on an activity, a "doing," the ensuing responsibilities to self and to the doing involve taking several things into consideration, including commitment, reflective awareness, learning, investment, resistance, and bad and good experiences.

Going to practice, especially when a person does not feel like it, is part of what being active is all about. There is a commitment involved and, hence, a duty of sorts to be fulfilled in the name of that commitment. A person's word (i.e., commitment) should stand for and translate into her conduct.

Commitment and investment are related. A person commits to a doing and then follows through on that commitment with investment of self, time, and effort. If people did not follow through on their verbal commitments, there would be very little basis for trust or dependability.

Following through usually entails investment of some kind or another.

Having a doer talk about what she is doing is considered to be a valuable thing, although a doer should not be forced to talk, and it should not be imposed on her. Instead, it should flow naturally from the doing as reflective awareness of what has been experienced within or because of the doing. Reflective awareness also allows doers to know some history of the doing and develop a familiarity with the doing; hence, the doing becomes more meaningful. Many doing situations are "forced on" doers, or doers are "made" to do without consultation, without details, without understanding, without any questions or "saying" of their own. When parents force children into activities, neither the doing nor the saying seems to be fun or meaningful. When activities become competitive obsessions and the enjoyment of them depends on some "end product," rather than on the doing itself, the price to pay for such high achievement might be considered too high; i.e., both the doer and the doing become something other than what they are.

Doers need to talk about their areas of ignorance in various activities, and they need to be able to ask questions about the technical side of activities, but it is just as important to talk about why they are doing the activity, how it feels to do it, and how they feel about it; in short, reflective awareness is as important as having information about something.

Participating in a project which involves saying about doing and practicing reflective awareness is considered to be a good and valuable experience for a doer. A doer is then able to learn about herself and her activity and is able to realize how much she takes for granted within her doing. She is able to realize and discover things she does and feels and to improve as a doer and a person.

Doing, reflecting, and saying allow a doer to "see" in a different way. She develops a different perspective on her body and on the way it works and moves. She is able to recognize and acknowledge the depth of her investment in terms of effort, as well as the profound enjoyment she experiences. She comes to realize and respect how and what her body does, and she learns how to connect with her body wisdom.

> The task of reflection is to force our often clandestine choices of emotional strategies into the light, where they can be cross examined and confronted with the evidence, compared to their alternatives, and ultimately, if they are acceptable to us, taken hold of as our own fully deliberative and gladly chosen commitments. . . . And for all of us who are still trapped in our own degrading worlds of resentment, envy, guilt, self-hate, and spite, the ideal of reflection is nothing less than the promise of liberation, the one possible weapon with which we can destroy the vicious cycles of degradation and unhappiness in which we have entrenched ourselves. (Solomon, 1976, p. 420)

The thinker (or, we could say, the reflective doer), Heidegger (1973) says, is one who "stands within the decision of what there is at all, and what beings are" (p. 110). The reflective doer dares to stand out into the openness of truth. Levin (1985) suggests that "the farther away a thinker goes from the field where the historical force of metaphysics would hold him captive, the more his movements, his way of bearing the gift of thought, will take on a form, a character, that could not have been anticipated (p. 304). Heidegger suggests that "care moves every thinker who thinks in the direction of the decision" (p. 112).

Are we, as doers, prepared, then, to entrust ourselves to the "care" which "moves every thinker"? What is it to be involved in this kind of decision? And how are we moved when we are moved by care in virtue of our thinking? We might also want to ask, perhaps asking only ourselves:

How do we move in the spirit of that care?

Nietzsche (1956) suggests that we consider the importance of the spirit of "dance": Only in the dance do I know how to tell the parable of the highest things (p. 112). This study on lived experiences of and with difficulty in physical activity proposes that the relationship between the doer (the body-subject) and the difficult doing and, ultimately, the relationship between the doer and herself/himself are "bearers of thought." The "spirit of the dance" present in all moving and doing is made explicit in its fulfillment as a body of ontological understanding, a body standing on the earth, standing for something and moving about with a high purpose in a way that is inconceivable from a metaphysical standpoint. Deciding to stand in the world in a certain way (as body-subject) is also a decision to stand for something. This kind of decision requires that we break away from the "gravity" and rigidity of our metaphysical history (our "normal science," our positivist indoctrination) and can come to pass only as (and in) a "leap of faith," a leap of infinite passion. Levin (1985) declares that the "gravity of metaphysics will never understand the graceful dancing of thought; nor will it ever unbend enough to approve a thinking which moves, or is moved, in leaps of ecstatic self-abandon" (p. 309). (I am a little more optimistic than Levin, perhaps naively so; I believe that with bodies, body-subjects, doing, and difficulty as common grounds, there is enormous potential and possibility for deep intersubjectivity.)

Kierkegaard (1954) proclaims that "to transform the leap of life into a walk, absolutely to express the sublime in the pedestrian--that only the knight of faith can do--and this is the one and only prodigy" (p. 53). Kierkegaard is challenging doers to "walk their talk," to live their understandings in such a way that they (the person and her/his understanding) are "seen," "heard," and "read" by others. The truly powerful gait is moved, as Heidegger says, by the gracefulness of Care.

Kierkegaard says that the infinite passion in the leap must become one's walk of life; thus when the doer moves within the human realm, the caring which moves her/him--the caring by which she/he is visibly moved--is called compassion, our openness to all beings (Levin, 1985, p. 316). Wosein (1974), in Sacred Dance: Encounter with the Gods, gives us a line from St. John's "Hymn of Jesus": "To each and all it is given to dance. . . . He who joineth not in the dance knoweth not the way" (pp. 7, 28). I submit that, for those of us who "do" (and that quite possibly means everyone), and in particular for those of us in physical education who stand for doing, it is our responsibility to show the way.

Chapter VII

Toward a Phenomenology of Difficulty in Physical Activity

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Constellation Revisited


Difficulty is a relationship between a doer and an
object/happening which resists and demands and is ultimately
a relationship between a doer and herself/himself.
ineffable
embodiment
"of"
themes
degree and kind of
resistance
strangeness
control
demand
decision
change
investment
self-honesty
body-subject
attitude-toward
body
"with" themes

Figure 1. A constellation of difficulty.

We began this consideration of a constellation of difficulty in physical activity with a proposition: Difficulty is a relationship between a doer and object/happening which resists and demands and is ultimately a relationship between a doer and herself/himself. The sections on ineffability and embodiment, the "of themes" of resistance, demand, strangeness, control, decision, change, investment, and self-honesty, and the body-subject, attitude-toward, and "with themes" of attitude, physically felt, and feeling and emotion experiences have allowed us to unpack and take a closer look at each component of our proposition.

The ineffable and embodied qualities of difficulty mean that a doer encounters it in an object/happening. The doing and the doer co-create each other. The object/happening resists the doer in varying degrees and kinds; the object/happening makes demands of the doer in varying degrees and kinds. The doer, the body-subject, responds to the "of" with the "with" and also responds to the "with." The doer and body-subject establish a more connected, felt relation in the self-honesty experience and in the lived experience of and with difficulty. The doer in a re-created relation with the body-subject is more susceptible to the voice of Being and more trusting in her/his dance of life.

> "Do not be worried and upset," Jesus told them. "Believe in God and believe also in me. There are many rooms in my Father's house, and I am going to prepare a place for you. I would not tell you this if it were not so. And after I go and prepare a place for you, I will come back and take you to myself so that you will be where I am. You know the way that leads to the place I am going."
>
> Thomas said to him, "Lord, we do not know where you are going; so how can we know the way to get there?
>
> Jesus answered him, "I am the way, the truth, and the life; no one goes to the Father except by me. Now that you have known me," he said to them, "you will know my Father also, and from now on you do know him and you have seen him." (John 14:1-7)

Christ's apostles want to know where "heaven" is. Where is the Father's house where my room is? They want a location, and they want to know how to get there. Christ is "going" to re-establish His relationship with the Father, with whom He is already a unity (the relationship of the body-subject and Being is akin to this)--a Trinity, in fact. The "place" where Christ is going is a relationship with the Father. This is "heaven." Heaven is not a place; it is a relationship with the Father, and the way to this "place" is Christ ("I am the way, the truth"), who is already the embodiment, the incarnation of the Father. "Heaven" is a relationship; Christ is the way to that relationship.

Difficulty is not an object or a definition or an explanation. It is a relationship between a doer and an object/happening and between a doer and herself/himself. It is a relationship which in-forms and is in-formed by living in one's lifeworld in a committed way. It is a wonderfully human way to hear the voice of Being and harmonize with the rhythm of the Great Dance. It is also a profound praxis.

Body Speak and the Politics of Dancing

During the course of the study, "dance" presented itself as primordial movement. The metaphors of dance, voice, soundness, melody, harmony, rhythm, and grounding are prevalent in our discussions and considerations of difficulty in physical activity. Lived experiences of difficulty are features of the larger dance which is informed by and informs difficulty. Dance as primordial movement is that original rhythm to which the body-subject attunes, and with which the body-subject reverberates.

Dance is not a new phenomenon. Cave paintings and archaeological finds from the Neolithic period in particular have shown men hunting and dancing. Dance as a social convention and leisure activity has been with us as long as people have been upright. There is something primordial about the human being's relationship and connection with rhythmic movement--something that defies language and transcends cultures and histories.

In spite of its relatedness to Being (or perhaps because of it) and its intersubjective meaningfulness, there has been debate over the inclusion of dance in the curriculum since pre-Renaissance days, the church insisting that any movement that gave pleasure (or perhaps insight?) was sinful and should be suppressed and controlled. This attitude persists even now, and there are some denominational pockets where "dance" is included only if it is labelled and taught as "movement."

Ballet and ballroom are dance forms which adhere to definite and rigid structures and standards. These are one pole of a continuum in dance and are characterized by discipline, suppression, and control. Creative, modern, ethnic, and tribal dance are at the other pole, these being characterized by wildness, passion, and lack of structure and strict rules. This polarity is part of the tension, the dynamic, that is dance. The paradox of "form" is, of course, that discipline is incredibly liberating: No matter what structure (or lack thereof) the dance form imposes (or rescinds), the expression is never bound or limited, but always breathes a life of its own into a dancer, a mover, a doer. Then the two become one: a dance.

For many years and, indeed, centuries, dance has been the "property" of private dance schools, individual instruction situations, elitist organizations such as the National Ballet of Canada, and more popular, sponsored schools such as Fred Astaire and Arthur Murray Studios. These areas tended to be geared toward learning, progressing through syllabus sequences, and performance. As well, the social aspects have always been present.

The roots of dance "instruction" seems to be in the "utilitarian tradition" (Goodson, 1988), with people who could dance passing on their "knowledge" to people who had an interest in learning how. Even more basic than this are dance forms which spring from folklore, ritual, festival, religion, or culture almost spontaneously, instinctively, and are passed on as part of a continuing definition of who and what a people are, stand for, and believe in.

The most stylized dance forms represent an "academic tradition" (Goodson, 1988), in that they each have a body of knowledge, a syllabus, standards, evaluation procedures, and so on. In given periods of history, dance was considered a necessity in a socially "well-rounded" person, yet dance instruction typically was not an aspect of "formal" education. Dance in North American schools does not have a long history, particularly in Canada where the push for dance in the schools began in the 1930s. The challenge seemed to be to find a way to describe what kind of dance could be done in schools so that as many children as possible could experience it and benefit from it.

Dance as a school subject has tended to mean ethnic, folk, and creative dance, taught in the physical education class. Dance, gymnastics, and games usually form the core of most primary and elementary physical education curricula in North America, Europe, and especially in Great Britain. Laban's (1977) work was instrumental in providing a language of instruction for creative dance which could be made understandable and non-threatening for teachers with a desire to teach dance, but without years of training in traditional dance forms. It is not the intent to collapse a lifetime of dance training into a package that a prospective teacher can unpack and "have"; instead, the prospective inexperienced teacher needs a "package" that is different in kind rather than degree.

The academic tradition at the university level grants degrees in dance in many North American institutions, but the "training" is directed toward performance, skill acquisition, research, and certification. Graduates often go on to dance professionally or open dancing schools or teach in some capacity. The non-academic tradition produces the same kind of "graduate" with the same kind of qualifications and expertise. The "proficiencies" are necessary but not sufficient for the teaching of dance within the instructional program of a school.

The dilemma seems to be one of how to make dance accessible and enjoyable for children and adults who are not going to make it their life's work, who may not have "natural" ability (whatever that means), or who simply cannot afford dance on an "outside-the-school," specialized basis. Also, the "dance form" would have to "invite" rather than intimidate. Including dance in the physical education curriculum poses problems for teacher education and curriculum development largely because there is almost no pedagogic tradition in dance (we are creating it as we go, so to speak). It is an art form, yet it also has a scatological element; it is athletic, yet it is also aesthetic; it has tradition and structure, yet these seem to be handled better in non-school organizations (which do not have a tendency to exclude working and lower-class participants). Dance in schools is about access: We have to get it to people who "need" it or who have been deprived of it; hence the crisis-management, "back-formation" approach to pre-service and in-service "training." In the absence of a "pedagogic tradition"

(Goodson, 1988), it is the immediate, albeit "band-aid solution."

Dance has an academic and utilitarian tradition. It is attempting to address its pedagogic tradition by separating itself from physical education and finding its own "pedagogue voice." However, as long as the only people attracted to teaching dance as a school subject are "dance people" (i.e., people already in the tradition), then we are continuing a tradition of inaccessibility that we claim we are trying to remedy and change via the school-subject route, and we have not really attended to a pedagogic vision or voice.

In order to make the tradition reachable for the uninformed, a cookbook approach to pedagogy has been initiated, and much of the text, workshops, audio and visual tapes, and methodologies are "how-to" materials, often "teacher-proof" so that someone who knows or cares nothing about dance can still "teach" it to children in the instructional program.

While this no doubt does provide access to dance, enjoyment of dance, and some form of relief for the teacher, I believe that it does violence to whatever pedagogic tradition we may be trying to build. As long as dance is taught as just another skill, disembodied from any kind of personal investment, thoughtfulness, carefulness, concern for children, or concern for what can be said and felt in this particular kind of expressive mode, it will not find its pedagogic voice.

Although dance is a different kind of doing, it is also the fundamental doing. Separating it from physical education only allows the non-acknowledgement of our connectedness to our primordial rhythm (Being) to continue. As long as physical education remains a necessary "frill," it can develop a critical, re-constructionist posture and conduct without the scrutiny that other "real" subjects have the privilege of enjoying. By isolating itself, publicly declaring its agenda and legitimacy, and "proving" both with academic, utilitarian, quasi-pedagogic, Tylerian "materials," dance runs the risk of losing its voice. I can understand and sympathize with the desire to be recognized as special and with the need to speak with one's own voice, but I believe that integrated, multidimensional physical education can be powerful, empowering, accessible, and pedagogic. I believe that it also has the capacity for the in-dwelling of many voices.

Dance does not seem to be valued by the majority of physical education teachers until they come into contact with the instructional program in a school and with an actual "typical" child (i.e., a child who is no more or less "talented" than any other child) of a school community; then, all of a sudden, it is seen as something that can and should be done with (not to) children. Developing an attitude toward and relationship with dance is an aspect of pre-service that has been ignored for too long in physical education. Dance is not a speed bump that we drive over once or twice in a five-year journey of qualification. It is a part of being human that we have to rediscover as we go about the business of becoming teachers and becoming selves. The politics of dancing unfold as people discover things about dance, themselves, their co-dancers, their dancing partners. In my experience with and in dance and with students of all ages, a group conscience develops, a character, a breakdown of public and private boundaries, a feeling of personal richness and depth that is beautifully one's own, yet is profoundly connected to one's fellow humans. I believe that it is a significant aspect of a teacher's biography, yet it has not been acknowledged as the heart which beats inside all movement, possibly because it is so primordial, so fundamental, so human, so childlike, so unmediated. Unfortunately, it has taken fragmentation and disunity to make many physical education practitioners aware of errors and omissions in our pedagogic tradition.

Physical education and, in particular, dance present problems for existing paradigms. Dance cannot really be contained by a paradigm, so the paradigm must, therefore, do everything in its power to "explain" or "define" dance. This cannot really be done, because dance does not need words; it can and does transcend words.

Discourse control is a real danger for any non-mainstream area such as dance (physical education, religious studies, vocational education, and feminism are prime candidates), but this kind of control is more difficult in dance because dance discourse is more elusive. Our discourse in dance and, in a broader sense, in physical education cannot be controlled in the same way as other "cognitive" subjects because most of our discourse is non-verbal: It is physical, body, embodiment, expression as lived, bodyspeak.

There is an aura surrounding dance. A sense of mystique and myth exists even before dance is (or ever will be) mythologized as a school subject: Dancers are deep, spooky, marginal types who dwell in some nether region--anorexic women and gay men living outrageously eccentric, misunderstood lives, in touch with experiences mere mortals can barely imagine. Or there is a skeptical, somewhat embarrassed attitude toward passionate displays of religious, ethnic, or cultural experience. Perhaps there is even some fear of the danger inherent in the sin that the churches of long ago and today assure us is lurking somewhere in there in dance.

In all its forms, dance delivers wonderful, subtle insights into self and others. In ballroom dance, for example, it is the tension between the man and the women (not submission or domination) that creates a unified shape and movement that makes the dance possible. Language is becoming an equal partner with music in much of the dance work that we are now negotiating with children and other learners. Our "sources" of theme and inspiration are becoming less and less contained by limits and boundaries. It is an exciting time. I hope that we dwell in it in a pedagogic rather than in a self-obsessed fashion.

I have already suggested that "dance" needs to be understood as the primal rhythm beneath and inside all movement. Physical education professionals seem to want to keep "skill-based" activities such as swimming, running, and gymnastics or "skill-based" games such as volleyball, soccer, hockey, and basketball and dance as distinct and separated as possible. This does violence to the notion of dance I have been developing. In physical education, as in life, we have to become more attentive to the dance within the game or under the game so that moving can be a personal and intersubjective discovery, journey, and commitment.

Chapter VIII

Is There a Doctrine to This Landscape?

(i.e., What is "there"? How shall I conduct myself?)
(Wolfe, 1985)

Chapter VIII

Is There a Doctrine to This Landscape?

Opening Remarks

> As clearly as I can remember my cast of mind as a small boy, so can I recall feeling very old when I was that boy--very old and solemn and weighted down with experience I never had. I could feel a sort of sympathy with the future. As every kid knows, childhood is much more serious than its reputation.
>
> When we unearth our childhood, then, we touch both past and present. The child we once were seemed to sense what sort of grown-ups we'd become. If the child is the one who done it in the mystery story of adulthood, the reverse is equally true; we are strangely familiar with the entire capsule of our being at a very early age, and notwithstanding a few healthy surprises along the way, we pretty much know at every stage of our lives the persons we will be, are and were.
>
> For every child there is a solitary experience, like a long walk on a country road, in which he participates in the history of his whole life, though he cannot yet know the details of that history. The child on the road is the child one reaches back to, unconsciously, in so much of adulthood. He is lost. And being lost, he is in the best place possible, because he is about to find a new way. Those moments, which are frequently recollected in a life, belong to the child whom we grow out of and whom we never cease to be. (Rosenblatt, 1990, p. 7)

A few pages back I stated that this research project is committed to improving the way I stand in the world with and for children and young people. This commitment is informed by a deep pedagogical concern for children and young people (and people generally): for the way they are treated, talked about, thought about, lived with, and taught. Like Oldham (1982), I hoped that by asking after lived experiences of and with difficulty in physical activity in the lifeworlds of children and young people, we who claim to be pedagogues might gain a better understanding of these lived experiences of and with difficulty and, through that, a deeper and deepening sense of our being with children (p. iv). So, before I go on to a discussion of what the "disclosures" that I and my co-authors saw, heard, and felt might mean for physical education, I would like to refocus, for a moment, on children and young people. It is children and young people, after all, who authorize us as people, adults, and teachers.

Where is the child in that collection of research findings which addresses the traditional pedagogical field of physical education? We need to ask this question and keep asking it in order to avoid our becoming entangled in the competing claims which have been made by researchers from the "Right" and the "Left" and lose sight of the child and the young person altogether. There is evidence of the authoritativeness of competing accounts of physical education, first, in the way that teacher effectiveness researchers such as Locke (1977), Metzler (1986), Placek (1986), and Siedentop (1986) legitimize what they do via a common allegiance to the so-called scientific method and, second, in the indictment of this approach by those such as Fitzclarence (1986), Kirk (1986), Smith (1982), and Tinning (1984), who feel more comfortable with the discourse of ideology critique.

> Whereas positivistic physical education tends to dismember the child through the imagery of information-processing models, cognitive models, cybernetic models, and through the denuding of the child's landscape such that one might, in good conscience, talk of cohorts, subjects, students, and children in the same breath, the alternative ideology and epistemology advocated by the critical theorists would do away with the body of the child altogether. (Smith, 1988, p. 2)

As a woman and, therefore, a member of a population who have been sadly and inexcusably oppressed and silenced for centuries, I am much more sympathetic to and supportive of the visions and options which critical theory is making possible than perhaps is Smith (1988; above). However, I am in complete agreement with Smith's concern for "the loss of the child" in physical education research. While much of the research, both positivist and critical, quite possibly has its origins in sincere intent, there is the danger of preoccupation with "the cause," with the result being that children and young people are overlooked, disregarded, and forgotten even as they are being viewed, measured, and "studied."

Smith (1988) advocates our using a language which tries to keep the child in view so that we might become more appreciative of those principles which sustain pedagogical research in physical education (p. 11).

> There is a methodology at work in our pedagogical inquiries which has less to do with techniques and procedures and much more to do with the responsibility we have for children's lives and the empathic understanding through which we can remember what is the best thing to do for this child at this particular place and time. (p. 11)

Smith's (1988) point is well taken. As we get caught up in methods, problems, concerns, strategies, and questions, we must continue to ask this question: Where is the child? or Where is the young person? We can bring this question more clearly into focus by acknowledging Gould's (1984) admonition that there is no such thing as "the" monkey; there are many monkeys and many kinds of monkeys. Just so, there is no such thing as the child or the young person; there are many children and young people, and many kinds of children and young people. There is a need to keep reminding ourselves to keep children and young people in view, to be attentive and attuned to their voices. There is the need within this larger need to see, hear, and honor this particular child and this particular young person. The bottom line is that I must someday look into the eyes of a child or a young person and, in the silence that surrounds that look, offer what I am and what I stand for and hope to God that it is worth accepting.

Not all researchers, theorizers, people, or even teachers profess an interest in or concern for children and young people. However, if there is in their work, their lives, their wondering and questioning a hint or a whisper of concern for human betterment, then they are working in service of children and childhood from which young people and all persons come.

In the preceding sections of this study I proposed that difficulty (in physical activity) is a relationship between a doer and an object/happening which resists and demands and is ultimately a relationship between a doer and herself/himself. I believe that I and my co-authors have shown that lived experiences of and with difficulty in physical activity are open spaces, "clearings," in which the voice of Being is heard, felt, and understood by the body-subject, in which the body-subject co-creates and is informed by the Dance which moves in Being and in all beings. Further, I believe that we have shown that a renewed reconnection with and respect for the body-subject allows us to co-create and re-create our grounds and ourselves. Lived experiences of and with difficulty in physical activity are transformation experiences, conscientizing experiences, praxis (unity) experiences, common experiences. They are the tie that binds us in sweet accord.

The following section will consider what such a proposition of difficulty in physical activity might mean for physical education.

Physical Education and the "Praxis Gap"

For the past number of years I have had the privilege and opportunity of working with children, young people, adults, coaches, and teachers in classrooms, gymnasiums, dance rooms, swimming pools, wilderness areas, and pre-service and in-service education experiences. Their and my own dominant concern is how to make this "package" here accessible or understandable or "operationalizable" for a learner there (or anywhere, for that matter). How can I (we) best present "material," or how can I (we) best arrange a learning landscape so that learners (and teachers) can have meaningful, disclosing experiences, so that they come to develop "owning-belonging to" relationships with the "material," rather than being subject to it within a victimizing, dehumanizing agenda?

My profession is physical education. Physical education has a long, robust history, and twentieth-century physical education, in particular, has undergone several "shifts," as it were, in character, emphasis, and guidelines. The three dominant faces of twentieth-century physical education have been education through the physical, education of the physical, and education for and through human movement.

North American physical education in this century has been heavily weighted toward contributing to the child's development as a future citizen of a democracy. Such an approach centers on the social development of the individual. The findings of educational and behavioral psychologists which were put into educational philosophical perspective by Dewey (1938, 1958) and others led to the germination of "education through the physical" as the central theme of physical education. Various values, knowledges, attitudes, and behaviors over and above physical skills could be learned through doing physical activity. The movement reached greater fruition under the stimulation and careful guidance of Williams (1920) and physical education's more contemporary progressivist leaders (Zeigler, 1979).

On the other end of the spectrum, however, were those in the professions who argued that physical education was getting too enmeshed in social development and was neglecting what might be termed "education of the physical." In its infancy, western physical education was rooted in the teachings of medical men whose concern about physical fitness and efficiency was prompted by scientific rather than social motives. The foremost twentieth-century torchbearer of the science-oriented concept of physical education was Charles H. McCloy. The biosciences sector of physical education, often essentialist in its philosophical stance (Zeigler & Vander Zwaag, 1968), associates closely with physical development underscored by vigorous, large-muscle exercise and the strengthening of organic vigor--approaches validated by scientific inquiry rather than by authoritative pronouncements (Gerber, 1971). As might be imagined, the science-oriented scholars have produced the major share of physical education literature. From the laboratories of McCloy at Iowa, Karpovich at Springfield, and Cureton at Illinois, among others, flowed a steady stream of scientific research findings related to exercise of all types.

The social science dimension of physical education and sport has also been producing its fair share of research; unfortunately, the positivist ethic is alive and well in physical education, and contributions of a "non-scientific nature" are politely acknowledged, but the attitude toward a perspective offered by philosophical, historical, anthropological, and, to a lesser degree, sociological and psychological research in physical education and sport is one of tolerance.

The emergence of movement education can be traced back to the theories and practical work of Laban. The concept that people respond to natural movement impulses (a need to play), that people discover themselves and their world through experience (both sensation and reflection), that there is value in free, voluntary, and natural physical activity is not a new one, but it received new and vital emphasis during the age of the Enlightenment through the writings of authors such as Locke and Rousseau. Both these men set out treatises on education that were to have far-reaching effects on physical education. Their ideas were taken up and advanced by other theorists such as Pestalozzi, Basedow, Guts Muths, Froebel, and later Gaulhofer, Stretcher, Laban, and Morison (Zeigler, 1979).

The term "movement" became of prime importance for advocates of Laban's (1977) concepts, and phrases such as "the art of movement," "movement gymnastics," and "movement education" became a part of physical education vocabulary. As with the Austrian system, proponents of movement education believe that children learn most effectively and efficiently when they are given the opportunity to search for and "discover" the movement sequence which is best for them. No uniform standards of performance are established. Instead, generalized tasks are assigned, and children find a solution within their own level of understanding, their physical limits, and their movement repertoire. Skills are refined through instruction and individualized suggestions as to how the movement quality might be improved. The key to movement education was to wed this "discovery" element to the factors of movement as identified by Laban. Advocates of the system believe that the principles involved are applicable to generalized physical tasks in physical education and to dance movements, and that it has transfer potential to games as well (Stanley, 1977).

These three major "ethics"--nationalism (through the physical), biocentrism (of the physical), and egocentrism (for and through human movement)--identified as "trends" in physical education and sport have been fused, to a large degree, into contemporary school physical education. The following is a list of generally agreed-upon "objectives" for such programs:

1. Development of physical fitness and health
2. Enhancement of social development
3. Improved knowledge and skill level in sports and games
4. Development of leadership ability and enhanced ability to co-operate with others
5. Development of broad-based skills, particularly for leisure time beyond school years

Physical education programs based on the ethnocentric ethic (particularly the systems of Ling, Jahn, and Nachtegall) had a tremendous worldwide impact on the field as a whole. Significant elements of the "labor and defense" objectives remain a part of many programs, but contemporary curricula through the nations which were influenced by Western democratic countries in the 1800s and early 1900s reflect a strong emphasis on the egocentric ethic. The sport and game environment, based extensively on the virtues of effort, individual initiative, courage, and sportsmanship, and fired by the popularization of sport through the numerous well-publicized sports events, dominates the curriculum at the intermediate and secondary levels.

Also, a distinct shift has taken place in the North American way, a drifting away from the necessity to maintain the "work ethic" and toward a state in which entertainment and the use of leisure became key cultural factors. North Americans once worked with only peripheral regard for play. Today that ethic has been reversed to a significant degree. Such a reversal presents immense challenges to physical education and sport.

Democracy was and is a culmination of sorts of advances in previous centuries in personal, social, religious, and human freedoms, but there is much in democracy that implicitly promotes positivism. Positivism takes as its model the natural sciences (mechanical, physical, biological), using the physical/natural world to explain the social world. The paradigm shifts which began, developed, and entrenched positivist thought were liberating at the time: These "scientific" advances enabled people to see more, understand more, and become more conscious and reflective, and the advances did indeed contribute to reorganization in thought and action. But as positive as positivism was, ultimately, it is "thingifying." It treats humans as things to be structured, ordered, analyzed, explained, and modified. Even paradigm shifts or "trends" can be positivist if they continue to apply the natural model (mechanical, organismic, chemical, geological, embryological method and metaphor) to the social sciences, to humans, to people. Dilthey (1976) suggested that nature we can explain; humans we must understand.

Our present reality and the approaching twenty-first century almost require a kind of method or model which would overcome that kind of dualism (the separation of knowledge from values) that positivism purports and preaches. Up to 1800 all paradigms and methods have been positivist (Garfinkle, 1987, 1988). What we seek is a post-positivist, non-reductionist method in the sciences and in other areas where positivism has had far too determining and defining an influence. It seems to be a time for us to undertake the emancipation of ourselves from that which previously had been emancipating. Humans are constantly becoming; we must learn to delight in our human-ness. We are always a little beyond ourselves and a little behind ourselves and a little within ourselves, and this invites us to become self-conscious, to become the co-authors of our own conscientization (Freire, 1970).

Physical education currently is defined as the art and science of voluntary, purposeful, human movement. Its central concern is the individual engaging in selected motor performances and the significance of these experiences (Nixon, 1975; cited in Zeigler, 1979).

Aside from the connotations that accompany the words "art," "science," "voluntary," and "purposeful," the central concern is quite intriguing: The individual engaging in selected motor performances and the significance of these experiences. While in recent years there has been some variety in method and focus, by and large both the individual and his or her experience and its significance have been overlooked, and the emphasis in research, teaching, and program development has been on the "selected motor performance."

I see evidence of the "algoregm" (Garfinkle, 1987) or rule-following, unquestioning, "single-truth" mentality in physical education with our continuing fascination with measurement, standards, comparisons, and instrumentality (EKGs, EMGs, calipers, anthropometric paraphernalia, ergometers, etc.). I see the scientism/scientific method mentality exerting its enormous positivist influence in the type of research being carried out: performance and its analysis and improvement. The spectator-sport phenomenon has reached epidemic proportions. Professional athletes are exemplars, rightly or wrongly, and their lives are open books thanks to the insistence of a media and a populace that demands and expects information. Our loneliness and disconnectedness show in our need to know that which previously was private.

Competition and rivalry have become "paradigm sciences" in many ways in physical education. Endeavor without achievement is considered a waste of time. The notion of a person as a creature tending toward machine-like perfection is an unfortunate yet attractive metaphor in athletics. The mechanistic orientation allows its participants to live in (eventually) an error-free ontology. For many this is comforting, secure, solid, something to hold onto in a world that is becoming less and less predictable and controllable. This is the empty, unintentional, irresponsible legacy left to us by positivism. However, because of the "frill" or "unnecessary" label attached to sport, games, leisure, physical education, or practically any bodily mode of being in the world, the physical education profession has been trying to become a positivist science. Its basic lack of pride in itself contributes to this desire to prove itself legitimate even though we are only looking at our bodies. This is reflected in the jargon we have produced to talk about ourselves, in the performance fetish we have with athletes and competitive endeavor, in the antiseptic model of health and wellness we present to our children to keep them in their tending toward perfection in physique and behavior. We do things to bodies. We do not do for the "joy of functioning" (Lorenz, 1983). Positivist metaphor has this cumulative passivity which does not really reflect the intentional, conscious, self-conscious participation in change.

I believe that it is changing, however. Our "is" in physical education looks promising. In spite of their dehumanizing, demeaning character, the violence and political un-neutrality being demonstrated in sport are indicative of contradictions screaming their way to the surface; the inclusion and consideration of "disabled" and other "special" people, while in many ways being stereotypical and condescending, is at least a step away from exclusion and continuing ignorance. The theories of Bloom (1982), Mazlow (1954), and Piaget (1952), among others, have offered consolidating models to help us "organize." We can applaud their progressiveness while acknowledging their limitations (which are mostly positivist in nature). The emphasis on health, fitness, and wellness, while obsessive and self-doubting in some cases, is an improvement over apathy towards hygiene, nutrition, and personal fitness; the movement and biofeedback trends in teaching, coaching, and training are examples of the human element in a larger systems theory approach. Playgrounds no longer resemble mini-stimulus-response experiments, but are being constructed with children rather than "the child's performance only" being considered. Organizations and institutions of sport, recreation, and physical education are encouraging and publishing research which talks about human qualities such as feeling, wondering, trying, risking, caring. We are not as embarrassed about being human as we have been.

Having devoted several paragraphs to where we are and how we got here, I should like, at this juncture, to discuss our "is" and what is happening here, before moving on to some sort of "ought" and how we might make our way there.

In the area of "teacher education" there remains, for me at least, a disturbing reality: Learning how to do does not necessarily mean learning how to help others learn how to do. Being "good at something" brings no assurance that we will therefore be "good at" teaching that something or teaching others how to teach it. Indeed, in many cases it is repetition of the way we were taught to do something. Teaching and learning can become paradigm dominated and entrenched in much the same way that scientific, philosophic, and socio-economic inquiry can. "Studying about something" sets up a similar "disturbing reality" in the messy area of "implementation of theory." Permit me to give a life experience example.

Recently I worked in a pre-service setting (I was teaching a course) with fourth- and fifty-year physical education students. One of the issues which received continuous, adamant attention was integration (i.e., integration of handicapped/"disabled" persons into the regular program of study in the schools). These students felt ill-prepared to work with "handicapped people"--children or adults--in instructional settings, even though they had taken the courses in adapted physical education, in psychology, in physiology, in kinesiology. They knew what the specific disabilities were and how they affected the body and the person, yet they did not know what to do with an actual child in an actual setting where the onus was on them to "teach." Reacting to crisis rather than responding to people was the usual scenario.

These students were not satisfied with the cause-and-effect, stimulus-response, fixed-ceiling approach to working with "physically challenged" individuals. The physiology of the condition made sense but did not translate into operational, instructional settings.

Permit me another example. Again (October, 1988) I worked with physical education teachers in an in-service capacity. We were looking at gymnastics as a school activity for primary, elementary, junior and senior high classes. Please understand, these were all working physical education teachers with between 5 and 15 years' experience in the field. These teachers had all received gymnastics training, i.e., their own acquisition of skills, and had also received instruction in "theory." In other words, they knew the activity themselves from the theoretical and participant perspectives, yet they felt unable to pass this activity on to or share it with the children and young people entrusted to them.

This problem is not activity or concept specific. The examples I presented were integration and gymnastics. They could just as easily have been administrative theory and basketball or, indeed, any area where an accumulation of facts and experiences remains untranslatable in the lived experience of teaching and learning.

How can it be that such a hole exists between this accumulated knowledge _about_ something and the ability to "put it into practice," to make it do-able for someone else? How can it be that such a hole exists between this accumulated skill and the ability to pass it on by means other than imitation or cloning?

This is the "disturbing reality" to which I spoke earlier, the legacy left to us by positivism: to mistrust that which empowers us. I call this reality "the praxis gap."

Praxis is a mercurial notion, but it has commanded enough attention of late so that at least a working explanation is somewhat possible. Put simply, "praxis" is the non-separation of theory and practice. Simple, perhaps; easy, no.

Aoki (1978) suggests that some of us feel that the inherent logic of "application" often found in education talk--the notion of "applying thought to practice"--should be made problematic, at least when reference is made to the world of people.

> For too long "thought" and "practice" have been set apart, an act which has tended to invite reified "thought" on one hand, and a theoretical utilitarian "practice" on the other. For too long, we have not been aware that second order thoughts were being "applied" to the first order social world of practice. (p. 17)

The notion of praxis provides a possibility of contextualizing "thought" and "practice," of assimilating or joining theory and application in some kind of dialogue.

Praxis also encourages and invites us not only to "change," as it were, our ideas about teaching, learning, and curriculum, but it also encourages and invites us to "change" our ideas about people, particularly people in the dialogical, pedagogical situation, which, I might add, is not only (or often) found in schools and classrooms.

Praxis is a conduct; it is a way of standing in the world not only as a teacher, but also as a person. Freire's (1971) comments are cogent here:

> You need, above all, to have faith in man, to believe in his possibility to create, to change things. You need to love. You must be convinced that the fundamental effort of education is the liberation of man, and never his domestication. You must be convinced that this liberation takes place to the extent that a man reflects upon himself, his relationship to the world in which, and with which, he lives. And that it takes place to the extent that, in conscientizing himself, he inserts himself in history as a subject. (pp. 53-57)

Praxis is also a notion which finds relation and context in the critical orientation to inquiry (Habermas, 1972; Aoki, 1978). A critical stance calls the person to live in the world in a more responsible, intentional, susceptible manner. For the critical theorist there can be no thought without an accompanying, consequential, embodying action, and there can be no action without reflection on it, without conscious involvement. Here, the criteria which make thought and action distinguishable also make them inseparable. There is a tension--it is necessary for creative dialogue--but there is no gratuitous violence, no butchering or sacrificing one for the other. Indeed, one cannot exist without the other; they are intertwined rather than opposing. Critical reflection leads to an understanding of what is beyond the person's ordinary view by making the familiar unfamiliar, by making the invisible visible. Such reflective activity allows liberation from the unconsciously held assumptions and intentions that lie buried and hidden. Critical reflection, though, is a reflection on a happening, an experience _after the fact_. There is action and reflection on it, which lead to more action, more reflection--what Ricoeur (1976) calls the endless circle of dialogue or the endless plurality of discourse. For too long people have been strangers to themselves; praxis--and non-positivist theory--offers an opportunity to discover a harmony of self, a dialogical, becoming self, a self which can change itself as it enacts upon and interacts with its reality.

> There is no such thing as a _neutral_ educational process. Education either functions as an instrument which is used to facilitate the integration of the younger generation into the logic of the present system and bring about conformity to it, _or_ it becomes the practice of freedom, the means by which men and women deal critically and creatively with reality and discover how to participate in the transformation of their world. (Schaull, 1968, p. 15)

Praxis suggests a diffusion rather than a dissolution of thought and action. It seems almost a disturbingly self-evident manner of conducting one's self in the teaching-learning situation, yet it remains elusive and still somewhat enigmatic. We cannot intellectualize about praxis in an effort to come to know it fully before we "get our feet wet"; we have to experience it, do it, become a co-creator with it--a far cry from the predictable, safe, "means-end stimulus-response" orientation to which we have grown accustomed. It is time to move--surely a motto for a physical education person and profession.

If this notion of praxis is to replace the disturbing reality which presently seemingly exists in physical education, several factors deserve consideration. I present these, not as a comprehensive "solution" to a "problem," but rather as one physical education practitioner's attempt at articulation in the name of hopefulness.

Body. We experience our lifeworlds as body-subjects, yet body remains an embarrassing entity for many humans and, indeed, for many within physical education. Why it should be that our corporeality and our carnality make us uncomfortable is a question which should stir the hearts of those of us who see doing (dancing) as a way of grounding in the world. Perhaps we feel guilty about the abandon and primordiality we claim as essential to our humanness and connectedness to Being (whatever we see or know this Being to be). Perhaps we are reluctant to explore the relation of our body-subject and our commitment to a conduct in our lifeworlds. The primacy of body needs to be appreciated, respected, considered, and reconsidered now more than ever in physical education (and in the lifeworld).

Language. A former professor of mine, Dr. Harry Garfinkle, once said that language is a cookie cutter, i.e., it shapes reality. Indeed. If language is treated in a casual, neutral fashion, it will remain the indoctrinating weapon that it is. How we say what we say is as significant as what we say. Word choice is just that: choice. It is our responsibility to examine language for metaphors and messages which thing-ify, reduce, mechanize, categorize, and control people, and not only what we read and hear, but also what we say and write. The post-structuralist era of scientific inquiry provides the opportunity to create new visions of ourselves and the world. We must, however, be vigilant in our commitment to keep children and young people in view. The success of these enterprises requires the involvement of those Hutcheon (1988) calls the "ex-centrics," the formerly silenced or marginalized. Bain (1990) suggests that an important contribution of criticism and deconstruction is that they identify the distortions resulting from the silencing of the disenfranchised and thereby create a space where they can be heard (p. 6).

> Concerns relating to epistemology, power relationships, root metaphors, politics of schooling, and other factors that interplay to construct that phenomenon we know as "science education" need to be examined and exposed so that participants have a clearer view of their situation. (Jacknicke & Rowell, 1984, p. 17)

Although Jacknicke and Rowell (1984) have directed their concerns to "science education," "physical education" (or math education or vocational education or language education) could just as easily have been fitted into that slot. Whenever we have the privilege of using language, we have the accompanying responsibility of noticing it.

Research. The dominant model in physical education is quantitative and positivist. As mentioned earlier, physical education seems to want to become a "science," and so has embraced the "normal science" strategies, methods, and lenses. Kuhn (1962) asserted that science was marked not by linear progression and continuous accumulation of knowledge, but by scientific revolutions in which a dominant paradigm is challenged and replaced by a new paradigm. Needless to say, Kuhn's work has been criticized, but it served to illustrate that the rules of research are historically bound (Bain, 1990, p. 3). As Cherryholmes (1988) points out, "Policing some methodological rules to the exclusion of other sets of rules is a political as well as a scientific activity" (p. 182), or, put another way, the question is not what knowledge, but whose knowledge, counts (Bain, pp. 3-4).

> Knowledge about sport and physical education is not some autonomous body of facts that is passed on through the generations. It is a socially constructed phenomenon that is contoured by historical situations and struggles among dominant and subordinate groups (Sparks, 1985). It is also a resource that can be used to legitimize and delegitimize the interests of powerful people. (McKay, Gore, & Kirk, 1990, p. 62)

McKay et al. go on to suggest that the body is seldom portrayed as a pleasurable site for ecstatic, aesthetic, vertiginous, autotelic, sensuous, and holistic experiences (p. 60).

> It is depicted as a mechanical object that must be managed, maintained, conditioned, tuned, and repaired for instrumental reasons such as improving linear performance or increasing one's physical attractiveness (Broekhoff, 1972; Norton, 1986). Here we have illustration of what Linn (1985) calls the technicist inversion of digital culture--treating machines as people and people as machines. Collectively, these body probers (sport scientists) and body managers (technocratic physical educators) have produced knowledge about the body, sport, physical education, recreation, performance, and health for their students that personifies what Manning and Fabrega (1973) call impersonal medicine. (p. 60)

I believe that it would be a misrepresentation if McKay et al.'s (1990) and others' comments were construed as "science smashing" or a call to get rid of technology. Science and technology are not inherently evil, oppressive, and life-ending; they have been and still have the potential to be critical of agendas, of research methods, of the efficacy of efficiency. We are called to be mindful of the children and young people in front of and around us, and of the brothers and sisters with whom we share this world. We are called to be vigilant, reflective, sensitive, pedagogic, and responsible as we construct our human science questions, methods, and conduct. McKay et al. suggest that we cannot

> live without scientific rationality and technology, but we can minimize scientism, demystify the logic of technocratic fixes, privilege value over instrumental rationality, prefer substantive over formal rationality, and sustain sciences and technologies that are holistic, human centered, and democratically organized (Barger-Lux & Heaney, 1986; Brubaker, 1984; Rothschild, 1983; Winnier, 1977). As Berger (1976, p. 24) reminds us, "In science as in love a concentration on technique is quite likely to lead to impotence." (p. 67)

Bain (1990) proposes that the

> new era in scientific thinking that has been labeled postmodernism or poststructuralism or deconstruction gives us new visions, new ways of seeing ourselves and the world. At the heart of this new era is a questioning of the basic assumptions of positivist science: neutrality, objectivity, and observable facts. Lather (1989) summarizes the critique:
>
> > Facts are not given but constructed by the questions we ask of events. All researchers construct their object of inquiry out of the materials their culture provides, and values play a central role in this linguistically, ideologically, and historically embedded project that we call science. (p. 5)
>
> (p. 3)

Bain (1990) suggests that the poststructural era has not resulted in an abandonment of science, but in its redefinition. She claims that at least three alternative paradigms have emerged: (1) post-positivism, which is a search for "warranted assertions" rather than "truth" (Phillips, 1989). Objectivity is viewed not as an attainable reality, but as a regulative ideal in which one's work withstands critique by peers. The practice of science remains much the same, but its limitations are recognized and acknowledged; (2) interpretive-hermeneutic, which focuses on understanding the meaning of human behavior within a particular social and historical context; and (3) critical theory, which views research as inherently political and inescapably tied to issues of power and legitimacy.

> Physical educators' earliest contacts with poststructuralism were primarily through reading and coursework in history, philosophy, and sociology. A relatively small number had doctoral training in those areas and some, but not all of them, pursued interpretive or critical inquiry. As the field of education began to give greater attention to poststructuralism, specialists in physical education pedagogy began to study alternative paradigms and research methods. However, there has been little cross-influence between these two groups of physical educators, the social scientists and the pedagogical researchers. (Bain, 1989, p. 7)

> There are several areas within kinesiology and physical education in which poststructural inquiry is being done. There is a solid tradition of hermeneutic or interpretive research in sport history (Park, 1986). Phenomenological research is also not new in kinesiology and physical education, but it is less well established. A few dissertations have employed phenomenological methods but there is relatively little published work. (Bain, 1990, p.)

I am delighted that there is a commitment to "body-work" from a phenomenologically informed research stance in such projects as Somatics, The Study Project in the Phenomenology of the Body, Johnson's Body (1983), Sensory Awareness Foundation Bulletin, to name but a few. I am saddened to have to agree with Bain (1990) that the bulk of phenomenologically informed "body work" is being done outside physical education.

> The early work in sport sociology was dominated by the positivist paradigm, but more recently some sport sociologists have analyzed sport from a critical theory perspective (Gruneau, 1983) and conducted interpretive research (Harris, 1981, 1983a; Sage, 1987). Martens (1987) recently argued for the importance of experiential knowledge and interpretive research in sport psychology. Within physical education pedagogy, interpretive research is expanding rapidly, and critical research is beginning to emerge (Bain, 1989; Bain & Jewett, 1987; Locke, 1989).

> If we want to create a new world, we must have new ways of seeing the world. We must have new visions and new voices. What inquiry in the poststructural world involves is not a

> quest for certainty but a celebration of ambiguity and competing discourses (Lather, 1989). The dialogue has entered our field; let the celebration begin! (Bain, 1990, p. 9)

Diefenbeck (1984) suggests that a celebration is an activity that stands for another activity, that holds it up for examination, for illumination, for delight (p. 243). Diefenbeck further states that reflective philosophy is a celebration: It proceeds by way of revelation, as well as by way of argument (p. 243).

> Arguments can point to the strains and contradiction stirring within a position, they can even intimate new conceptions, but only a radical leap of thought beyond its [a mind's] habitual boundaries--when, in exultation, it throws off the yoke of custom--can lead it to a new philosophical commitment. Like faith, it is a self-initiated movement of the knowing mind as it reaches out to expand itself beyond its present dimensions. Reflective faith is that act of thoughtful self-trust by which we move beyond ourselves. (p. 243)

Traditional reason attempts to discover reality by asking, "What exists?" But reflective thought has begun to see that a more fundamental question is, "In what shapes do we wish to create our worlds?" This "subjective" point of view does not deny that an objective world exists, nor that the world can be partially described by laws; but it does challenge the belief that these "facts" are final and beyond question and that their apprehension is the essence of rational knowledge. Diefenbeck (1984) claims that reflective thought accepts the Kantian insight of the primacy of the subject's initiative autonomy, but it turns the tables of knowledge by beginning not with an objective or passive conception of reason anchored to the static, but with subjective activity, and then seeks to develop a conception of knowledge which emerges from this very activity itself in its unrestricted spontaneity (p. 241). Diefenbeck proclaims, "I celebrate the subject-action incarnate, creating itself and the world" (p. xv).

Strasser (1985) also has some thoughts on the personal, the subjective, as he addresses himself to the humanity of the human sciences. Strasser claims that the implicit telos of the human sciences is to enhance humanity. Thus, they are not the instruments of technocrats; they are, rather, destined to limit the "kratos" of the technocrats in a beneficial fashion (p. 181). Strasser insists that a scholar who disregards human freedom, dignity, or fundamental rights in order to attain a definite technical, economic, or political goal cannot be considered a representative of a human science. Strasser concedes that this is a normative statement on his part, but he adds that if people were to become indifferent to the value of freedom, dignity, and human rights, they would factually cease to be human (p. 182).

Strasser (1985) identifies unselfishness as a distinguishing feature of human science. Many researchers and practitioners are normally interested in discretion, equity, public health, and so forth. In contributing to these achievements, the practitioners contribute to their own protection, safety, and well-being. Economists might well approve of this utilitarian line of conduct; Kant (1983) might consider these merely as "advices of prudence." Strasser states unequivocally,

> In actuality, the moral necessity of sacrificing in some situations one's own safety, well-being, and health in favor of others cannot be demonstrated scientifically. This necessity originates from my personal moral decision only. No community of researchers or practitioners can make such a decision in my stead. (p. 182)

At its best, human science and human science research are responsible and unselfish. The means the practitioners of human science placed at the disposal of humankind do not have the same character as technical tools, since some, indeed, many, of them even have the immanent tendency to render themselves dispensable. Such is the basis for a praxis of empowerment.

In the push for status and legitimation, physical education risks losing that which makes it what it is: a body-, movement-, self-centered study. Recent research has, at least, brought us back face to face with ourselves to ask some fundamental, disturbing questions: What is the relation of our child-ness to our human-ness? What is play that we should fear its influence and messages so much? Are we afraid to respect and wonder at our bodies, or have we become strangers in our own skins? What are our attitudes about achievement and effort? And so on.

Bertola (1986; cited in Grundy, 1984), Best (1983), and Measor (1984) are among those practitioners who conduct research which takes children and young people seriously. Their work also describes school experiences which demonstrate the existence of various, yet simultaneous, agendas. The experiences also demonstrate how different people in the situations see the same situation in different ways (perception and perspective).

The fact that Bertola (1986; cited in Grundy, 1984), Best (1983), and Measor (1984) recognize and acknowledge children as significant entities in the school is encouraging. The absence of children from research in schooling is troubling, but it makes a statement on their status. Now that they are finally being given a voice, we cannot hope to "figure them out" in a short period of time. Our virtual ignorance of them for so long compels us to listen long and hard to what they have to teach us about themselves and ourselves, but we cannot make "figuring them out" into an educational or research "objective." In spite of our "good intentions," we have to be vigilant about and sensitive to the dangers and abuses to which children can be exposed in our zealousness to make up for lost time and understand them better.

I would suggest more qualitative, phenomenological, critical inquiry into lived experiences in physical education and education in general. Our what and who are as significant as our why and how, and "seeing" in a new way or from a different perspective is a challenge for both quantitative and qualitative advocates to be more interactive and open-minded.

Teachers. What is called for is a reconsideration of who and what a teacher is: In many situations a teacher is no more than a dispenser of knowledge; a teacher, convinced of her/his wisdom, which she/he considers absolute, gives classes to pupils, passive and docile, whose ignorance she/he also considers absolute (Freire, 1971). It is time to shake off the mantle of positivism and speak and think in different ways about teaching, about pedagogy. Pedagogy is not found in philosophy, but like love or friendship, it is to be found in the experience of its presence, that is, in concrete, real-life situations. It is there, where and when an adult (or a teacher or a person) does something right in the personal becoming of a child (or a learner or another person) (van Manen, 1981). Further to this, van Manen suggests that pedagogy is not something to be "had," "possessed" in the way that a person "has" or "possesses" a set of specific skills or performative competencies. Rather, pedagogy is something that a pedagogue continuously must redeem, retrieve, regain, or recapture in the sense of recalling. Teaching as a pedagogic act is called into being through the learning of the student. Pedagogy calls the teacher to be an experienced, caring guide who leads children through rich fields of learning experiences (Mueller, 1981).

> The pedagogical relationship calls into being the teacher and the student, but this mode of being as teacher and as student is not self-sufficient. It is not just two people being for each other, but it is two people being with each other for a purpose. This purpose, simply put, is to allow the student to safely grow into a larger,more complex world, a world of which the teacher has some knowledge that he endeavors to offer the student. (Mueller, p. 7)

Teaching, then, is more than depositing information; it is enabling learners to see reality more clearly, it is empowering learners with a love of and a responsibility for learning. It is not one thing, one feeling, one act; it is as complex as the people involved in it and the realities co-authored with it.

Learners. Are we willing to maintain the concept of the "acted-upon" learner? Certainly, in an adult-child teaching-learning situation, a child or young person is often seen as someone we do things to, rather than someone we do things with and learn things from. Pedagogically, a child or young person or learner needs to be seen not as something to be filled, but as someone to be travelled with (Mueller, 1981).

> Teaching-learning occurs for both partners, the guide and the guided, as a unitary experience, and, in fact, often the guide and the guided exchange places or explore learning experiences together. The artificial boundaries between teacher and learner become blurred in these moments, and we see how interrelated and interdependent teacher and learner are. (p. 4)

Freire (1971) suggests that teaching-and-learning is a live and creative dialogue in which everyone knows some things and does not know others, in which all seek, together, to know more. This is why we, as "coordinators" of this dialogue, must be humble, so that we can grow with the group, instead of losing our humility and claiming to direct the group, once it is animated.

Curriculum. Among the educators who called for the need for probing into the deep structure underlying curriculum research thought are two, Beittel (1973) and Eisner (1974), grounded in art education. These gentlemen, among others, seriously question the underlying presuppositions of the dominant tradition in curriculum conceptions and research, calling for close examination of curriculum orientations at the root level (Aoki, 1978). In Alternatives for Art Education Research, Beittel (1973) urged the uncovering of "the root metaphors in art education" (p. 5), and in Conflicting Conceptions of Curriculum, Eisner (1974) asked for surfacing "conceptual underpinnings" and "the goals and assumptions . . . of major orientations to curriculum" (p. 2). In like fashion, curriculum generalists ("reconceptualists") such as MacDonald (1975) have begun to press for recognition of the deep-level value and intent base of underlying curriculum perspectives. Another curriculum theorist, Apple (1975), is concerned with the assumptions that educators bring to their curriculum work. He has called upon curriculum researchers to become aware of the latent dilemmas involved in the modes of discourse they employ, discourse that tends to obscure fundamental human interests.

It is generally acknowledged that the term "hidden curriculum" was first coined and elaborated in Jackson's (1968) celebrated study, Life in Classrooms. Jackson was concerned with capturing something of the everydayness of classroom life and those features that are less obvious and rarely seen by visitors but are well known (if not always fully articulated) by the teachers and children/young people who spend significant portions of their lives in classrooms.

The perceptions we are attempting to become aware of have to do with the implicit and explicit curricula, the point being that children and young people in schools have to contend with many experiences and many messages and have to make some sense out of it all. Several layers of experience and message have been offered by a number of researchers. Jackson (1968) suggested that the day-to-day routines of classroom life communicate particular values to students. He identified three "facts of classroom life" that pupils learn, more or less effectively, to cope with, which he termed "crowds," "praise," and "power."

In a more recent study, Turner (1983) has suggested that examinations have a hidden curriculum of their own that affects pupils' work strategies and the nature of teacher-pupil interaction. Teachers, apparently, use exams to ensure control and promote conformity; students use them to develop study and political strategies in an adversarial context.

Apple (1979), Freire (1971), and others have pointed to how a doctrine of conformity can be extremely political and manipulated in its intent and ability to convey a particular set of social values and practices.

Bain (1975, 1976) conducted one of the earliest studies which examined hidden curriculum in physical education. The purpose of her research was to describe the patterns and regularities of behavior in physical education classes that appeared to communicate values and attitudes to pupils. She proposed that a range of values relating to achievements, autonomy, orderliness, privacy, specificity, and universalism were evident in teacher-pupil interactions, and further, that these were influenced by gender, urban or suburban locale, and ability in sport and physical education.

While Bain (1985) recently described her early research as naive, she suggests that more recent studies of the hidden curriculum in physical education have, however, begun to recognize that the hidden messages communicated to children/young people in schools are best approached through cultural analysis and the meanings individuals and groups attach to their experiences.

More studies are using some form of "human science methodology" and are investigating such areas as pupils' views of personal conflict in basketball (Tindall, 1975); contradictory teacher-sponsored and pupil-imposed curricula in a physical education as conformist, humiliating, and fragmented (Kollen, 1983); and differential pupil perceptions of gymnastics based on gender (Griffin, 1983).

Dodds (1985) suggests that four "levels" of curriculum operate simultaneously within any physical education program in schools. She describes these as explicit (official curriculum), covert (unspoken, non-public agendas), null (that which is left out or absent), and hidden (reflexive actions or messages). Dodds suggests that each of these levels of curriculum will be in operation in every physical education lesson, although some may exert a more prominent influence than others at any given time. Taken together, these various levels constitute the functional curriculum, the full, dynamic display from which children/young people learn and, we would presume, perceive. It is important that we do not commit the error of seeing the functional curriculum as in some way an aggregate of these four levels. Indeed, these levels interact in a way that does not simply add on one source of learning to another, but rather distorts, contradicts, or reinforces the messages that get through to pupils from teachers (Kirk, 1988, p. 135).

Most educators acknowledge the presence and power of hidden curriculum. The fact that we "use" it (even as it uses us) is evidence enough that we realize our spoken messages are not enough. Sadly, though, in our recognition of our lack of "transmission expertise" we have not often recognized that it is transmission in which we are engaged, rather than mutuality of discourse and message.

Physical education has long been on a mission to prove itself as a "real" school subject: McCloy began, in the 1920s and 1930s, with his push for a physiological, "scientific" basis for physical education, and since then much effort and documentation have been invested to make physical education look like other subjects. This includes embracing "domain theory," using behaviorist, reductionist teaching and coaching methodologies, introducing examinations, weeding out "non-useful" activities, and promoting "values" that contribute to and perpetuate the structural functionalist tradition. We have categorized, compartmentalized, tested, and legitimized just like the other school subjects, and we have used hidden curriculum in much the same manipulative, unilateral fashion. The assumption has been that we have much to give to children, and they are going to get it through whatever implicit or explicit means we have to use. ("It's for their own good and the good of society.")

In the past ten years research in physical education has been taking a more critical look at what physical education is and what it stands for. Arnold (1979) warns that compartmentalizing the physical education curriculum may make for easier administration and program construction, but it leads at best to a misrepresentation of the reality of what participation in physical activities actually entails, and at worst to the redundancy and irrelevance of "theory" in relation to "practical activity" or to a reification of "motor skills over intelligent performance." While I have problems with Arnold's separation of theory and practice, I would agree that his point is well taken.

Kirk (1988) suggests that it is this problem of misrepresentation of the realities of participation in physical activities that has been responsible for the difficulties physical education has encountered in gaining acceptance as an educational activity. According to Kirk, educational theorists and policy makers have consistently underplayed, dismissed, or misunderstood the cognitive demands of physical activities and the cultural significance of organized physical activities such as sport and dance. Moreover, Kirk suggests, physical educators have sometimes lacked the confidence and expertise to press this case (p. 78).

Kirk emphasizes, though, that it is important to point out in this respect that physical activity does not lead to cognitive development; i.e., it does not have to justify itself on the basis of what it can do for other subjects. Rather, it demands conceptual awareness, knowledge, and understanding as a necessary (though not sufficient) part of successful engagement and participation (p. 79).

Writers such as Arnold (1979) and Reddiford (1983) have argued conceptually that physical activity is important in terms of the most fundamental matters of the development of individual identity and subjective reality, and complex forms of social communication and expression. On the other hand, while there is scant empirical evidence to show directly the values people place on organized physical activity, the levels of participation by individuals in recreational pursuits such as aerobics, walking, games, and so on suggests that non-sporting physical activity is highly valued by many people in society. Given the prominence of this broad range of physical activities in the lives of so many people, this may be sufficient grounds in itself to argue that these activities ought to be experienced by children as part of the educational process in schools (Kirk, 1988, pp. 79-80).

The status of physical education is an issue that physical educators have wrestled with for a considerable period of time. Our concerns are legitimate. Drawing on data from a study of kindergarten children, Apple and King (1979) present evidence that suggests that even from the earliest days of schooling, children are encouraged to learn that work-like activities are more important than play-like activities, and that they come to school to work, not to play. Work is supposed to be the main activity that schools foster, because it is "serious" and "productive." Play, on the other hand, is considered to be "fun," but essentially trivial and superfluous (Kirk, McKay, & George, 1986). This distinction, as Proctor (1984) acknowledges, has had significant implications for physical education since the subject has traditionally been associated with play-like activities.

Kirk (1988) suggests that while examinations adopted in physical education may have improved the timetable allocation for physical education, it has also led to a reduction and devaluing of physical activity. This, in the end, may be a backward step because it suggests that physical education cannot provide an educational medium for students unless it is an academic pursuit. Kirk further suggests that becoming academic does not prove a subject to be "educational" any more than it proves physical education or physical activities to be non-educational (p. 67).

It would seem that the foregoing theorists have identified crises in curriculum research as being related to the dominance of the traditional (positivist) orientation to research, what Freire (1970) has termed a "limit-situation" within which many curriculum researchers seem trapped.

> What seems to be needed in curriculum inquiry, therefore, is general recognition of the epistemological limit-situation in which current curriculum research is encased, i.e., a critical awareness that conventional research has not only a limiting effect, but also to some degree, a distorting effect on new possibilities in curriculum research. Accordingly, we need to seek out new orientations that allow us to free ourselves of the tunnel vision effect of mono-dimensionality. (Aoki, 1978, p. 4)

If curriculum is to be transformed into the transforming landscape it can be, we need to shed our "Tylerian" (1949), positivist, means-ends baggage and take on a more critical approach as posited by Aoki (1978), which involves everyone concerned: teachers, learners, children, parents, researchers, program designers; in short, anyone who touches or is touched by curriculum.

While I applaud Kirk's and other practitioners' intentions, I am cautious about the assumption that because adults in society value something, it is therefore proper material for children. It may well be proper and valuable for children, but they should be consulted. We have to guard against doing things only to and for and remind ourselves about doing things with.

Situated pedagogy. This is a notion of Freire's (1968) that speaks volumes. Basically, it is a call to return to the lived experience and notice, in a more thoughtful way, what is happening there. It is a call for immersion rather than dispassionate observation and commentary. If we might return to my gymnastics example given early on in this discussion, we could practice situated pedagogy by working and consulting with learners in a lived experience, e.g., doing gymnastics. We might begin to notice more about what the "skill" we are trying to teach is rather than how it looks. We might try some doing ourselves, but always with a mind toward noticing. What makes this a roll and that a handstand? How are they different? How can I arrange an environment or a question so that a learner can feel the differences? Or, indeed, feel the move or aspects of the move? In the example of integration, surely talking with a person with a disability about her condition, her wants, her body is as important as reading about it. The first contact should not be in a classroom, but neither should it be an artificially constructed encounter where two learners, e.g., the pre-service teacher and the "disabled person," are placed in opposition to one another and where the controls are already in place. In this situation the "teacher" is actually learning from the person with a disability, but the illusion is that the "teacher" is doing something to the "disabled" individual. Situatedness is not only a location concept; it is more than using a bank to teach banking or using a farm to teach farming, and so on: It is a state of being. It involves empathy. It involves bringing implicit knowledge into explicit expression. It requires consideration of a dreaded cliche: relevancy. How significant is it to speak of muscle tension in the handstand position when a learner has no idea about how to tighten his muscles in any position? How significant is it to discuss biomechanical concepts of action-reaction, rotation, and centrifugal force in a classroom on a frame-by-frame diagram if it does not translate into recognizing these forces at work in a handspring and expressing them in language that is real to the teacher and learner? If we want to study movement principles, we have to watch and notice people moving, ourselves included.

Situated pedagogy also means grounding learning in objects/happenings which are meaningful and empowering for children and young people and for the teachers who are learning with them. The more I talk with and listen to children, students, learners, and teachers, the more I realize that material that has little or no meaning for a person is not really "known" by a person. Why should it be? Yet memorization and regurgitation seem to be the standard study skills being developed in many educational settings. Apparently, these skills "work" until evaluation time, but they do not allow a learner to develop any kind of relation with the subject matter other than mastery for the moment. It seems to me that cerebral palsy, the condition, would be more meaningful for a future physical educator concerned about integration if a face, a person, a personality were attached. Still, developing relationships is risky business. In much the same way, applying force over time and distance becomes more meaningful when a child or a learner we know is swinging the bat--but this entails investment of a more "permanent" nature. Again, principles of rotation become more meaningful when we are able to work with a learner until he or she develops an "owning-belonging to" relationship with that cartwheel. And so on.

As long as we remain separated from theory, from action, from learners, we remain separated from teaching, from pedagogy, from praxis. Without meaningfulness, experiences do not penetrate, and we remain untouched. Susceptibility and noticing are qualities which are expected in teachers but which are not really nurtured. I would recommend that more attention be paid to them. It probably means changing some attitudes and removing some barriers and making boundaries more negotiable. It probably means more humility, more elasticity, and more responsibility for teacher educators, but I believe that the alternative is apathy. Personally, I am on the side of hopefulness.

Do-say-see-express. How does a teacher engender that kind of learning that encourages children and young people to "move" in the primal sense? that allows them access to hidden agendas and empowers them so that they can do something about those agendas?

Does physical education have a place in this conscientization which overcomes the enconscientization that has already been done? I believe that it does. I believe that physical education can help us question the positivistic and ethnocentric norms which "define" us, which tell us our (from whatever authority or paradigm) "nature." I believe that physical education can help us ask, Is this our "nature"? or What is "this," and where did it come from? How did it get here? I believe that one of the contributions that physical education can make to the larger system of pedagogy is that of re-acquainting people with their bodies--more importantly, with their doing bodies. I believe that we must first take steps to repair our fragmented profession, to become less "efficient" and more grounded in lived experience.

Presently, we have many people observing many things (or sections of things) making isolated discoveries and never sharing them with each other. There is almost no discourse; there is only publication, and then we do not easily understand each other's words.

Children's realities are subsumed by adults' realities. Dialogue is difficult: We do not speak the same language anymore, if we ever did. We have developed so many ways of doing things for children and to children that we have forgotten what it is like to be with children. Our curriculum still embodies positivist ideals: achievement at all costs, narrow focus, success as the only valued outcome, and, above all, application of scientific (usually "value neutral") principles and laws to human beings.

As long as we use mechanistic and organismic metaphors,we remain "determined" and limited in an invariant sense. If we follow the metaphor of the organism, the organism eventually dies. If we have a model of regeneration, of conscious intentional effort, we can enable a civilization, a culture, a person, to re-create, to co-create. Supposedly, our intention in physical education is the study of the body, of human motor performance and the effect it has on the person experiencing it. Ironically, the obsession with the study of the body of the developing child, of the moving, behaving person, has contributed to the detachment from the body, the child, and the person. Because of the fascination with "the study of," the object of study has been neglected.

How do we learn to listen to what our bodies have to say? Why are we still talking about the body one has instead of the body one is? Why do we need "scientific research" to convince us we are whole? Have we lost the ability to listen to ourselves, or do we believe that there is nothing our "selves" have to say? How do we learn to trust ourselves and like ourselves and care about ourselves?

In our field, Fetters (1978), in an article in Quest, provides an excellent summary of this perspective:

> If man [sic] is to live life as a "creative enterprise" he must begin to communicate with himself, to enter into open dialogue with himself. He must trust his own experience and what his experience is revealing to him. He must face the realization that social reality is a human construction and that the myths, the pervasive stories, images and symbols of his culture have structured much of his experience. He must have the courage to confront the deep sense of abandonment that comes with momentarily suspending and questioning those cultural myths, so

> that he might be responsively open to alternate ways of being in the world. (p. 44)

I have several notions which I have been developing over a period of time:

Let us ask children and young people about what they are doing and what is being done to them.

Let us return to our doing bodies (body-subject) and be taught by them.

Let us talk about what we experienced in doing.

Let us allow the doing and discourse to induce a "seeing" (and "hearing" and "feeling") of Being.

Let us express that relation (relation-to-Being) in whatever way our body-subject "moves" us.

Let us do some more. I do, and I understand myself and others.

Let us listen to what the body (body-subject) says.


Expressing
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understanding
dialogue
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transforming
self & reality
trust self
(thoughtfulness)
share understanding(s)
new understanding
action-thought
trust others
(appreciating)
trust doing
(responsibility)
thought-action
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The "dance" begins with a doing. I would recommend an intentional doing of something difficult. I make this recommendation based upon several years of dialogue with children and young people (my dissertation research) and with other doers, and upon the research of Waller (1987), Altercations of Consciousness in Sports Peak Performance; Devine (1984), The Workout: The Phenomenology of Training; Lorenz (1983), The Waning of Humaneness; Zuckerman (1983), Biological Bases of Sensation Seeking, Impulsivity, and Anxiety; Shapiro (1985), Bodily Reflective Modes; Levin (1985), The Body's Recollection of Being; Gendlin (1978), Focusing; and a supporting cast of Buytendijk (1950), Merleau-Ponty (1964), Sartre (1956), van den Berg (1972), Zaner (1971), and many others.

This doing should take place with the understanding that there will be a recurring discussion over a period of weeks or months with others involved in similar doings.

Following the doing, the saying should happen. Individual journaling is also recommended, where possible. We can begin by sharing in twos or threes but eventually expanding into the cultural circle/fellowship notion of Freire (1971). This dialogue allows for articulation of experience, reflection, languaging, expressing. Doing is a common ground. We find relation with others who are "digging deeply." The difficulty allows us to work with that which resists and demands--something hidden and as yet undisclosed. The dialogue assists in bringing the implicit to expression; there is an opportunity to appreciate alternate realities; there is the opportunity for tolerance, patience, self-honesty, perseverance, respect (self- and others), and trust (self- and others).

The doing and "saying about it" leads to a "seeing" (a saying-seeing cycle a la Ricoeur, 1976)--a new way of looking at or thinking about possibly new language, the participation in our own transformation, our own becoming conscious and self-conscious.

This instigates expressing, then further doing. And so on.

It has been my experience during my research that participation in strenuous, difficult activity enables a receptivity, a susceptibility. We experience more than we realize in a doing. That is why saying, seeing, and expressing are also important.

I believe that this sort of encounter, over a period of time, could impart much of the groundwork necessary for "humanization-thinking." I believe that this kind of experience can engender a caring mentality and a praxis which has integrity, unselfishness, and an unshakable faith in the ability of people to conscientize themselves and discover, co-create, and re-create their dance with Being.

After-Words

Reflection. My friend Jane--also doing doctoral work, also committed to children and young people--once suggested to me that we (not only she and I in particular, but people doing research in general) do our research on our childhood. My earliest memories are memories of moving--crawling, actually, in, over, around, and through places and things that were too big for me. Jane remembers being "the fat kid" and feeling "different." I was also "the fat kid" (by the time I was seven), but differentness is not what stands out for me. Hard work and doing are what stand out for me. I believe that there may be a lot of truth in what Jane says--at least for Jane and me. Jane is doing her work on the notion of differentness, particularly within a multicultural context. I am doing my work on difficulty.

I include this anecdote about Jane's and my own research origins because I believe that it is representative of the way this reflection will unfold. I am aware that there are a number of things I want to say, and I am not sure why their voices are speaking now, but I feel an urgency and a properness that are uncanny.

This reflection will be a kaleidoscope of lived experiences which will, quite possibly, embody much of what this dissertation stands for: difficulty in physical activity. This voice of difficulty has been such a constant companion for the past number of years that it is no surprise that it wants to be heard here, too. I am not at all sure how these experiences fit or will fit together, but I have been "following my heart" for so long with this project that I probably should continue.

I should speak first to the only "regrets" I have. I mentioned in the body of the work how one of the gymnasts, Carmen, stopped coming to gymnastics. Carmen was passionate about doing, but she had no "bearings." She knew what she knew and had no idea what was "next." She wanted to keep doing, but she had no place or direction to turn, at least as far as she was concerned. Carmen returned at the end of the season to participate in a display for the Children's Festival, but I cannot help feeling that Carmen was poorly served by us (physical education), that I, we, should have been able to help her get her bearings.

The other regret has a different character to it. In order for me to do this project in the manner in which the voice of the notion and children and young people were directing me, it was necessary for me to "leave" the physical education department where I began my program. I suppose there is no way to "leave" without causing someone some pain, but I wish there had been some way to lessen the hurt felt by the woman who was my supervisor for the early part of my program.

I had felt a great affinity with phenomenological work for a number of years, but I felt the absolute carnality of it in the writing of the Experience of Living with an Absent Child in the context of Dr. Max van Manen's course in pedagogical theorizing. Not only did I re-establish a ground under my feet, but I also "found" my child.

I remember my supervisor, Dr. Larry Beauchamp, as angry as I have ever seen him, "telling" me that no degree was worth my dignity. Larry did not (does not) "tell" me very much or very often. It is not his way. But he "told" me about my dignity in no uncertain terms. Larry has the eyes and the discernment that look right into my heart and ask me not only what do I stand for, but am I living it? If my work has any authenticity and rigor about it, it is in large measure due to the regaining of myself under the pedagogic gaze of a sensitive supervisor (person) who really cares.

During the course of this research project, the wonderful man with whom I share my life and I decided to get married. He and I also realized that, if it is God's will, we would like to have a child. These may sound like "typical" man-woman decisions, but they were profound and terrifying for me, and I continue to be humbled and amazed.

In December, 1989, I felt some of the worst pain of my whole life experience. Pain is not and has not ever been a deterrent in any of my doing. I usually had it, and I always worked with it. This time, however, dysfunction accompanied the pain, and I was as afraid as I have ever been. Fortunately, I was led to an extremely sensitive and competent chiropractor, and I am happy to say that the dysfunction and the pain are gone. I should mention, though, that it was terribly traumatic for me to give my pain over to the hands of my chiropractor, and I am still coming to terms with my relationship with pain.

Since the very beginnings of this project, the notion of "voice" has been persistent and insistent. I can say now that I have been aware of this "voice" for most of my life. It is what called me to physical education and what led me to this relationship with doing and difficulty. I am delighted by the resounding presence of dance, voice, melody, and rhythm in this work. I had no idea when I began that they would be there, but now that they are, it seems so "natural" that they would be.

I have to say, too, that I do have a conscious contact with a Higher Power whom I choose to call God, and I have felt particularly guided and nurtured throughout this project.

I should also say that for over two years I have not done any cooking (well, very little) or any dishes. My husband assured me that, while he could not write my dissertation, he could certainly fashion a "landscape" in which I could write. Frank embodies what human science stands for: integrity, unselfishness, and love.

Throughout this project, particularly the last two weeks of the writing, time has been a precious, fleeting thing. I made a decision early on in the project which was actually a life-decision: that I cannot separate my life from my craft. I kept training throughout this project and remained deeply embedded in all the "existentials" of my lifeworld: my marriage, my family, my teaching, my students, my friends. If I had removed myself from my training and my life, I believe that I would have forfeited the right to do this kind of work.

Finally, a personal breakthrough. For most of my life I have been afraid to cry. I am not sure why. Perhaps I am afraid that, once I start, there will be so much there to feel that I would never stop. Perhaps I thought of it as a weakness. All I know is that when I stop writing I am going to have a "good" cry, and for the first time in my life I know what that means. It may be that I have helped to bring forth the voice of this project, this notion, but it is most certainly the case that this project has "delivered" me.

When my knees "gave out" and I could no longer do all the things I formerly could do, I thought that my dancing days were over, but I was wrong. I am going to be dancing for a long time to come.

Birthrights

> HUNTER-GAULT: Finally tonight, as this holiday season draws to a close, essayist Roger Rosenblatt has some thoughts about human rights.
>
> ROGER ROSENBLATT: This holiday season has more than once raised the subject of human rights, about which all good folks

agree with a healthy nod.

Yet the subject of human rights is almost always discussed in terms of negatives, arising from emergencies. An atrocity committed in Chile, Turkey, or the Soviet Union. And one considers what human beings have the right not to endure at the hands of other human beings. The assertion of negatives, the crying of "No," lies at the heart of such organizations as Amnesty International, which cries "No" emphatically to the world's torturers, executioners, and false imprisoners.

To cry no with authority, however, requires some idea of what the yes is. What human rights means positively. And that in turn requires making a connection between human rights and being human. We would never fight those who tell us what we are not if we did not share some idea of who we are. Who are human beings then?

For one thing, we are visible. And therefore we have the human right to remain visible. You would think visibility is so fundamental to the species, to matter itself, that it can never be violated. Yet the Nazis did a fairly thorough job of making the Jews disappear. Stalin and Idi Amin sought to make their political enemies disappear. Americans in the worst moments of their history have sought to make blacks disappear. And still, people insist on their visibility. When bodies are destroyed, minds are visible. When minds are invisible, words remain. When words are erased, memory is substance. People are visible. And they have the right to remain visible.

Second, people are messy, and we therefore have the right to mess up our own lives. To create our own problems without outside interference. Under totalitarian regimes, you rarely get the chance to mess up your own life, because the government does that so efficiently. Messiness implies complementary rights. People have the right to be puzzled. Stupid. Ridiculous. They have the right to be wrong. More significantly, they have the right to figure out when they are wrong. And to strive toward their own rationality. Rationality is an anathema to tyrants, so tyrants will always work to keep it down.

Third, people are complex. And therefore we have the human right to our complexities. It has been said that evil was banal. But evil is also simplifying. Torture simplifies the human body. Reduces the body to less than it ought to be. Tyrants seek to simplify minds. Imaginations. Dreams. When tyrants see their own dreams threatened, they make their dreams the only dreams in town. But people have a right to their complexities, because their complexities can lead them to moral improvement. Again, tyrants oppose that evolution, preferring people to hate them rather than to love them, hatred being morally simplifying. But people have the right to evolve to a generosity. It is a complex right involving everything we are.

At face value, the world of human rights is a scarred and ugly world, characterized by chains, racks, electric shock devices, gates, bars and graveyards. In fact, it is a beautiful world, characterized by expressions of kindness and hope, especially in this season. By displays of people who refuse to be locked up, hushed up, or disappear, and who refuse to let others suffer the same outrages.

There is a fourth human condition and right. That of our basic and astonishing mystery. When we hand over partial control of our lives to governments, we do so with the understanding that our mystery will not be degraded, stunted or made to vanish. We want governments to celebrate our mystery. To treat us with the wonder we deserve. For that is how, in our very best times, times like these, we treat one another: with wonder and amazement. ("MacNeil-Lehrer News Hour," Dec. 30, 1987)

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Appendix

Conversation - Transformation - Description

Leslie 13, 4, 88

1

M. So, tell me what you've been doing for the past couple of weeks.

L. I think last time we talked I told you about my first practice.

M. uh huh.

L. we had another one after that, and everything went well. I've got it all back together again.

M. oh great, yeah.

L. yeah. I was catching flies again like I used to.

M. great.

L. it all came back. And, haven't had a ball since then 'cause of the snow, remember? There was lots.

M. uh huh.

L. and, what did I do. I went skiing on the weekend.

2

M. and how was that?

L. awesome! It was lots of fun. Yeah, lots and lots of people and we just skiied the whole weekend. Saturday, it was warm, so we just cruised, it was four girls, and we just skiied together all day, and we found massive powder, we just stayed there all day. And on Sunday, I just skiied with the guys from our, that were in the group, I took them down there with me, we had lots of fun, there was about 13 of us, we just had an awesome time, skiing and skiing.

M. and you had a spring break in between there.

3

L. yeah.

M. do anything special?

L. no, I just worked from 8:00 in the morning till 4:30 at night (evening) every day. So nothing overly exciting at all.

M. so your biggies were your ball practice and the skiing.

L. yeah.

M. so we could talk about those.

L. uh huh. /

M. can you remember your practice?

4 L. well, kinda; it was a while ago.

M. yeah, because the one before you were worried about your back and your knee, and ...

L. and everything, yeah.

M. and things weren't clicking.

L. yeah.

M. how did you feel going into this next one?

L. like, I wasn't worried about it, but it all just came back. It was funny. The ball kept coming out to me and I was catching it. I was happy. /

M/ how did it feel, natural, automatic?

5 L. yeah, it just came back; as soon as I caught one it was, like, right on!

M. did you feel something?

L. yeah, I knew I was doing it right, and then it came out again, and I caught it again, and I'm, like "Oh, right on". Uh huh. And then they kept coming again and again and by the end I was "No problem".

M. did you have to run or work or anything?

L. oh yeah.

M. but you knew you were ... before you caught it you knew you had it back.

L. yeah. Uh huh/ 6/ My batting's not too good, but I guess I'll practice on that a lot. But we should be starting in about May, which is good.

M. anything else you need to work on?

L. grounders, yeah.

M. you think they're going to plague you forever, eh?

L. oh yeah. They always will. It's funny. Yeah. My grounders. I'm always, I got to learn to get down on them instead of kinda letting them go through my legs. They go zooming by, you know. No, I got to work on those, and my batting, and my running has to get into it, my knee is still bothering me a little but the more I run the better it gets. /

M. 7 it's bothering you in the base running but not in the fielding.

L. yeah, yeah. The base running especially, 'cause if I'm turning from first to second, my foot, my inside leg always crosses over and touches the base so you keep on going, so you kinda do crossover, right? and that's my knee that's the sorest.

M. and it takes all the weight.

L. yeah, it kind, like, slows down and then I touch it (the bag), and then go.

M. so you're aware of it, you got to think about it too much.

L. yeah, that's probably silly, that's probably why I'm so nervous about it. 'cause I'm so worried, I guess, I'm going to hurt it. /

M. 8 yeah. So what kinds of things will you have to do to work on grounders and batting, just lots of grounders and batting.

L. yeah, just practice. In batting, what we have is a ball on the end of a string and it just goes around and around.

M. like a tether ball.

L. yeah, and you hit it and hit it, and hit it as many times as you can, and then, usually after I'm done that, that helps a lot. And then just a lot of practice, swinging at the balls that come at me. We need a batting cage right away. That would be great. /

M. 9 have you experienced, like, working "through the wall", you know, facing something and going beyond it, after your injury?

L. probably, yeah.

M. you know, like, a "moment of decision".

L. well, when I was out on the field and I was having difficulty with my knee, the first practice 'cause I remember telling you that I couldn't judge if I should take another step or so.

M. yeah.

L. and I think that I've overcome that in the field because it has gone away. I just don't think about it and it won't bother me. In skiing, was kinda like that too, in a way.

10

M. is this the first time you've skiied since.

L. yeah, since the accident, but I did fine. It hurt, the impact hurt when I'd bounce, things like that would hurt 'cause I was going over some moguls, go through them for the first time and my knees kinda came back and I kinda stopped because it hurt, but I kinda pushed myself. Arggh! - get mad and just go! Just went through it; yeah, that's the way you have to do it, I think.

11

M. is that what you did when you started catching after your eye injury?

L. yeah, 'cause I remember my parents didn't want me to go, and I wanted to go so bad. And I just went out there and my coach just threw balls at me, and balls at me until I wasn't scared no more.

12

M. you think a coach can really help you get over an injury like that?

L. uh huh.

M. could you do it by yourself, or does it help if someone's with you?

L. it takes longer, I think, by yourself; but a coach helps, I think, like, someone who cares and who wants to make you ... it's like anything, once you're in an accident or some sort of happening, you have to get back into it right away, because otherwise, you'll just become terrified and you won't do it. Like, anything. Like, driving a car. I was scared to drive a car at first, after that. My Dad just gave me the keys and said "Go - because otherwise you'll never drive again". And that's with anything. I think baseball's like that too, you have to push yourself or you'll never get back on the field again.

13

M. so how was the skiing, were you nervous at first?

L. not really, I just went out there and started skiing like I normally would. It didn't really bother me. It was a little, it was, at, I noticed one knee was so much weaker than the other one. If I tried to turn on it I noticed that it kinda go jitter-jitter, and the other one didn't. Or when I was bringing one leg around, the other leg wouldn't, but otherwise it didn't bother me at all, skiing was really good.

M. and you had a good time with your friends.

14

L. yeah, except for I got sick on Saturday night. Everybody went to the bar. I went to bed. (laughs) Maybe that's for the better, eh?, 'cause everybody Sunday morning didn't want to ski. I was the only one. "Come on - let's get to the hills." They all groaned. I just wanted to go, oh, Sunday morning, I was raring to go. I skiied Sunday for, as soon as we got there, until four o'clock. I didn't even stop for lunch.

M. how did you feel after, bagged? was it good?

15

L. oh, I was tired. I was so tired after that. That was a long weekend.

M. were you sore?

L. no, not at all, except for the back of my arms on Monday morning were sore. That's from poling, but nothing else was sore. My legs weren't sore at all.

M. did they feel strong, tight?

16

L. oh, um, I noticed when I was skiing, 'cause I like to do this, when I'm skiing and I can go and I can feel it in my legs, like I can just feel it, my legs just like "rrrrr", and I hate to stop when it's like that so I just keep going and going, and then I stop and I remember saying to my friend "Holy!. My legs are so sore." (laughs) But they never really actually got sore sore, I could just feel it in my legs out there.

M. you knew they were there.

L. yeah, uh huh.

M. it's really a good feeling.

L. uh huh. I have a ball practice tomorrow.

M. that's alright. Do you talk to your friends about how you feel, the sensation of it, the rush, do you talk about it much?

L. sure. Not while we're skiing, but after, while we're on the lift, we always say "Oh, God, that was awesome, did you see that? I did this, and this and that." "Yeah, that was wicked."

M. 18 that's a part of it, talking about it.

L. yeah. Skiing is, um, to me, is just a blast. And the, 'cause it was so nice out, that it seemed like everything was just perfect and you're having such a good time, you're just talking way, and laughing.

M. so there's an opportunity in a sport like that to reflect on what you've done, and share it.

L. yeah, uh huh.

M. 19 does that happen? do people talk?

L. oh yeah, maybe not about the actual feeling of their legs - people complain a lot when they're skiing: "Oh my boots hurt, my legs hurt, my arms hurt". 'cause it is a strenuous sport, and after a while it's ... you're tired 'cause you do get tired really fast, faster than you would in any sport, and people complain a lot, but you never actually hear people say "Oh that was wicked, I could just feel it in my legs". I would say that to my friend, Rydell, 'cause that's how we are, but I would never come out and say that to anybody else, but a lot of people will say "Oh, did you see what I did? Did you see that fall I took?" or something like that. Yeah.

M. there's something about the experience that they want to ...

L. yeah, share.

M. 20 that's good. Do you think there are other sports like that, is physical activity in general like that, or do some things lend themselves to it more than others?

L. um, it depends what it is. I think skiing has it the most.

M. I know we do it a lot in body building.

L. really? Yeah.

M. there's a lot of dialogue about it, and I don't remember it being that way in some of my team sports, like volleyball or field hockey.

2 L. yeah. I think because in skiing, when you fall or something, you just look so hilarious, because people look absolutely funny when they fall, they do. And um, if you made such a big fall, you'll be a hit. It's almost like who can fall the best. In other sports, I think it wouldn't be as bad, it's like, if you fall, you don't get up and say, you don't have time to say "Did you see that?" You're, like you're trying to get back into the game. In skiing you don't have anyone telling you what you should be doing, and what you can be doing, you don't have any pressure, you can stop any time you want, and do what you want, in any other sport, you're kinda pushed into it, you know?

M. you're accountable, people are depending on you.

L. yeah.

M. say, if you were running around the bases and took a magnificent fall between first and second.

L. oh God. I wouldn't get up and say "Did you see that?"

M. you'd be really disgusted.

L. oh yeah.

M. it doesn't have the same effect as a great fall down the hill.

L. exactly! uh huh.

M. different sports, eh?

L. yeah.

3a M. are there things in baseball or ringette that are talked about?

L. um, . . .

M. or things that make impressions?

L. yeah, impressions for sure. If you're a good hitter, or doing anything you're good at, you're known for that. In baseball, maybe, after a game, or in a practice, somebody will, you'll start laughing about things that happened. I can remember when I was younger, throwing the ball, like, you're out in the field, and you're so excited you're going to throw this ball, and you're ready to throw it and you just push it as hard as you can and it falls behind you, you know? (laughs) I can remember that happening to me and you're, like "Oh my God", so embarrassed. Turn around, pick it up, throw it in. "How did I do that!" and then after, the next game or something, you're just laughing. Everybody laughs "Nice ball".

M. no one's laughing at the time.

L. yeah, uh huh. It's "What are you doing!?"

23 M. can you relate to this good feeling of breaking into a sweat?

L. it depends on what I'm doing, like I said before, you're playing ringette, or something like that, and you come off and you're sweating, you know you had a good game. But if, sometimes, I hate it, like, in aerobics or something like that, my thought always used to be, and it still is, if you sweat and you see a little blonde chick over there who isn't sweating. I feel like a pig, like, I'm so overweight, I'm so fat, I just got to ... and I guess that's not what it is, it's how much you're ...

M. it's your effort.

L. yeah, and it's, I guess your sweat glands, you maybe sweat more. But I used to always think that was just horrible, but when I sweat in ringette, I know I feel like that's good, right on.

24 M. do you sweat when you ski?

L. oh yeah, you can, very much. Not really when it's cold, but when it's hot like it was on the weekend, and you're skiing so hard and you hit the bottom you're like "Ho!" "Whew!" You just got to peel all the clothes off. Uh huh.

M. that's a good feeling.

L. yeah.

25 M. fascinating. One is different from the other. Like, after a good sweat, I feel so clean and tight ...

L. you do, yeah.

M. I don't know if this cleansing feeling has something to do with it.

L. I think, um, when I exercise and I sweat, like, when I run I "perspire" a lot, I do, OK. I feel good. I feel like I know I did something good for my body, I know that, I just feel great. I do - which I'm going to have to start doing again.

M. good feeling.

L. yeah.

M. do you feel the same thing with soreness? - like, not so sore you can't move, but ...
26

L. yeah, oh yeah. I love that. I know it hurts. That's a good feeling. You know that's really muscle.

M. it's like you're more aware of something that's always been there.

L. yes, yes.

M. well, that's good, my dear.
27

Interview 14, Leslie (13, 4, '88)

1. M. So, tell me what you've been doing for the past couple of weeks. L. I think last time we talked I told you about my first practice. M. uh huh. L. we had another one after that, and everything went well. I've got it all back together again. M. oh great, yeah. L. yeah. I was catching flies again like I used to. M. great. L. it all came back. And, haven't had a ball since then 'cause of the snow, remember? There was lots. M. uh huh.	1. L describes what has been happening in her lifeworld over the past couple of weeks. She has had another baseball practice since her rather disappointing first one, and in this second practice, she reports that she got it all back together again, and everything went well. L says that everything came back and she was catching flies like she used to; however, she has not had a practice since then because of the sudden, somewhat excessive snowfall.	1. Among the events happening in L's lifeworld over the past two weeks has been her second baseball practice during which she "got it all back together". All the skills, instincts, and decisions which had seemed absent from her first, rather disappointing, practice came back, and everything went well. L has not had a practice since then, however, because of the sudden, somewhat excessive snowfall.

2.	L.	and, what did I do, I went skiing on the weekend.	2.	L continues her description by reporting that she went skiing over the weekend and had lots of fun. She says she and a group of male and female friends simply skied for two days on whatever kinds of snow they could find. L says that the weather was warm, the skiing and camaraderie were great, and everyone had an awesome time.	2.	Another event was a weekend ski trip which L and a group of male and female friends recently participated in. L and her friends skied for two days on whatever kind of snow they could find and had lots of fun in the process. The weather was warm, the skiing and camaraderie were great, and a better than good time was had by all.
	M.	and how was that?				
	L.	awesome! It was lots of fun. Yeah, lots and lots of people and we just skied the whole weekend. Saturday, it was warm, so we just cruised, it was four girls, and we just skied together all day, and we found massive powder, we just stayed there all day. And on Sunday, I just skied with the guys from our, that were in the group, I took them down there with me, we had lots of fun, there was about 13 of us, we just had an awesome time, skiing and skiing.				

3. M. and you had a spring break in between there. L. yeah. M. do anything special? L. no, I just worked from 8:00 in the morning till 4:30 at night (evening) every day. So nothing overly exciting at all. M. so your biggies were your ball practice and the skiing. L. yeah. M. so we could talk about those. L. uh huh.	3. L reports that during this two-week period she also had spring break from school, but she did nothing special for her spring break other than work from 8:00 to 4:30 each of the spring break days. L says that the skiing and the ball practice were the big events of the immediate past, and she is more than willing to talk about these during today's interview.	3. During this two-week period L also had spring break from school, but she did nothing special for her spring break other than work from 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. on each of the days made available to her by the break. The skiing and the ball practice are the two significant events that L is more than willing to speak to during this interview.
4. M. can you remember your practice? L. well, kinda; it was a while ago. M. yeah, because the one before you were worried about	4. L says that she can remember this second baseball practice, although it was a while ago. L recalls how during her first practice she was worried about her knee, and things just	4. In direct contrast to her first practice, L went into her second practice not worrying about her knee, about making everything work the way it used to, or about skills and so forth "coming back".

your back and your knee, and ... L. and everything, yeah. M. and things weren't clicking. L. yeah. M. how did you feel going into this next one? L. like, I wasn't worried about it, but it all just came back. It was funny. The ball kept coming out to me and I was catching it. I was happy.	weren't clicking, but for her second practice, she was not really worried about her knee or about things coming back, and everything came back to her and went well anyway. L says she was able to catch the ball without any worries or problems, and she was happy.	In spite of - or maybe because of - her lack of pre-occupation with her injury and her incompetence, L was able to catch the ball without any worries or problems, everything did indeed come back to her, and everything seemed to go well. L was happy with the practice and with herself.
5. M. how did it feel, natural, automatic? L. yeah, it just came back; as soon as I caught one it was, like, right on! M. did you feel something?	5. L explains that her catching ability just came back as if on its own. L says as soon as she caught one, she felt something, and she knew she was doing it right. She then kept "doing it right" with every ball that came her way. L says she knew she was having no problems,	5. L's catching ability seemed to come back almost on its own. L felt like she did not have to work, run, or strain to make her catch, and had a sense that something had been restored even before she made her first catch. As soon as L caught her first ball of the practice,

L. yeah, I knew I was doing it right, and then it came out again, and I caught it again, and I'm, like "Oh, right on". Uh huh. And then they kept coming again and again and by the end I was "No problem". M. did you have to run or work or anything? L. oh yeah. M. but you knew you were ... before you caught it you knew you had it back. L. yeah. Uh huh.	and from her first catch, had a good feeling about what she was doing. She says it felt like she did not have to work or run, and even before her first catch she knew she had "it" back.	she felt something, knew she was doing it right and having no problems, and kept "doing it right" with every ball that came her way. From the first catch, and perhaps even before the actual first catch, L had a good feeling about what she was doing.
6. L. My batting's not too good, but I guess I'll practice on that a lot. But we should be starting in about May, which is good. M. anything else you need to work on?	6. L says there are things she does need to work on, like batting, grounders, and running. The batting she just has to practice a lot and the running is still troublesome because of her knee, but the more she runs the better it	6. Although catching and fielding have been restored and regained, L has other skills that still need some work, namely batting, running, and grounders. The batting simply requires practice, the running, still

L. grounders, yeah. M. you think they're going to plague you forever, eh? L. oh yeah. They always will. It's funny. Yeah. My grounders, I'm always, I got to learn to get down on them instead of kinda letting them go through my legs. They go zooming by, you know. No, I got to work on those, and my batting, and my running has to get into it, my knee is still bothering me a little but the more I run the better it gets.	gets. L admits that grounders may plague her forever, but she still has to learn to get down on them rather than letting them go zooming by or through her legs. L says all she can do is keep working on them.	troublesome because of the knee injury, gets better the more L runs, but the grounders may plague L forever. L has to learn to get down on her grounders rather than let them go zooming by or through her legs, and it seems that dogged, persistent working on them is what is called for.
7. M. it's bothering you in the base running but not in the fielding. L. yeah, yeah. The base running especially, 'cause if I'm turning	7. L agrees that running does not bother her when she is fielding, but it does bother her when she is running the bases. In base running, the player has to do a crossover step to touch the bag	7. Running does not bother L when she is fielding, but it does bother her when she is base running. In base running, the player has to do a crossover step in order to touch the bag and keep on

	from first to second, my foot, my inside leg always crosses over and touches the base so you keep on going, so you kinda do crossover, right? and that's my knee that's the sorest. M. and it takes all the weight. L. yeah, it kind, like, slows down and then I touch it (the bag), and then go. M. so you're aware of it, you got to think about it too much. L. yeah, that's probably silly, that's probably why I'm so nervous about it, 'cause I'm so worried, I guess, I'm going to hurt it.	and keep on going, and during this step, one leg takes all the weight. Unfortunately for L, this weight-bearing leg is her weak leg, so she tends to slow down during the crossover step because she is thinking too much about what might happen to her knee during this crossover. L says she knows it's silly, but she is still a little nervous and worried about hurting her knee just as she is starting to recover and regain some ground.	going, and during this step, one leg takes all the weight. Unfortunately for L, her weak leg is the weight-bearing leg, so she tends to slow down because she is thinking too much about what might happen to her knee during this crossover step. L acknowledges that her anxiety may be unfounded and silly, but she is still concerned about hurting her knee just as she is starting to recover and regain some ground.
8.	M. yeah. So what kinds of things will you have to	8. L says she will have to do lots of grounders and batting	8. L realizes that she has to put in lots of work and practice if

	do to work on grounders and batting, just lots of grounders and batting. L. yeah, just practice. In batting, what we have is a ball on the end of a string and it just goes around and around. M. like a tether ball. L. yeah, and you hit it and hit it, and hit it as many times as you can, and then, usually after I'm done that, that helps a lot. And then just a lot of practice, swinging at the balls that come at me. We need a batting cage right away. That would be great.	in order to improve on them. For batting practice, they use a ball suspended from a string which they hit, over and over, and also batting and swinging at balls which are thrown at them. L says that what her team really needs to practice batting is a batting cage.	she is going to improve her batting and her grounder. L practices batting by hitting and swinging, over and over, at a ball suspended from a string, and by hitting and swinging at thrown balls. In L's opinion, a batting cage would be of enormous benefit to her team's batting practice.
9.	M. have you experienced, like, working "through	9. L says she probably has lived through a "going through the	9. L realizes that she has lived through a "going through the

the wall", you know, facing something and going beyond it, after your injury?	wall", "moment of decision" kind of experience because she has overcome her difficulty of stopping herself from taking a weighted step with her weak leg. L says she does not think about it, it no longer bothers her, and it has "gone away" (probably through her efforts toward, and decisions about, overcoming it.	wall, moment of, decision" kind of experience because her difficulty with stopping herself from taking a weighted step onto her weak leg has "gone away". L has overcome this difficulty through personal efforts and decisions, and she no longer thinks about it or lets it bother her.
L. probably, yeah.		
M. you know, like, a "moment of decision".		
L. well, when I was out on the field and I was having difficulty with my knee, the first practice 'cause I remember telling you that I couldn't judge if I should take another step or so.		
M. yeah.		
L. and I think that I've overcome that in the field because it has gone away. I just don't think about it and it won't bother me.		

10. L. In skiing, was kinda like that, too, in a way. M. is this the first time you've skied since. L. yeah, since the accident, but I did fine. It hurt, the impact hurt when I'd bounce, things like that would hurt 'cause I was going over some moguls, go through them for the first time and my knees kinda came back and I kinda stopped because it hurt, but I kinda pushed myself. Arggh! - get mad and just go! Just went through it; yeah, that's the way you have to do it, I think.	10. L says she had a similar breakthrough in skiing. This recent weekend was the first time L has skied since her accident, and she says, although she felt fine, she did feel her knee hurting on bounces and impacts going down the hill. L says she stopped the first time it hurt, but then she just got mad and pushed herself through it. L says she just worked through it, and that's the way she thinks it had to be done.	10. L had a similar breakthrough experience in skiing. This recent weekend was the first time L has skied since her accident, and, although she felt fine, she did feel her knee hurting on bounces and impacts as she skied down the hill. L stopped the first time she felt something hurting, but then she just got angry and pushed herself through it. L realizes she worked through this difficulty, and that is the way she thinks it had to be done.
11. M. is that what you did when you started catching after your eye injury?	11. L says that working through the difficulty was also how she did it when she came back after her eye injury and started catching	11. Working through the difficulty was also how L came back to baseball, and catching balls, after her eye injury. L's parents

L. yeah, 'cause I remember my parents didn't want me to go, and I wanted to go so bad. And I just went out there and my coach just threw balls at me, and balls at me until I wasn't scared no more.	balls again. L says her parents did not want her to go, but she wanted to return to baseball so much, and she just went out there and had her coach throw balls at her until she wasn't afraid any more.	did not want her to return to baseball, but L wanted to get back to it so much that she just went out there and had her coach throw balls at her until she wasn't afraid of catching them any more.
12. M. you think a coach can really help you get over an injury like that? L. uh huh. M. could you do it by yourself, or does it help if someone's with you? L. it takes longer, I think, by yourself; but a coach helps, I think, like, someone who cares and who wants to make you ... it's like anything, once you're in an accident or some sort of happening,	12. L says that getting over bad experiences like injuries, can be done by herself, but it would take longer doing it on her own than it would with a coach or someone else helping her. L says she needs to be helped by someone who cares about her, and about her getting back into something she loves after a trauma. L says if a person does not get back into it right away, she'll be terrified, and will not do it at all. L explains how she was afraid to drive after the accident, and her father gave her the keys and insisted she	12. L acknowledges that she could possibly get over a bad experience, like an injury, on her own, but it would take longer than it would with a coach or someone else helping her. L needs to be helped by someone who cares about her, and about helping her return to something she loves after experiencing a trauma of some kind. L was afraid to drive after the accident, but her father gave her the keys and insisted she go driving. L realized that if she did not push herself and get back into it right away - whether

		you have to get back into it right away, because otherwise, you'll just become terrified and you won't do it. Like, anything. Like, driving a car, I was scared to drive a car at first, after that. My Dad just gave me the keys and said "Go - because otherwise you'll never drive again". And that's with anything. I think baseball's like that, too, you have to push yourself or you'll never get back on the field again.	go driving. L says people have to push themselves or they'll never get back in a car, or on a field, again.	driving or catching - she would always be terrified by it, and would not do it again.
13.	M.	so how was the skiing, were you nervous at first?	13. L says she was not really nervous about skiing, she just went out and started skiing like she normally would, and it did not really bother her. L says she noticed that one of her knees was much weaker, and she noticed that her weak	13. L was not really nervous about skiing, she just went out and started skiing like she normally would. L was not really bothered by her knee, except that she noticed one knee was much weaker, and the weak knee was slower,
	L.	not really, I just went out there and started skiing like I normally would. It didn't really bother me. It was a little,		

it was, at, I noticed one knee was so much weaker than the other one. If I tried to turn on it I noticed that it kinda go jitter-jitter, and the other one didn't. Or when I was bringing one leg around, the other leg wouldn't, but otherwise it didn't bother me at all, skiing was really good.	knee was a little more jittery, and slower on her turns, but otherwise, it did not bother her too much, and skiing was really good.	and more jittery on the turns. Other than this, the skiing was really good.
14. M. and you had a good time with your friends. L. yeah, except for I got sick on Saturday night. Everybody went to the bar, I went to bed. (laughs) Maybe that's for the better, eh?, 'cause everybody Sunday morning didn't want to ski, I was the only one. "Come on - let's get to the hills." They	14. L says she had a good time with her friends, except she felt sick on Saturday evening and went to bed instead of going to the bar with her friends. She says this was an advantage in the long run, because she was the only one in any shape to ski on Sunday morning, and she subsequently stayed out all day on Sunday without even stopping for lunch.	14. L had a good time with her friends on their ski weekend, although she did go to bed early on Saturday evening because she was not feeling well, hence did not go to the bar with her friends. Not going to the bar proved advantageous for L, who was the only one of her group in any shape to ski on Sunday morning, and she subsequently stayed out all day on Sunday

		all groaned. I just wanted to go, oh, Sunday morning, I was raring to go. I skied Sunday for, as soon as we got there, until four o'clock. I didn't even stop for lunch.		without even stopping for lunch.
15.	M.	how did you feel after, bagged? was it good?	15. L says that after two long days of skiing, she was really tired, but, except for the back of her arms, she was not sore on Monday morning. L says her arms were sore from poling, but her legs weren't sore at all.	15. L was really tired after two long days of skiing, but, except for the back of her arms, was not too sore on Monday morning. L's arms were sore from poling, but her legs weren't sore at all.
	L.	oh, I was tired. I was so tired after that. That was a long weekend.		
	M.	were you sore?		
	L.	no, not at all, except for the back of my arms on Monday morning were sore. That's from poling, but nothing else was sore. My legs weren't sore at all.		
16.	M.	did they feel strong, tight?	16. L says she noticed a strong tension	16. L noticed a feeling of strength and muscle

L.	oh, um, I noticed when I was skiing, 'cause I like to do this, when I'm skiing and I can go and I can feel it in my legs, like I can just feel it, my legs just like "rrrrr", and I hate to stop when it's like that so I just keep going and going, and then I stop and I remember saying to my friend "Holy! My legs are so sore." (laughs) But they never really actually got sore sore, I could just feel it in my legs out there.	coursing through her legs while she was skiing. She says she can really feel this, and it is such a good feeling that she hates to stop. L says she usually just keeps going until she is too tired to go any more. L explains how she experiences soreness as an increased awareness of her legs during the activity, and it's a really good feeling, and she never actually gets "sore" sore (after-sore).	tension coursing through her legs while she was skiing. L can really feel this (i.e., is very aware of it) and it is such a good feeling that she hates to stop. Consequently, L usually just keeps going until she is too tired to go any more. L experiences soreness, both during and after activity, as an increased awareness of the body part used and it is a really good feeling. L seldom experiences "bad" soreness, either during or after.
M.	you knew they were there.		
L.	yeah, uh huh.		
M.	it's really a good feeling.		
L.	uh huh.		

16a. L. I have a ball practice tomorrow. M. that's alright.	16a. L reports that she is going to have a ball practice tomorrow.	16a. L is going to have a ball practice tomorrow. It will be her third practice.
17. M. Do you talk to your friends about how you feel, the sensation of it, the rush, do you talk about it much? L. sure. Not while we're skiing, but after, while we're on the lift, we always say "Oh, God, that was awesome, did you see that? I did this, and this and that." "Yeah, that was wicked."	17. L says that she and her friends do talk about the sensations and feelings involved in skiing, not necessarily while they are skiing, but after they have finished. While they are on the lift, for example, or at some other opportune moment, they will discuss how this looked, or how that felt, or how impressive something else was.	17. L and her friends do talk about the sensations and feelings they experience in skiing, not necessarily while they are skiing, but after they have finished. When they are on the lift, for example, or at some other opportune moment, they will discuss how something looked, or felt, or how impressive or funny it was.
18. M. that's a part of it, talking about it. L. yeah. Skiing is, um, to me, is just a blast. And the, 'cause it was so nice out, that it seemed like everything was just perfect and	18. L agrees that talking about the activity is a part of doing the activity. L says that, to her, skiing is just a blast, and when it is nice outside, when everything seems perfect, when everyone is having such a good time, it seems natural	18. Talking about the activity is a part of doing the activity. Skiing is such a blast for L, that when it is nice outside, everything seems perfect, and everyone is having a good time, it seems natural to her to laugh and talk about the experience.

you're having such a good time, you're just talking away, and laughing. M. so there's an opportunity in a sport like that to reflect on what you've done, and share it. L. yeah, uh huh.	to laugh and talk about the experience. L agrees that there are opportunities in a sport like skiing for the doers to reflect on what they've done, and share it with each other, and with other others.	There seem to be opportunities in a sport like skiing for the doers to reflect on what they've done and share among themselves and with others.
19. M. does that happen? do people talk? L. oh yeah, maybe not about the actual feeling of their legs -people complain a lot when they're skiing: "Oh my boots hurt, my legs hurt, my arms hurt", 'cause it is a strenuous sport, and after a while, it's ... you're tired 'cause you do get tired really fast, faster than you would in any sport, and people complain a lot,	19. L says that people do talk about their skiing experiences. L explains that she could discuss the incredible sensations in her legs with her friend, Rydell, because they talk about those kind of things, but that most people get at discussing their sensations by way of complaining about discomforts, or poking fun at mistakes and/or falls. Either way, L says there is something about the experience that they want to share, and	19. People do talk about their skiing experiences. L could discuss the incredible sensations in her legs with her friend, Rydell, because they talk about those kinds of things, but many people get at discussing their sensations by way of complaining about discomforts, or poking fun at mistakes or falls. Either way, L claims there is something about the experience that people want to share, and something about it that makes them want to share.

	but you never actually hear people say "Oh that was wicked, I could just feel it in my legs". I would say that to my friend, Rydell, 'cause that's how we are, but I would never come out and say that to anybody else, but a lot of people will say "Oh, did you see what I did? Did you see that fall I took?" or something like that. Yeah..	that makes them want to share.	
M.	there's something about the experience that they want to ...		
L.	yeah, share.		
20. M.	that's good. Do you think there are other sports like that, is physical activity in general like that, or do some things lend	20. L says that the need, desire, and opportunity to reflect and talk about the experience could indeed be a part of physical activity in general, but she thinks some things	20. The need, desire, and opportunity to reflect on and talk about the experience could indeed be a part of physical activity in general, but L thinks that some activities lend themselves to it

themselves to it more than others? L. um, it depends what it is, I think skiing has it the most. M. I know we do it a lot in body building. L. really? Yeah. M. there's a lot of dialogue about it, and I don't remember it being that way in some of my team sports, like volleyball or field hockey.	lend themselves to it more than others, and it depends on what the thing is and who the person is. L says that, for her, skiing has it the most. M says that she notices it in body building, too, but that she does not remember this kind of dialogue going on in her other sports like volleyball and field hockey.	more than others, and it also depends on what the activity is and who the person doing it is. For L, skiing has it the most. M notices it in bodybuilding, too, but does not remember this kind of dialogue going on in other activities. (This is not to say that others in those other activities were not having this experience of reflection and dialogue.)
21. L. yeah. I think because in skiing, when you fall or something, you just look so hilarious, because people look absolutely funny when they fall, they do. And um, if you made such a big fall, you'll be a hit. It's almost like who can fall the best.	21. L explains that, in skiing, falls are so hilarious, and, as long as they don't result in injury, are quite spectacular and entertaining. In other sports, however, falls are neither entertaining nor hilarious because they take the player out of the game. In skiing, there is no pressure on the doer, in a game	21. In skiing, falls can be so hilarious, and, as long as they don't result in injury, are quite spectacular and entertaining. In other sports, however, falls are neither entertaining nor hilarious because they usually take a player out of the game. In skiing, the pressure on the doer is of a different degree and

	In other sports, I think it wouldn't be as bad, it's like, if you fall, you don't get up and say, you don't have time to say "Did you see that?" You're, like you're trying to get back into the game. In skiing you don't have anyone telling you what you should be doing, and what you can be doing, you don't have any pressure, you can stop any time you want, and do what you want, in any other sport, you're kinda pushed into it, you know?	like baseball, the doer is accountable and has people depending on her. L says that taking a great fall running around the bases does not have the same fun effect as taking a great fall during skiing. L agrees that these sports are different, hence their circumstances and expectations are different, and hence the responses to falls will probably be different.	king than in a game like baseball, where the doer has people depending on her, and her accountability is a more significant consideration. Taking a great fall running around the bases does not have the same fun effect as taking a great fall while skiing. These sports are different, their circumstances and expectations are different, hence the responses to falls will probably be different.
M:	you're accountable, people are depending on you.		
L.	yeah.		
M.	say, if you were running around the bases and took a magnificent fall		

between first and second. L. oh God. I wouldn't get up and say "Did you see that?" M. you'd be really disgusted. L. oh yeah. M. it doesn't have the same effect as a great fall down the hill. L. exactly! uh huh. M. different sports, eh? L. yeah.		
22. M. are there things in baseball or ringette that are talked about? L. um, ... M. or things that make impressions? L. yeah, impressions for sure. If you're a good	22. L says there are things in baseball that might not be talked about so much as there are things which "make impressions". L says that if a person is a good hitter, or good at anything, she gets known for that, i.e., she leaves an impression. L says	22. According to L, there are things in baseball which make impressions more so than there are things which are talked about. If a person is a good hitter, or is good at any particular thing, she gets known for that, i.e., she makes or leaves an impression. Some

hitter, or doing anything you're good at, you're known for that. In baseball, maybe, after a game, or in a practice, somebody will, you'll start laughing about things that happened. I can remember when I was younger, throwing the ball, like, you're out in the field, and you're so excited you're going to throw this ball, and you're ready to throw it and you just push it as hard as you can and it falls behind you, you know? (laughs) I can remember that happening to me and you're, like "Oh my God", so embarrassed. Turn around, pick it up, throw it in. "How did I do that!" and then after, the next game or something, you're just

that some things happen during games / and practices that are funny - like flubbing a throw, for example - but people don't laugh about them at the time. They do laugh and talk about these incidents after the fact, although at the time the incident probably evoked some exasperation.

things happen during games and practices that are funny - like flubbing a throw, for example - but people don't laugh about them at the time. They do laugh and talk about these incidents after the fact, although at the time the incident probably evoked some exasperation.

		laughing. Everybody laughs "Nice ball".		
	M.	no one's laughing at the time.		
	L.	yeah, uh huh. It's "What are you doing!?"		
23.	M.	can you relate to this good feeling of breathing into a sweat?	23. L says she can relate to the good feeling of breaking into a sweat, although it does depend on what L is doing. L says that sweating during a ringette game means she had a good game, but sweating during aerobics, especially if more shapely young things are there, usually makes L feel like a pig. L says in aerobics, sweating makes her more aware of how big she is, rather than how hard she is working. L realizes she needs to be aware of how hard she is working when she sweats so that sweating is a good experience, rather than a horrible one.	23. L can relate to the good feeling of breaking into a sweat, although it does depend on what she is doing. For example, sweating during a ringette game means that L had a good game, but sweating during aerobics, especially if more shapely young women are present, usually makes L feel like a pig. In aerobics, sweating makes L more aware of how big she is, rather than how hard she is working. L accepts the need to be more aware of how hard she is working when she sweats so that sweating is a good experience.
	L.	it depends on what I'm doing, like I said before, you're playing ringette, or something like that, and you come off and you're sweating, you know you had a good game. But if, sometimes, I hate it, like, in aerobics or something like that, my thought always used to be, and it still is, if you sweat and you see a little blonde chick over there who isn't		

		sweating. I feel like a pig, like, I'm so overweight, I'm so fat, I just got to ... and I guess that's not what it is, it's how much you're ...		rather than a horrible one.
	M.	it's your effort.		
	L.	yeah, and it's, I guess your sweat glands, you maybe sweat more. But I used to always think that was just horrible, but when I sweat in ringette, I know I feel like that's good, right on.		
24.	M.	do you sweat when you ski?	24. L says a person can sweat a lot when she skis, not so much when the weather is cold, but especially when the weather is hot like it was on the weekend. L says when it's warm, and she is skiing hard, she hits the bottom of the hill and feels like pulling her clothes off. L says that this is a	24. A person can sweat a lot when she skis, not so much when the weather is cold, but certainly when the weather is hot, like it was on L's recent ski weekend. When it is warm, and L is skiing hard, she hits the bottom of the hill and is sweating so much she feels like pulling her clothes
	L.	oh yeah, you can, very much. Not really when it's cold, but when it's hot like it was on the weekend, and you're skiing so hard and you hit the bottom you're like "Ho!" "Whew!"		

You just got to peel all the clothes off. Uh huh. M. that's a good feeling. L. yeah.	really good feeling.	off. For L, this is a really good feeling.
25. M. fascinating. One is different from the other. Like, after a good sweat, I feel so clean and tight ... L. you do, yeah. M. I don't know if this cleansing feeling has something to do with it. L. I think, um, when I exercise and I sweat, like, when I run I "perspire" a lot, I do, OK. I feel good. I feel like I know I did something good for my body, I know that, I just feel great, I do - which I'm going	25. L agrees that activities are different from each other, so the sweating inside the activities is also different, and she agrees that after a good sweat, she feels clean and tight. L says that when she exercises and sweats a lot, she feels good, like she knows she did something good for her body and she feels great. She feels great while she is doing it, and because she is doing it.	25. Activities are different from each other, so the sweating inside the activities is also different. When L exercises and sweats a lot, she feels clean and tight, she knows she did something good for her body, and she feels good. L feels great while she is working and sweating, and because she is working and sweating.

to have to start doing again. M. good feeling. L. yeah.		
26. M. do you feel the same thing with soreness? - like, not so sore you can't move, but ... L. yeah, oh yeah. I love that. I know it hurts. That's a good feeling. You know that's really muscle. M. it's like you're more aware of something that's always been there. L. yes, yes.	26. L says she feels this same good feeling with soreness. L says she loves the feeling of soreness, of knowing it hurts, that it's there. L says knowing that it's really muscle there is a good feeling, because she is made more aware of something that's always been there.	26. L experiences this same good feeling with soreness. L loves the feeling of soreness - of knowing that it hurts, of knowing that it's there. Knowing that it is really muscle in there is a good feeling for L because she is made more aware of something that is always there, but that goes unnoticed or taken for granted.
27. M. well, that's good, my dear.	27. M suggests that this is enough for today.	27. M and L conclude this interview at this point.

SPECIFIC DESCRIPTION

Leslie, Interview 14 - 13, 4, 88

Among the events happening in L's lifeworld over the past two weeks have been her second baseball practice, during which she "got it all back together", a weekend ski trip with a group of male and female friends, and spring break from school, during which she did nothing special other than work from 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. on each of the days made available to her by the break. Skiing and ball practice are the two significant events of the past two weeks that L is more than willing to speak to during this interview.

L had a good time with her friends on their ski weekend. L and her friends skied for two days on whatever kind of snow they could find, and had lots of fun in the process. L did not feel well on the Saturday evening, and went to bed early instead of going to the bar with her friends. As it turned out, not going to the bar proved advantageous for L who was the only one of her group in any kind of shape to ski on Sunday morning, and she subsequently stayed out and skied the whole day on Sunday without even stopping for lunch.

Although this ski weekend was L's first time on skis since her car accident, she was not really nervous about skiing but, rather, just went out and started skiing like she normally would. L was not really bothered by her knee, except that she noticed one knee was much weaker than the other, and this weak knee was slower and more jittery on the turns. Other than this, skiing was really good. The weather was warm, the skiing and camaraderie were great, and a better than good time was had by all, although L confesses to being really tired after two long days of skiing. Surprisingly, L's legs were not all that sore on Monday morning and, except for her arms, which were sore from poling, L was not too sore at all.

All the skills, instincts and decisions which had seemed absent from her rather disappointing first practice "came back" during L's second practice, and everything went well. In direct contrast to her first practice, L went into this second practice not worrying about her knee, about making everything work the way it used to, or about skills and aptitudes "coming back". In spite of - or, maybe, because of - her lack of pre-occupation with her injury and her perceived incompetence, L was able to catch the ball without any worries or problems, instincts did indeed come back to her, and everything seemed to go well. L was happy about the practice and happy with herself.

L's catching ability seemed to come back almost on its own. L felt like she did not have to work, run, or strain to make the catch, and had a sense that something had been restored even as she was preparing to make her first catch. As soon as L caught her first ball of the practice, she felt something, she knew she was doing it right, she knew she was having no problems, and she kept "doing it right" with every ball that came her way. From, and perhaps before, the actual first catch, L had a good feeling about what she was doing.

Although catching and fielding have been restored and regained, L has other skills that still need some work, namely batting, running, and grounders. L is of the mind that grounders may plague her forever. She has to learn to get down on her grounders rather than let them go zooming by or through her legs, and it seems that dogged, persistent working on them is what is called for.

L realizes that she has to put in lots of work and practice if she is going to improve her batting. L practices batting by repeatedly hitting and swinging at a ball suspended from a string, and by hitting and swinging at thrown balls. L wishes her team had a batting cage because this would be of enormous benefit to the team's batting practice repertoire. Running seems to be getting better the more L runs, but it is still troublesome, not so much when she is fielding, but certainly when she is base-running. In base-running, the player has to do a crossover step in order to touch the bag and keep on going, and during this step, one leg takes all the weight. Unfortunately for L, the weight-bearing leg in her crossover step is also her weak leg, so she tends to slow down because she is thinking too much about what might happen to her knee during this step. L acknowledges that her anxiety may be unfounded and silly, but she is still concerned about hurting her knee just as she is starting to recover and regain some ground.

L has not had a practice since this second one because of the sudden, somewhat excessive snowfall; however, she is going to have a ball practice tomorrow.

L realizes that she has lived through several "going the wall, moment of decision" kind of experiences. L's difficulty with stopping herself from taking a weighted step onto her weak leg has "gone away". L has overcome this difficulty through personal efforts and decisions, and she no longer thinks about it or lets it bother her. L has a similar breakthrough experience in skiing. This recent weekend was the first time L has skied since her accident, and although she felt fine, she did feel her knee hurting on bounces and impacts as she skied down the hill. L stopped the first time she felt something hurting, but then she just got angry and pushed herself through it. L realizes she worked through this difficulty and that is the way she thinks it had to be done. Working through the difficulty was also how L came back to baseball and catching balls, after her eye injury. L's parents did not want her to return to baseball, but L wanted to get back to it so much that she just went out there and had her coach throw balls at her until she wasn't afraid of catching them any more.

L acknowledges that she could possibly get over a bad experience, like an injury, on her own, but it would take longer than it would with a coach or someone else helping her. L needs to be helped by someone who cares about her and about helping her return to something she loves after experiencing a trauma of some kind. L was afraid to drive after the accident, but her father gave her the keys and insisted she go driving. L realized that if she did not push herself and get back into it right away - whether driving or catching - she would always be terrified of it, and would not do it again.

L noticed a feeling of strength and muscle tension coursing through her legs while she was skiing. L can really feel this - i.e., is very, very aware of it - and it is such a good feeling that she hates to stop what it is she is doing. Consequently, L usually just keeps going until she is too tired to go any more.

L can also relate to the good feeling of breaking into a sweat, although the good feeling does depend on what she is doing. For example, a person can sweat a lot when she skis, not so much when the weather is cold, but certainly when the weather is hot, like it was on L's recent ski weekend. When it is warm and L is skiing hard, she hits the bottom of the hill and is sweating so much she feels like pulling her clothes off. For L, this is a really good feeling. In like fashion, sweating during a ringette game means that L had a good game; however, sweating during aerobics, especially if more shapely young women are present, usually makes L feel like a pig. In aerobics, sweating makes L more aware of how big she is, rather than how hard she is working. L accepts the need to be more aware of how hard she is working when she sweats so that sweating is a good experience, rather than a horrible one.

Activities are different from each other, so the sweating inside the activities is also different. When L exercises and sweats a lot, she feels clean and tight, she knows she did something good for her body, and she feels good. In some activities, L feels great while she is working and sweating; in some activities, L feels great after the sweating is done. She also feels great because she is working and sweating.

L experiences this same good feeling with soreness. L experiences soreness, both during and after activity. She has an increased awareness of the body parts being used, and she knows that it is really muscle in there. L seldom experiences "bad" soreness - i.e., so sore it is painful like an injury, or impossible to move - either during or after activity, and she loves the feeling of "good" soreness: of knowing that it hurts, of knowing that something is there. L considers all these sensations and experiences of soreness to be good feelings because she is made more aware of body parts and muscles that are always there, but because they are not "felt", they often go unnoticed or taken for granted. (The same could be said for effort and investment.)

L and her friends do talk about the sensations and feelings they experience in skiing, not necessarily while they are skiing, but after they have finished. When they are on the ski-lift, for example, or at some other opportune moment, they will discuss how something looked or felt, or how impressive or funny something was. Skiing is such a wonderful experience for L that when it is nice outside, everything seems perfect, and everyone is having a good time, it seems natural to her to laugh and talk about the experience. There seems to be opportunities in a sport like skiing for the doers to reflect on what they've done, and share it among themselves and with others. Talking about the activity is a part of doing the activity.

The need, desire, and opportunity to reflect on, and talk about the experience may indeed be elements of physical activity in general; however, in L's opinion, some kinds of activities lend themselves to these processes more so than others. What the activity is, and the person who is doing it, are significant factors. For L, skiing has these elements the most. M notices them in body building as well, but does not remember these kinds of experiences in other activities. (This is not to say that other people in those other activities were not having these experiences of reflection and dialogue.) According to L, there are things in baseball which make impressions more so than there are things which are talked about. If a person is a good hitter, or is good at any particular thing, she gets known for that - i.e., she makes or leaves an impression. Some things happen during games and practices that are funny -

like flubbing a throw, for example - but people do not laugh about them at the time. They do laugh and talk about these incidents after the fact, although at the time the incident probably evoked some exasperation.

In skiing, falls can be hilarious, and as long as they do not result in injury, can be quite spectacular and entertaining. In other sports, however, falls are neither entertaining nor hilarious (at the time) because they usually take a player out of the game. In skiing, the pressure on the doer is of a different degree and kind than in a game like baseball, where the doer has people depending on her, and her accountability is a more significant consideration. Taking a great fall running around the bases usually does not have the same fun effect as taking a great fall while skiing. These sports are different from each other, their circumstances and expectations are different, hence the responses to falls will probably be different.

People do talk about their skiing experiences and their experiences in other sports and activities. L could discuss the incredible sensations in her legs with her friend, Rydell, because they talk about those kinds of things. Many people, however, get at discussing their sensations by way of complaining about discomforts, or poking fun at mistakes or falls. Either way, L claims there is something about the experience that people want to share, and something about it that makes them want to share.

GENERAL DESCRIPTION

Leslie, Interview 14 - 13, 4, 88

Ski weekends with a group of friends tend to be fun experiences characterized by weather experiences, skiing experiences, and interpersonal experiences. The aftermath of such weekends can span a spectrum of experiences, ranging from hangovers, to a supremely pleasant soreness and tiredness.

Returning to skiing after a leg injury can cause a few anxious moments. The initial, alarming awareness of the weaker leg, its subsequent slowness of response, and the jittery, instead of stable, feelings in the leg, are a few typical "coming back" experiences. Skiers who try to ski as normally as possible, rather than excessively protecting the weaker leg, tend to recover and regain more quickly. There seems to be a process of the familiar feeling strange, and then this new strangeness giving way to familiar, or a new familiar.

Skills, instincts and decisions which had seemed absent from typically disappointing first practices of the season, seem to "come back" almost of their own accord during second or subsequent practices. Perhaps the person is less pre-occupied with forcing and straining, and so the body is able to "do" without being impeded by well-intentioned, earnest, "trying-too-hard" strategies. There seems to be a click of recognition, a feeling of rightness, a rejoining with a movement pattern that had been elusive, and the euphoria that accompanies this "natural attitude" doing.

There are, of course, skills and competencies which will always require practice, diligence, discipline and patience. Some of these will eventually "feel right", and some will simply plague the person, in a challenging, beckoning kind of way, for as long as she plays.

Again, returning from a leg injury can cause a person to be over-cautious, particularly on weight-bearing or sudden impact movements. The caution needs to be lived with while the person regains confidence.

Returning to activities after a physical trauma often involves a "going through the wall, moment of decision" kind of experience. The difficulty needs to be worked through, rather than gone around, and this sometimes means a person has to get angry with herself, and push herself through her fear and self-doubt.

A person can get through a "coming back" difficulty by herself, but doing it alone can take longer than if the person is helped by a significant other who cares about the person, and the person's love for the activity.

These breakthroughs are necessary if the person is to be able to return to the activity, and they seem to require great personal effort and decisions, as well as the supportive presence of a caring other.

Doers can and do experience incredible sensations of body, and within body, both during and after activity. Prominent among these are the feeling of strength and muscle tension coursing through the limbs and other body parts, the euphoria that prevents a person from stopping until practically exhausted, breaking into a sweat, sweating itself, and soreness.

Sweating can be pleasant and cleansing, or it can be unpleasant and uncomfortable, depending on the activity. Sweating in some activities makes some people feel more aware of their size and perceived incompetence; sweating in another activity may give these same people supreme satisfaction in a job well done. Generally speaking, a person needs to be aware of how hard she is working, so that sweating will be a good, rather than disgusting experience for the doer, and evidence that she is investing.

Soreness is good as long as it is not damaging the doer. The hurt and pain of "good" soreness is different from the hurt and pain of an injury. The person is aware of the presence of a muscle, the person has an increased awareness of the body parts being used. Soreness elicits a good feeling in a doer because she is made aware of her own investment, and of her own body in a way that is "felt" rather than taken for granted.

The need, desire and opportunity to reflect on, and talk about the experience may indeed be elements of physical activity in general; however, some kinds of activities seem to lend themselves to these processes more so than others. The activity being done, and the person doing it, remain the most significant factors as far as these processes of reflection and dialogue are concerned.

People do talk about their physical activity experiences, but the degree and kind of discussion depends on the people involved and the activity they are doing. Many people speak openly and passionately about their sensations. Many people, however, discuss their sensations by way of complaining about discomforts, or poking fun at mistakes or falls. Either way, there is something about physical experience that people want to share, and something about it that makes them want to share.